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THE

DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES

DEMONSTRATED.

BY THE RIGHT REVEREND

WILLIAM WARBURTON, D.D.,

LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

A DISCOURSE BY WAY OF GENERAL PREFACE:

CONTAINING SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND CHARACTER OF THE AUTHOR.

BY RICHARD HURD, D.D.,

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ADVERTISEMENT TO THE TENTH EDITION.

This edition of *the Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated* is a reprint of that in quarto, which was edited by bishop Hurd in 1788; except in the very few instances in which the latter differs, in matters of orthography, from the octavo edition of 1766, and from that of 1811.

Every man of letters is aware, that bishop Warburton considered it to be an affair of great consequence to distinguish the wit latent in his compositions by a formidable array of *Italics*, Small Capitals, and CAPITALS. In the present edition all these, in their curious variety, have been observed and retained. Other peculiarities have likewise been preserved wherever they occurred. For instance: Variations will be found in spelling some proper names; as, Appion and Apion; Erectheus and Erechtheus; Habbakkuk and Habakkuk; Judea and Judæa; Manassah and Manasseh; Philistians and Philistines; Philo-Byblios and Philo-Biblios, &c. Other proper names commence with a small letter, instead of a Capital: as, argonautic, christian, jews, romans, samothracians, &c.; while many common words, in the middle of a sentence, (such as Both, Other, Your, They, &c.,) are made, without any ostensible reason, to commence with a Capital. Variations in spelling also will be met with, in administring and administering: antients and ancients; copists, copiests, and copyists; compleat and complete; cosmogeny and cosmogony; compartiments and compartments; capacitied and capacitated; defense and defence; disasterous and disastrous; enquiries and inquiries; enobled and ennobled; expresly and expressly; embaras and embarrass; fantom and phantom; forceable and forcible; fullfilled and fulfilled; grosly and grossly; imbarassed and embarrassed; isle and aisle; lyes and lies; least and lest; mistery and mystery; marvelous and marvellous; origine and origin; ordonance and ordinance; obelisques and obelisks; oftner and oftener; prophane and profane; paultry and paltry; rally and ralley; steddy and steady; satyric and satiric; strolers and strollers; strait and straight; tryal and trial; wrath and wroth; worshiper and worshipper; *cum multis aliis*. A malformation of the plural of nouns is occasionally exhibited: as in specieses and species's, falsarys, Ptolemys, &c. The apos-

trophe which marks the genitive case plural, is frequently omitted: as in childrens children, mens minds, &c.

In these and numerous other instances all bishop Warburton's arbitrary and unaccountable anomalies have been scrupulously followed. The only case in which there is any intentional swerving from this practice is in the fifth book, where the proper distinction has been made between the noun *prophecy* and the verb *prophesy;* both of them being often repeated, and having a misleading tendency when not discriminated according to modern orthography. In the multifarious notes too, the same scrupulous attention has been paid to his singularities, except in regard to the names of the authors quoted, and of their works; in each of which an uniform system of reference has been adopted. When the sense of some of the extracts seemed to be incomplete, on consulting the very editions of the Classic Writers and of the Christian Fathers from which they were professedly taken, it was not unfrequently found that an important word had been omitted, or a wrong one substituted: in both these cases, the correct reading is now given according to the particular copies to which bishop Warburton himself had referred. The only addition which it has been considered needful to make to the work, is a small note respecting Bayle in vol. ii. p. 432.

This attention to minutiæ, which was strictly observed in seven or eight previous editions, may appear to be ridiculous affectation; but such persons as have had any tolerable acquaintance with the caustic class of writers to which bishop Warburton belonged, and know that in these "their ashes live their wonted fires," will be very reluctant to disturb their *manes* by the least apparent neglect of literary punctilios, and especially of those in which he, as one of the modern commentators on Shakspeare, much delighted.*

* Great service was rendered to the cause of sound learning and legitimate criticism, and deserved ridicule poured on the arrogant presumption of pedantry, by the seasonable publication of EDWARDS'S Letter to Dr. Warburton, and his "Canons of Criticism." The latter of these passed through several editions; and allusion is made to its allowable and salutary raillery in the following verses, from HUDDESFORD'S "Wiccamical Chaplet," by a very clever Winchester scholar, "on two publications entitled *the editions of two of our poets*," which were BENTLEY'S Milton and WARBURTON'S Shakspeare:—

"When critic science first was known,
Somewhere upon the Muses' ground
The pruning-knife of wit was thrown,—
Not that which ARISTARCHUS found.

"*That* had a stout and longer blade,
Would at one stroke cut off a limb:
This knife was delicately made,
Not to dismember, but to trim.

Various have been the opinions of learned and clever men concerning the relative merits of this demonstration of "the Divine Legation of Moses;" but, after all that has been written against it, every one will acknowledge that many of the great doctrines of orthodox theology incidentally receive important elucidation from certain parts of the argument. Unfortunately, however, this partial brightness is much too often obscured by its strange connexion with dark and doubtful sentiments of the sceptical school, the origin of which cannot be mistaken: and I conceive it to be a matter of little difficulty for an intelligent reader to discover, in this protracted treatise, traces of the ruling principles in Warburton's mind, which generally received their complexion from those of his principal friends at various periods in his life, from his early intimacy with Conyers Middleton, down to the time when he devoted all his energies to supplant Bolingbroke in the affections of Pope; and was ultimately successful in tearing from his lordship's brow the enviable laurels with which it had been adorned by the poet:—

"My guide, philosopher, and friend!"

It is a remarkable circumstance, that, toward the close of the work, the cogency of nearly all the valid objections against it (and they are numerous) has been, either directly or indirectly, admitted by bishop Warburton himself. But this is generally done with the adroitness of an old and practised tactician; and the attentive student will be surprised to find many of these sweeping admissions secreted either in the corner of some

"With a short harmless edge a-top,
'T was made like our prize-fighting swords:
Pages and chapters 't would not lop,
But cut off syllables and words.

"Well did it wear; and might have worn
Full many an age, yet ne'er the worse,
Till BENTLEY's hand its edge did turn
On MILTON's adamantine verse.

"WARBURTON seized the blunted tool,
Scarce fit for oyster-opening drab;
For critic use 't was now too dull;
But though it would not cut, 't would stab.

"Then SHAKESPEARE bled, with every friend
That loved the bard:—he threaten'd further:
And Heaven knows what had been the end,
Had not TOM EDWARDS cried out *Murther!*

"Confounded at the fearful word,
Awhile he hid the felon steel;
Now gives it MASON, lends it HURD;
Ah! see what GRAY and COWLEY feel!"

unpretending note, or, more frequently, in the unsuspected clause of a long sentence.

On the literary character of bishop Warburton the following high encomium has been bestowed by Dr. Thomas Chalmers:—

"In comparing Lardner on the one hand with Warburton on the other upon this question," [the evidence for the miraculous prevention of the attempt by the Emperor Julian to rebuild the temple at Jerusalem,] "it will be found that the preponderance of argumentative force is with the latter. His 'Julian' is one of the ablest and most characteristic of his specimens. For himself, he belongs to a genus, nowhere more abundantly exemplified than in the Church of England. We might conceive of erudition apart from strength, as in Lardner; or of strength apart from erudition, as perhaps in Isaac Barrow* and Butler; though it was not so much strength as sagacity that formed the characteristic of Butler's mind. But it is the union of both,—the native and original vigour, along with stores of massive learning; the inherent power, conjoined with extensive scholarship; the momentum and the firm staple of their own independent authorship, along with the achievement of unparalleled reading and research into the authorship of other men; the creative literary power that yielded standard books from themselves, and yet the prodigious industry that enabled them to grapple with whole libraries, and to master the books innumerable of the predecessors who had gone before them: it is this combination of vast strength with vast acquisition and labour, that invests, and rightfully invests, with such might and authority, the Divines of our sister Establishment. We can imagine learning in feeble and impotent hands to be very inefficient; but when learning is wielded by an arm of strength, then we have a mighty instrument in the hold of a mighty agent; and the execution is irresistible. To encounter a man of great personal and original *vis* is sufficiently formidable; but when to this are superadded the lore and the languages of antiquity, and a vast and various information, the product of the converse of many years with the tomes of other days, then can we perceive an adequate meaning for the epithets bestowed on the most celebrated heroes of the church-militant, —the irrefragable Doctor, the redoubted champion of the

* Had not Dr. Chalmers introduced this comparison between Dr. Isaac Barrow and bishop Warburton with a modest "perhaps," one might have been inclined to put in a demurrer to this opinion. The fact is, the scholarship of the former was far more varied and profound than that of the latter; of which many undeniable proofs might be adduced, were this the proper place for entering into such a discussion.

faith, the great Goliath of sacred literature,—*capax, profundus, eximius homo et venerabundus.* The first name that occurs to us of one who conjoined this original strength with this acquired scholarship, is Grotius. But we are speaking now of the Church of England. Cudworth had both, Chillingworth had both, Brian Walton had both, Stillingfleet had both, Samuel Clarke had both, WARBURTON HAD PRE-EMINENTLY BOTH. The most recent example, perhaps, is Horsley, who had both. And Samuel Johnson, had he been an ecclesiastic, with the urgent stimulus of a preferment, to which he had no other avenue but his works, would, if fairly aroused from his constitutional lethargy, and resolutely set on the road of perseverance, have been a perfect exemplar of both."—"Works," vol. iii. p. 267, 12mo edit.

The subjoined is an admirable specimen of the acute perception and manly expression of Warburton, in relation to a subject which was introductory to much of the Arianism and refined infidelity that subsequently prevailed :—

"Yet as we have often seen writers deceived in their representations of pagan antiquity; and while zealously busy in giving such a one as they imagined favourable to Christianity, they have been all along disserving it: lest I myself should be suspected of having fallen into this common delusion, I shall beg leave, in the last place, to show, that it is just such a representation of antiquity as this I have given, which can possibly be of service to our holy faith; and that, consequently, if what is here given be the true, it does revealed religion much service.

"This will best appear by considering the usual views men have had, and the consequent methods they have pursued, in bringing pagan antiquity into the scene.

"Their design has been, either to illustrate the reasonableness, or to show the necessity, of Christianity.

"If the subject were reasonableness, their way was to represent this antiquity as comprehending all the fundamental truths concerning God and the soul which our holy religion hath revealed. But, as greatly as such a representation was supposed to serve their purpose, the infidels, we see, have not feared to join issue with them on the allowed fact; and, with much plausibility of reasoning, have endeavoured to show, that therefore Christianity was not necessary. And this very advantage Tindal (under cover of a principle which some modern divines afforded him, of Christianity's being only a republication of the religion of nature) obtained over some writers of considerable name.

"If the design were to show the necessity of Christianity,

they have then taken the other course, and (perhaps misled by a sense of the former mischief) run into the opposite extreme, in representing pagan antiquity as ignorant even of the first principles of religion and moral duty: Nay, not only that it knew nothing, but that nothing could be known; for that human reason was too weak to make any discoveries in these matters: Consequently, that there never was any such thing as natural religion; and that what glimmerings of knowledge men have had of this kind, were only the dying sparks of primitive tradition. Here the infidel again turned their own artillery upon them, in order to dismount that boasted reasonableness of Christianity, on which they had so much insisted: and, indeed, what room was there left to judge of it, after human reason had been represented as too weak and too blind to decide?

"Thus while they were contending for the reasonableness, they destroyed the necessity; and while they urged the necessity, they risked the reasonableness, of Christianity. And these infidel retortions had an irresistible force on the principles on which our advocates seemed to go; namely, that Christianity was only a republication of primitive natural religion.

"It appears, then, that the only view of antiquity which gives solid advantage to the Christian cause, is such a one as shows natural reason to be clear enough to perceive truth, and the necessity of its deductions when proposed; but not generally strong enough to discover it, and draw right deductions from it. Just such a view as this I have here given of antiquity, as far as relates to the point in question, which I presume to be the true, not only in that point, but likewise with regard to the state of natural religion in general; where we find human reason could penetrate very far into the essential difference of things; but, wanting the true principles of religion, the ancients neither knew the origin of obligation, nor the consequence of obedience. Revelation hath discovered these principles; and we now wonder that such prodigies of parts and knowledge could commit the gross absurdities which are to be found in their best discourses on morality. But yet this does not hinder us from falling into a greater and a worse delusion. For, having of late seen several excellent systems of morals, delivered as the principles of natural religion, which disclaim, or at least do not own, the aid of revelation, we are apt to think them, in good earnest, the discoveries of natural reason; and so to regard the extent of its powers as an objection to the necessity of any further light. The objection is plausible, but sure there must be some mistake at bottom; and the great difference in point of excellence

between these supposed productions of mere reason, and those real ones of the most learned ancients, will increase our suspicion. The truth is, these modern system-makers had aids, which, as they do not acknowledge, so, I will believe, they did not perceive. These aids were the true principles of religion, delivered by revelation: principles so early imbibed, and so clearly and evidently deduced, that they are now mistaken to be amongst our first and most natural ideas. But those who have studied antiquity know the matter to be far otherwise." *

This quotation is valuable for the reason which I have mentioned; but it is clogged with the awkward allusion to the author's own lucid "view of antiquity," which on examination will be seen to partake largely of the rather too recondite erudition of bishop Hurd, his *fidus Achates* in classical matters. But I have cited the entire passage from "the Divine Legation," chiefly for the purpose of appending the following interesting note which belongs to it, and which furnishes a still better specimen of the masterly manner in which he was qualified to dispose of many difficult subjects in history and theology:—

"Justification by faith alone, built upon the doctrine of the redemption of mankind by the death and sacrifice of Christ, was the great gospel-principle on which Protestantism was founded, when the churches of the north-west of Europe first shook off the yoke of Rome: by some perhaps pushed too far, in their abhorrence of the Popish doctrine of merit: the Puritan schism amongst us being made on the panic fancy, that the church of England had not receded far enough from Rome. However, justification by faith alone being a gospel-doctrine, it was received as the badge of true Protestantism by all; when the Puritans (first driven by persecution from religious into civil faction, and thoroughly heated into enthusiasm by each faction, in its turn) carried the doctrine to a dangerous and impure antinomianism. This fanatic notion soon after produced the practical virtues of these modern saints. The mischiefs which ensued are well known. And no small share of them has been ascribed to this impious abuse of the doctrine of justification by faith alone; first by depreciating morality, and then by dispensing with it.

"When the Constitution was restored, and had brought into credit those few learned Divines whom the madness of the preceding times had driven into obscurity, the church of England, still smarting with the wounds it had received from the abuse of the great gospel-principle of faith, very wisely laboured to

* "Divine Legation," vol. i. pp. 508—510.

restore morality, the other essential part of the Christian system, to its rights, in the joint direction of the faithful. Hence, the encouragement the church gave to those noble discourses which did such credit to religion, in the licentious times of Charles the Second, composed by these learned and pious men, abused by the zealots with the nickname 'Latitudinarian Divines.' The reputation they acquired by so thoroughly weeding out these rank remains of fanaticism, made their successors fond of sharing with them in the same labours: a laudable ambition, but too often mixed with a vain passion for improving upon those who have gone successfully before. The church was now triumphant. The sectaries were humbled; sometimes oppressed; always regarded with an eye of jealousy and aversion; till at length this gospel-principle of faith came to be esteemed, by those who should have known better, as wild and fanatical. While they who owned its divine original found so much difficulty in adjusting the distinct rights and prerogatives of faith and morality, that, by the time this century was ready to commence, things were come to such a pass, (morality was advanced so high, and faith so depressed and encumbered with trifling or unintelligible explanations,) that a new definition of our holy religion, in opposition to what its Founder taught, and unknown to its early followers, was all in fashion; under the title of a 'Republication of the Religion of Nature:' natural religion, it seems, as well as Christianity, teaching the doctrine of life and immortality. So says a very eminent prelate.* And the gospel, which till now had been understood as but coeval with redemption, was henceforth to be acknowledged *as old as the creation.*"

The work abounds in noble passages of this description, possessing no merely evanescent interest, but worthy at all times of attentive perusal and deep consideration. Whatever opinion may be entertained concerning the vague and desultory manner in which he has attempted to establish his main proposition, which he usually abandons to its fate on the appearance of any petty adversary, "the Divine Legation of Moses" will always be regarded by the learned as the production of a writer endowed with no ordinary powers of mind, and as containing useful allusions to the current literature and theology of the author's times,—half a century of stirring events, important in their consequences.

JAMES NICHOLS.

Hoxton-square,
March 6th, 1846.

* "Sherlock's 'Sermons,' vol. i. serm. vi."

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ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE EDITION OF 1788.

THE Reader will expect some account of the *Life*, *Writings*, and *Character* of the Author to be prefixed to this complete edition of his Works. He is therefore informed, that a Discourse to that effect hath been prepared, and will be published; but not now, for reasons that will be seen hereafter. However, it may be proper to add, that the purchaser of this edition will be entitled to a Copy of the Discourse, whenever it comes out, on his producing a ticket, which for that purpose will be delivered to him by the Bookseller.

All I have to say, at present, of the Author's WORKS, is, That they have been printed carefully from his last corrections and improvements; and arranged in that order, which was judged most convenient.

Of the new tracts, included in this edition, the most considerable is, The NINTH BOOK of the Divine Legation; printed, so far as it goes, by the Author himself, but left unfinished. This Discourse must be interesting to the reader; but will not appear to have all the novelty which he may expect. The reason is, that the Author had laid aside all thoughts of compleating this book for many years, and had, in the mean time, employed some parts of it in his other Works. From these, when he at length resumed that intention, he extracted many passages, which are now again inserted in their place.

Thus much I thought fit to say of this additional Book, that the Reader may come the better prepared to the perusal of it. For the rest, he is referred to the Author's LIFE at large.

R. WORCESTER.

GREAT RUSSELL-STREET, BLOOMSBURY,
February 6th, 1788.

A DISCOURSE,

BY WAY OF GENERAL PREFACE

TO

THE WORKS OF BISHOP WARBURTON:

CONTAINING

SOME ACCOUNT

OF

THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND CHARACTER

OF

THE AUTHOR.

BY THE RIGHT REVEREND RICHARD HURD, D. D.
LORD BISHOP OF WORCESTER.

McCormick
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Theological Seminary.
THE

LIFE OF THE AUTHOR.

FIRST PRINTED IN MDCCXCIV.

William Warburton was descended from an ancient and very considerable family in Cheshire, at the head of which is the present Sir Peter Warburton, Baronet, of Arley, in that county.

I leave the rest to the genealogist; and go no farther back in his pedigree than to his grandfather, of the same name, who distinguished himself in the civil wars of the last century. He was of the royal party, and showed his zeal and activity in that cause, by serving under Sir George Booth at the affair of Chester. I mention this little circumstance chiefly for the use I shall make of it elsewhere. All that I know more of him is, that he married Frances, daughter of Robert Awfield, of Etson, in the county of Nottingham, by whom he had three sons; the second of whom, George, was Mr. Warburton's father.

It seems probable that upon this marriage he removed into Nottinghamshire. His residence was at Shelton, a village about six miles from Newark, where he died.

Mr. George Warburton, the second son, as I observed, of William Warburton, Esq., of Shelton, was bred to the law. He settled at Newark, where he practised as an attorney, and was particularly esteemed for his integrity in that profession.

He married Elizabeth, daughter of William Hobman, alderman of Newark, and had by this marriage five children, George, William, Mary, Elizabeth, and Frances.

George died very young. William, the subject of this memoir, was born at Newark, December 24th, 1698. He was first put to school there under Mr. Twells, whose son afterwards married his sister, Elizabeth: but he had the chief part of his education at Okeham, in Rutlandshire, under Mr. Wright. Here he continued till the beginning of the year 1714; when his cousin, Mr. Warburton, who also bore the name of William, being made head-master of the school at Newark, he returned to his native place, and was for a short time under the care of that learned and respectable person, of whom more will be said presently. I only now add, that he was father to the Rev. Thomas War-

burton, the present very worthy archdeacon of Norfolk, to whom I am indebted for the particulars here mentioned concerning his family.

I cannot, I confess, entertain the reader of this narrative with those encomiums which are so commonly lavished on the puerile years of eminent men. On the best inquiry I have been able to make, I do not find that, during his stay at school, he distinguished himself by any extraordinary efforts of genius or application. My information authorizes me to go no further than to say, that he loved his book and his play just as other boys did. And, upon reflection, I am not displeased with this modest testimony to his merit; for I remember what the best judges have thought of premature wits. And we all know that the mountain-oak, which is one day to make the strength of our fleets, is of slower growth than the saplings which adorn our gardens.

But although no prodigy of parts or industry in those early years, with a moderate share of each, he could not fail of acquiring by the age of sixteen, the time when he left school, a competent knowledge of Greek and Latin, under such masters as those of Okeham and Newark.

It had been his misfortune to lose his father very early. He died in 1706; and the care of his family devolved, of course, upon his widow; who, as we have seen, gave her son the best school-education, and, in all respects, approved herself so good a woman, as well as parent, that her children paid her all possible respect: her son in particular, all whose affections were naturally warm, gave her every proof of duty and observance while she lived, and after her death retained so tender a regard to her memory, that he seldom spake of her but with tears.

The circumstances of the family could be but moderate; and when Mr. Warburton had now finished his education at school, he was destined by his friends to that profession which is thought to qualify men best for the management of their own affairs, and which his father had followed with so much credit in that neighbourhood.

He was accordingly put out clerk to Mr. Kirke, an eminent attorney of Great Markham in Nottinghamshire, in April, 1714, and continued with that gentleman five years, that is, till the spring of the year 1719. Tradition does not acquaint us how he acquitted himself in his clerkship: probably, with no signal assiduity; for now it was that the bent of his genius appeared in a passionate love of reading, which was not lessened, we may believe, but increased, by his want of time and opportunity to indulge it.

However, in spite of his situation, he found means to peruse again and digest such of the classic authors as he had read at school, with many others which he understood to be in repute with men of learning and judgment. By degrees he also made himself acquainted with

the other elementary studies; and, by the time his clerkship was out, had laid the foundation, as well as acquired a taste, of general knowledge.

Still, the opinion and expectation of his friends kept him in that profession to which he had been bred. On the expiration of his clerkship, he returned to his family at Newark; but whether he practised there or elsewhere as an attorney, I am not certainly informed. However, the love of letters growing every day stronger in him, it was found advisable to give way to his inclination of taking orders; the rather, as the seriousness of his temper and purity of his morals concurred, with his unappeasable thirst of knowledge, to give the surest presages of future eminence in that profession.

He did not venture, however, all at once to rush into the church. His good understanding, and awful sense of religion, suggested to him the propriety of making the best preparation he could, before he offered himself a candidate for the sacred character. Fortunately for him, his relation, the master of Newark school, was at hand to give him his advice. And he could not have put himself under a better direction; for, besides his classical merit, which was great, he had that of being an excellent divine, and was a truly learned as well as good man.

To him then, as soon as his resolution was taken of going into orders, he applied for assistance, which was afforded him very liberally. "My father," says Mr. Archdeacon Warburton, in a letter to me, "employed all the time he could spare from his school in instructing him, and used to sit up very late at night with him to assist him in his studies." And this account I have heard confirmed by his pupil himself; who used to enlarge with pleasure on his obligations to his old tutor, and has celebrated his theological and other learning in a handsome Latin epitaph which he wrote upon him after his death.

At length he was ordained deacon the 22d of December, 1723, in the cathedral of York, by archbishop Dawes; and even then he was in no haste to enter into priests' orders, which he deferred taking till he was full twenty-eight years of age, being ordained priest by bishop Gibson in St. Paul's, London, March the 1st, 1726–27.

Some will here lament that the precious interval of nine years, from his quitting school in 1714 to his taking orders, was not spent in one of our universities, rather than his private study, or an attorney's office. And it is certain, the disadvantage to most men would have been great. But an industry and genius like his overcame all difficulties. It may even be conceived that he derived a benefit from them. As his faculties were of no common size, his own proper exertion of them probably tended more to his improvement, than any assistance of tutors and colleges could have done. To which we may add, that, living by

himself, and not having the fashionable opinions of a great society to bias his own, he might acquire an enlarged turn of mind, and strike out for himself, as he clearly did, an original cast both of thought and composition:

"Fastidire lacus et rivos ausus apertos:"

while his superior sense, in the mean time, did the office of that authority which, in general, is found so necessary to quicken the diligence, and direct the judgment, of young students in our universities.

The fact is, that, without the benefit of an academical education, he had qualified himself, in no common degree, for deacons' orders in 1723; and from that time till he took priests' orders in the beginning of the year 1727, he applied himself diligently to complete his studies, and to lay in that fund of knowledge which is requisite to form the consummate divine. For to this character he reasonably aspired; having that ardour of inclination which is the earnest of success, and feeling in himself those powers which invigorate a great mind, and push it on irresistibly in the pursuit of letters.

The fruits of his industry, during this interval, appeared in some pieces composed by him for the improvement of his taste and style, and afterwards printed, most of them without his name, to try the judgment of the public. As he never thought fit to reprint or revise them, they are omitted in this edition. But they are such as did him no discredit; on the contrary, they showed the vigour of his parts, and the more than common hopes which might be entertained of such a writer.

Among these "blossoms of his youth," to borrow an expression from Cowley, were some notes communicated to Mr. Theobald, and inserted in his edition of Shakspeare; which seems to have raised a general idea of his abilities, before any more important proof had been given of them. But of this subject more will be said in its place.

It was also in this season of early discipline, while his mind was opening to many literary projects, that he conceived an idea, which he was long pleased with, of giving a new edition of Velleius Paterculus. He was charmed with the elegance of this writer; and the high credit in which emendatory criticism, of which Paterculus stood much in need, was held in the beginning of this century, occasioned by the dazzling reputation of such men as Bentley and Hare, very naturally seduced a young enterprising scholar into an attempt of this nature. How far he proceeded in this work, I cannot say; but a specimen of it afterwards appeared in one of our literary journals, and was then communicated to his friend, Dr. Middleton; who advised him, very properly, to drop the design, "as not worthy of his talents and industry, which," as he says, "instead of trifling on words, seem calculated rather to correct the opinions and manners of the world."

These juvenile essays of his pen, hasty and incorrect as they were, contributed, no doubt, very much to his own improvement. What effect they had on his reputation, and how soon they raised it to a considerable height among his friends, will be seen from the following curious fact.

In the year 1726, a dispute arose among the lawyers about the judicial power of the Court of Chancery. It is immaterial to observe on what points the controversy turned, or with what views it was agitated. It opened with a tract called, "The History of the Chancery; relating to the judicial Power of that Court, and the Rights of the Master;" printed without a name, but written, as was generally known, by a Mr. Burrough; and so well received by the lord chancellor King, that he rewarded the author of it, the same year, with a mastership in chancery.

To this book an answer presently appeared, under the name of, "A Discourse of the Judicial Authority of the Master of the Rolls;" and so well composed, that they who favoured the cause of the Historian saw it must suffer in his hands, if it were not supported by some better writer than himself, who was evidently no match for the Discourser.

In this exigency, he was advised by one of his friends (I forget, or never heard, his name) to have recourse to Mr. Warburton, as a person very capable of supplying his defects. Accordingly, when he had prepared the proper materials for a reply, he obtained leave to put them into Mr. Warburton's hands, and afterwards spent some time with him in the country; where, by their joint labours, the whole was drawn out, and digested into a sizable volume, which came out in 1727, and was entitled, "The Legal Judicature in Chancery stated." This book was so manifestly superior to the "History," that such of the profession as were not in the secret, wondered at Mr. Burrough's proficiency in the art of writing; and the lord chancellor King, as much as any body. The author of the "Discourse" saw it concerned him to take notice of such an adversary, and in 1728 reprinted his work "with large additions, together with a preface, occasioned by a book entitled, 'The Legal Judicature in Chancery stated.'" And with this reply, I believe, the dispute closed.

Many years afterwards, the secret being now of no consequence, Mr. Warburton chanced to mention, in conversation, to Mr. Charles Yorke, the part he had taken in this squabble; when Mr Yorke smiled, and said he fancied he was not aware who had been his antagonist; and then named his father, the lord chancellor Hardwicke, who, though attorney-general at the time, had undertaken to plead the cause of his relation, Sir Joseph Jekyll, then master of the rolls. But I have dwelt, perhaps, too long on this little anecdote.

Upon Mr. Warburton's taking priests' orders, Sir Robert Sutton

procured for him the small vicarage of Griesley, in Nottinghamshire; and in 1728, presented him to the rectory of Brand-Broughton, in the diocess of Lincoln. He was also, the same year, and, I suppose, by the same interest, put upon the king's list of masters of arts, created on his majesty's visit to the university of Cambridge.

Brand-Broughton was a preferment of some value, and, from its situation in the neighbourhood of Newark, pleased him very much. Here then he fixed himself, with his family, and spent the best part of his life; that is, from 1728 to 1746.

They who are unacquainted with the enthusiasm which true genius inspires, will hardly conceive the possibility of that intense application with which Mr. Warburton pursued his studies in that retirement. Impatient of any interruptions, he spent the whole of his time that could be spared from the duties of his parish, in reading and writing. His constitution was strong, and his temperance extreme; so that he needed no exercise but that of walking; and a change of reading or study was his only amusement.

His mother and sisters, who lived with him, and were apprehensive of the hurt he might do himself by this continued industry, would invite themselves to drink coffee with him in his study after dinner, and contrive to lengthen their stay with him as much as they could. But when they had retired, they saw no more of him that evening; and his sister, Mrs. Frances Warburton, told me, that he usually sat up a great part of the night. What is most extraordinary, the vigour of his parts was such, that his incessant labour neither wearied his spirits, nor affected his health.

In this way it was that he acquired that habit of deep thinking, with that extensive erudition, which afterwards astonished the reader in his works, and made himself acquainted with the whole range of polite and elegant learning, in the way of diversion, and in the interval of his graver studies.

I express myself with exact propriety. For it was his manner at this time, and the habit continued with him through life, to intermix his literary pursuits in such sort as to make the lighter relieve the more serious; and these again, in their turn, temper and correct the other. He was passionately fond of the more sublime poets, and, what is very uncommon, had almost an equal relish for works of wit and humour. One or other of these books he had always lying by him, and would take up when he found himself fatigued with study; and, after spending some time in this sort of reading, was so much refreshed by it, that he returned with new life to the work he was upon; and so made these amusements, which are apt to get the mastery of common minds, and to exhaust their whole force, only subservient to his more important meditations.

And this humour (to observe it by the way) of associating the so different powers of reason and fancy in the course of his studies, passed into his style, and indeed formed one distinctive character of it. For in all his writings, on whatever subject, you see him occasionally ennoble his expression by picturesque imagery, or enliven it by strokes of wit: and this (though the practice be against rule) with so much ease, and with so little affectation, that none but a very captious or very dull reader can take offence at it.

With that passion for letters which, as I observed, transported Mr. Warburton at this time, the sobriety of his judgment is to be admired. The little taste he had had of fame in the early publications before alluded to, did not corrupt his mind, or seduce him into a premature ambition of appearing as an author in form, till he had fully qualified himself, by the long course of reading and meditation, now mentioned, to sustain that character. It was not till the year 1736 that he published the first of those works, on which his great reputation is raised. This was, "The Alliance betwixt Church and State;" the occasion, and end, and substance of which work cannot be expressed in fewer or clearer terms than his own.

After a short historical view of religious parties in England, from the Reformation downwards, of the discordant notions entertained of religious establishments, and of the heats and animosities which those notions had produced, he proceeds thus:—

"In this ferment, and in this embroiled condition, the author of 'The Alliance between Church and State' found the sentiments of men concerning religious liberty and establishments, when he proposed his theory to their consideration: a theory calculated to vindicate our present happy constitution on A PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT, by adjusting the precise bounds of either society; by showing how they come to act in conjunction; and by explaining the nature of their union; and from thence, by natural and necessary consequence, inducing, on the one hand, an ESTABLISHED RELIGION, with all its rights and privileges, secured by a TEST LAW; and, on the other, a full and free TOLERATION, to all who dissented from the national worship.

"He first showed the use of religion to society, from the experience and practice of all ages: he inquired from whence the use arose, and found it to be from certain original defects in the very essence and plan of civil society. He went on to the nature of religion; and showed how, and for what causes, it constituted a society; and then, from the natures of the two societies, he collected that the object of the civil is only the body and its interest; and the object of the religious, only the soul. Hence he concluded, that both societies are sovereign and independent, because they arise not out of one another, and because, as they are concerned in contrary provinces, they can

never meet to clash; the sameness of original, or the sameness of administration, being the only causes which can bring one, of two distinct societies, into natural subjection to the other.

"To apply religion therefore to the service of civil society, in the best manner it is capable of being applied, he showed it was necessary that the two societies should unite: for, each being sovereign and independent, there was no other way of applying the service of religion in any solid or effectual manner. But no such union could arise but from free compact and convention. And free convention is never likely to happen, unless each society has its mutual motives and mutual advantages. The author, therefore, from what he had laid down of the natures of the two societies, explained what these motives and advantages were. Whence it appeared that all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the two societies, thus united, with the civil magistrate at their head, were indeed those very rights, privileges, and prerogatives, which we find established and enjoyed under our present happy constitution in church and state. The result of this was, that an ESTABLISHED CHURCH and a free TOLERATION are made perfectly to agree by the medium of a TEST LAW. This law, therefore, the author in the last place proceeded to vindicate, on the same general principles of the law of nature and nations.

"This is a true, though short, analysis of 'The Alliance between Church and State.'" *

This work made a great impression on the best judges. One of them,† to whom he had sent a present of his book, expresses himself thus:—

"I had formerly been very agreeably entertained with some emendations of yours on Shakspeare, and was extremely pleased to find this work was by the same hand. Good learning, great acuteness, an ingenious working head, and depth of thought, will always please in an author, though we are not entirely in the same ways of thinking." And, in the close of it, he adds: "You have not, sir, only my thanks for what you have done, but my sincere wishes, that what was intended for the service of the public may prove also to be for your own, to which my endeavours, in any proper way, shall not be wanting."

This was candid and generous, considering that the eminent person was not altogether in the author's sentiments on the subject of his book. But he was struck with his great abilities, and became from this moment his sincere friend.

The truth is, no sort of men, either within or without the church, was prepared, at that time, for an indifferent reception of this new theory, which respected none of their prejudices. It was neither calculated to please the high-church divines, nor the low; and the laity had taken their side with the one or the other of those parties.

* See "View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy," Letter iv. † Bishop Hare.

However, though few at that time were convinced, all were struck by this essay of an original writer, and could not dissemble their admiration of the ability which appeared in the construction of it. There was indeed a reach of thought in this system of church-policy, which would prevent its making its way all at once. It required time and attention, even in the most capable of its readers, to apprehend the force of the argumentation; and a more than common share of candour to adopt the conclusion, when they did. The author had, therefore, reason to be satisfied with the reception of his theory, such as it was; and having thoroughly persuaded himself of its truth, as well as importance, he continued to enlarge and improve it in several subsequent editions; and in the last, by the opportunity which some elaborate attempts of his adversaries to overturn it had afforded him, he exerted his whole strength upon it, and has left it in a condition to brave the utmost efforts of future criticism.*

Some indeed have taken offence at the idea of an alliance, but without cause; for the meaning is this, that our church-establishment is such as in equity it must have been, had the terms of it been settled by mutual agreement between the two parties. Which, in other words, is only saying, that those terms are just and reasonable.

The idea of an alliance was conceived, in preference to any other mode of conducting the argument, because the theory of civil government had been formed on the like notion of a contract between prince and people. This way of reasoning, therefore, without being less conclusive, had the advantage of being more popular than any other, and, as such, was very properly adopted by our author.

Notwithstanding this management, "The Alliance," as I observed, was not generally understood. But he did not wait for the reward of public favour, to encourage him in the resolution he had taken of dedicating his great talents to the service of religion. In the close of this first edition of "The Alliance," he announced his next and greatest work, "The Divine Legation of Moses;" which he had now planned, and in part composed. For when such a writer as this has, by a long course of study, laid in the proper materials for invention to operate upon, and has, by one vigorous essay, assured himself of his own strength, his progress to perfection is rapid and almost instantaneous; like the pace of Homer's gods, whose first step reaches to Olympus, and the second to the ends of the earth.

It had been pretended by those who called themselves deists, and,

* An eminent writer has delivered his opinion of it in these terms: "Bishop Warburton, in his 'Alliance between Church and State,' hath shown the general good policy of an establishment, and the necessity of a test for its security, upon principles which republicans themselves cannot easily deny.—His work is one of the finest specimens, that are to be found perhaps in any language, of scientific reasoning applied to a political subject."—Dr. HORSLEY'S "Review of the Case of the Protestant Dissenters." Preface, London, 1787.

in the modesty of free-thinking which then prevailed, had, or affected to have, a respect for the natural doctrine of a future state, that the omission of this doctrine in the Mosaic law was a clear, decisive proof of its imposture, as no institute of religion, coming from God, could be without that principle.

The author of "The Alliance" saw the omission in another light; and was so far from admitting the deists' conclusion, that he thought himself able to prove, in the clearest manner, and with the evidence of what is called *moral* demonstration, the divinity of the Mosaic law from that very circumstance.

Such then was the subject and scope of Mr. Warburton's capital work, "The Divine Legation of Moses demonstrated on the Principles of a religious Deist." But in the conduct of this new and paradoxical argument, so many prejudices and objections, both of believers and unbelievers, were to be removed; and so many collateral lights to be let in upon it; that the discourse extended itself far and wide, and took in all that was most curious in Gentile, Jewish, and Christian antiquity.

In the beginning of the year 1738, the first volume of this work appeared, and immediately drew all eyes upon it. Some were too weak, and some too much dimmed or distorted by prejudices, to take a full and distinct view of its contents. No wonder then if such readers misconceived of the writer's purpose, and misrepresented it. Yet few were so blind as not to admire the execution. "I hear nobody speak of your book," says the bishop of Chichester, "who do not express themselves highly entertained with it; though they think the principal point which remains to be proved a paradox." * And what the bishop himself thought of it, before publication, when the sheets were sent to him from the press, he tells the author in these words: "I can say, without any compliment, that your papers have given me high delight. So many beautiful thoughts, such ingenious illustrations of them, such a clear connexion, such a deduction of notions, and so much good learning upon so useful a subject, all expressed in proper and fine language, cannot but give an intelligent reader the greatest satisfaction." †

And to much the same purpose another learned friend, the bishop of Salisbury: ‡ "Last night I received some sheets of your book, and ran them over with great pleasure, though not with the attention which the subject and your way of treating it demand." § And in another letter, when he had taken time to consider the contents of this volume: "The learning and ability of the author of 'The Divine Legation' are not called in question; and the first part has raised a great desire and expectation of the second." ‖

* MS. Letters, Feb. 21st, 1737–8. † Oct. 18th, 1737. ‡ Dr. Sherlock.
§ MS. Letters, Oct. 18th, 1737. ‖ March 2d, 1737–8.

I quote these passages so particularly, because the bishops, Hare and Sherlock, were, without doubt, among the ablest of his judges, and because their temper was far enough from inclining towards an officious and lavish civility to their friends.

After authorities of so much weight, I should not think it worth while to take notice of what was objected to him by ordinary writers, but that he thought fit to answer one of them,* in a style so soft and elegant, that they who have a taste for the gentler polemics will read it with great pleasure.

The real ground of the abuse cast upon him, though other causes were pretended, was the handsome manner in which he had spoken of Dr. Middleton, in his preface to the first volume. This ingenious man, of whom more will be said as we go along, had written some things which gave occasion to suspect him of a leaning towards infidelity. Mr. Warburton was personally acquainted with him, and had a real esteem for him. He wished, therefore, if possible, to draw his friend off from that bias, which his passions, rather than his judgment, he conceived, had impressed upon him, by putting the fairest constructions on his writings, and by affecting to understand them in the most favourable sense. But instead of clearing his friend, by this means, from the guilt of heterodoxy, the effect was to involve himself in the suspicion of it: and it was thought proper that he should disclaim and repel so groundless an imputation. This it was not difficult for him to do, so far as respected his own character; but that of his friend required managing, and he would not justify himself at his expense.

In these delicate circumstances, he acquitted himself with dexterity, yet with perfect good faith, and to the singular satisfaction of his friends. "I received yesterday," says Bishop Hare, "your 'Vindication,' which I read twice over with great satisfaction: the part that relates to Dr. Middleton, we think extremely well done. It was the only difficult part; and it cannot but please every candid reader to see you do justice to yourself, and yet not to do it at his expense, nor say a word that either he or his friends can be offended at, or that is in the least giving up a man with whom you ive in friendship. Here is courage and integrity very agreeably joined." †

The bishop here gives a very just account of "The Vindication," and indeed of Mr. Warburton's general conduct towards Dr. Middleton; as appears from the whole of his intercourse with him, which began in 1736, and was carried on, by a frequent exchange of friendly and affectionate letters, from that time to 1741, when it seems to have ceased, or to have been interrupted at least, for reasons which will be mentioned hereafter.

In the whole course of these letters, which I have in my hands,

* Dr. Webster. See vol. xi. [Edition of 1811.] † March 23d, 1737–8.

every sort of polite insinuation is employed to soften and remove his prejudices against revealed religion; by joining with him, sometimes, in his graver complaints of bigoted divines, and, sometimes, in his ridicule of their pretended orthodoxy; but in taking for granted, everywhere, his respect for revelation, and his real belief of it, and in seeming to think that, if other opinions were entertained of him, they had proceeded from an ignorance of his true character.

But the friendliness of his views will best appear from his own words. He had taken occasion to acquaint Dr. Middleton with the manner in which he meant to address the freethinkers, in his dedication to them, prefixed to the first volume of "The Divine Legation," and with his purpose of making respectful mention of him in it. To this information Dr. Middleton replies, September 22d, 1737: "I am pleased with the manner of your address to the freethinkers, and obliged to you for your friendly intentions with regard to myself; and though I should be as proud to have the testimony of your judgment and good opinion, as of any man, yet I would have you consider how far such a declaration of it may expose you to a share of that envy which has lain, and still lies, very heavy upon me."

This was handsome on his part, but was not likely to divert his friend from the measures he had taken. Accordingly, in a letter dated December 23d, 1737, after telling him that his book was coming out, and that he had ordered a copy of it to be sent him, he proceeds thus, with a manifest allusion, in the concluding sentence, to Dr. Middleton's letter: "I have your pardon to ask for the liberty I have taken of designing you by your character, in one place of the body of the book, as well as in the dedication to the freethinkers. For I would fain contribute to abate an *unjust prejudice*, that might lie in the way of those honours which wait for you, and are so much your due. And I shall reckon it for nothing, in so honest an attempt, to run the risk of sharing that prejudice with you."

And again, writing to him March 18th, 1737–8, on the subject of his answer to the author of the "Weekly Miscellany," he says, "I am to thank him for the agreeable necessity of vindicating you, by a quotation in one of the defences that pass for yours, from his *false accusation* of denying the inspiration of scripture; and from his *imagination*, which is the ground of this clamour, that you defend revelation, not as true, but only useful; and that, as to other points, you and I can differ without breach of common humanity, friendship, and Christian charity."

I have put these things together, because I would not interrupt the recital of what concerns the first appearance of those two capital works, "The Alliance" and "Divine Legation," so closely connected with each other, that the former, in the original design, was but a

chapter of the latter; the reception they met with from the public; and the occasion they gave him of justifying an obnoxious friend, as well as explaining his own sentiments.

I must now go back a little, to mention a circumstance in his life, which does the parties concerned too much honour to be omitted by me, and which happened in the latter end of the year 1737. "The Alliance" had now made the author much talked of at court; and the bishop of Chichester, on whom that work had impressed, as we have seen, the highest ideas of his merit, was willing to take that favourable opportunity of introducing him to the queen. Her majesty, it is well known, took a pleasure in the discourse of men of learning and genius; and chancing one day to ask the bishop, if he could recommend a person of that description to be about her, and to entertain her sometimes with his conversation, the bishop said he could, and mentioned the author of "The Alliance between Church and State." The recommendation was graciously received, and the matter put in so good a train, that the bishop expected every day the conclusion of it, when the queen was seized with a sudden illness, which put an end to her life the 20th of November, 1737.

I find this transaction alluded to in a letter from the bishop, dated November 11th, that is, nine days before that unhappy event. His lordship thanks Mr. Warburton for some sheets of the first volume of the "Legation," which were just then sent him from the press, and after making some remarks upon them, takes notice of a stroke of pleasantry, which, it seems, had escaped him, on Mr. Wollaston's famous book on "The Religion of Nature," and which he advises him to strike out, "as it would give great offence to the admirers of that book. I have besides," continues his lordship, "a *particular reason* for advising you to alter that passage, which you shall know at a proper time."

And, afterwards, in the same letter: "I would advise, not only the cancelling that leaf, but the doing it immediately, that it may not get into many hands. When I see you, I am persuaded, you will allow this is right advice from a friend."

The secret was, that he was then endeavouring to serve his friend with the queen, and was apprehensive that the freedom he had taken with that work, which she much admired, might hurt him in her majesty's opinion, and defeat his design.

This disappointment, when he came to know it, did not abate his ardour in prosecuting his studies at Brand-Broughton. After publishing the "Vindication," before mentioned, early in the year 1738, he applied himself with great industry to compose the second volume of his work, notwithstanding the clamours which had been raised, and now grew louder, against the first. "I go steadily on," says he, in a

letter to Dr. Middleton, November 12th, 1738, "amidst much ill treatment. If you ask, what is it that supports me, I will tell you, my excellent friend: it is the love of truth, and a clear conviction of the reality of the Jewish and Christian revelations."

Animated with these principles, he went on with his great design, and seems to have spent the two or three succeeding years upon it. Only, in 1739, he drew up and published a short defence of Mr. Pope's "Essay on Man," against M. de Crousaz, who had written a book to show that it was constructed on the principles of Spinosa, and contained a dangerous system of irreligion. But though this was a slight thing, and took up little of his time, yet, as it respected so eminent a person, and had great consequences with regard to himself, it will be proper to enlarge upon it.

It has been objected to Mr. Warburton, that, in his earlier days, he had himself entertained a prejudice against Mr. Pope, and had even expressed it in very strong terms. The offence taken had probably been occasioned by a severe reflection, in one of his satires, on Mr. Warburton's friend and patron, Sir Robert Sutton; and, in that case, it is likely that he might express himself of the poet with too much warmth; for I will not conceal or disguise the infirmity of my friend. When his moral feelings were touched, he was apt to be transported into some intemperance of expression, and was not always guarded, or even just, in his censures or commendations. But a mind, naturally great, does not long retain this fervour, and, when cooled by reflection, is in haste to make amends for its former excesses. It is impossible indeed that, under any provocation, he should be blind to so much merit as our great poet possessed; and what he saw of this sort in any man, he was not backward to declare to others. In his "Vindication" of himself, last year, he had shown how much he admired Mr. Pope, by quoting a fine passage from him, and applying it to himself in a way, that showed an esteem of his morals, as well as poetry. Since that time, he had suffered so much abuse himself from angry zealots, and felt so strongly, in his own case, what it was for a well-meaning man to have his religious sentiments misrepresented, that this attack of M. de Crousaz would naturally find him in a disposition to resent it.

Add to all this, that he saw with concern the ill use which some were ready to make of the supposed fatalism of Mr. Pope, and how hurtful it was to religion to have it imagined that so great a genius was ill inclined towards it.

These reasons, working together, seem to have determined him to take the part of the injured poet; as indeed he explains the matter himself in a letter of July 16th, 1739, to Dr. Middleton:—"A certain great man is very angry with me for speaking of you in the manner I did.

I make no question but another sort of those they call 'great men' will hold themselves outraged by me in my vindication of Mr. Pope, against M. de Crousaz, in some letters which are going to be collected together and published. But I cannot forbear showing my esteem of merit, and my contempt of their calumniators, or thinking that it is of use to religion to prove so noble a genius is a friend to it."

These letters were much read,* and gave a new lustre to Mr. Warburton's reputation. They showed the elegance of his taste in polite literature, as well as his penetration into moral subjects. Mr. Pope was supremely struck with them,† and might now exult, as his predecessor Boileau had done, when he cried out in the face of his enemies,—

"Arnauld, le grand Arnauld, fait mon apologie."

From this time there was an intimate acquaintance formed between the poet and his commentator. The effects of this union will be taken notice of presently. I now only add, that it was strongly cemented by a mutual profession of esteem, and a constant interchange of letters.

Among these I find one which Mr. Warburton addressed to his friend, in vindication of Sir Robert Sutton; written, as appears, with the view of prevailing with him to strike that gentleman's name out of his satires. As it sets the author in an amiable light, and seems to confirm my conjecture that his former dissatisfaction with Mr. Pope had arisen from this circumstance, I shall give it in the Appendix A.

Towards the end of this year, 1739, he published a new and improved edition of the first volume of the "Divine Legation," and sent it to his friend bishop Hare; who, in a kind letter, of December 1st, 1739, returns his thanks for it, and adds, "I hope not only posterity, but the present age, will do justice to so much merit; and do assure you, it shall not be my fault if it do not." Which I mention, to show that the envy which was then rising very fast against the author of the "Divine Legation," and which was supposed to have the countenance of some considerable churchmen, had made no alteration in the sentiments of that great prelate, or lessened his esteem of him. Indeed on all occasions he expressed his regard for Mr. Warburton in the friendliest manner, of which the following instance must not be omitted.

Sir Thomas Hanmer, who was a man of business, and had been speaker of the House of Commons in queen Anne's time, grew ambitious, in the latter part of his life, to be taken notice of as a critic on Shakspeare. He had seen some notes on his favourite poet by Mr. Warburton in Mr. Theobald's edition: and as he was now preparing one of his own, which he afterwards printed at the Clarendon press, he

* See vol. xi [Edition of 1811.] † See his Letter in his Works, April 11th, 1739.

very justly conceived that the assistance of Mr. Theobald's coadjutor might be of service to him in the execution of that project.

With this view he got himself introduced to Mr. Warburton by the bishop of Salisbury, Dr. Sherlock, and managed so well as to draw from his new acquaintance a large collection of notes and emendations, which were, in confidence, communicated to him in a series of private letters.

What followed upon this, and what use he made of those friendly communications, I need not repeat, as the account is given by Mr. Warburton himself in the lively preface to his and Mr. Pope's edition of Shakspeare, of which something more will be said in its place. It is enough to say here, that he very reasonably resented this usage, and complained of it to his two friends, the bishops of Salisbury and Chichester. The former expresses his concern at this ill treatment, and the more so, he says, "as he had in some measure been the occasion of it;" that is, by bringing Mr. Warburton and Sir Thomas Hanmer together.

The latter tells him, in a letter of May 9th, 1739, "Sir Thomas Hanmer's proceeding with respect to Shakspeare is very extraordinary. —I think you do very well to get your own papers out of his hands: it is pity they have been so long in them, since it is probable he has squeezed what he could out of them; which is most ungenerous treatment." He concludes with saying, "I hope you will find leisure to give the world a Shakspeare yourself, which the sooner it is made known the better."

And thus ended this trifling affair, which I should scarcely have mentioned but to do justice to the friendly temper of Bishop Hare, who interested himself so kindly in all his concerns; and to show that Mr. Warburton's conduct was not directed by caprice or petulance, but was that of a man of sense and honour, and as such was approved by his most judicious friends.

Mr. Warburton was so taken up with his studies, and found so much delight in them, that he rarely stirred from home: which, he would often say, there was no good reason for doing, except necessary business, and the satisfaction of seeing a friend. What the world calls amusement from a change of the scene, passed for nothing with him, who was too well employed to be tired of his situation, or to have a thought of running away from himself; which, after all, they who are incessantly making the experiment, find impossible to be done. Yet he sometimes found himself obliged to go to London; as he did in the spring of the year 1740; and he took that opportunity of making his first visit to Mr. Pope, of which he immediately * gave Dr. Middleton the following account:—

"I passed about a week at Twickenham in the most agreeable man-

* May 6th, 1740.

ner. Mr. Pope is as good a companion as a poet; and, what is more, appears to be as good a man."

The last was indeed the consideration, that so much endeared Mr. Pope to him. He found him an honest and well-principled man; zealous to promote the interests of virtue, and impressed with an awful sense of religion, natural and revealed. In short, he found an image of himself in his new acquaintance: no wonder, then, their esteem and affection grew so fast as to give umbrage, in no long time, to a certain nobleman, who had taken to himself the honour of being the guide and philosopher of Mr. Pope.

The acquisition of this new friend came very seasonably to support Mr. Warburton under the loss of another, the excellent Bishop Hare, who died, after a short illness, the 6th of April this year.

How he felt that loss, the public has been informed by himself in the preface to the second volume of the "Divine Legation," and with a flow of sentiment and expression which only the truest friendship, operating on a mind like his, could inspire. But we are better pleased to hear him express his sense of it in a private letter to a friend. Speaking of the bishop's death to Dr. Middleton, in the letter abovementioned of May 6th, 1740, he says, "He has not left his fellow behind him for the love and encouragement of learning. I have had a great loss in his death. He honoured me with his esteem and friendship. This I esteemed a great obligation. I never sought to increase it by any other dependence upon him; and by the terms on which we kept up a correspondence, he did me the justice to believe, I expected no other."

This freedom of correspondence does honour to both parties; and was observed, with address, in this letter to Dr. Middleton, who had conceived Bishop Hare to have taken a prejudice against himself, for his liberty in professing some sentiments, not conformable to his lordship's. He therefore insinuates there was no ground for such a suspicion; for that he himself, so much and so long in the bishop's favour, had lived with him on the same free terms. He knew very well, that nothing could recommend his patron or himself to his friend's good opinion, more than such liberality on the one part, and so manly a conduct on the other.

But the truth is, though Mr. Warburton very properly sought not to increase his obligation to Bishop Hare, he would certainly have received the highest, had it been in the bishop's power; which very probably ended with the queen's death.

In May, 1741, was published the second volume of the "Divine Legation," which completed the argument, although not the entire plan, of that work: a work, in all views, of the most transcendant merit, whether we consider the invention, or the execution.

A plain simple argument, yet perfectly new, proving the divinity of the Mosaic law, and laying a sure foundation for the support of Christianity, is there drawn out to a great length by a chain of reasoning, so elegantly connected, that the reader is carried along it with ease and pleasure; while the matter presented to him is so striking for its own importance, so embellished by a lively fancy, and illustrated, from all quarters, by exquisite learning and the most ingenious disquisition, that, in the whole compass of modern or ancient theology, there is nothing equal or similar to this extraordinary performance.

Such is the general idea of the "Divine Legation of Moses." But for a more distinct conception of its frame; to see at once

———"the bearings and the ties,
The strong connexions, just dependencies;"

the reader is referred to the recapitulation at the end of the sixth book, where the author himself has drawn up a brief comprehensive view of his whole scheme, with great spirit.

This year, but something earlier, came out Dr. Middleton's famous "History of the Life of Cicero;" which was received by the public, as it deserved to be, with great applause. Mr. Warburton took the first occasion to compliment his friend upon it: and, as in the concluding part of that work Dr. Middleton had controverted the account given of Cicero's philosophical opinions in the first volume of the "Divine Legation," he takes notice, that "he had a more particular pleasure in the last section, as he was more particularly interested in it;" and then proceeds to moralize in the following manner: "We perhaps shall neither of us be esteemed orthodox writers. But this we shall do, we shall give an example to the world, which orthodox writers rarely do, and perhaps of more use to mankind than most of the refined subjects they engage in, that we can differ in many important points, and publicly avow our difference, without the least interruption of the declared friendship and esteem we bear to each other. And the 'Life of Tully,' and the 'Divine Legation' will be a rule, which few have set us, and perhaps few will follow, how men, who esteem and love each other, should comport themselves when they differ in opinion. So that whichever is right or wrong in opinion, the honest part of the world will judge both of us to be right in sentiment." *

To whom Dr. Middleton replies, with great complacency, in the same strain: "As to the circumstance, from which you draw so just and useful a lesson, of our differing from each other in some particular opinions, as I was always persuaded that it could not have any other effect upon you, so I have the comfort to assure you, that I never felt the least impression from it disadvantageous to our friendship. It is the necessary consequence of that privilege of our nature on which

* April 29th, 1741.

all men of sense set the highest value, the liberty of judging for ourselves; yet since it would be a great satisfaction to me in all cases to find my judgment confirmed by yours, so, when you are at full leisure, I should be glad to know the particular reasons which force you to differ from me on the subject of Cicero's opinions; to which alone our difference in the present case is to be referred, that as far as is possible we may come still nearer to each other." *

Thus these two ingenious men; and the same spirit breathes through the rest of their letters: so that their whole temper seems to have resolved itself into a principle of general candour. Yet within a month or two, a fresh difference of opinion taking place, (though on a subject of no more importance than the other about Cicero, respecting only the origin of popish ceremonies,) and neither side giving way, our two candid friends cooled insensibly towards each other, and seem, thenceforward, to have discontinued their correspondence; for I find no letters that passed between them, of a later date than those of this year, which touch upon that difference. A memorable instance of our common weakness! which shows how little stress is to be laid on those professions of candour, with which our letters and conversations overflow; and how impossible it is for any lasting friendship to subsist between men of opposite principles and persuasions, however their feelings may for a time be dissembled, or disguised even to themselves, by a show of good breeding.

For a contrary reason,—the conformity of their sentiments, the friendship between Mr. Warburton and Mr. Pope became every day closer and more confidential. In the beginning of this summer, when the business that had called him to London, on the publication of his book, was over, he went down again to Twickenham, and passed some weeks with Mr. Pope there and in a country ramble, which led them at last to Oxford. The university was naturally pleased at the arrival of two such strangers, and seemed desirous of enrolling their names among their graduates. The degree of doctor of divinity was intended for the divine, and that of doctor of law for the poet, as a testimony of their great respect for each. But intrigue and envy defeated this scheme; and the university lost the opportunity of decorating with its honours the two greatest geniuses of the age, by the fault of one or two of its members.† Mr. Pope retired with some chagrin to Twickenham, but consoled himself and his friend with this sarcastic reflection: "We shall take our degree together in fame, whatever we do at the university." ‡

The time they spent together this summer gave occasion to some

* Cambridge, April 5th, 1741. I suppose, a misdate for May 5th, or Mr. Warburton's letter is misdated. † Pope's "Works," vol. ix. London, 1753. Letter 107. ‡ Sept. 20th, 1741.

interesting conversations. Mr. Warburton suggested many alterations and improvements of Mr. Pope's moral writings, and particularly advised him to strike out "every thing in them that might be suspected of having the least glance towards fate or naturalism;" which he consented to, we are told, "with extreme pleasure." * It was also at this time that he concerted with him the plan of the fourth book of the "Dunciad." †

Mr. Pope lost no time in carrying it into execution. In November following he presses his friend to meet him at Prior Park, on the invitation of Mr. Allen, with whom he then was, and tells him it was there that he should find most leisure to profit by the advice he had given him "to resume the studies, which he had almost laid aside by perpetual avocations and dissipations."

Here accordingly they met: a great part of the new poem was read and highly approved: the rest was finished in the course of the year 1742, and a project formed for making Mr. Warburton the editor of the four books complete; which was executed very early in 1743, and so much to the author's satisfaction, that he afterwards engaged him to sustain the like office with regard to the rest of his works.‡

I shall find a fitter place, in the course of these reflections, to speak my own sentiments of the edition of Mr. Pope's works. All I have now to add on this interesting part of Mr. Warburton's life, is, that the most unreserved confidence continued between the two friends till Mr. Pope's death, in May, 1744; and with what warmth of affection on both sides, appears from the last will and testament of the latter, and from the zeal of the former to fulfil his intention, and to do all possible honour to his memory.

It must indeed be regretted that this memorable friendship commenced so late and ended so soon. We might otherwise have seen the most valuable fruits of it. Their hearts and heads were exactly attuned to each other; and, had the life and health of Mr. Pope permitted, this harmonious agreement in the powers and purposes of two such men, could not have failed to produce many a noble design in favour of virtue and religion.

The death of our great poet was an event that could not fail of putting the spirits of the ingenious in motion, and of exciting an emulation, among the lovers of polite literature, to adorn his memory and virtues. It accordingly produced Mr. Brown's "Essay on Satire," which was addressed to Mr. Warburton, and so far approved by him, as to be prefixed to his edition of Mr. Pope's works. It also brought on the dawn of Mr. Mason's genius, in "The Monody," entitled

* Preface to his "Works." † POPE'S "Works," vol. ix. Letter 110.
‡ Letters 112—115.

"Musæus;" which gave so sure a presage of his future eminence in poetry, and so advantageous a picture of his mind, that Mr. Warburton, on the sight of it,

"With open arms received one poet more."

Soon after Mr. Pope's death, Mr. Warburton received a letter from a learned and ingenious lady, Mrs. Cockburn, lamenting that event, and making some inquiry after Mr. Pope's works; but the real purpose of the letter-writer was to draw Mr. Warburton into an explanation of his system concerning moral obligation, as delivered in the first volume of the "Divine Legation," it being different from one espoused by herself, which was that of Dr. Samuel Clarke.

His answer to this lady is written with great civility and politeness, and was so well received, that when, a year or two afterwards, she drew up her confutation of Dr. Rutherforth's "Essay on Virtue," she sent the manuscript to Mr. Warburton; who was extremely pleased with it, and wrote a short preface in recommendation of that work. His letter may be seen in the Appendix B.

But to return to what I was saying of Mr. Pope's friendship for Mr. Warburton.

Next to the enjoyment itself of such a friendship, the chief benefit Mr. Warburton derived from it, was the being introduced by his means to his principal friends; particularly Mr. Murray and Mr. Allen, two of the greatest and best men of the age. As I had myself the honour of being well acquainted with these excellent persons, and very much obliged to them, I may the rather be allowed to indulge myself in the recollection of their virtues.

Mr. Murray, afterwards earl of Mansfield, and lord chief justice of England, was so extraordinary a person, and made so great a figure in the world, that his name must go down to posterity with distinguished honour, in the public records of the nation. For his shining talents displayed themselves in every department of the state, as well as in the supreme court of justice, his peculiar province; which he filled with a lustre of reputation, not equalled perhaps, certainly not exceeded, by that of any of his predecessors.

Of his conduct in the House of Lords I can speak with the more confidence, because I speak from my own observation. Too good to be the leader, and too able to be the dupe, of any party, he was believed to speak his own sense of public measures; and the authority of his judgment was so high, that, in regular times, the House was usually determined by it. He was no forward or frequent speaker; but reserved himself, as was fit, for occasions worthy of him. In debate, he was eloquent as well as wise; or rather, he became eloquent by his wisdom. His countenance and tone of voice imprinted the

ideas of penetration, probity, and candour; but what secured your attention and assent to all he said, was his constant good sense, flowing in apt terms and the clearest method. He affected no sallies of the imagination, or bursts of passion; much less would he condescend to personal abuse or petulant altercation. All was clear, candid reason, letting itself so easily into the minds of his hearers as to carry information and conviction with it. In a word, his public senatorial character resembled very much that of Messala, of whom Cicero says, addressing himself to Brutus:—

"Do not imagine, Brutus, that, for worth, honour, and a warm love of his country, any one is comparable to Messala: so that his eloquence, in which he wonderfully excels, is almost eclipsed by those virtues. And even in his display of that faculty, his superior good sense shows itself most: with so much care and skill hath he formed himself to the truest manner of speaking! His powers of genius and invention are confessedly of the first size; yet he almost owes less to them than to the diligent and studious cultivation of his judgment." *

In the commerce of private life, he was easy, friendly, and agreeable; extremely sensible of merit in other men, and ready on all occasions to countenance and produce it. From his early youth, he had attracted the notice, and obtained the friendship and applause, of our great poet.

Mr. Allen was a man of plain good sense, and the most benevolent temper. He rose to great consideration by farming the cross-posts, which he put into the admirable order in which we now find them, very much to the public advantage, as well as his own. He was of that generous composition, that his mind enlarged with his fortune; and the wealth he so honourably acquired, he spent in a splendid hospitality and the most extensive charities. His house, in so public a scene as that of Bath, was open to all men of rank and worth, and especially to men of distinguished parts and learning; whom he honoured and encouraged; and whose respective merits he was enabled to appreciate, by a natural discernment and superior good sense, rather than any acquired use and knowledge of letters. His domestic virtues were above all praise. With these qualities he drew to himself an universal respect; and possessed, in a high degree, the esteem of Mr. Pope, who, in one of his moral essays, has done justice to his modest and amiable character.

To these two incomparable persons Mr. Pope was especially anx-

* "Cave putes probitate, constantiâ, curâ, studio reipublicæ, quidquam illi simile esse; ut eloquentia, quâ mirabiliter excellit, vix in eo locum ad laudandum habere videatur. Quanquam in hâc ipsâ sapientia plus apparet: ita gravi judicio multâque arte se exercuit in verissimo genere dicendi. Tanta autem industria est, tantumque evigilat in studio, ut non maximè ingenio, quod in eo summum est, gratia habenda videatur."—Cicero *Ad Brutum*, lib. i. epist. 15.

ious to introduce his friend; and it was not long before he experienced the most substantial benefits from this recommendation.

In the mean time his attention was turned towards that numerous host of answerers, which the "Divine Legation of Moses" had brought down upon him. The extensive argument and miscellaneous nature of that work had led him to declare his sentiments on a multitude of questions, on which he thought differently from other writers, and of course to censure or confute their opinions. Whole bodies of men, as well as individuals of the highest reputation, were attacked by him; and his manner was to speak his sense of all with freedom and force: so that most writers, and even readers, had some ground of complaint against him. Not only the freethinkers and unbelievers, against whom the tenor of his book was directed, but the heterodox of every denomination were treated without much ceremony; and of those, reputed orthodox, some tenet or other, which till then they had held sacred, was discussed and reprobated by him. Straggling heresies, or embodied systems, made no difference with him; as they came in his way, no quarter was given to either; "his end and manner of writing," as Dr. Middleton truly observed, "being to pursue truth, wherever he found it, and, from the midst of smoke and darkness, to spread light and day around him." *

Such a writer, independently of the envy which ever attends superior genius, must needs have innumerable enemies. And as all could not receive, nor the greater part deserve, his notice, he determined to select a few of the more respectable, out of the gross body of assailants, and to quit his hands of them at once, in a general comprehensive answer. This was done by "Remarks on several occasional Reflections," in two parts; the former published in 1744, and the second (which he styles the last) in 1745; and both executed in such a manner as was not likely to invite any fresh attacks upon him.†

Yet the rage of his answerers was not presently subdued. Writing to a confidential friend from Prior Park the year following, July 15th, 1746, he tells him: "I have a deluge of writers against me. But two great men have made me promise to answer none of them. They said, 'You imagine the world takes as much notice of your answerers, as you yourself do. You are mistaken. The names of none of them were ever heard of in good company. And the world wonders you should so misemploy your time.' To this I said, 'It was true. But that there was another body to which some regard should be had,—the inferior clergy.' They said, if such writers misled them, it was in vain for me to think of them. And indeed I begin to think Aristotle mistaken when he defined man to be a rational animal. Not but I know,

* Letter 7 in Dr. Middleton's "Works," vol. ii. † See vol. xi. [Edition of 1811.]

the source of all this opposition is rather to be attributed to a bad heart, than a bad head. And you would be surprised at the instances of envy I could give you. Had I the complaisance to die to-morrow, it would all be over before the end of the week. I am in this condition of a dead man already, with regard to the Indies, there being, at this immense distance, no room for envy, as you will see by the following extract of a letter I received from one of the governors of Virginia:—

"'I never had so much profit from any book, except the Bible, as from yours. The flood of infidelity has reached us. The blessing of God upon your excellent pen will, I hope, preserve us from the evil influence. Pennsylvania seems to be overrun with deism. The Quakers are generally infected; and it being their constitution to have no established religion, their too universal toleration receives all without distinction. And they who worship God, and they who do not, are in the same esteem.

"'Your first and second volumes of the Divine Legation came over to their public library. I recommended it strongly. It soon became the subject of all conversation. Never were such struggles about any book, who should first read it. The reasonable were convinced; the obstinate were astonished. A friend of mine, of learning and station there, spoke of it with the warmest praise: he said, it had made him ten times more a Christian than he had ever been.'"

These reflections were consolatory to him, and made him bear with more temper the petulance of his adversaries; whom he seems to have neglected, till one of high fame and confident pretensions forced him again into the field of controversy. But this was not till some years afterwards. I now go on with my narrative from 1745.

Mr. Pope had very early introduced his friend to the notice of Lord Chesterfield; who, going this year lord lieutenant to Ireland, was desirous of taking Mr. Warburton with him, as his first chaplain. He had his reasons for declining this offer; but he had a proper sense of the civility, and made his public acknowledgments for it in a dedication of the "Alliance," reprinted with many corrections and improvements, in 1748. The style of compliment in this piece will perhaps be censured as too high. But the truth is, that specious nobleman had the fortune to be better thought of in his lifetime, than he has been since. The general opinion therefore, which came confirmed to him by Mr. Pope, very naturally inflamed the expression of his gratitude, in that panegyrical epistle.

After an acquaintance of some years, Mr. Allen had now seen so much of his friend, that he wished to unite him still more closely to himself by an alliance of marriage with an accomplished lady of his own family.*

* Miss Gertrude Tucker, Mr. Allen's favourite niece.

This event took place in the beginning of the year 1746; and soon after, the preachership of Lincoln's Inn happening to become vacant, Mr. Murray, then solicitor-general, easily prevailed with the learned bench to invite so eminent a person as Mr. Warburton to accept that office.

II.

From the time of his marriage, Mr. Warburton resided chiefly at Prior Park. In so agreeable, or rather splendid, a retreat, he enjoyed health, affluence, and leisure; the best company, when he chose to partake of it; and every other accommodation, which could be acceptable to a man of letters. His ambition was also gratified with the highest personal reputation; and in due time he succeeded to the chief honours of his profession. All this he could not but be sensible of. Yet I have heard him say, that the most delicious season of his life was that which he had spent at Newark and Brand-Broughton. So delightful are the springing hopes of youth! and so enchanting the scenes which open to a great genius, when he comes first to know himself, and to make trial of his powers! The impression these left upon him, is very agreeably described in a letter to Mr. C. Yorke, so late as the year 1758. Mr. Yorke had acquainted him with an excursion he had been making into Nottinghamshire. In his answer from Prior Park, October 2nd, 1758, he says, "I am glad to understand you have amused yourself agreeably with a ramble into Nottinghamshire. It would have been the greatest pleasure to have chopped upon you at Newark; and I would have done so on the least intimation. I could have led you through delicious walks, and picked off, for your amusement in our rambles, a thousand notions which I hung upon every thorn, as I passed thirty years ago."

But to return from this reflection:—

The preachership of Lincoln's Inn had been offered him in so handsome a manner, that it could not be refused. Otherwise, the thing was not agreeable to him.

In a letter to Dr. Taylor,* from Prior Park, May 22nd, 1746, he says, "I think I told you in my last, that the society of Lincoln's Inn had made me an unanimous offer of the preachership; which therefore I could not refuse, though I would gladly have done it; for it will require five or six months' attendance. And the advantage of the thing itself you may judge of, by this: Mr. Allen would have me take a house, for which I pay as much rent as the whole preachership is worth. This only to you. And do not think I speak with any affectation when I tell you in your ear, that nothing can be more disagreeable to me than this way of life. But I hope and determine that it shall not continue

* The physician, first of Newark, afterwards of London, very eminent in his profession, and from his early youth a friend of Mr. Warburton's.

long. Do not you pity me? I shall be forced to write sermons: and God knows what will become of the 'Divine Legation.' But if I can do any good in this new station, I shall know how to bear the disagreements of it, and that is all. How capricious is the fate of mortals! Any other clergyman would think himself happy in such an honour as the society has done me. I believe it is the first * that has been done to their preacher. Yet I have no joy in it."

The truth is, the attendance on the term broke in upon his leisure; and, what was worse, the necessity he was under of composing sermons, with which he was but slenderly provided, diverted him from other things, for which he judged himself better qualified, and which he had more at heart.

The fruits of his industry in this new office, there will be occasion to speak of and to appreciate hereafter. For the present, it is true, his greater designs received some interruption, and particularly, as he intimates, that of the "Divine Legation;" although other reasons concurred to make him defer (indeed much too long) the prosecution of that noble work.

In the year 1747 appeared his edition of Shakspeare's works, which he had undertaken at the instance of Mr. Pope. "He was desirous"—the editor speaks in his own person—"I should give a new edition of this poet; and that his edition should be melted down into mine. In memory of our friendship, I have therefore made it our joint edition." †

As the public envy was now at its height, from the rising fortune, as well as fame, of the author, this edition awakened a spirit of criticism, which haunted him in every shape of dull ridicule, and solemn confutation. Happening to speak of this, in a letter written to him, 1749, (for by that time I had the honour of being personally acquainted with him,) he replies to me in the following lively manner: "I have, as you say, raised a spirit without designing it. And, while I thought I was only conjecturing, it seems I was conjuring. So that I had no sooner evoked the name of Shakspeare from the rotten monument of his former editions, than a crew of strange devils, and more grotesque than any he laughs at in the old farces, came chattering, mewing, and grinning round about me." ‡

The outcry against him was, indeed, pretty much what is here so pleasantly described. His illustrations of the poet's sense were frequently not taken; and his corrections of the faulty text not allowed. And, to speak candidly, it could scarce be otherwise. For, though all pretend to be judges of poetry, few have any idea of poetical criticism. And, as to what concerns the emendation of the text, the abler the critic,

* He means, by the *unanimous* offer of their preachership. † Preface to Shakspeare. ‡ Prior-Park, Sept. 28th, 1749.

the more liable he is to some extravagance of conjecture, as we see in the case of Bentley himself, it being dulness, and not judgment, that best secures him from this sort of imputation.*

For the rest, such is the felicity of his genius in restoring numberless passages to their integrity, and in explaining others which the author's sublime conceptions, or his licentious expression, had kept out of sight, that this fine edition of Shakspeare must ever be highly valued by men of sense and taste; a spirit, congenial to that of the author, breathing throughout, and easily atoning, with such, for the little mistakes and inadvertencies discoverable in it.

Mr. Warburton very properly neglected all attacks on his own critical fame. But of one, that was made soon after on the moral character of his friend, he took more notice. In 1749 an insignificant pamphlet, under the name of "A Patriot King," was published by Lord Bolingbroke, or by his direction, with a preface to it, reflecting highly on Mr. Pope's honour. The provocation was simply this: The manuscript of that trivial declamation had been intrusted to the care of Mr. Pope, with the charge, as it was pretended, that only a certain number of copies should be printed. Mr. Pope, in his excessive admiration of his lordship, which was the chief foible of his character, took that opportunity, for fear so invaluable a treasure of patriot eloquence should be lost to the public, to exceed his commission, and to run off more copies, which were found, after his death, in the printer's warehouse; but with so little secrecy that several of his friends, and in particular Mr. Allen, as he told me, was apprized of it at the time, and by Mr. Pope himself. This charge, however frivolous, was aggravated beyond measure; and, notwithstanding the proofs Lord Bolingbroke had received of Mr. Pope's devotion to him, envenomed with the utmost malignity. Mr. Warburton thought it became him to vindicate his deceased friend; and he did it so effectually, as not only to silence his accuser, but to cover him with confusion.

And here let me have leave to pause a little, while, in emulation of this generous conduct of my friend towards one great man, I endea-

* The apology, which an eminent French writer makes for Joseph Scaliger, may serve for all commentators of his size:—

"Je ne sçay si on ne pourroit pas dire que Scaliger avoit trop d'esprit, et trop de science, pour faire un bon commentaire; car à force d'avoir de l'esprit, il trouvoit dans les auteurs qu'il commentoit, plus de finesse et plus de génie, qu'ils n'en avoient effectivement: et sa profonde litérature étoit cause qu'il voyoit mille rapports entre les pensées d'un auteur, et quelque point rare d'antiquité. De sorte qu'il s'imaginoit que son auteur avoit fait quelque allusion à ce point d'antiquité, et sur ce pied-là il corrigeoit un passage. Si on n'aime mieux s'imaginer que l'envie d'éclaircir un mystère d'érudition inconnu aux autres critiques, l'engageoit à supposer qu'il se trouvoit dans un tel ou tel passage. Quoiqu'il en soit, les commentaires qui viennent de lui, sont pleins de conjectures hardies, ingénieuses, et fort sçavantes, mais il n'est guères apparent que les auteurs ayent songé à tout ce qu'il leur fait dire. On s'éloigne de leur sens aussi bien quand on a beaucoup d'esprit, que quand on n'en a pas," &c.—*Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, Juin,* 1684.

vour to perform the same office towards another; the most amiable of his time, who has suffered, in the public opinion, by a charge of immoral meanness brought against him by Mr. Pope himself, and, as I am persuaded, without the least foundation. The person I mean is Mr. Addison, in whose good name, as in that of Mr. Pope, virtue herself has an interest. He and Mr. Pope were likewise friends; and this relation between them brings the two cases into a still nearer resemblance with each other.

The charge I allude to is briefly this: Mr. Addison had uniformly* advised and encouraged Mr. Pope's translation of the Iliad, from the year 1713, when the design of that work was first communicated to him. He had even been zealous to promote the subscription to it; and in May, 1716, when a considerable progress had been made in the translation, and some parts of it published, he speaks of it in the "Freeholder," No. 40, in the following manner:—

"When I consider myself as a British freeholder, I am in a particular manner pleased with the labours of those who have improved our language with the translation of old Latin and Greek authors, and by that means let us into the knowledge of what passed in the famous governments of Greece and Rome. We have already most of their historians in our own tongue: and, what is still more for the honour of our language, it has been taught to express with elegance the greatest of their poets in each nation. The illiterate among our countrymen may learn to judge from Dryden's Virgil, of the most perfect epic performance; and those parts of Homer which have already been published by Mr. Pope, give us reason to think the Iliad will appear in English with as little disadvantage to that immortal poem."

Notwithstanding all this, Mr. Pope believed, and his friends, as was natural, believed with him, that in 1715 Mr. Addison either translated himself, or employed Mr. Tickell to translate, the first book of the Iliad in opposition to him.

If we ask on what grounds this extraordinary charge is brought against such a man as Mr. Addison, we are only told of some slight and vague suspicions, without any thing that looks like a proof, either external or internal. What there is of the latter tends to confute the charge. For whoever is acquainted with Mr. Addison's style and manner, must be certain that the translation was not his own, though Steele, in a peevish letter written against Tickell,† has, it seems, insinuated some such thing. And for external proof, we have absolutely nothing but a report from hearsay evidence, that Mr. Addison had expressed himself civilly of Tickell's performance; whence it is concluded that

* See letters to and from Mr. Addison, in Mr. Pope's "Works." † Dedication of the Drummer to Mr. Congreve.

this translation was, at least, undertaken by Mr. Addison's advice and authority, if not made by himself.

Still, it will be owned, that so generous a man as Mr. Pope must believe he had some proof of this charge against his friend; and I think I have at length discovered what it was.

I have seen a printed copy of Tickell's translation,* in which are entered many criticisms and remarks in Mr. Pope's own hand. And from two of these, compared together, I seem to collect the true ground of the suspicion. But the reader shall judge for himself.

To the translation are prefixed a DEDICATION and ADVERTISEMENT. The latter is in these words: "I must inform the reader that, when I began this first book, I had some thoughts of translating the whole Iliad; but had the pleasure of being diverted from that design, by finding the work was fallen into a much abler hand. I would not therefore be thought to have any other view in publishing this small specimen of Homer's Iliad, than to bespeak, if possible, the favour of the public to a translation of Homer's Odysseis, wherein I have already made some progress."

To the words in this advertisement—*When I began this first book*—Mr. Pope affixes this note,—*See the first line of the dedication.*

Turning to the dedication, we find it begin thus: "When I first entered upon this translation I was ambitious of dedicating it to the late Lord Halifax." Over against which words is likewise entered, in Mr. Pope's hand, the following note. *The translator was first known to him* [Lord Halifax] *four months before his death. He died in May*, 1715.

Now, from comparing these two notes together, one sees clearly how Mr. Pope reasoned on the matter. He concluded from Tickell's saying, when he first entered on this translation, that is, began this first book, he thought of dedicating his work to Lord Halifax, that he could not have entertained this thought, if he had not at that time been known to Lord Halifax. But it was certain, it seems, that Mr. Tickell was first known to that lord only four months before his death, in May, 1715. Whence it seemed to follow that this first book had been written within or since that time.

Admitting this conclusion to be rightly made by Mr. Pope, it must indeed be allowed that he had much reason for his charge of insincerity on Mr. Addison, who, as a friend that had great influence with the translator, would not have advised, or even permitted, such a design to be entered upon and prosecuted by him at this juncture. But

* It was then in Mr. Warburton's hands. It was afterwards sold, by mistake, among the other books which he had at his house in town, to Mr. T. Payne, and came at length into the possession of Isaac Reed, Esq., of Staple's Inn; who was so obliging as to make me a present of it, to be kept in the library at Hartlebury, (in which that of Mr. Pope is included,) where it now remains.

there seems not the least ground for such a conclusion. Lord Halifax was the great patron of wits and poets; and if Tickell had formed his design of translating the Iliad long before Mr. Pope was known to have engaged in that work, he might very well be supposed to think of dedicating to this Mæcenas, as much a stranger as he then was to him. Nothing is more common than such intentions in literary men: although Mr. Pope might be disposed to conduct himself, in such a case, with more delicacy or dignity.

I see, then, no reason to infer from the premisses, that Mr. Tickell began his first book but four months before Lord Halifax's death. For any thing that appears to the contrary, he might have *begun*, or even *finished*, it four years before that event, and have only relinguished the thoughts of prosecuting his translation from the time that he "found this work had fallen," as he says, "into an abler," that is, Mr. Pope's, "hand."

These passages, however, of the advertisement and dedication, reflected upon and compared together, furnished Mr. Pope, as I suppose, with the chief of those odd concurring circumstances, which, as we are told,* convinced him that this translation of the first book of the Iliad was published with Mr. Addison's participation, if not composed by him. If the work had been begun but four months before its appearance, it must have been at least by his allowance and participation; if before that time, (Mr. Tickell's acquaintance with Lord Halifax not being of so early a date,) it was, most probably, his own composition. And to this latter opinion, it seems, Mr. Pope inclined.

How inconclusive these reasonings are, we have now seen. All that remains, therefore, is, to account for the publication at such a time. And for this I see not why Mr. Tickell's own reason may not be accepted as the true one,—that he had no other view in publishing this specimen, than to bespeak the favour of the public to a translation of the Odysseis, in which he had made some progress.

The time, it must be owned, was an unlucky one. But if Mr. Addison had reason to believe his friend's motive to be that which he professed, he might think it not fit to divert him from a work which was likely to serve his interest; (poetical translation being at that time the most lucrative employment of a man of letters;) and, though it had less merit than Mr. Pope's, to do him some credit. And for the civility of speaking well of his translation afterwards, or even of assisting him in the revisal of it, this was certainly no more than Mr. Addison's friendship for the translator required.

That Mr. Addison had, in fact, no unfriendly intention in the part he had taken in this affair, is certain from the passage before cited from the "Freeholder," where he speaks so honourably, in May,

* In the notes on [the] Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot.

1716, of Mr. Pope's translation, after all the noise that had been made about Mr. Tickell's first book in the summer of 1715. We may, indeed, impute this conduct to fear, or dissimulation; but a charge of this nature ought surely not to be made but on the clearest and best grounds.

I have the rather introduced these observations into the account of my friend's life, as he himself had been led by Mr. Pope's authority to credit the imputation on Mr. Addison; and, on more occasions than one, had given a countenance to it. And it is but justice to him to assure the reader that when some years before his death I showed him this vindication, he professed himself so much satisfied with it, as to say, if he lived to see another edition of Mr. Pope's works, he would strike out the offensive reflections on Mr. Addison's character.

To return now to our subject. We left Mr. Warburton illustrating the works of one of our great poets, and vindicating the moral character of another. But whatever amusements or friendly offices might employ his pen, he never lost sight of what he had most at heart, the defence of religion. And a controversy then carrying on concerning the miraculous powers of the Christian church, between Dr. Middleton and his opponents, and so managed on both sides as to hurt the cause of Christianity itself, gave him occasion to explain his own sentiments on the subject in an admirable book, entitled, "Julian; or, a Discourse concerning the Earthquake and fiery Eruption which defeated that Emperor's Attempt to rebuild the Temple at Jerusalem." This work was published in 1750, and is written throughout in the genuine spirit of its author.*

It is introduced by an exquisite preface on the literary character of the fathers, and on the condition of moral science before and after the appearance of Christianity.

This excellent book had the fate of the author's other writings, to be censured at home. In a letter from Prior-Park to Dr. Balguy, January 17th, 1751–2, "They tell me," says he, "there are some remarks published against my 'Julian.' I do not know the nature of them, nor ever shall. That matter interests every clergyman, that is to say, every Christian, in England, as much as myself. Besides, I have long since bid adieu to controversy. I give my sentiments to the public, and there is an end. If any body will oppose them, he has my leave: if any body will defend them, he has my thanks. I propound them freely: I explain them as clearly, and enforce them as strongly, as I can. I think I owe no more either to myself or truth. I am sure I owe no more to the public. Besides, I know a little, as you will see by the new edition of the first and second

* See vol. viii. [Edition of 1811.]

volumes of 'Divine Legation,' how to correct myself, so have less need of this assistance from others; which you will better understand when you see that I have not received the least assistance from the united endeavours of that numerous band of answerers, who have spared no freedoms in telling me of my faults."

Again: some months afterwards, writing to the same friend, Bedford-Row, May 12th, 1752, he observes:—

"I think you judge rightly of the effects of Lord Bolingbroke's writings, as well as of their character. As to his 'Discourse on the Canon of Scripture,' I think it below all criticism, though it had mine. He mentions (and I believe with good faith) that foolish rabbinical fable of Esdras's restoring the whole lost canon by inspiration, and argues from it. However, the redoubtable pen of Sykes, though now worn to the stump, is drawn upon him, or, at least, threatened to be drawn. He threatened, too, to draw it upon poor 'Julian;' but he left the execution to another. And who do you think that other proves? Somebody or other, by far more curious than myself, would unearth this vermin; and he is found to be one Nichols, which your university some time ago prosecuted for stealing their books, or rather should have prosecuted. Have I not reason to blame you for your ill-timed clemency? Had they hanged him, as justice called upon them to do, my book had been safe. It is true, he has not fulfilled the old proverb, but rather contributed to a new one, 'Save a rogue from the gallows, and——he will endeavour to save his fellow.' I had gibbeted up Julian, and he comes by night to cut him down." The pleasantry of these reflections has drawn me into a citation of them. Otherwise, it was scarce worth while to tell the reader what some of our own prejudiced countrymen thought of "Julian." For the learned abroad were generally much taken with this work. Among others, the president Montesquieu, who, it seems, was then meditating a visit to his friends in England, writes thus to Mr. Charles Yorke, from Paris, June 6th, 1753: "When you see Dr. Warburton, pray let him know the satisfaction I propose to myself in making a further acquaintance with him, and in taking a nearer view of his great talents. His 'Julian' charms me; although I have but indifferent English readers, and have myself forgotten a great deal of what I once knew of that language." *

And speaking of this work some years afterwards, in a letter to me, Mr. Warburton says, "My 'Julian' has had a great effect in France, where freethinking holds its head as high as in England.

* "Quand vous verrez M. le Docteur WARBURTON, je vous prie de lui dire l'idée agréable que je me fais de faire plus ample connoissance avec lui; d'aller trouver la source du sçavoir, et de voir la lumière de l'esprit: son ouvrage sur Julien m'a enchanté, quoi que je n'aie que de très mauvais lecteurs Anglois, et que j'ai presque oublié tout ce que j'en sçavois."

This is a consolation to me, as my sole aim is to repress that infernal spirit." And again: "It has procured me the good-will of the best and greatest man * in France, while there is hardly a nobleman in England knows I have written such a book." †

This admirable work, as I observed, took its rise from Dr. Middleton's "Inquiry concerning the Miraculous Powers in the Christian Church." That ingenious man died towards the end of this year; and although some difference had arisen between them in 1741, and seems to have kept them asunder for the rest of Dr. Middleton's life, yet no change appears to have been made, by this misadventure, in Mr. Warburton's opinion, or even esteem, of him; so constant was he in his friendships, as the reader will see in the following extract from a letter, which he wrote to me just before the doctor's death: "Prior-Park, July 11th, 1750. I hear Dr. Middleton has been at London, I suppose to consult Dr. Heberden ‡ about his health, and is returned in an extreme bad condition. I am much concerned for the poor man, and wish he may recover, with all my heart. Had he had, I will not say piety, but greatness of mind, enough, not to suffer the pretended injuries of some churchmen to prejudice him against religion, I should love him living, and honour his memory when dead. But, good God! that man, for the discourtesies done him by his miserable fellow-creatures, should be content to divest himself of the true viaticum, the comfort, the solace, the asylum from all the evils of human life, is perfectly astonishing. I believe no one, all things considered, has suffered more from the low and vile passions of the high and low amongst our brethren than myself. Yet God forbid it should ever suffer me to be cold in the gospel interests! which are, indeed, so much my own, that without it I should be disposed to consider humanity as the most forlorn part of the creation."

What this letter tenderly hints at, was the exact truth. Dr. Middleton was an elegant scholar, and very fine writer; but his vanity having engaged him early in religious controversy on a subject which he did not understand, he had given just offence to some considerable churchmen; and yet would not condescend to recover

* Duc de Noailles. The intelligence was communicated to the author by his friend, M. de Silhouette, who admired his writings, and has translated some of them. See Preface to "Alliance." † In planning his treatise on Julian, he had proposed, as the title-page sets forth, to "inquire into the Nature of that Evidence, which will demand the Assent of every reasonable Man to a miraculous Fact." But this part of his plan he reserved for another discourse. The subject was, in fact, resumed, and has been sufficiently explained in the "Discourse on the Resurrection," vol. x. Discourse 29. [Edition of 1811.] ‡ Dr. Middleton had been well acquainted with Dr. Heberden at Cambridge, where he flourished in great reputation for several years before he removed to London. He has now, [1794,] for some time past, declined all business; but, through the whole course of it, was the most esteemed of any physician I have known, not only for his skill, but generosity, in the exercise of his profession. My own personal obligations to him must be my excuse for the liberty I have taken in paying this small tribute of respect to his merit and character.

their good opinion by retracting what he had hastily and unwarily advanced. Hence the obstruction to his views of preferment, which by degrees soured his temper so much, that his best friends, as Mr. Warburton found by experience, could not calm his resentments, or keep them from breaking-out into some unhappy prejudices against religion itself. This misadventure was the effect of his passion, not judgment; for his knowledge of theology was but slight, and his talents not those which qualified him to excel in that science. The bent of his genius and studies lay another way, and had raised him to great eminence in polite literature; of which his "Letter from Rome," and his "Life of Cicero," are shining instances. His other works are of much less value, and will soon be forgotten.

Nothing shows the extent of Mr. Warburton's genius, and the command he had of it, more, than his being able to mix the lightest with the most serious studies, and to pass, as his friend speaks,

"From grave to gay, from lively to severe,"

with so much grace and facility: a striking instance of which power we have here, in finding "Julian" between our two poets. For in the very next year, 1751, he appeared again as a critic and commentator, in the noble edition he gave of Mr. Pope's works. And, as here there was no room for emendatory criticism, of all others the easiest to be misapplied or misconstrued, so the public found very little to censure on this occasion. Indeed the main object of the edition being to do justice to his friend, it was natural for him to exert his whole force upon it; and as none can divine so happily of a poet's meaning, as the well-exercised critic, if he be at the same time of a congenial spirit with his author, it is no wonder that he made this, what I formerly said of it, and still think it to be, the best edition that was ever given of any classic.

But, admirable as Mr. Warburton was in this elegant species of literature, we are now to take our leave of him under that character; his editions of Shakspeare and Pope being, as he himself expressed it to me, amusements, which his fondness for the works of one poet, and for the person of another, had engaged him in. We are henceforth to see him only in his proper office of divine, which he resumed when Mr. Pope's volumes were out of his hands, and ennobled by a set of sermons preached by him at Lincoln's Inn, and entitled, "Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion, in two volumes:" the former published in 1752, and the other in 1754; to which he added a third in 1767, consisting chiefly of occasional discourses.*

I bring his works of this sort together under one view, that I may

* See vols. ix. and x. [Edition of 1811.]

consider them at once, and give the reader an idea of their true character.

He had used himself very little to write sermons, till he came to Lincoln's Inn. His instructions to his parish had either been delivered without notes, or extracted from the plainest discourses of our best preachers. In his present situation, he found it necessary to compose his sermons, and with care; his audience consisting wholly of men of education, and those accustomed to reasoning and inquiry. Here was then a scene in which his learning and knowledge might be produced with good effect; and it was in this kind of discourse that his taste and studies had qualified him to excel. His sermons are accordingly, all of them, of this cast; not slight harangues on ordinary subjects, but close, weighty, methodical discourses, on the most momentous doctrines of natural and revealed religion; opening the grounds of them, and supporting them against objections; expressed in that style of nervous eloquence which was natural to him, and brightened occasionally, but without affectation, by the liveliest strokes of imagination. In short: they were written for the use of men of parts and learning, and will only be relished by such. They are masterly in their way; but fitter for the closet than the church; I mean, those mixed auditories that are usually to be expected in that place.

There had been a friendship of long standing between Mr. Warburton and Mr. Charles Yorke, cultivated with great affection and esteem on both sides; the fruit of which appeared in 1753, in the offer of a prebend in the church of Gloucester, by the Lord Chancellor Hardwicke. In acknowledgment of this favour, Mr. Warburton addressed the first volume of the "Divine Legation" to his lordship, when he gave the next edition of that work. Some who were curious in observing coincidencies, and meant to do honour both to the patron and client, took notice that the stall to which Mr. Warburton was preferred, was the same in which the lord chancellor Nottingham, that great patron of all the learned churchmen in his time, had placed Dr. Cudworth: such a similitude was there apprehended to be between the two magistrates; and still more strikingly between the two divines, authors of "The Intellectual System," and "The Divine Legation."

But what idea of dignity soever might be annexed to this prebend, he exchanged it, a year or two after, for one of more value in the church of Durham, which Bishop Trevor, who did himself honour by the disposal of his preferments, very obligingly gave him, at the request of Mr. Murray, now attorney-general, in 1755.

He had been made chaplain to the king the year before; and that promotion, as well as the present, making it decent for him to take

his doctor's degree, the archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Herring, very wisely took to himself the honour, which the university of Oxford had unhappily declined, of conferring that distinction upon him.

But while his friends were vying with each other in their good offices and attempts to serve him, a matter far more interesting to him, than any preferment, engaged his attention during the course of these two years.

Lord Bolingbroke died in 1751, and his philosophical works were published in 1753. Every one knows the principles and presumption of that unhappy nobleman. He was of that sect, which, to avoid a more odious name, chooses to distinguish itself by that of "Naturalism;" and had boasted in private what feats he should be able to perform in the attack he had long threatened on all our metaphysics and theology; in other words, on natural and revealed religion.

Some had the simplicity to believe him on his word; and others, it may be, wished him success. All serious men stood aghast at the loud vaunts of this Goliath of the infidel party; and, prepossessed with the ideas of consequence, which the fond applauses of his friends, and, what must ever be lamented, of his tuneful friend, had thrown about him, waited with anxiety for the event.

In the mean time, as that friend said divinely well,—for surely, in this instance, he prophesied, as well as sang,—

> "Heaven with loud laughter the vain toil surveys,
> And buries madmen in the heaps they raise."

Dr. Warburton had very early penetrated the views of Lord Bolingbroke; and observing some tincture of his principles (but without the knowledge of the author, who could not be trusted with the secret) artfully instilled into the "Essay on Man," had incurred his immortal hatred by making the discovery, and, in consequence of it, by reasoning Mr. Pope out of his hands.* It was easy to foresee what would follow from this vigilant and able divine, when his lordship's godless volumes should come forth; and the dread of it seems to have kept them back for the remainder of his life. The interval, however, was made good use of, in reasoning them with poignant invectives against the "Alliance," and "Divine Legation," and with whole pages of the grossest personal abuse; so that, when they appeared, Dr. Warburton was provoked, as well as prepared, to give them a strict examination, and was animated to the undertaking by a just resentment, as well as religious zeal.

And these two principles, the most operative in our nature, were never exerted to better purpose, or with greater effect. He planned the "View" of his philosophy in "Four Letters to a Friend," † and,

* See "View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy," Letter iv. vol. xii. [Edition of 1811.]

† Mr. Allen, of Prior-Park.

in writing it, has surpassed himself; the reasoning and the wit being alike irresistible, the strongest and keenest that can be conceived. He himself was not a little pleased with this work, and says in confidence to a friend,* "I have given to it all the finishing in my power; and reckon, if any thing of mine should stumble down to posterity, it will have as good a chance as any. And now, *cæstus artemque repono.*"

Some of Dr. Warburton's friends (such of them, I mean, as had been the friends of Mr. Pope) had, of course, been acquainted with Lord Bolingbroke; and were very naturally in the common opinion of his parts and abilities, without knowing much, or perhaps any thing, of his religious sentiments. These were likely to take offence at the freedom of the "View," which was to show him in a light very different from that in which the world had hitherto seen him. The consequence to himself was clearly foreseen, and with no small concern.

Writing from Prior-Park to Mr. Charles Yorke, August 24th, 1754, while these Letters were drawing up, he says, "I am busy with my second volume of Sermons, which I propose to publish early in the winter. I amuse myself, too, with another thing, which, were you here, you would be plagued with, because I never like my things so well as while you are reading them. I have a better reason for your reading them. But, to tell you the truth, this flatters me most, the thing will be without my name, and a secret. I wish it may in no degree displease one I have so much reason to value, as our friend; nay, I would not have it displease any of his friends on his account. You will ask me, then, why I venture upon it? I will tell you sincerely. I think it my duty; for I am a Christian. I think I was designed to be the declared enemy of infidelity; for I am a little fanatical."

In a letter also to me, September 7th, 1754, he says, "As to my 'View of Bolingbroke,' I tell it you in confidence, I am apprehensive of displeasing some by it whom I most honour, and at a critical time; so that I solemnly assure you, nothing but the sense of indispensable duty, as a Christian and a clergyman, could have induced me to run the hazard of doing myself so much injury. But *jacta est alea.* All other considerations are now past with me; and I let providence take its course without any solicitude on my part."

And again, December 10th, 1754, some time after the two first letters were published, and while he was preparing the two last: "I go on pushing this grand enemy of God and godliness. But what I predicted to you, I am sorry to tell you, I have experienced to

* Dr. Balguy.

be true; that I tread *per cineres dolosos*. However, my duty tells me, this is a capital case, and I must on."

What he alludes to is an anonymous letter, sent him by the post, and expostulating with him, but in the friendliest terms, on the manner in which he had treated the subject of the "View" in the parts already printed. He guessed at the writer,* and had the highest respect for him. He resolved, therefore, to make his apology to him, and, as he was denied the opportunity of a private explanation, in a public answer to his letter. Accordingly, in 1755, he printed the two concluding Letters of the "View" with an "Apology for the two first," † which now stands in this edition, as it did in the subsequent ones of the "View" in the author's lifetime, as a prefatory discourse in vindication of the whole work. The occasion of the subject fired the writer. His very soul came out in every sentence, and is nowhere seen to more advantage than in this "Apology," which is written throughout with a peculiar glow of sentiment and expression; and is, at once, the most interesting, and the most masterly, of all his works.

It had the effect, which was natural, on the so-much-respected letter-writer, who thought fit to preserve an inviolable silence in regard to this "Apology;" but by a signal act of friendship done to the author very soon after,‡ showed how entirely satisfied he was with him.

As to the "View" itself, it was universally read and admired. The followers of Lord Bolingbroke and his philosophy hung their heads; the friends of religion took heart; and these big volumes of impiety sunk immediately into utter contempt.

After this complete triumph over the great chieftain of his party, it would scarce be worth while to celebrate his successes against inferior adventurers, if one of them had not published his own shame; and if what I owe to Dr. Warburton's memory did not require me to explain a trifling matter in which I happened to be concerned.

Mr. Hume had given an early specimen of his freethinking philosophy in some super-subtile lucubrations of the metaphysical kind, which, however, did no great mischief to religion; and, what chagrined him almost as much, contributed but little to his own fame, being too sublime, or too dark, for the apprehensions of his readers. For so good a purpose as that of assisting in the common cause of impiety, he thought fit to come out of the clouds, and to attempt a popular vein of writing, as the more likely to get himself read and talked of in the world. In 1749 he therefore gave the public a hash of his stale notions, served-up in the taking form and

* Mr. Murray. † See vol. xii. [Edition of 1811.] ‡ See page 37.

name of "Essays," and with a stronger, at least a more undisguised, mixture of atheism than before.

Dr. Warburton, who was then sending his "Julian" to the press, saw these "Essays," and had thoughts of closing that work with some strictures upon them. In a letter of September 28th, of that year, to a friend at Cambridge, he says: "I am tempted to have a stroke at Hume in parting. He is the author of a little book called 'Philosophical Essays:' in one part of which he argues against the being of a God; and in another, very needlessly, you will say, against the possibility of miracles. He has crowned the liberty of the press. And yet he has a considerable post under the government. I have a great mind to do justice on his arguments against miracles, which I think might be done in few words. But does he deserve this notice? Is he known amongst you? Pray answer me these questions. For if his own weight keeps him down, I should be sorry to contribute to his advancement to any place but the pillory."

No encouraging answer, I suppose, was returned to this letter; and so the author of the "Essays" escaped for this time. His next effort was to discredit religion by what he calls, its "Natural History." This book came out early in 1757, and falling into the hands of Dr. Warburton, provoked him, by its uncommon licentiousness, to enter on the margin, as he went along, such remarks as occurred to him. And when that was too narrow to contain them all, he put down the rest on loose scraps of paper, which he stuck between the leaves. In this state the book was shown to me, as I chanced at that time to be in London with the author, merely as matter of curiosity, and to give me an idea of the contents, how mischievous and extravagant they were. He had then written remarks on about two-thirds of the volume; and I liked them so well, that I advised him, by all means, to carry them on through the remaining parts of it, and then to fit them up, in what way he thought best, for public use, which I told him they very well deserved. He put by this proposal slightly; but, when I pressed him again on this head, some time after, in a letter from Cambridge, he wrote me the following answer:—

"As to Hume, I had laid it aside ever since you were here. I will now, however, finish my skeleton. It will be hardly that. If then you think any thing can be made of it, and will give yourself the trouble, we may perhaps between us do a little good, which I dare say we shall both think will be worth a little pains. If I have any force in the first rude beating out the mass, you are best able to give it the elegance of form and splendour of polish. This will answer my purpose, to labour together in a joint work to do a little good. I will tell you fairly, it is no more the thing it should be, than the Dantzic iron at the forge is the gilt and painted ware at Birmingham.

It will make no more than a pamphlet; but you shall take your own time, and make it your summer's amusement if you will. I propose it bear something like this title: 'Remarks on Mr. Hume's late Essay, called, The Natural History of Religion, by a Gentleman of Cambridge, in a Letter to the Rev. Dr. Warburton.' I propose the address should be with the dryness and reserve of a stranger, who likes the method of the 'Letters on Bolingbroke's Philosophy,' and follows it here, against the same sort of writer, inculcating the same impiety, Naturalism, and employing the same kind of arguments. The address will remove it from me; the author, a gentleman of Cambridge, from you; and the secrecy of printing, from us both."

I saw by this letter he was not disposed to take much trouble about the thing. Accordingly his papers were soon after sent down to me at Cambridge, pretty much in the state I had seen them in at London, so far as they then went, only with additional entries in the latter part of the book. However, in this careless detached form, I thought his observations too good to be lost. And the hint of the "address" suggested the means of preserving them, without any injury to his reputation, and indeed without much labour to myself. Having therefore transcribed the "Remarks," * with little alteration, I only wrote a short introduction and conclusion, merely to colour the proposed fiction; and in this form sent them to the press.

When Dr. Warburton saw the pamphlet, he said, I should have done much more, and worked up his hasty remarks in my own way. He doubted also whether the contrivance, as I had managed it, would not be seen through. But in this he was mistaken; for the disguise, as thin as it was, answered its purpose in keeping the real author out of sight.

Mr. Hume in particular (understanding, I suppose, from his bookseller, who was also mine, that the manuscript came from me) was the first to fall into the trap. He was much hurt, and no wonder, by so lively an attack upon him, and could not help confessing it in what he calls, his "Own Life;" in which he has thought fit to honour me with greater marks of his resentment than any other of the writers against him; nay, the spiteful man goes so far as to upbraid me with being "a follower" (indeed, a closer, in this instance, than he apprehended) "of the Warburtonian school."

This idle story would not have been worth the telling, but for the reason already given, that I could not, in justice to the author, take the merit of so fine a work to myself. And yet, in disclaiming it, the reader sees I make but an awkward figure, as being obliged to open the secret of our little stratagem, in which the grace of it mainly consists.

* They are given in vol. xii. in their original form. [Edition of 1811.]

Dr. Warburton had now for some time been preparing, and in 1758 he printed, a correct and improved edition of the first volume of the "Divine Legation." The notes to this edition are numerous and large; some of which are answers to objections made to him by archbishop Secker. "Where you find me," says he in a letter to one of his friends, (Prior-Park, April 19th, 1758,) "speaking, in the notes, of objections that have been made, understand them of the present archbishop's, who formerly gave me some sheets of them, which I have still by me, and have in this edition considered all I thought worth observing."

Dr. Secker was a wise man, an edifying preacher, and an exemplary bishop. But the course of his life and studies had not qualified him to decide on such a work as that of the "Divine Legation." Even in the narrow walk of literature he most affected, that of criticising the Hebrew text, it does not appear that he attained to any great distinction. His chief merit, and surely it was a very great one, lay in explaining clearly and popularly, in his sermons, the principles delivered by his friend, bishop Butler, in his famous book of "The Analogy," and in showing the important use of them to religion.

Of this last admirable prelate, what Dr. Warburton's sentiments were, appears from a letter he wrote to Dr. Balguy on his death, which happened in 1752: "You have heard of the death of the poor bishop of Durham. The church could have spared some other prelates much better; and, in its present condition, could but ill spare him. For his morals and serious sense of religion, to say nothing of his intellectual endowments, did honour to his station. His death is particularly unhappy for his chaplain, Dr. Forster. He is my friend, whom I much value, as one of great worth, and whose ill luck I much lament. He has not only seen his hopes drop through, when he was every thing but in the very possession of them, but has lost a patron, who deserved the name of friend, which goes much harder in the separation than the other." (Prior-Park, June 21st, 1752.)

In the memoirs of such a life as I am now writing, nothing, I am sensible, interests the reader less than the chapter of preferments. Yet these must not be wholly overlooked. Towards the end of the year 1757, Dr. Warburton had been promoted to the deanery of Bristol. And in the beginning of the year 1760, by Mr. Allen's interest with the minister, Mr. Pitt, he was advanced to the bishopric of Gloucester.

III.

In the common estimation, this last was a preferment suitable to his merit. Mr. Pitt himself gloried in it, as what did honour to his administration. I remember to have seen a letter of his, in which he

said, "that nothing of a private nature, since he had been in office, had given him so much pleasure as his bringing Dr. Warburton upon the bench." This virtuous self-gratulation became the minister; and others may be of his mind. But I have sometimes doubted with myself, whether the proper scene of abilities like his be not a private station, where only great writers have the leisure to do great things.

Here, at least, it was that "The Alliance" and "Divine Legation" were written: and here, too, was composed the immortal work of "Ecclesiastical Polity," which in the end proved so fatal to our English Disciplinarians; now rising again in the shape of Levellers and Socinians; but to fall again, in good time, by one or other of our learned clergy, going forth against them, in the spirit of order and orthodoxy, from the cool invigorating shade of private life.*

But let me not be misunderstood. When I say that great men should not be taken from their privacy, I speak of great men indeed. The church is, no doubt, much benefited and adorned by a learned prelacy. The pastoral functions cannot well be discharged by any other. But a genius of the high order here mentioned, is given by a gracious Providence, now and then in the course of ages, "to correct," as Dr. Middleton observed, "the sentiments and manners of mankind."

Such a man as this is lessened by elevation; he is in himself, methinks, too great to be advanced.

But be this as it may; it must be allowed that religion and learning suffered somewhat by his promotion, as it interrupted those designs which he had formed for the service of both, and would have executed, if his whole time had been at his command. He himself lamented this inconvenience of his public station; and, after all, was not able (such was the root his former habits of study had taken in him) to be so active in it as he wished.

He performed the ordinary duties of his office with regularity; but further than this he could not prevail with himself to go. And perhaps, on the whole, it was better that he did not; as the leisure he thus procured to himself, was spent to more advantage in defending religion, than it could have been in a vain endeavour to support that discipline which the spirit of the times has utterly overthrown.

They who stood at a distance from him, and knew him only by the report of such as had no kindness for him, concluded, at least, that he would take an active part in the House of Lords. I have heard of a certain minister who dreaded his promotion on this

* Soon after I had hazarded this prediction, I had the pleasure to see one half of it completely fulfilled. See Dr. Horsley's "Charge to the Clergy of the Archdeaconry of St. Alban's," and his unanswerable "Letters," in vindication of it. This able divine was deservedly advanced to the see of St. David's in 1788, and has since (1793) been translated to that of Rochester, and this year (1802) to that of St. Asaph.

account, and thought he saw a second Atterbury in the new bishop of Gloucester. But all such were egregiously mistaken. Alas, he had neither talents nor inclination for parliamentary intrigue or parliamentary eloquence! He had other instruments of fame and consideration in his hands, and was infinitely above the vanity of being caught

"With the fine notion of a busy man,"

as one of our poets * well expresses it.

On the 30th of January, 1760, ten days after his consecration, he preached the customary sermon before the Lords. I mention this only because his sermon, which, of course, was printed, is one of the best he ever wrote, and the best, without question, that ever was preached on that day. It could not be any other, since, besides his great abilities as a writer, he possessed a perfect knowledge of our history, and of that period of it in particular. I have heard him say, there was scarce a pamphlet or memoir published between 1640 and 1660 which he had not read. This predilection for the history of the rebellion seems to have been occasioned by a circumstance just touched by me in the entrance of this discourse. I observed that his grandfather had been active in that scene. His grandmother, a woman of sense and spirit, lived to a great age, and would often, as I have heard him say, take a pleasure to relate to him, when a boy, such passages of those times as she remembered and was well acquainted with. This taste of those transactions, made interesting to him by the part which his family had taken in them, raised an eager curiosity in him, as he grew up, to know more of the subject. And thus he not only acquired an early insight into that part of our history, but continued through life to be so fond of it, that he had thoughts, at one time, of writing the history of the civil wars; and would, without doubt, have done it with supreme ability, and, as the tenor of his sermons shows, with equal candour, if the studies of his own profession had left him at leisure to engage in so great a work.

Lord Clarendon was one of his favourite characters, as well as writers; he honoured the man, and admired his History of the Grand Rebellion in the highest degree. Yet there is a copy of that work now extant, and in the hands of his family, in which he has entered marginal notes containing so minute a censure of all that is blamable in it, that a stranger who had heard nothing of his predilection for Lord Clarendon, would be apt to think him an enemy to the noble person's writings and reputation. With such wonderful impartiality is the censure made! †

* Dryden. † Since I wrote this paragraph, the valuable copy alluded to, of Lord Clarendon's "History," has been very obligingly put into my hands, to be preserved in Hartlebury library.

Another instance of his skill in the story of those times, and of his fairness in representing it, may be mentioned. When he was one summer in residence at Durham, he found Neal's "History of the Puritans" in their library, and for his amusement took it with him to his own house, and "scribbled enough upon the margins of the several volumes" (I use his own words in a letter to me) "to expose and confute the mistakes and misrepresentations of the writer." By the favour of a friend, I have obtained a correct copy of those notes, and believe the reader will agree with me, that they deserve a place in this complete collection of his works.*

To put things of a sort together, I will here mention another book which he has rendered valuable by some manuscript animadversions. Writing to me from Weymouth, where Mr. Allen had a house, and where he generally passed some part of the year with his family, he tells me how his hours of leisure were employed at that place. The letter is dated September 3d, 1758. "If you were here, you would see how I have scribbled over the margins of Tindal's 'Christianity as Old as the Creation.' I think I have him as sure as I had Collins: that is, I overturn the pillars of this famous edifice of impiety, which all the writers against him hitherto have left standing, busying themselves only to untile his roof. This is my present amusement for a fortnight at Weymouth." †

The bishopric of Gloucester was the more agreeable to him, as the deanery of Bristol had been for the same reason, on account of its situation, being in the neighbourhood of Prior-Park. At so small a distance from his diocess, he could perform the duties of it without much trouble, or loss of time in journeys, which were always irksome to him. Yet some months in the summer he usually passed at Gloucester, and resided there altogether after Mrs. Allen's death.

Wherever he was, he chiefly employed himself in revising his printed works, with the view of making them as complete and useful as he could.

Among others he spent some time on his "Sermons;" and in 1761 he reprinted one of them, which he took to be of importance, in a small size, that it might be more known than it was likely to be in the larger volume. This was a well-considered and elaborate discourse on "The Lord's Supper;" ‡ a subject which had been so embroiled by two eminent writers of opposite principles, that it became necessary to take it out of their hands, and to guard the public from being bewildered and misled, either by a Popish or Socinian comment. In a moderate compass (for he never dealt in the verbiage of ordinary writers) he has refuted the system of either

* See vol. xii. [Edition of 1811.] will be found in the library at Hartlebury.

† This book is also in my possession; and

‡ See vol. ix. [Edition of 1811.]

party, and explained his own notion of the sacrament (which was also that of the great Cudworth) in so clear a manner, that few men of sense and judgment will now question where the truth lies.

But the good bishop was always meditating something for the benefit of religion. What is called Methodism had now spread among the people. It was a new species of Puritanism, or rather the old one revived under a new name. This sect first appeared at Oxford, where two fellows of colleges, Mr. George Whitefield, and Mr. John Wesley, were its chief promoters and supports. They were both of them, it may be, frank enthusiasts at setting out. The former is said to have been a weak, the latter was unquestionably a shrewd, man.

Mr. Wesley had rambled through a part of Germany and North America, as well as Great Britain and Ireland, pretending everywhere to a sort of apostolic mission; and, at a convenient distance of time from these peregrinations, his manner was to print journals of them, for the edification of his followers. The bishop of Gloucester had watched his motions with care for some years, and now thought he had gained such an insight into his views and character from his journals, which he constantly read, as to be able to give a fair and full account of him to the public.

It seems to have been principally for this reason that he altered and enlarged what he had written on the influence of the Holy Spirit, in the second volume of his sermons; or rather he composed that discourse anew, and, with many improvements, moulded it into a regular treatise on the subject, which he published in 1762, under the name of "The Doctrine of Grace; or, the Office and Operations of the Holy Spirit vindicated from the Insults of Infidelity, and the Abuses of Fanaticism," in two small volumes, 12mo.*

He designed this work, as the title shows, for a vindication of that most important Christian doctrine from the abuses of libertine, as well as fanatical, writers. The former he confuted with his usual energy and precision; the latter, as not being accessible on the side of reason, he attacked with ridicule, in holding up to view, and exposing their leader and archetype, John Wesley, out of the materials largely furnished to him in that adventurer's own journals. This discourse, like Pascal's "Letters," and for the same reason, the singular merit of the composition, will be read when the sect that gave occasion to it is forgotten; or rather, the sect will find a sort of immortality in this discourse.

As to the grave and reasoning part of this work, that also, as I said, is written with great weight and authority. But I think I see a degree of labour in the expression of some parts, which shows his

* See vol. viii. [Edition of 1811.]

pen had now lost something of its wonted freedom and facility, though it retained its force.

From this time he seems to have planned no new work of difficulty and length, but to have confined himself very properly to the single purpose of giving the last finishing to his former writings.*

Accordingly in 1765 he published a new edition of the "Second Part of the Divine Legation," in three volumes; and, as it had now received his last hand, he presented it to his great friend, Lord Mansfield, as he had done the former part, when finished to his mind, to Lord Hardwicke. But there was this difference in the character of the two dedications: that to the lord chancellor was respectful and ceremonious, being little more than a letter of thanks to his patron; this other to the chief justice was sublime and pathetic; in short, the overflowing of an affectionate heart to a generous and much-esteemed friend.

The subject, too, of the latter is of that high importance which a great writer chooses when he would consult his own and his friend's dignity, and transmit them both with advantage to succeeding times. It sets before him the state of religion in England for half a century past, and, with a confidential freedom, deduces the causes of that alarming neglect into which it had fallen, and by which, indeed, the author had been induced to project this defence of it, and to put it into his lordship's hands. The information is interesting, and the manner in which it is conveyed, solemn and awful. It will be read hereafter with no small attention; and the time will come when this discourse will be reckoned among the chief honours of the noble person addressed.

This edition of 1765, besides many other improvements with which it was enriched, is further distinguished by a remarkable discourse, printed at the close of the last volume, and entitled, "An Appendix concerning the Book of Job." † In this short piece, which is exquisitely written, he repels an attack made upon him by Dr. Lowth. The dispute was managed on both sides with too much heat; but, on the part of the bishop, with that superiority of wit and argument, which, to say the truth, in all his controversial writings, he could not well help. For it may, I believe, be as truly said of him as it was of Carneades, "That he never defended an opinion which he did not prove, nor opposed any which he did not confute." ‡

* The bishop grew very exact and critical in giving the later editions of his works, so that he would review the same sheet several times, and, of course, gave the compositor no small trouble; which made his learned printer, Mr. Bowyer, whom he much esteemed for his friendly qualities, as well as merit in his profession, say pleasantly to him on a certain occasion, "Those were fine times, when you never blotted a line, but allowed me to print your copy as fast as it came to hand, and without interruption." † See vol. iii. [of this editlon.] ‡ "Qui nullam unquam, in illis suis disputationibus, rem defendit, quam non probarit; nullam oppugnavit, quam non everterit."—CICERO *De Oratore*, lib. ii. cap. 38.

Dr. Lowth, afterwards bishop of London, was a man of learning and ingenuity, and of many virtues; but his friends did his character no service by affecting to bring his merits, whatever they were, into competition with those of the bishop of Gloucester. His reputation as a writer was raised chiefly on his Hebrew literature as displayed in those two works,* his "Latin Lectures on Hebrew Poetry," and his "English Version of the Prophet Isaiah." The former is well and elegantly composed, but in a vein of criticism not above the common; the latter I think is chiefly valuable, as it shows how little is to be expected from Dr. Kennicott's work, (which yet the learned bishop pronounces to be the greatest and most important that has been undertaken and accomplished since the revival of letters,†) and from a new translation of the Bible for public use.

On the subject of his quarrel with the bishop of Gloucester I could say a great deal; for I was well acquainted with the grounds and the progress of it. But besides that I purposely avoid entering into details of this sort, I know of no good end that is likely to be answered by exposing to public censure the weaknesses of such men.

In the next year, 1766, he gave a new and much-improved edition of "The Alliance," meaning to leave these two great works, now wrought-up to all the perfection he could bestow upon them, as legacies to the public; or rather as monuments to posterity of his unwearied love of the Christian religion, and (for the sake of so dear an interest) of the Church of England.

With a third volume of sermons already alluded to, and printed in 1767, he closed his literary course; except that he made an effort towards publishing the ninth and last book of the "Divine Legation;" on a subject he had much at heart, which he had long and diligently considered, and which now, for some years, he had been labouring to digest and explain in the best manner he could. But of this matter it will be expected that I give the reader a more particular account.

The argument of the "Divine Legation," properly so called, was completed in six books; but the plan of it required three more, in which the author proposed, as he tells us, "to remove all conceivable objections against the conclusion, and to throw in every collateral light upon the premisses."

But the argument itself was so ill-received, and so violently opposed by many of the clergy, that he grew disgusted at the treat-

* In saying this, I speak the sense of those who rate his talents at the highest, and would be thought to do most honour to his literary character. For myself, I confess I have always considered a juvenile essay of the excellent person (I mean a poem published by him under the name of "The Judgment of Hercules") as the best specimen of his taste and genius, and one that gave the promise of greater things than he ever performed afterwards. † Preliminary Dissertation, p. 62.

ment he met with, and could not be prevailed upon to finish his design in support of it. His letters are full of complaints on this head. In 1741, some time before he published the second volume, he says to one of his friends, "I am still condemned to drudge in the mines of antiquity. I may well give it that slavish appellation, while I am so used by my masters, the clergy, for whose ease and profit I am working." And writing to another in 1754, when the two first Letters of the "View" were coming out, he observes with indignation, "You will see there is a continued apology for the clergy; yet they will neither love me the more, nor forgive me the sooner, for all I can say in their behalf." *

And so on a hundred other occasions. The truth is, his resentment at the established clergy for their long and fierce opposition to his favourite work was the greatest weakness I ever observed in him. The number of books and pamphlets that appeared against him for twenty years together was, indeed, very great. But, the nature of his work considered, and his own freedom in dissenting from all others as occasion offered, what less could be expected? And when he had given two or three of his principal adversaries, as he did, a complete answer, he should not have suffered the clamour of the rest to divert him from the great design he had projected. But his conduct in this instance was not that which might have been expected from his usual magnanimity. When I sometimes expostulated with him upon it, his answer was, "I surely have reason to think myself very ill used. The enemies of revealed religion and of the Church of England I have treated as they deserved, and am neither surprised nor hurt at their resentments against me. To their censures or commendations I can be equally indifferent. But that my brethren the established clergy, the friends of religion, and fellow-members of that society whose cause I am pleading,—that these should set themselves against me with so much rancour, is what I cannot so well bear. If, indeed, the published volumes of the 'Divine Legation' be so weak or so mischievous as they suppose, I will not add to the offence given them by adding any more."

One sees what was at the bottom of the good man's mind. He loved the Church of England and its ministers, and had shown his zeal for them on all occasions. He was, therefore, hurt at not receiving that return of good-will from them which his life and conscience told him he might expect, and had deserved. Yet, as much as he felt the injury, and complained of it, he was never moved by it, as many others, with less provocation, and of less irritability, have been, to retract his good opinion of them, or to alter his conduct towards them in any respect.

* MS. Letters in my hands.

He only withheld the sequel of his capital work from them; and, unhappily, he persisted in this resolution till time had softened their passions, and, of course, his own.

At length the orthodoxy of his sentiments seemed gradually to be acknowledged: his own resentments proportionably abated; and from the time he had given the corrected edition of his "Divine Legation" in 1765, he was in earnest about resuming so much, at least, of his long-neglected work, as he had meant to comprise in the last or ninth book. The seventh and eighth, though the materials for them, too, were at hand, he had long since despaired of composing; but this last being an attempt to give a *rationale* of Christianity, he anxiously wished, for the importance of the subject, to leave behind him complete.

But the time was now past. Not only the business of his station broke in upon his leisure; the infirmities of age came insensibly upon him. His faculties, hitherto so bright and vigorous, suffered some eclipse and diminution of their force from his growing indispositions. "I read still," he would often say to me, "with the usual pleasure; but I compose with less ease, and with less spirit." In a letter to me from Gloucester, September 4th, 1769, he writes in the following manner:—

"I have received your kind letter of advice.*.....You know, by experience, how difficult it is, when we have once got into a wicked habit of thinking, to leave it off. All I can promise is, if that will satisfy you, to think to no purpose; and this I know, by experience, I can do; having done so for many a good day.

"I think you have heard me say, that my delicious season is the autumn; the season which gives most life and vigour to my mental faculties. The light mists, or, as Milton calls them, the 'steams,' that rise from the fields in one of these mornings, give the same relief to the views, that the blue of the plum (to take my ideas from the season) gives to the appetite. But I now enjoy little of this pleasure, compared to what I formerly had in an autumn morning, when I used, with a book in my hand, to traverse the delightful lawns and hedgerows round about the town of Newark, the unthinking place of my nativity."

And again, July 11th, 1770: "Hunter sent me his 'View of Lord Bolingbroke's Character.' He is a good man; but in this book I think he has shown himself very absurd and indiscreet: absurd, in a florid declamation; and indiscreet, as well as very injudicious, in the most extravagant encomium of Bolingbroke's parts that ever was; even to say 'he reasoned with the pride of a superior spirit, and I had almost said with the faculties of an angel.'

* Not to pursue his studies too closely.

"This disposed me to look again into the reasoning of this superior spirit, this angelic man, as I have collected together the best he has in my 'View of' his 'Philosophy.' I have done it justice. But this retrospect is accompanied with a mortifying conviction, that the time is now past when I was able to write with that force. Expect to find in my future writings the marks of intellectual decay. But so much for that matter."

In my answer to this letter from Thurcaston, July 23rd, to soothe the mind of my friend under this unwelcome discovery, and to prevail upon him, if I could, to relax those efforts in composition which, not being so easy to him as they had been, might affect his health and spirits, I wrote as follows: "As to what you say of your not writing with the force you formerly did, it may very well be, and yet be no subject of mortification. For besides that you can afford to abate something of your ancient force, and yet have enough left, force itself has not, in all periods of life, the same grace. The close of one of these long and bright days has not the flame and heat of noon, and would be less pleasing if it had. And I know not why it may not be true, in the critical, as well as moral, sense of the poet's words,

'Lenior et *melior* fis accedente senectâ.'

"But what I would chiefly say on the subject is this, that, whether with force or without it, I would only wish your future writings to be an amusement to you, and not a labour; and this I think is the proper use to be made of your observation, if it be ever so well founded."

In short, I continued to express myself in this way to him and his family with so little reserve, that he saw my intention was to draw him off by degrees from writing at all, which he takes notice of in a letter of the next year, June 2nd, 1771, though with some little chagrin, as was but too natural, at this plain dealing.

"I never believed I should feel so tenderly for —— as I now do. A suffering friend's good qualities, in such a condition, separate themselves, and rise superior to his failings, which we are insensibly disposed to forget. If this be the case of common acquaintance in certain seasons, what must be our constant sentiments of a real friend at all seasons, who loses no occasion of expressing every mode of tenderness towards those he loves! I fell into this train of thinking by what my wife told me, with much pleasure, a little before I left London. She said, that Dr. Hurd assured her that I would write no more. I received this news, which gave her so much satisfaction, with an approving smile. I was charmed with the tenderness of friendship which conveyed, in so inoffensive a manner, that fatal secret which Gil Blas was incapable of doing, as he ought, to his patron the archbishop of Granada."

I insert these extracts, chiefly in reference to the ninth book of the "Divine Legation," which twenty years before would have been finished in a few weeks, and with that flame of genius which irradiates the former books, but which now lay under his hands many years, was written by snatches and with difficulty, and left incomplete by him at last.* An unwelcome part this of the little history I am writing! yet not unuseful, if it may admonish superior writers to place a just confidence in themselves, and little ones to treat them with something more respect. Cudworth and Warburton are memorable and instructive instances to either purpose.

The misfortune, in the case of the latter, was, that although he had digested in his own mind, long ago, the substance of the ninth book, and was perpetually meditating upon it, yet he had committed very little of it to paper; his way being to put down in writing only short notes of what he intended to enlarge upon, and to work them up only when he was preparing to send his copy to the press. This, in his best days, was so easy to him, that, in printing some of his elaborate works, he had not in his hands two sheets together, but sent the copy to his printer as fast as it was composed.

I know indeed that many persons, from the compass and variety of his learning, imagined that he drew the materials of it from a voluminous common-place. The fact was just otherwise. His memory was so tenacious, that he trusted every thing to it: or if he may be said to have kept a common-place, it was nothing more than a small interleaved pocket almanac, of about three inches square; in which he inserted now and then a reference to a curious fact or passage, that he met with in his reading, but chiefly short hints of sentiments and reflections, which occasionally struck him, and might some time or other be put to use. At the end of every year, he tore out of his almanac such leaves as contained any of those reflections, and put them together under general heads, that he might recur to them, on occasion, the more readily. Of these papers, or rather collections of papers, I have many in my hands, relative to the subjects of the three last books of the "Divine Legation;" and from these the ninth book, such as he left it, was composed.

Another inconvenience, attending the late composition of this book, was, that he had occasionally delivered, in his sermons, and other printed works, some of the leading principles contained in it. Thus he had, in effect, anticipated a good part of his subject. Nor was this all.

* Yet it may be concluded from the subject, which is a general view of God's moral dispensations from Adam to Christ, (see "Divine Legation," book vi. sect. vi. at the end, and book ix. at the beginning,) that very little is wanting to complete the author's design; only, what he had proposed to say on the apocalyptic prophecies, and which may be supplied from the "Discourse on Antichrist." (See Discourse xxviii. vol. x. [Edition of 1811.])

Finding the labour of composing troublesome to him, he quoted from himself very freely; and such passages as had found a place elsewhere, when the purpose of completing the last book was suspended or laid aside, were now inserted in it, without much alteration, in order to carry on the thread and order of his discourse.

From both these causes, therefore, (his not having reduced to form the materials he had provided for the ninth book, and his having already worked up some part of them,) it is easy to see the disadvantage with which he came, in the close of his long life, to the composition of this work. His memory and invention were not what they had been; his facility and variety of expression were not the same; and, what was worst of all, the grace of novelty in the subject was in some measure gone off.

It was therefore matter of deliberation with me, for some time, whether I should insert the ninth book, though printed, so far as it goes, by himself, entire and in its own form, or only some fragments of it. But, on further consideration, I judged it right to give that work exactly as the author left it; especially, as the subject is highly interesting, and even new, unless where anticipated by himself; the method clear and exact; and the whole cast of composition masterly; his reasonings being carried on, if not with the splendid ease and perspicuity of his best manner, yet with a force and spirit, both in the sentiment and expression, which may well excite our admiration, when the circumstances under which he wrote are considered.

In a word, this ninth book of the "Divine Legation," under all the disadvantages with which it appears, is the noblest effort that has hitherto been made to give a *rationale* of Christianity. How far it may satisfy those who have so long and so loudly called for it, will be now seen: without doubt no farther than as it may agree (if, in any respects, it should agree) with their reason. In the mean time, the investigation is made with the best design—

"To justify the ways of God to man;"

and, let me add, in a way that entitles it to another sort of regard than is due to theories, constructed, as they usually are, on fanciful suppositions, and arbitrary assumptions: since every thing, here, is advanced on the sure grounds of natural and revealed religion: the one estimated by the purest reason; the other, interpreted with an awful reverence of the written word, and according to the rules of the soundest and soberest criticism.

While the good bishop was thus exerting his last strength in the cause of religion, he projected a method by which he hoped to render it effectual service after his death. This was by the institution of a lecture on PROPHECY; a subject which he conceived had not been considered with the care it ought; and from a thorough discussion of

which, he assured himself, much additional force would arise to the proof of the Christian religion. He had himself opened a way to the successful investigation of the general subject, in some principles delivered in the "Divine Legation," and in his confutation of Collins's book by means of those principles. But some particular prophecies had struck his attention, as furnishing the most decisive argument for the truth of Christianity. In the preface to his Remarks, part ii. printed so long ago as 1745, he says, "I have ever thought the prophecies relating to Antichrist, interspersed up and down the New and Old Testament, the most convincing proof of the truth of the Christian religion, that any moral matter is capable of receiving." And again: "This question (namely, what individual power is meant in the prophecies) is one, on the right determination of which alone, I am fully persuaded, one might rest the whole truth of the Christian religion."*

Under this persuasion then, in 1768, he gave five hundred pounds in trust to Lord Mansfield, Sir Eardley Wilmot, and Mr. Charles Yorke, for the purpose of founding a lecture at Lincoln's Inn, in the form of a sermon, "to prove the truth of revealed religion in general, and of the Christian in particular, from the completion of the prophecies in the Old and New Testament, which relate to the Christian church, especially to the apostasy of papal Rome."

The subject is infinitely curious, and of vast extent: for those who have taken it to be too much narrowed by specifying the prophecies concerning Antichrist, seem not to have understood the compass of the controversy, nor the terms of the institution itself. The truth is, there is more danger that lecturers will be wanting to the institution, than that it will not afford matter and scope enough for their discussion. He was anxious to leave this important trust in the best hands. And while it continues in such as have had the management of it, there is no doubt that the best supply which the age furnishes will be provided for this lecture. And, if I had not myself preached the first course of these sermons, I should add that, hitherto, their choice of lecturers has afforded no signal cause of complaint.

It was afterwards in the bishop's contemplation to double the original endowment. But he was diverted from this design, though with some difficulty, by those who represented to him that the sum given was sufficient to answer his purpose of engaging men of ability to read his lecture, if they were influenced by such motives as became them, a regard for their own honour, and a zeal for the service of religion; and that more could answer no good purpose, nay, might easily be abused to bad ones, if they were not.

The last years of the bishop's life were clouded with misfortune, as

* See "Remarks on several occasional Reflections," &c., part ii. preface, vol. xi. [Edition of 1811.]

well as indisposition. He had for some time been so sensible of his declining health, that he read little, and wrote less. But in the course of the year 1775, the loss of a favourite son and only child,* who died of a consumption in his twentieth year, when every hope was springing up in the breast of a fond parent, to make amends, as it were, for his want of actual enjoyment—this sudden affliction, I say, oppressed him to that degree, as to put an end to his literary labours, and even amusements, at once. From that disastrous moment he lived on indeed for two or three years; but when he had settled his affairs, as was proper, upon this great change in his family, he took no concern in the ordinary occurrences of life, and grew so indifferent to every thing, that even his books and writings seemed, thenceforth, to be utterly disregarded by him.

Not that his memory and faculties, though very much impaired, were ever wholly disabled. I saw him so late as October, 1778, when I went into his diocess to confirm for him. On our first meeting, before his family, he expressed his concern that I should take that journey, and put myself to so much trouble, on his account. And afterwards, he took occasion to say some pertinent and obliging things, which showed not only his usual friendliness of temper, but the command he had of his attention. Nor was this all. The evening before I left him, he desired the family to withdraw, and then entered into a confidential discourse with me on some private affairs, which he had much at heart, with as much pertinence and good sense as he could have done in any former part of his life: such was the

* He had been placed, much to his father's satisfaction, under the care of Dr. Halifax; then an eminent tutor of Trinity Hall at Cambridge, and the king's professor of law in that university; who in 1782 was advanced to the see of Gloucester, and translated in 1789 to that of St. Asaph. He died March 4th, 1790.—His distinguished worth and ability deservedly raised him to the high rank he held in the church.—But his character is given more at large in the following elegant inscription, composed by his father-in-law, the Rev. Dr. William Cooke, dean of Ely, and provost of King's College, Cambridge, and engraved on his monument in the church of Warsop, in Nottinghamshire; of which church the bishop was rector, and in which, for the reason assigned in the two first lines of the inscription, he was buried.

Hìc juxta filiolum dulcissimum acerbo olim fato
præreptum paternas exuvias deponi voluit vir
reverendissimus SAMUEL HALIFAX LL. D. et S. T. P.
Ex hac vicinia oriundus primisque literis imbutus in
academiâ protenus Cantabrigiensi floruit juris civilis
prælector publicus et professor regius in curiâ prærogativâ
Cantuariensi facultatum registrarius in hâc ecclesiâ
rector in ecclesiâ cathedrali Glocestriensi primò deinde
Asaphensi episcopus quæ per omnia officia ingenio claruit
et eruditione et industriâ singulari summâ in ecclesiam
Anglicanam fide concionum vi ac suavitate flexanimâ
scriptorum nitore et elegantiâ vitâ insuper id quod primarium
sibi semper habuit inculpabili
Natus est apud Mansfield Jan. 18, 1733, calculo oppressus
properatâ morte obiit Martii 4, 1790, ætatis ebeu 57
Catharina conjux cum filio unico et sex filiabus superstes
relicta in aliquod desiderii sui solamen mœrens P.

power he had over his mind, when roused to exert himself by some interesting occasion. But this was an effort which could not be sustained very long. In less than half an hour the family returned, and he relapsed into his usual forgetfulness and inattention.

In this melancholy state he languished till the summer following, when he expired at the palace in Gloucester, on the 7th of June, 1779, and was buried in his cathedral, at no great distance from the west door, and near to the grave of one of his predecessors, bishop Benson.

A neat mural monument has been put up there to his memory, with the following inscription :—

TO THE MEMORY OF
WILLIAM WARBURTON, D.D.
FOR MORE THAN NINETEEN YEARS
BISHOP OF THIS SEE;
A PRELATE
OF THE
MOST SUBLIME GENIUS, AND EXQUISITE LEARNING;
BOTH WHICH TALENTS
HE EMPLOYED, THROUGH A LONG LIFE,
IN THE SUPPORT
OF WHAT HE FIRMLY BELIEVED,
THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION,
AND OF WHAT HE ESTEEMED
THE BEST ESTABLISHMENT OF IT,
THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

IV.

It only remains for me to draw together the several parts of the bishop's character, and to present them to the reader in one view; which I shall now attempt, with the affection of a friend, no doubt, yet, on the whole, with as much severity as I ought. For I remember the wise and humane reflection of the great biographer, who, in his life of Cimon, expresseth himself to this purpose: "When a painter undertakes to give us the portrait of a beautiful person, if there be any smaller blemishes in his subject, we do not expect him to omit them altogether; for then the picture would be unlike: nor to express them with too much care; for then it becomes disgusting.

"In like manner, it being difficult, or rather impossible, to find a faultless character, the writer of a great man's life will lay himself out in delineating his good qualities, and not dwell with pleasure, or an anxious diligence, on his foibles, out of a respectful tenderness to human nature, which unhappily is not capable of attaining absolute perfection." *

* Plutarch. Cimon. *sub init.*

And with this little apology for myself I proceed to give the outline of my friend's character.

He possessed those virtues which are so important in society, truth, probity, and honour, in the highest degree; with a frankness of temper very uncommon, and a friendliness to those he loved and esteemed, which knew no bounds; not suspicious or captious in the least; quick, indeed, in his resentment of real manifest injuries, but then again, as is natural to such tempers, of the utmost placability.

He had an ardent love of virtue, and the most sincere zeal for religion; and that the freest from all bigotry and all fanaticism that I have ever known. He venerated the civil constitution of his country, and was warmly attached to the church of England. Yet he was no party man, and was the sincerest advocate for toleration. It was not his manner to court the good opinion of our dissenters. But he had nothing of prejudice or ill-will towards them; he conversed familiarly with such of them as came in his way, and had even a friendship with some of their more noted ministers,* who did not then glory in Socinian impieties, or indulge themselves in rancorous invectives against the established church.

I know, indeed, that he spoke his sense of men and things, occasionally, with force, which in the language of some persons will be termed bigotry. And the truth is, he never indulged his candour so far as to treat all opinions and all characters alike. On the contrary, he held profane and licentious writers to be fit objects of public reproof; and though civil penalties should not be applied to the coercion of mistaken, or even to a certain degree of hurtful, opinions, yet literary chastisement, he thought, should; an equal acceptance of all being the ready way to introduce scepticism under the specious name of liberality, or rather irreligion itself under the mask of charity. And if this zeal may be abused, as without doubt every thing may at most, he had only to answer for that abuse; the use itself being surely unquestionable, if there be truth or meaning in the apostle's aphorism, that "it is always good to be zealously affected in a good matter." But the reader, if he thinks fit, may see his own vindication of himself in the "Apology for his View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy."

Indeed his conduct had been always uniform in this respect. Even in the year 1738, when the first volume of the "Divine Legation" was published, he makes a full and frank declaration of his character. For in his dedication to the freethinkers, speaking of the advantage he should have, in that address, of not being called upon to disgrace himself or them by a style of adulation, he goes on thus:—

* See a "Collection of Letters to and from Dr. Doddridge, of Northampton;" published by T. Stedman, M. A., vicar of St. Chad's, Shrewsbury, 1790.

"Not but I must own you have been managed, even by some of our order, with very singular complaisance. Whether it was that they affected the fame of moderation, or had a higher ambition for the honour of your good word, I know not; but I, who neither love your cause, nor fear the abilities that support it, while I preserve for your persons that justice and charity which my profession teaches to be due to all, can never be brought to think otherwise of your character, than as the despisers of the Master whom I serve, and as the implacable enemies of that order to which I have the honour to belong; and as such, I should be tempted to glory in your censures, but would certainly refuse your commendations."

Such were his early, as well as late, notions of candour. They who affect to push them still farther, may do well to reflect whether they be their own dupes, or the dupes of others; I mean, whether they have indeed any principle themselves, or can be content to serve the views of those whose interest it is that men of principle speak and act as if they had not any.

His love of letters was extreme, and his disposition to countenance all those in whom he perceived any kind or degree of literary merit, the most prompt and generous; as appeared by his incessant recommendation of them to his great friends, when his own scanty patronage, as he would oft and vehemently complain, denied him the means of rendering them any service himself.

If we consider him as a writer and a divine, it is not easy to find terms that will do justice to his merit.

His reading was various and extensive, and his discernment exquisite. He saw and seized what was just and useful in every science which he cultivated, and in every book he read. The lumber and the refuse he shook off, and left to others. Perhaps no learned writer ever dealt less in ordinary quotation. Even the more familiar passages, unless when cited by him as direct authorities, take an air and turn in his application of them, which makes them in a manner new. The same observation may be extended to his reasonings, which are either purely his own, or appear to be so, by his management of them. So that it seems a natural question which one* of his friends put to him, on the receipt of a volume of his sermons,—"How do you manage always to say something new upon old subjects, and always in an original manner?"

To say all in a word, he possessed, in an eminent degree, those two qualities of a great writer, *sapere et fari;* I mean, superior sense, and the power of doing justice to it by a sound and manly eloquence. It was an ignorant cavil that charged him with a want of taste. The objection arose from the originality of his manner; but he wrote

* Mr. C. Yorke, in one of his letters, February 2nd, 1767.

when he thought fit with the greatest purity and even elegance, notwithstanding his strength and energy, which frequently exclude those qualities.*

The character of his style is freedom and force united: as that of the style now in vogue is effort without either. Nobody understood the philosophy of grammar better; yet in the construction of his terms he was not nice, rather he was somewhat negligent. But this negligence has no ill effect in works of reasoning, and of length, where the writer's mind is intent on the matter, and where a certain degree of irregularity gives the appearance of ease and spirit.

In his use of the terms themselves, especially of what are called "mixed modes," and in the nice adjustment of the predicate to the subject, (in which the accuracy of style chiefly consists,) he was of all writers the most scrupulously exact. It was by this secret in his expression (so far as it depended on art and design) that he is never stiff or languid in his style, but everywhere free and nervous. It never flattens upon you, not being over-laboured in the phrase, or too general in the terms. There is the appearance of freedom, with the utmost energy and precision.

For the rest, the higher excellencies of his style were owing to the strength of his imagination, and a clear conception of his subject; in other words, to his sublime genius.

Thus his style was properly his own, and what we call "original." Yet he did not disdain to draw what assistance he might from the best critics, among whom Quinctilian was his favourite.

By this union of art and nature he succeeded, of course, in all sorts of composition. But in one especially, the controversial, he was so much superior to himself, that barely to say he excelled in it would be a poor and scanty praise.

From his first entrance on theological studies, he had applied himself with care to the reading of our best writers in controversy, such as Hooker, Chillingworth, and Locke; of whom he was so fond, that he had their works bound up in small detached pieces for the convenience of carrying them with him in his hand or pocket when he travelled or walked abroad by himself. Of these I have several in my possession, which appear to have been much used. It is no wonder he should have this taste; for besides that controversy was then in vogue, he disdained to oppose the enemies of religion in any other way than that of logical confutation; and "against those," to use his own words in a letter to me, "he had denounced eternal war, like Hannibal against Rome, at the altar."

* Mr. Pope gives the true character of him, as a writer, where he says, that "he had a genius equal to his pains, and a taste equal to his learning."—"Works," vol. x. p. 291, 12mo. edition, 1754. L. cxiii.

Thus disciplined, he came with advantage to the use of his arms, when he found himself obliged, as he soon was, to take them up. Use and habit did the rest; so that he became consummate in this mode of writing; and, at the same time, original. For to the authority of Hooker, the acuteness of Chillingworth, and the perspicuity of Locke, he added more than all their learning, together with a force of style, and poignancy of wit, of which we had hitherto seen no example in theological controversy.

With these talents and qualifications he was the terror of the infidel world while he lived, and will be their disgrace to future ages. His sublime reason, aided by his irresistible wit, drove them from their old fastnesses of logic and philosophy, and has forced them to take shelter in the thin cover of history and romance; whence we now see them shoot their arrows, dipped in irony and badinage; to the annoyance, indeed, of some witless passengers; but to the wary and well-appointed, who take a fancy to ramble into those paths, perfectly harmless and insignificant.

But when I mentioned his making war on our freethinking philosophers, let me be understood to mean, not the minute and plebeian, but the more considerable, and, as one may say, "sizeable" men of that party; such as pretended to erudition, and reasoned, at least, though weakly or perversely. For as to those insect-blasphemers, of whatever condition, which the fashion, rather than the philosophy, of the age has generated, and sent forth in swarms over a great part of modern Europe, he regarded them but as the summer flies, which tease a little by their murmurings, (for stings, he would say, they had none,) and are easily brushed away by any hand, or vanish of themselves.

Next to infidels professed, there was no set of writers he treated with less ceremony than the Socinian, in whom he saw an immoderate presumption, and suspected not a little ill faith. For professing to believe the divine authority of the scriptures, they take a licence in explaining them which could hardly, he thought, consist with that belief. To these free interpreters of the word he was ready to say, as St. Austin did to their precursors, the Manichæans, "Tell us plainly, that ye do not at all believe the gospel of Christ; for ye who believe what ye will in the gospel, and disbelieve what ye will, assuredly believe not the gospel itself, but yourselves only." *

It is true he himself would reason on revealed truths farther than to some may seem necessary; but he never reasoned against them. It was his principle and his practice to follow the apostolic rule of

* "Apertè dicite non vos credere Christi Evangelio: nam qui in Evangelio quod vultis creditis, quod vultis non creditis, vobis potius quàm Evangelio creditis."—*Contr. Faust.* l. xvii. c. 3.

"casting down all imaginations that exalt themselves against the knowledge of God," (2 Cor. x. 5,) which, when clearly revealed, he held it an extreme impiety in any Christian, not only to question directly, but to elude by any forced interpretation. In short, he regarded Socinianism, the idol of our self-admiring age, as a sort of infidelity in disguise, and as such he gave it no quarter.

Other religionists he would confute, as occasion offered, with his usual vivacity; but he made allowance for their prejudices, and, when no malevolence intervened, treated their persons with respect. But enough, you say, of his controversial merits; let us hear something of his defects.

"He was arrogant, and impatient of contradiction." It is true he knew his own strength, and confided enough in it. But, then, as that quality made him incapable of envying his opponents, it should have made him careless of being censured by them. Still it must be owned that he had the common infirmity of being better satisfied with such as adopted his opinions than with those who rejected them. I say the *common* infirmity; for, I doubt, it adheres to our very nature, and that we shall in vain seek for a man dispassionate enough to be indifferent to contradiction; especially when direct and public, and urged, too, with some degree of eagerness, or rather sharpness, which is scarcely separable from controversy.

"But he was violent in his resentments, and excessively severe in his expression of them." As to this charge, hear, first, his own apology for himself. "The paper I send you * is the introductory note to ——. I need not explain it to you. You will understand every word. What I want to know is, whether some parts of it be not too severe. Whatever there is of this kind, I shall gladly strike out. For though I have had provocation enough, I can assure you, I have no resentments. I perhaps may not be thought the best judge of my own temper in this matter, and reasonably. But why I say I have so little resentment, I collect from hence, that there is not one word in this volume against them [his adversaries] which I could not, with the greatest indifference, strike out, either with reason or without. I do not expect the world should do me this justice, because they are to judge by appearances; and appearances are against me; for there are caustic strokes enough against the ignorance and ill faith of my adversaries. But if this be resentment, it is the resentment I should show in the case of any other honest man."

His resentment, then, was impartial; and that it was so, he showed in his vindication of Mr. Pope, and in other instances. But I take upon me to go farther, and to assert, that the severity objected to him was the effect of his genius, and of no vindictive spirit. For

* In a letter to me, January 18th, 1757.

the difference between him and ordinary writers, who seem to be at their ease in disputing, whether on religion or any other subject, is merely this: he felt strongly, and wrote forcibly; they are incapable of doing either. This is the simple truth, if it may be told; and hence it is that the same complaint has been made of every great genius in controversy from Jerome down to our author.

Not but another consideration may be worth attending to. The end of controversy is either to convince the person you dispute with, or simply to confute his opinions. When the former is the object, without doubt, the softest words are the best; but the other is best done by vigorous expression, because it shows the disputant to be in earnest, and sets the error contended against in the strongest light; (the likeliest means to prevent others from being infected with it;) and such was the bishop's view in most of the controversies in which he engaged. The same observation may be extended to what has been called his dogmatic manner of writing, which is only the firm tone of one who believes what he says, and is, indeed, very different from the careless, unconcerned air of the sceptic.

But, lastly, I must observe, that the charges of impatience and severity, in the sense intended by those that urge them, are not true. When no unfriendliness appeared in those who differed from him, he heard their reasons as patiently, confuted them as calmly, or gave way to them as readily, as other men: which I may the rather affirm, having had the experience of it on many occasions. Our sentiments, no doubt, agreed in the main: there could not otherwise have been so entire a friendship between us as there was. But I never took greater liberties with any man than with him, nor with less offence, and that in matters of no small delicacy, as the reader will see from the following example among many others which I could easily give him:—

Voltaire had spent a great part of his miserable life in railing against the Jewish law, and its divine Author. His complete ignorance of the subject disposed men of learning very generally to treat his censures with neglect. But the bishop of Gloucester, observing the impression they made on a licentious public, thought it might be of use to show this fashionable blasphemer in his true light; to strip his sophistical reasonings of the little plausibility they had; and, for the rest, to turn his favourite weapon of ridicule against himself.

With this view he had been at the pains to plan a work of some length, in three Dissertations, which would take in the whole of that subject, and give him occasion to expose, with much force, Voltaire's libertine glosses upon it. When he had sketched out the contents of this discourse, he sent it to me, and desired to know what I thought

of it, and whether he should proceed in the design or no. I told him very frankly, that, although I thought his plan an excellent one, and could trust him with the execution of it, yet, upon the whole, I wished him to prosecute his design no farther. I said there was no end of confuting every shallow, though fashionable, scribbler against religion; that he had done enough already in exposing so many others of that family, and, very lately, the noble writer that was at the head of it in England, to the just scorn of thinking men; that to go on in this agonistic course was not only needless, but would bring a storm of envy upon him from all quarters; and that even his friends would, many of them, consider him as too fond of controversy, and as indulging himself too freely in the talent he had for it. I added other considerations, and particularly this, that I thought it beneath him to commit himself with a person so little acquainted, as Voltaire confessedly was, with the matter in question; and that for him to answer such a writer in form would be like breaking a butterfly upon a wheel, according to his friend Pope's ingenious illustration of such achievements.

In conclusion: I pressed him earnestly to leave this man of merriment to his own serious reflections, if he ever had any; and to reserve his force for some better occasion than that of repelling the slight cavils of ignorant and ill-informed men.

This free remonstrance was not ill taken. He answered me without hesitation, and in one word: "In the matter of Voltaire, your advice will have its usual weight with me." The plan was accordingly laid aside and forgotten.

After such an example of facility in taking advice, the bishop of Gloucester will not be thought that impracticable man he has been sometimes represented to be. Many perhaps will think, with more reason, that his easiness went too far in this instance; for that his three dissertations on the Jewish law and history would have been highly entertaining at least; and perhaps as useful in repressing the petulance of the French poet, as the Four Letters had been in dismounting the arrogance of the English philosopher. And upon these grounds I might indeed have repented me of the free advice I gave him, but for the pleasure I have since had in seeing the same design undertaken and executed with great elegance and ability by another hand.*

But perhaps I have misemployed my pains in setting the controversial character of my friend in a just light. There are those, I know, who will regard this praise, whatever it be, as injurious to the learned prelate, rather than honourable to him; who will be ready to tell us that controversial janglings are out of date; that they never did

* See "Lettres de quelques Juifs," &c., in 3 tom. 12mo, Paris, 1776.

any good, and are now at length fallen into general and just contempt.

To these wise men I should have much to say, if I could find means to do it without disgracing myself and disgusting them by an air of controversy. And would to God that religious controversy were now of no use in this manly age of the world! I should then be for laying it aside with other childish things. But is this the fact? and when all quarters, besides, resound with controversy, is there no demand for it in the schools of religion? After all, the reader sees what is aimed at by this affected contempt of theological altercation. A hint in passing is more than enough on a subject, which the bishop himself has treated at some length, and with his usual force.*

I apprehend therefore no discredit to my friend or myself, in having dwelt so long on the virtues of the controversial writer. They were eminently conspicuous in him, and exerted for a just purpose, that of confuting error and repressing calumny. Not that I am concerned to deny all mixture of frailty in my friend's exercise of his polemic talents. It will be found in our best performance of the best things. And it is credible enough, that the abundance of his wit, the vivacity of his temperament, and the petulance of his adversaries, may have sharpened his style too much in some instances. Yet, on the whole, he might apologize for himself, as Erasmus has done in a fine letter to his friend Sadolet: "Some of my opponents," says he, "because they deserved no better of me, I have exposed, perhaps, rather than confuted: yet with more temper, as I think myself, than they attacked me. Although I am sensible that passion may have biassed my judgment. For I must confess that I am easily warmed by ill usage; but so as not to retain the resentment of it long, and to forget injuries as soon as any man." †

As a divine, properly so called, he filled and adorned that character with the highest ability.

Strength of reason, exquisite learning, a critical knowledge of antiquity, an enlarged view of the scheme of revelation, a wonderful sagacity in discovering the sense of scripture, and in opening the probable grounds of its clearly revealed doctrines, with the profoundest submission of his understanding to them, whether those grounds of reason were apparent to him or not; these rare and admirable qualifications shone out in him with greater lustre than in any other orna-

* See "Doctrine of Grace," book iii. chap. 2, near the end, vol. viii. [Edition of 1811.]

† "Quosdam, quia sic merebantur, IRRISI verius quàm confutavi, nusquam non temperatior his a quibus lacessebar, ut mea quidem fert opinio; nam fieri et potest et solet, ut meo judicio imponat affectus; atque is sum, fateor, qui possem lacessitus incandescere, sed nec iræ pertinacis, et injuriarum obliviosus, ut si quis alius."—*Epistola mxciv.* Edit. Clerici, Lug. Bat. 1703.

ment of our church, Stillingfleet and Barrow, and Taylor himself, not excepted. To which I must add that first and noblest quality of all, a perfect honesty of mind, and sincere love of truth, which governed his pen in all his religious inquiries.*

After mentioning to me, in one of his letters, (January 12th, 1757,) some interesting meditations he was then engaged in, he stops short, and asks, "But what is man? A fit of the spleen, a fit of illness, and lastly death, may wipe out all these glorious visions, with which my brain at present is painted over: as, Law said, it once was with hieroglyphics. But I hope the best; because I only aim at the honour of God and good of men. When I say this, I need not perhaps add, as I do with the utmost seriousness, that I shall never wittingly advance one falsehood, nor conceal or disguise one truth."

So that those, if any such there were, who thought he wrote for a party, with the views of interest, for the sake of reputation, or, in short, from any other cause than conviction, and the purest zeal for the advancement of truth, knew nothing of his character, and did him great wrong.

But to take him out of his study, and to consider him in the common walks of life.

He was of a cheerful temper, yet subject at times to fits of absence, and, if we may believe himself, even of melancholy. For so he paints his own complexional habit in two remarkable letters, addressed to a friend, and lately made public.†

In one of these, dated February 14th, 1742–3, he writes thus: "We have all something to make us think less complacently of the world. Religion will do great things. It will always make the bitter waters

* Considering him in this view, I mean as a consummate divine, one cannot but lament the fate of a work he had projected, but never executed, at least in the manner intended by him, "On theological Studies, for the Use of young People:" a plan of which he had digested in his own mind, and communicated to me by letter, so early as the year 1750. The principal heads were, 1. The right state and disposition of mind to make proper, improvements—in this were to be considered the natures of scepticism, dogmaticalness, enthusiasm, superstition, &c. 2. The previous studies of morality and natural religion from their first principles and foundations; and of antiquity, critical, historical, and philosophical. 3. The study of the scriptures. 4. Fathers and modern divines. 5. Ecclesiastical history. 6. Sermonizing, or the art of preaching. This work he reserved for the amusement of his declining years. But, as what is deferred so long, is rarely executed at all, and never so well as at an earlier season, so this noble design, which required the exertion of his best faculties in their full vigour, was not wholly neglected indeed, but slightly attempted by him a few years before his death: as I find from a brief sketch of it among his papers, which appears to have been drawn up hastily for the use of a friend, and was afterwards made to serve by way of charge to his clergy. Such as it is, I have judged it worth preserving. The reader will be pleased to see the thoughts of so great a man on this subject; and will, without doubt, make the proper allowances for their being laid before him in this imperfect state; without the detail, which was intended, and without those embellishments of style and composition, which in his best time he could so easily have bestowed upon them. This discourse, under the name of "Directions for the Study of Theology," will be found in vol. x. [Edition of 1811.]

† In the collection before mentioned. [Page 58.]

of Marah wholesome and palatable. But we must not think it will usually turn water to wine, because it once did so. Nor is it fit it should, unless this were our place of rest, where we were to expect the Bridegroom. I do the best I can, and should, I think, do the same, if I were a mere Pagan, to make life passable. To be always lamenting the miseries, or always seeking after the pleasures, of it, equally takes us off from the work of our salvation. And though I be extremely cautious what sect I follow in religion, yet any in philosophy will serve my turn; and honest Sancho Panca's is as good as any; who on his return from an important commission, when asked by his master, whether they should mark the day with a *black* or a *white* stone, replied, 'Faith, sir, if you will be ruled by me, with neither, but with good *brown ochre*.' What this philosopher thought of his commission, I think of human life in general, *good brown ochre* is the complexion of it."

The other letter I hinted at is dated February 2nd, 1740, and is of a still darker cast. For, speaking of what had made him delay so long the second volume of his "Divine Legation," he proceeds in the following manner: "I would not have you think that natural indolence alone makes me thus play the fool. Distractions of various kinds, inseparable from human life, joined with a naturally melancholy habit, contribute greatly to increase my indolence, and force me often to seek in letters nothing but mere amusement. This makes my reading wild and desultory: and I seek refuge from the uneasiness of thought from any book, let it be what it will, that can engage my attention. There is no one whose good opinion I more value than yours. And the marks you give me of it make me so vain, that I was resolved to humble myself in making you this confession. By my manner of writing upon subjects, you would naturally imagine they afford me pleasure, and attach me thoroughly. I will assure you, No. I have amused myself much in human learning, to wear away the tedious hours inseparable from a melancholy habit. But no earthly thing gives me pleasure, but the ties of natural relation, and the friendship of good men. And for all views of happiness, I have no notion of such a thing, but in the prospects which revealed religion affords us."

These letters appear to have been written, the latter of them especially, in a splenetic moment. But what is said of a melancholy habit, means no more (for there was no gloom of melancholy in the tenor of his life or conversation) than that, being of an inventive turn, or, in the language of his friend bishop Hare, having an "ingenious working head," * the driving of his thoughts sometimes wore his mind too much, and forced him to relieve it by changing the object of his attention.

* Page 10.

Hence the desultory reading; which, however, stored his memory with images of all sorts, and, as I before observed,* while it repaired the vigour of his mind, threw a richness and variety of colouring over all his writings.

But to go on with what I proposed to say of his companionable qualities.

In mixed companies he was extremely entertaining; but less guarded than men of the world usually are; and disposed to take to himself a somewhat larger share of the conversation, than very exact breeding is thought to allow. Yet few, I believe, wished him to be more reserved, or less communicative, than he was. So abundant was the information, or entertainment, which his ready wit and extensive knowledge afforded them! In private with his friends, he was natural, easy, unpretending; at once the most agreeable and most useful companion in the world. You saw to the very bottom of his mind on any subject of discourse; and his various literature, penetrating judgment, and quick recollection, made him say the liveliest or the justest things upon it. In short, I was in those moments affected by his conversation, pretty much as Cato was by that of Maximus Fabius, and may say, as he does in the dialogue on "Old Age,"—"I was so fond of his discourse, and listened to it so eagerly, as if I had foreseen, what indeed came to pass, that when I lost him, I should never again meet with so instructive a companion."†

I spoke of his private friendships. They were with men of learning and genius; chiefly with clergymen of the established church; and those the most considerable of the time. It would be invidious to give a list of these. I shall only mention, by way of specimen, the learned archdeacons of Stow and Winchester.

The former of these, Mr. Towne, was of his early acquaintance, when he lived in Lincolnshire, and much respected by him to his death. He was an ingenious and learned man, and so conversant in the bishop's writings, that he used to say of him, "he understood them better than himself." He published some defences of the "Divine Legation," in which with a glow of zeal for his friend, he showed much logical precision and acuteness.‡

The latter, Dr. Balguy, was a person of extraordinary parts, and extensive learning; indeed of universal knowledge; and, what is so

* Pages 5, 6. † "Ejus sermone ita tum cupidè fruebar, quasi jam divinarem id quod evenit, illo extincto, fore, undè discerem, neminem."—CICERO, *De Senectute*, cap. 104. ‡ The following is, I believe, an exact list of them:—1. Critical Inquiry into the Practice and Opinions of the ancient Philosophers concerning the Soul, &c. London, 1748. 2. Exposition of the Orthodox System of Civil Rights and Church Power; addressed to Dr. Stebbing. 3. Argument of the Divine Legation, fairly stated. London, 1751. 4. Free and candid Examination of Bishop Sherlock's Sermons and Discourses on Prophecy. London, 1756. 5. Dissertation on the ancient Mysteries. London, 1766. 6. Remarks on Dr. Lowth's Letter to Bishop Warburton. London, 1766.

precious in a man of letters, of the most exact judgment; as appears from some valuable discourses,* which, having been written occasionally on important subjects, and published separately by him, had raised his reputation so high, that His Majesty, out of his singular love of merit, and without any other recommendation, was pleased, in 1781, to make him the offer of the bishopric of Gloucester. Dr. Balguy had a just sense of this flattering distinction, but was unhappily prevented by an infirm state of health from accepting it.

With these, and such as these, the bishop was happy to spend his leisure hours. A general conversation he never affected, or rather took much pains to avoid, as what he justly thought a waste of time in one of his temper, talents, and profession.

But to draw to an end of this long and, as it may seem to those who knew little of him, too fond a character of my friend.

He had his foibles, no doubt, but such as we readily excuse, or overlook, in a great character. With more reserve in his writings and conversation, he had passed through the world with fewer enemies; (though no prudence could have kept a genius like his from having many;) and, with a temper less irritable, he would have secured a more perfect enjoyment of himself. But these were the imperfections of his nature, or rather the excrescences of his ruling virtues, an uncommon frankness of mind, and sensibility of heart. These qualities appear in all his writings, especially in his private letters; in which a warm affection for his friends, and concern for their interests, is everywhere expressed. But his tenderness for his family, and, above all, his filial piety,† strike us with peculiar force.

In a letter to me from Durham, July 12th, 1757, he writes thus: "I am now got, through much hot weather and fatigue, to this place. I hurried from the heat of London at a time, and under circumstances, when a true court chaplain would never have forgiven himself the folly of preferring the company of his friends and relations to attendance on the minister. But every one to his taste. I had the pleasure of finding you well at Cambridge; I had the pleasure of finding a sister and a niece well at Broughton, with whom I spent a few days with much satisfaction. For you must know, I have a numerous family; perhaps the more endeared to me by their sole dependence on me.

* These discourses, with some others, were afterwards collected into one volume in 1785, and presented, with a handsome dedication, to His Majesty. This excellent person died January 19th, 1795, while the concluding sheets of this discourse were yet in the press.

† A leading feature in the character of great men. See Plutarch's Coriolanus, Ed. Xyland. p. 215. Marcius, says his biographer, *οὐκ ἐνεπίμπλατο Οὐολουμνίαν εὐφραίνων καὶ τιμῶν.* When I complimented my friend on his promotion to the see of Gloucester, "It comes," said he, "too late; if my mother had been living, it might have given me some satisfaction." Seneca says to his mother, of his brother Novatus, "In hoc dignitatem excolit, ut tibi ornamento sit."—*De Consol. ad Helviam*, cap. xvi. H.

"It pleased Providence that two of my sisters should marry unhappily; and that a third, on the point of venturing, should escape the hazard, and so engage my care only for herself. I reckon this a lucky year; for I have married a niece to a reputable grocer at York, and have got a commission for a nephew in the regiment of artillery. These are pleasures," &c.

What his filial piety was, will be seen from the following extracts:—

"I am extremely obliged to you," says he to a confidential friend,* "for your remembrance of my dearest, my incomparable mother, whom I do more than love, whom I adore. No mortal can ever merit more of me than she has done. Her decline of life possesses me with anxiety; and I have no support for this but in the thoughts of that last meeting which excludes all farther chance of separation. But I must break off. You have had long experience what pain it is to me to speak of subjects that affect me most."

And again, to the same person, on occasion of her death in 1748: "You should have heard from me sooner, but that the afflictive news of my dear mother's death, which met me at this place,† made me incapable of writing, or indeed of doing any thing but grieve for the loss of the most admirable woman that ever was. She was the last of her family; and had in herself alone more virtues than are generally possessed by whole families throughout the whole course of their existence. My extreme sorrow for her death can only give place to my incessant meditation on her virtues and adoration of her memory. This is one of those losses that nothing can repair, and only time can alleviate. For I shall never enjoy that happiness as in the days when you and I were conversing together, while she was giving us our coffee. At present, I can think of nothing," &c.

But I grow prolix again, (for the reader's sake I will not say, tedious,) while I indulge myself in extracting these tender passages from his letters.

To conclude at length, in one word.

How differently soever men might think of him in his lifetime, all are, or will be, agreed in their opinions of him now he is dead. For, as a divine of his own size, and one after his own heart, said excellently well, "When great prelates are living, their authority is depressed by their personal defaillances, and the contrary interests of their contemporaries; which disband when they are dead, and leave their credit entire upon the reputation of those excellent books and monuments of learning and piety which are left behind them."‡

What that credit of our great prelate is, this collection of his works

* Dr. Taylor. May 22nd, 1746. † Prior-Park. ‡ Bishop Taylor, "Liberty of Prophesying," p. 210, 8vo, London, 1709.

will show; and will, if I mistake not, deliver him down to posterity as the ablest divine, the greatest writer, and the first genius of his age. They are faithfully printed from the last editions of the author, and those in many places corrected by his own hand. In one respect only I have some apology to make to the reader. Several of his friends had observed to him, and he was himself convinced of it, that he had filled the margin of the "Alliance," and "Divine Legation," with too many notes; and had swelled those volumes, in the latter editions, with too many extracts, under the name of postscripts, or appendices, from his controversial tracts. The longer notes occupy the reader too much, and divert him from the main argument, which, as it lies in the text of the "Divine Legation" especially, is drawn out to a sufficient length; otherwise they are infinitely curious and learned, and deserve to be read with great care. They are now, therefore, printed together at the end of each book, and referred to in the text. By this disposition, the reader's convenience is consulted, and the dignity of those capital works is preserved. As for such of the postscripts as are extracted from his controversial works, these I ought, perhaps, to have withdrawn; but, as hereafter they may have their use in separate editions of the "Alliance" and "Divine Legation," I have permitted them to keep their place. I did this the rather, because these discourses are not merely repetitions, but have received many corrections and alterations from the author; while the controversial treatises, from which they are taken, were never re-touched by him, but left in their original state.

Those controversial pieces themselves could by no means be suppressed or altered in the least, as they present the liveliest image of the writer's character and genius, and derive a peculiar grace from being seen in that connexion of thought and glow of colouring which they took, in the heat of composition, from his careless and rapid hand.

Some of his private letters (such as had been printed in his lifetime by himself or others) conclude the last volume, and show how much he excelled in this sort of composition, for which he was indeed singularly qualified by the characteristic virtues both of his head and heart. The reader will therefore wish for a larger collection of them; and he may in due time be gratified with it, out of the editor's long correspondence with him.

It may be proper to add, that this elegant edition * of his works is given at the sole expense of his widow, now Mrs. Stafford Smith,† of Prior-Park; who also erected the monument, before spoken of, to his memory in the church of Gloucester.

* In quarto, 1788. † She survived the bishop somewhat more than seventeen years; and died at Fladbury, near Evesham, a living of good value, which I had given to Mr. Stafford Smith, September the 1st, 1796. R. W.

I have now, as I found myself able, and in the manner I judged most fit, discharged my duty to this incomparable man; a duty which he seemed to expect would be paid to him by one or other of his surviving friends, when, in the close of his preface to Mr. Pope's works, he has these affecting words: "And I, when envy and calumny take the same advantage of my absence, (for while I live, I will trust it to my life to confute them,) may I find a friend as careful of my honest fame as I have been of his." I have, I say, endeavoured to do justice to his memory; but in so doing, I have taken, the reader sees, the best method to preserve my own. For in placing myself so near to him in this edition of his immortal works, I have the fairest, perhaps the only, chance of being known to posterity myself. Envy and prejudice have had their day; and when his name comes, as it will do, into all mouths, it may then be remembered, that the writer of this life was honoured with some share of his esteem, and had the pleasure of living in the most entire and unreserved friendship with him for near thirty years.

R. WORCESTER.

I, DECUS, I, NOSTRUM; MELIORIBUS UTERE FATIS.—*Virg. Æn.* vi. 546.

HARTLEBURY-CASTLE, *August 12th*, 1794.

APPENDIX TO THE LIFE.

LETTER A, p. 17.

"I HAVE known this gentleman about twenty years. I have been greatly and in the most generous manner obliged to him. So I am very capable, and, you will readily believe, very much disposed to apologize for him. Yet for all that, if I did not really believe him to be an honest man, I would not venture to excuse him to you. Nothing is more notorious than the great character he had acquired in the faithful and able discharge of a long embassy at Constantinople, both in the public part and the private one of the merchants' affairs. The first reflection on his character was that unhappy affair of the Charitable Corporation. I read carefully all the reports of the committee concerning it; and as I knew Sir Robert Sutton's temper and character so well, I was better able than most to judge of the nature of his conduct in it. And I do in my conscience believe that he had no more suspicion of any fraud, carrying on by some in the direction, than I had. That he was guilty of neglect and negligence as a director, is certain; but it was only the natural effect of his temper, where he has no suspicion, which is exceedingly indolent. And he suffered sufficiently for it,

not only in his censure, but by the loss of near £20,000. And at this very juncture he lost a considerable sum of money, through his negligence, by the villany of a land-steward, who broke and ran away. Dr. Arbuthnot knew him well; and I am fully persuaded, though I never heard so, that he had the same opinion of him in this affair that I have. But parties ran high, and this became a party matter. And the violence of parties no one knows more of than yourself. And his virtue and integrity have been since fully manifested. Another prejudice against him, with those who did not know him personally, was the character of his brother the general, as worthless a man, without question, as ever was created. But you will ask, why should a man in his station be engaged in any affair with such dirty people? It is a reasonable question; but you who know human nature so well, will think this a sufficient answer. He was born to no fortune, but advanced to that station in the Levant by the interest of his cousin Lord Lexington; besides the straitness of his circumstances, the usual and constant business of that embassy gave him, of course, a mercantile turn. He had seen in almost every country where he had been, societies of this kind, subsisting profitably to themselves and beneficially to the public. For not to think he came amongst them with a view to his own profit principally would indeed be absurd, yet I am sure with a view of an honest profit; for he is very far from an avaricious man. He lives up to his fortune, without being guilty of any vice or luxury. He is an extreme good and faithful husband, and with reason indeed, for it is to one of the finest women in England. He is a tender and indulgent father to very hopeful children; a kind master, and one of the best landlords to his tenants. I speak all this of my own knowledge. He has a good estate in this place. My parishioners are good people. The times, till very lately, for these last fifteen years, have been extreme bad for the graziers; I got of him for them two abatements in their rents at two several times. I will only beg leave to give you one more instance that relates to myself, and is not equivocal in his character. I chanced to know him when I was very young, by means of my neighbourhood to Lord Lexington, whom I never knew, where he oft came. And without any consideration to party or election interest, he seemed to have entertained an early esteem for me. He had two good livings on estates he had lately bought; and without the least intimation or solicitation he told me I should have the first that fell. He was as good as his word. But this was not all. As soon as I became possessed of the living, he told me, that (from what he had been informed by my predecessor, who at his death was going to commence a suit for his just dues) the living was much injured by a low and illegal composition. That he thought I ought to right myself, and he would join with me against the other freeholders, for his estate is something more than one-half of the parish. I replied, that as he paid all the tithes for his tenants, the greatest loss, in my breaking the composition, would fall upon himself, who must pay me half as much more as he then did. He said, he did not regard that; I was his friend, and it was my due. I answered, that, however, I could not do it yet, for that the world would never conceive it to be done with his consent, but would say that I had no

sooner got his living than I had quarrelled with him. But, when I came to my parish, I found them so good a sort of people, that I had as little an inclination to fall out with them. So, though to my great injury, I have deferred the matter to this day. Though the thing, in the opinion of Sir R. Raymond, who gave it on the case, as drawn up by the parishioners themselves, is clear and indisputable; yet they won't give it up without a lawsuit. In a word, there is nothing I am more convinced of than the innocence of Sir Robert Sutton, in the case of the Charitable Corporation, as to any fraud, or connivance at fraud. You who always follow your judgment, free from prejudice, will do so here. I have discharged my duty of friendship both to you and him."

LETTER B, p. 23.

"Good Madam, Newark, *January 26th*, 1744–5.

"I had the honour of your obliging letter of the 25th of last August, sent to me to Bath, where I then was. After some stay there, where my time was taken up more than I could have wished, I went to London, where I was still less in my own power. I am just now returned home: and the first thing I thought of was to make my acknowledgments for that favour.

"I do not wonder that the goodness of your heart, and your love of letters, should make you speak with so much tenderness of poor Mr. Pope's death; for it was a great loss both to the literary and moral world. In answer to your obliging question, what works of Mr. Pope have been published with my commentaries and notes, I am to inform you, they are the "Dunciad," in quarto, and the 'Essay on Man' and 'on Criticism,' in the same size. Which affords me an opportunity to beg the favour of you to let me know into whose hands in London I can consign a small parcel for you: for I have done myself the honour of ordering these two volumes to be sent to you, as I believed you would with difficulty get them of your booksellers so far north; and I hope you will forgive this liberty.

"Towards the conclusion of your letter, you have sent me one of the politest cartels imaginable. I think, his answer was generally commended, who told the emperor, when he pressed him, that he never would dispute with a man who had twenty legions at his beck. And do you think I will enter the lists with a lady, whose writings have twenty thousand charms in them? If I confided in myself, and aimed at honour, I could not indeed do better: for the case is there, as in the works of the Italian poets; who have, with great decorum, when they introduced female warriors, made the overcoming one of them the highest point of valour and address in their heroes. Besides, to speak out of a figure, we differ in what is the true foundation of morality. I have said all I have to say on the subject. And though it be hard to guess when a writer so much the mistress of her subject has said all, yet if I believed what you have said was all, I might perhaps be in some measure excusable; as I see you say so much more than any writer of your side of the question had done before you.

"One thing, and only one, you will give me leave, Madam, to observe: that I am a little surprised at the consequence drawn from my position—'that as without a God there could be no obligation, therefore the atheist who believes there is none (and might deduce that truth concerning obligation from the principles of right reason) would have no tie upon him.'

"Hence I concluded, and I thought rightly, that atheism was highly injurious to society. But how any one could conclude from this, (for this is the amount of what I said on that subject,) that, on my principles (for as to my opinion, I believe no one would question that) an atheist is not accountable in a future state for any enormities he may commit here, I do not see. And my reason for saying so is this: It is a principle, I suppose, agreed on, 'That crimes committed upon wrong principles are equally punishable with those committed against right; for that the falling into this wrong principle was occasioned by some punishable fault in the conduct.' Now I have not said one single word, throughout the discourse, that tends to invalidate this principle: consequently, all I have said cannot affect that truth, that an atheist is accountable. I ask your pardon, Madam, for this trouble. It is what I have not given to any other; though several have made the same objection. They deserved nothing at my hands; and you deserve every thing.

"You inquire with great civility concerning the third volume of the 'Divine Legation.' Several offices of friendship, several offices of domestic piety and duty, weariness with contradiction of sinners both against sense and grammar, (for such have been my adversaries,) have prevented me doing any thing at the last volume, since the publication of the second. But now being just upon the point of, not washing, but drying, my hands of controversy, I am about to sit down in earnest to the conclusion of the work.

"I beg, Madam, not only my best respects and services to Mr. Cockburn, who, I presume, is your spouse, but, in that case, my congratulations with him, for his honour and happiness in such a consort.

"I am, Madam,

"With the greatest regard and esteem,

"Your very obliged and obedient humble servant,

"W. WARBURTON."

DEDICATION

TO A NEW EDITION OF BOOKS I. II. III. OF

THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES,

IN MDCCLIV.

TO THE RIGHT HON. PHILIP EARL OF HARDWICKE,

LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT BRITAIN.

My Lord,

Your Lordship having so far approved of the good intentions of my endeavours for above twenty years past, in the cause of Religion, as to confer upon me a distinguishing mark of your favour, I am proud to lay hold of the first public opportunity which I have had, of desiring leave to make my most grateful acknowledgments.

I take the liberty to inscribe to your Lordship a new Edition of a work tending to show and illustrate, by a new argument, the *Divine Legation of Moses;* which in our own, as well as former times, the most celebrated Champions of Infidelity have cunningly, for their own purposes, laboured with all their might to overthrow.

If I have succeeded, or as far as I have succeeded, or may hereafter succeed, in the further prosecution of this attempt, I shall strengthen one foundation of Christianity.

As an author, I am not solicitous for the reputation of any literary performance. A work given to the world, every reader has a right to censure. If it has merit, it will go down to posterity: if it has none, the sooner it dies and is forgot the better.

But I am extremely anxious that no good man should mistake the view with which I write; and therefore cannot help feeling, perhaps too sensibly, when it is misrepresented.

So far as any censure can show that my poor labours are not calculated to promote *Letters* or *Learning*, to advance *Truth*, or, above all, to serve the cause of *Religion*, which I profess as a Christian and a Member of the Church of *England*, I own I have missed my end, and will be the first to join with the censure which condemns them.

In the mean time, the first book of this work, such as it is, is here humbly commended to your Lordship's protection. For to whom does

it so properly belong to patronize an argument showing the UTILITY of Religion to Society, as to that great Magistrate, Legislator, and Statesman, who is best able to recommend and apply the subject, by his being convinced of the TRUTH of Religion; and by his giving the most exemplary proof of his belief, in a steady regard to its dictates in his life and actions?

It is this which makes me presume on your Lordship's protection, not any thing extraordinary in the work itself. It is enough for your Lordship to find in those you favour a real zeal for the interests of Virtue and Religion. The effectual service of those interests depends on so many accidents, respecting both the ability of the Writer and the disposition of the Reader, that your Lordship's humanity and candour, enlarged, and not, as it often happens, diminished, by your great knowledge of mankind, will always dispose you to estimate merit by a better rule than the success.

I am,

MY LORD,

With the utmost Gratitude,

Your Lordship's most obliged and devoted Servant,

W. WARBURTON.

London, November 5th, 1754.

DEDICATION

TO THE FIRST EDITION OF BOOKS I. II. III. OF

THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES,

IN MDCCXXXVIII.

TO THE FREE-THINKERS.

GENTLEMEN,

As the following discourse was written for your use, you have the best right to this address. I could never approve the custom of dedicating books to men, whose professions made them strangers to the subject. A discourse on the Ten Predicaments to a leader of armies, or a system of casuistry to a minister of state, always appeared to me a high absurdity.

Another advantage I have in this address, is that I shall not lie under any temptations of flattery; which, at this time of day, when every topic of adulation has been exhausted, will be of equal ease and advantage to us both.

Not but I must own you have been managed, even by some of our Order, with very singular complaisance. Whether it was that they affected the fame of moderation, or had a higher ambition for the honour of your good word, I know not; but I, who neither love your cause, nor fear the abilities that support it, while I preserve for your persons that justice and charity which my profession teaches to be due to all, can never be brought to think otherwise of your character, than as the despisers of the Master whom I serve, and as the implacable enemies of that Order to which I have the honour to belong. And as such, I should be tempted to glory in your censures; but would certainly refuse your commendations.

Indeed, were it my design, in the manner of modern dedicators, to look out for powerful protectors, I do not know where I could sooner find them, than amongst the gentlemen of your denomination: for nothing, I believe, strikes the serious observer with more surprise, in this age of novelties, than that strange propensity to infidelity, so visible in men of almost every condition; amongst whom the advocates of Deism are received with all the applauses due to the inventors of the arts of life, or the deliverers of oppressed and injured nations. The *glorious liberty of the Gospel* is forgotten amidst our clamours against church-tyranny; and we slight the fruits of the restored *Tree of Knowledge*, for the sake of gathering a few barren leaves of Free-thinking, misgrafted on the old prolific stock of Deism.

But let me not be misunderstood; here are no insinuations intended against liberty: for, surely, whatever be the cause of this epidemic folly, it would be unjust to ascribe it to the freedom of the Press, which wise men have ever held one of the most precious branches of national Liberty. What, though it midwifes, as it were, these brain-sick births; yet, at the same time that it facilitates the delivery, it lends a forming hand to the mishapen issue: for, as in natural bodies, become distorted by suffering in the conception, or by too strait imprisonment in the womb, a free unrestrained exposition of the parts may, in time, reduce them nearer to their natural rectitude; so crude and rickety notions, enfeebled by restraint, when permitted to be drawn out and examined, may, by the reform of their obliquities, and the correction of their virulency, at length acquire health and proportion.

Nor less friendly is this liberty to the generous advocate of religion: for how could such a one, when in earnest convinced by the evidence of his cause, desire an adversary whom the laws had before disarmed; or value a victory, where the Magistrate must triumph with him? Even I, the meanest in this controversy, should have been ashamed of projecting the defence of the great Jewish Lawgiver, did not I know that the same liberty of thinking was impartially indulged

to all. And if my dissenting in the course of this defence from some received opinions need an apology, I desire it may be thought, that I ventured into this track the less unwillingly, to show, by my not intrenching in authorized speculations, that I put myself upon the same footing with you, and would claim no privilege that was not in common.

This liberty then may you long possess; may you know how to use; may you gratefully acknowledge! I say this, because one cannot, without indignation, observe, that amidst the full possession of it, you still continue, with the meanest affectation, to fill your prefaces with repeated clamours against the difficulties and discouragements attending the exercise of Free-thinking: and, in a peculiar strain of modesty and reasoning, employ this very liberty to persuade the world you still want it. In extolling liberty, we can join with you; in the vanity of pretending to have contributed most to its establishment, we can bear with you; but in the low cunning of pretending still to groan under the want of it, we can neither join nor bear with you. There was indeed a time, and that within our own memories, when such complaints were seasonable and even useful; but, happy for you, Gentlemen, you have outlived it: all the rest is merely Sir Martin;* it is continuing to fumble on the lute, though the music has been long over. For it is not a thing to be disguised, that what we hear from you, on this head, is but an awkward, though envenomed imitation of an original work of one, whoever he was, who appears to have been amongst the greatest, and most successful of your adversaries. It was published at an important juncture, under the title of *The difficulties and discouragements which attend the study of the Scripture.* But with all the merit of this beautiful satire, it has been its fortune not only to be abused by your bad imitations, but to be censured by those in whose cause it was composed; I mean the friends of religion and liberty. An author of note thus expresses himself:† "Nor was this the worst: men were not only discouraged from studying and revering the scriptures by—but also by being told that this study was difficult, fruitless, and dangerous; and a public, an elaborate, an earnest dissuasive from this study, for the very reasons now mentioned, enforced by two well-known examples, and believed from a person of great eminence in the church, hath already passed often enough through the press, to reach the hands of all the clergymen in Great Britain and Ireland: God in his great mercy forgive the author."‡ Seriously it is a sad case! that one well-meaning man should so widely mistake the end and design of another, as not to see by the turn and cast of the *Difficulties and*

* In a comedy of Dryden's. † "Revelation Examined with Candour," in the preface. ‡ The author was the excellent Dr. Hare, late Bishop of Chichester.

discouragements, that it is a thorough irony, addressed to some hot bigots then in power, to show them what dismal effects that inquisitional spirit, with which they were possessed, would have on literature in general, at a time when public liberty looked with a very sickly face! Not, I say, to see this, but to believe, on the contrary, that it was really intended as *a public, an elaborate, an earnest dissuasive from the study of the scriptures!* But I have so charitable an opinion of the great author, for a great author without doubt he was, as to believe that had he foreseen that the liberty, which animates this fine-turned piece of raillery, would have given scandal to any good man, he would, for the consolation of such, have made any reasonable abatement in the vigour of his wit and argument.

But you, Gentlemen, have a different quarrel with him: you pretend he hath since written on the other side the question. Now though the word of his accusers is not apt to go very far with me, yet, I must own, I could be easily enough brought to believe, that an author of such talents of literature, love of truth, and of his country, as this appears to have been, would as freely expose the extreme of folly at one end, as at the other, without regarding what party he opposed or favoured by it. And it is well known, that, at the time this is pretended to have been done, another interest being become uppermost, strange principles of licence, which tended to subvert all order, and destroy the very essence of a Church, ran now in the popular stream. What then should hinder a writer, who was of no party but that of truth, to oppose this extravagance, as he had done its opposite? And if he pleased neither bigot nor libertine by his uniformity of conduct, it was for his honour.

How public a blessing is such a virtue! which, unawed by that *fatal enemy of sense*, as the poet calls it, the *danger of offending*, dares equally oppose itself to the different follies of Party in extremes.

But to return to our subject: The poor threadbare cant of *want of liberty*, I should hope then you would be, at length, persuaded to lay aside; but that I know such cant is amongst your arts of controversy; and that something is to be allowed to a weak cause, and to a reputation that requires managing. We know what to understand by it, when after a successless insult on religion, the reader is intreated to believe that you have a strong reserve: but till the door of liberty be set a little wider, you have not room to display it.

Thus, at the very entrance of your works you teach us what we are to expect. But I must beg your patience, now I am got thus far, to lay before you your principal abuses of that liberty indulged to you for better purposes; or, to give them the softest name I can, in an address of this nature, your ARTS OF CONTROVERSY.

By this I shall at once practise the charity I profess, and justify the opinion I have passed upon you.

Your writers (I speak it, Gentlemen, to your honour) offer your considerations to the world, either under the character of petitioners for oppressed and injured truth, or of teachers to ignorant and erring men. These, sure, are characters that, if any, require seriousness and gravity to support them. But so great strangers are we to decorum on our entry on the stage of life, that, for the most part, like Bayes's actor in the 'Rehearsal,' who was at a loss to know whether he was to be serious or merry, melancholy or in love, we run giddily on, in a mixed and jumbled character; but have most an end, a strong inclination to make a farce of it, and mingle buffoonery with the most serious scenes. Hence, even in religious controversy, while the great cause of eternal happiness is trying, and men and angels, as it were, attending the issue of the conflict, we can find room for a merry story, and receive the advocate of infidelity with much welcome,* if he comes with but a disposition to make us laugh: though he brings the tidings of *death*, and scatters round him the poison of our *hopes*, yet, like the dying assassin,† we can laugh along with the mob, though our own despair and agonies conclude the entertainment.

This quality making a writer so well received, yours have been tempted to dispense with the solemnity of their character, as thinking it of much importance to get the laugh on their side. Hence RIDICULE is become their favourite figure of speech; and they have composed sad treatises to justify its use, and very merry ones to evince its utility. But to be fair with you, it must be owned, that this strange disposition towards unseasonable mirth, drives all parties upon being witty where they can, as being conscious of its powerful operation in controversy: RIDICULE having, from the hands of a skilful disputant, the same effect in barbarous minds, with the newly-invented darts of Marius,‡ which though so weak as to break in the throw, and pierce no farther than the surface, yet sticking there, they more entangle and incommode the combatant than those arms which fly stronger, and strike deeper. However, an abuse it is, and one of the most pernicious too, of the liberty of the Press. For what greater affront to the severity of reason, the sublimity of truth, and the sanctity of religion, than to subject them to the impure touch of every empty scurrilous Buffoon? The politeness of Athens, which

* Hence Anthony Urceus, surnamed Codrus, as vain and impious as any Free-thinker alive, being asked the reason (as we are told by Blanchini, the writer of his life) why he mixed so much buffoonery in his works, replied, "That nature had formed mankind in such a manner as to be most taken with buffoons and story-tellers." † Balthazar Gerard, who murthered the Prince of Orange. See his story. ‡ See PLUT. *Vit. Mar.* tom. ii. pp. 766, 767. Edit. Cruserii, 8vo.

you pretend so much to admire, should be here a lesson to you, which committed all questions of this nature, when they were to be examined, to their gravest and severest court, the Areopagus, whose judges would not suffer the advocates for either party to apply to the passions so much as by the common rules of the chastest rhetoric.* But a preposterous love of mirth hath turned you all into Wits, quite down from the sanguine writer of *The Independent Whig*, to the atrabilaire blasphemer of the miracles.† Though it would be but charity to tell you a plain truth, which Cicero told your *illustrious predecessors* long ago, when infected with the same distemper: "Ita salem istum, quo caret VESTRA NATIO in irridendis nobis, nolitote consumere. Et mehercule, si me audiatis, ne experiamini quidem: non decet; NON DATUM EST; non potestis." However, if you will needs be witty, take once more your example from the fine author of *The difficulties and discouragements*, and learn from him the difference between Attic irony and elegance of wit, and your intemperate scurrility and illiberal banter.

What a noise, you will say, for a little harmless mirth! Ah, Gentlemen! if that were all, you had my leave to laugh on: I would say with the old comic,

"Utinam male qui mihi volunt, sic rideant."

But low and mean as your buffoonery is, it is yet to the level of the people; who are as little solicitous, as capable, of the point of argument, so they can but catch the point of wit. Amongst such, and to such, you write; and it is inconceivable what havoc false wit makes in a foolish head: "The rabble of mankind," as an excellent writer well observes, "being very apt to think, that every thing which is laughed at, with any mixture of wit, is ridiculous in itself." ‡ Few reflect on what a great wit § has so ingenuously owned, *That wit is generally false reasoning*. But one, in whom your party most glories, hath written in defence of this abusive way of *wit and raillery* on serious subjects. Let us hear him then: "Nothing is ridiculous, except what is deformed; nor is any thing proof against raillery, except what is handsome and just; and therefore it is the hardest thing in the world to deny fair honesty the use of this weapon, which can never bear an edge against herself. One may defy the world to turn bravery or generosity into ridicule; a man must be soundly ridiculous, who, with all the wit imaginable, would go about to ridicule wisdom, or laugh at honesty or good manners." ‖ Yes, ridiculous, indeed, to laugh at bravery, generosity, wisdom,

* "Exemplo legis Atticæ, Martiique judicii causæ Patronis denuntiat Præco neque principia dicere, neque miserationem commovere."—APUL., lib. x., *Asin. Aur.*, p. 827. Lugd. 1587, 8vo. † Woolston. ‡ MR. ADDISON'S Works, vol. iii. p. 293, quarto. § Mr. Wycherley to Mr. Pope, Letter xvi. ‖ Characteristics, vol. i. Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour.

honesty, or good manners, as such: and I hardly think, Gentlemen, as licentious as some of you are, you will be ever brought to accept of his defiance. And why need you, when it is but shewing them, with overcharged and distorted features, to laugh at your ease? Call them but temerity, prodigality, gravity, simplicity, foppery, and as you have often experienced, the business is done, and the ridicule is complete. And what security will the noble writer give us, that they shall not be so called? I am persuaded, if you are never to be thought *ridiculous* till you become so, in the way this gentleman marks out, you may go safely on in the FREEDOM OF WIT AND HUMOUR, till there be never a virtue left, to laugh out of countenance.

But he will say, he means such clear virtue as hath no equivocal mark about her, which a prevaricator can lay hold on. Admit this: the man of wit will then try to make her ridiculous in her equipage, if he cannot make her so in her person.

However, will he say, it shews at least that nothing can be done against her till she be disguised. A mighty consolation this to expiring Virtue, that she cannot be destroyed till you have put her on a fool's coat. As if it were as hard to get that *on*, as Hercules's *off!* The comparison holds better in the converse, that when once *on*, it sticks as close as the envenomed one of old, and often lasts her to her funeral.

But if this noble writer means that truth cannot be obscured, however disguised; nor consequently, be made ridiculous, however represented; the two celebrated examples, which follow, seem to shew he was mistaken. Where, in the first, it is seen, that nothing was stronger than the ridicule, nor, at the same time more open and transparent than the disguise; in the latter, nothing more clouded and obscured than the beauty of the truth ridiculed, nor more out of sight than the fallacy in the representation. Which together may teach us, that any kind of disguise will serve the turn; and, that witty men will never be at a loss for one.

Of all the virtues that were so much in this noble writer's heart, and in his writings, there was not one he more revered than *love of public liberty;* or which he would less suspect should become liable to the impressions of buffoonery. Methinks I hear him say, "One may defy the world to turn the love of public liberty into ridicule: a man must be soundly ridiculous, who, with all the wit imaginable, would go about it."

However, once on a time, a great Wit set upon this task; he undertook to laugh at this very virtue; and that too, so successfully, that he set the whole nation a laughing with him. What mighty engine, you will ask, was employed, to put in motion so large a body, and for

so extraordinary a cause? In truth, a very simple one; a *discourse*, of which all the wit consists in the title; and that too sculking, as you will see, under one unlucky word. *Mrs. Bull's vindication of the indispensable duty of* CUCKOLDOM, *incumbent upon wives, in case of the tyranny, infidelity, or insufficiency of husbands.** Now had the merry reader been but wise enough to reflect, that reason was the test of ridicule, and not *ridicule the test of truth*, he would have seen to rectify the proposition, and to state it fairly thus: *The indispensable duty of* DIVORCE, *etc.* And then the joke had been over, before the laugh could have begun.

And now let this noble writer tell us, as he does, that *fair honesty can never bear an edge against herself, for that nothing is ridiculous but what is deformed;* and a great deal to the same purpose, which his Platonic manners supplied.

But very often the change put upon us is not so easily discernible. Sulpicius tells Cicero, that returning by sea from Asia, and seeing in his course Ægina, Megara, the Piræus, and Corinth in ruins, he fell into this very natural, and humane reflexion: "And shall we, short-lived creatures as we are, bear with impatience the death of our fellows, when in one single view we behold the carcases of so many lately flourishing cities?"† What could be juster or wiser than the piety of this reflexion? And yet it could not escape the ridicule of a celebrated French buffoon.‡ "If neither" (says he) "the Pyramids of Egypt, nor the Colosseum at Rome, could withstand the injury of time; why should I think much that my black waistcoat is out at elbows?" Here, indeed, the first thing to be observed is the superior resistance of truth.

The buffoon, before he could throw an air of ridicule on this admirable sentiment, was forced to change the image; and in the place of Ægina, Megara, etc. to substitute the *Pyramids* and *Colosseum*, monu-

* "History of John Bull," part i. chap. xiii. † "Ex Asia rediens, cum ab Ægina Megaram versus navigarem, cœpi regiones circumcirca prospicere. Post me erat Ægina; ante Megara; dextra Piræeus; sinistra Corinthus: quæ oppida quodam tempore florentissima fuerunt, nunc prostrata, et diruta ante oculos jacent. Cœpi egomet mecum sic cogitare? Hem! nos homunculi indignamur, si quis nostrum interiit, aut occisus est, quorum vita brevior esse debet, cum uno loco tot oppidum cadavera projecta jaceant?"—Sulpicius M. T. CICERONI, lib. iv. ep. 5.

‡ "*Superbes monumens de l'orgueil des humains,*
Pyramides, Tombeaux, dont la vaine structure
A temoigné que l'art, par l'adresse des mains
Et l'assidu travail, peut vaincre la nature!
Vieux palais ruinez, chef d'œuvres des Romains,
Et les derniers efforts de leur architecture,
Collisée où souvent *ces peuples inhumains*
De s'entr' assassiner se donnoient tablature,
Par l'injure des ans vous estes abolis,
Ou du moins la plus part vous estes demolis:
Il n'est point de ciment que le temps ne dissoude;
Si vos marbres si dures ont sentis son pouvoir,
Dois-je trouver mauvais, qu'un meschant pourpoint noir,
Qui m'a duré deux ans, soit percé par le coude?"—SCARRON.

ments of human pride, and folly; which, on that account, readily submitted to the rude touch of buffoonery: while those free cities, the noblest effort of human wisdom, the nurseries of arts and commerce, could not easily be set in a ridiculous or an idle light.

But then, how few of his readers were able to detect the change put upon them, when it is very probable the author himself did not see it? who, perplexed at the obstinate resistance of *truth*, in the various arrangement of his ideas turned the edge of his raillery, before he was aware, against the phantasm, and was the first that fell into his own deceit.

Hence may be seen what the noble writer seems to have spoken at random, at least, not at all to the purpose of the question he was upon, that such indeed is the inflexible nature of truth, that all the wit in the world can never render it ridiculous, till it be so distorted as to look like error, or so disguised as to appear like folly. A circumstance which, though it greatly recommends the *majesty of virtue*, yet, as it cannot secure it from insult, doth not at all shew the *innocence of ridicule*; which was the point he had to prove.

But to see what little good is to be expected in this way of *wit and humour*, one may go further; and observe, that even the ridicule of *false* virtue, which surely deserves no quarter, hath been sometimes attended with very mischievous effects. The Spaniards have lamented, and I believe truly, that Cervantes's just and inimitable ridicule of *knight-errantry* rooted up, with that folly, a great deal of their *real honour*. And it was apparent, that Butler's fine satire on *fanaticism* contributed not a little, during the licentious times of Charles II. to bring *sober piety* into disrepute. The reason is evident: there are many lines of resemblance between Truth and its Counterfeits: and it is the province of *wit* only to find out the *likenesses* in things; and not the talent of the *common admirers of it* to discover the *differences*.

But you will say, perhaps, Let Truth, when thus attacked, defend itself with the same arms; for why, as your master asks, should *fair honesty be denied the use of this weapon?* Be it so: come on then, and let us impartially attend the issue. We have, upon record, the most illustrious example of this contention that ever was. The dispute I mean, was between Socrates and Aristophanes. Here *truth* had all the advantage of place, of weapons, and of judges: Socrates employed his whole life in the cause of virtue: Aristophanes, only a few comic scenes against it. But, heavens! against what virtue! against the purest and brightest portion of it that ever enlightened the *gentile* world. The wit of the comic writer is well known: that of the philosopher was in a supreme degree, just, delicate, and forceable; and so habitual, that it procured him the title of the *Attic buffoon*. The *place* was the politest state in the politest time, Athens in its glory;

and the *judges*, the grave senators of Areopagus. For all this, the comic poet triumphed: and with the coarsest kind of buffoonry, little fitted, one would think, to take so polite a people, had the art to tarnish all this virtue; and, what was more, to make the owner resemble his direct opposite, that character he was most unlike, that character he most hated, that very character he had employed all his wit to detect, lay open, and confound; in one word, the SOPHIST. The consequences are well known.

Thus will *raillery*, in defence of vice and error, be still an overmatch for that employed on the side of truth and virtue. Because *fair honesty* uses, though a sharp, yet an untainted weapon; while knavery strikes with one empoisoned, though much duller. The honest man employs his wit as correctly as his logic: whereas the very definition of a knave's raillery is a sophism.

But, indeed, when a licentious buffoonry is once appealed to, and encouraged; its effects have no dependance on the fit choice of its object. All characters fall alike before it. In the dissolute times of Charles II. this *weapon*, with the same ease, and indeed in the same hands, completed the ruin of the best, and, of the very worst Minister of that age. The historians tell us, that Chancellor Hyde was brought into his master's contempt, by this court-argument. They mimicked his walk and gesture, with a fire-shovel and bellows, for the mace and purse. The same ingenious stroke of humour was repeated on Secretary Bennet, and, by the happy addition of his black patch, with just the same success. Thus, it being the representation, and not the object represented, which strikes the fancy, Vice and Virtue must fall indifferently before it.*

* The author of a late book called "Elements of Criticism," speaking of men's various opinions concerning the *use of ridicule*, proceeds against what is here said, in the following manner:—"This dispute has produced a celebrated question, *Whether Ridicule be, or be not, a test of Truth?* Which, (says he,) stated in ACCURATE TERMS, is, *Whether the* SENSE *of Ridicule be the proper test for distinguishing ridiculous objects from those that are not so? To answer the question with* PRECISION, I must premise that Ridicule is not a subject of reasoning but of SENSE OR TASTE." (Vol. ii. p. 55.) The Critic having thus changed the question, which he calls *stating it in accurate terms;* and obscured the answer, which he calls, giving it *with precision*, he concludes, that *Ridicule is not only the best, but the only, test of Truth.*

But what is all this to the purpose? Is the Dealer in Ridicule now debarred the liberty of doing what he has so often done, putting his object in a false light; and, by that means, making Truth appear like Error? As he is not, I inferred, against Lord Shaftesbury, *That Ridicule is not a test of Truth.* How does our Critic address himself to prove the contrary? Not by shewing, that *ridicule* is such a test: but that *the* TASTE *of ridicule is the test of what is ridiculous.* Who doubts that? It is the very thing complained of. For when our *taste* for ridicule gives us a sensible pleasure in a ridiculous representation of any object, we do not stay to examine whether that representation be a true one, but conclude it to be so, from the pleasure it affords us.

His second change of the question is a new substitution, viz. *Whether Ridicule be a talent to be used or employed at all?* Of which he supposes me to hold the negative. What else is the meaning of these words? "TO CONDEMN A TALENT FOR RIDICULE, because it may be converted to wrong purposes, is not a little ridiculous. Could one forbear to *smile* if A TALENT FOR REASONING was CONDEMNED, because it also may be perverted?" (P. 57.) He has no reason to *smile* sure, at his own misrepresentation.

I hope then, Gentlemen, you will in time be brought to own, that this method is the most unfair in itself, and most pernicious in its consequences: that its natural effect is to mislead the judgment, and to make the heart dissolute.

It is a small matter, that the State requires of you, sobriety, decency, and good manners, to qualify you for the noble employment of thinking freely, and at your ease. We have been told this, you will say, before; But, when it came to be explained; By *sober writing* was meant, writing in the *language of the Magistrate*. It may be so; but then, remember, it was not till you yourselves had led the way to the abuse of words; and had called calumny, plain dealing; and a scurril licence, urbanity. Happy for you, that you are in times when liberty is so well understood. Had you lived in the boasted days of classic freedom, he amongst you who had escaped best, had been branded with a character, the ancient Sages esteemed most infamous of all, AN ENEMY TO THE RELIGION OF HIS COUNTRY. A very candid and respectable author, speaking of the ancient *restraints* on free-thinking, says, "These were the maxims, these the principles, which the light of nature suggested, which reason dictated." * Nor has this fine writer any cause to be ashamed of his acknowledgment; nor his adversaries any pretence that he must needs esteem it the measure for the present times. For, as a great Ancient well observes, "It is one thing to speak of truth, and another to hear truth speak of herself." † It was CHRISTIAN TRUTH and CHARITY, the truth and charity you so much insult, which only could take off those restraints; and require no more of you than to be *as* FREE, *but not using your liberty for a cloak of maliciousness.* (1 Peter ii. 16.)

I have now done with your buffoonry; which, like chewed bullets, is against the law of arms; and come next to your scurrilities, those stink-pots of your offensive war.

As the CLERGY of the established church have been more *particularly* watchful in what is yet the common cause of all, the

I never *condemned a talent for ridicule* because it may be abused; nor for any other reason. Though others, perhaps, may be disposed to *smile* at his absurd inference, that we may as well *condemn a talent for reasoning*. As if *reason* and *ridicule* were of equal importance for the conduct of human life.

He may then perhaps ask, "If I do not *condemn* the *use* of Ridicule, on what employment I would put it, when I have excluded it from being *a test of truth?*" Let him not be uneasy about that. There is no danger that the *talent for ridicule* should lie idle, for want of proper business. When *reason*, the only *test of truth* I know of, has performed its office, and unmasked *hypocrisy and formal error*, then *ridicule*, I think, may be fairly called in, to quicken the operation. Thus, when Dr. S. Clarke had, by superior reasoning, exposed the wretched sophistry which Mr. Collins had employed to prove the Soul to be only a quality of Body; Dr. Arbuthnot, who very rarely misemployed his inimitable *talent for ridicule*, followed the blow, and gave that foolish and impious opinion up to the contempt and laughter it deserved, in a chapter of the Memoirs of Scriblerus. But to set Ridicule on work before, would be as unfair, indeed as scandalous, as to bestow the language due to convicted Vice, on a character but barely suspected.

* "Letter to Dr. Waterland," p. 52, et seq. † Ἄλλως τις περὶ ἀληθείας λέγει, ἡ ἀλήθεια ἑαυτὴν ἑρμηνεύει.

interests of *Christianity*, and most successful in repelling the insults of its enemies, they have fallen under the heaviest load of your calumny and slander. With unparalleled licence, you have gone on, representing them as debauched, avaricious, proud, vindictive, ambitious, deceitful, irreligious, and incorrigible. "An order of men profligate and abandoned to wickedness, inconsistent with the good of society, irreconcileable enemies to reason, and conspirators against the liberty and property of mankind." *

To fill up your common-place of slander, the most inconsistent qualities have been raked together to deform them: qualities that could never stand together but in idea; I mean, in the misshapen ideas of a Free-thinker.

The Order is now represented as most contemptible for their politics; ever in the wrong, and under a fatality of continued blunders, attending them as a curse: But anon, we are told of their deep-laid schemes of a separate interest, so wisely conducted, as to elude the policy of Courts, and baffle all the wisdom of Legislatures.

Now they are a set of superstitious bigots, and fiery zealots, prompt to sacrifice the rights of humanity to the interests of Mother-Church: but now again, they are *Tartufes without religion; Atheists and Apostates without faith or law.*

This moment, so united in one common confederacy, as to make their own Church-policy the cause of God: But, the next, so divided, that every man's hand is against his brother, *tearing and worrying one another*, to the great scandal of the charitable author of the *Discourse of Free-thinking.*

But it is to be hoped, as the evidence is so ill laid together, the accusation may be groundless.

But why do I talk of the Clergy, when there is not one, however otherwise esteemed by, or related to you, that can escape your slander, if he happen to discover the least inclination for that cause, against which you are so virulently bent? Mr. Locke, the honour of this age, and the instructor of the future, shews us, in the treatment he received from his FRIEND and from his PUPIL, what a believer is to expect from you. It was enough to provoke their resentment, that he had shewn *the reasonableness of Christianity;* and had placed all his *hopes* of happiness in *another life.*

The intimacy between him and Mr. Collins is well known. Mr. Collins seemed to idolize Mr. Locke while living; and Mr. Locke was *confident* Mr. Collins would *preserve his memory when dead.*† But he chanced to be mistaken: For no sooner was he gone, than Mr.

* "Rights of the Christian Church," and "Christianity as old as the Creation," *passim.* † "I know you loved me living, and will preserve my memory now I am dead," says he in his letter to be delivered to Mr. Collins at his death.

Collins publicly * insults a notion of his *honoured friend* concerning the *possibility of conceiving how matter might first be made and begin to be :* And goes affectedly out of the way to shew his good will to his memory.

The noble author of *the Characteristics* had received† part of his education from that great philosopher : And it must be owned, that this Lord had many excellent qualities, both as a man and a writer. He was temperate, chaste, honest, and a lover of his country. In his writings he hath shewn how largely he had imbibed the deep sense, and how naturally he could copy the gracious manner of Plato. How far Mr. Locke contributed to the cultivating these qualities, I will not enquire : But that inveterate rancour which he indulged against *Christianity*, it is certain, he had not from his master. It was Mr. *Locke's* love of it that seems principally to have exposed him to his pupil's bitterest insults. One of the most precious remains of the piety of that excellent man, are his last words to Mr. Collins : "May you live long and happy," *&c.* "all the use to be made of it is, *that this world is a scene of vanity, that soon passes away, and affords no solid satisfaction*, but the consciousness of well doing, and the HOPES OF ANOTHER LIFE. This is what I can say by experience, and what you will find when you come to make up your account."‡ One would think, that if ever the parting breath of pious men, or the last precepts of dying philosophers, could claim reverence of their survivors, this noble monument of friendship, and religion, had been secure from outrage. Yet hear, in how unworthy, how cruel a manner, his noble disciple apostrophizes him on this occasion : "*Philosopher !* let me hear concerning life, what the right notion is, and what I am to stand to upon occasion ; that I may not, when life seems retiring, or *has run itself out to the very dregs*,§ cry VANITY ! condemn the WORLD, and at the same time complain that LIFE IS SHORT AND PASSING. For why so *short* indeed, if not found *sweet ?* Why do I complain both ways ? Is *vanity*, mere vanity, a happiness ; or can misery *pass away* too soon ?" ‖ Here the polite author had the noble pleasure of ridiculing the *philosopher* and the *Psalmist* together.¶ But I will leave the strange reflexions, that naturally arise from hence, to the reader ; who, I am sure, will be beforehand with me in judging, that Mr. Locke had reason to *condemn a world* that cast him upon such a *friend* and *pupil*.**

* "Answer to Dr. Clarke's Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell," at the end.
† See *Bibl. Choisie*, tom. vi. p. 343. ‡ Amongst his Letters published by Desmaizeaux. § Mr. Locke was then in his seventy-third year. ‖ "Characteristics," vol. i. p. 302, third edition. ¶ *Man is like to vanity : His days are as a shadow that passeth away.* (Psalm cxliv. 4.) ** The noble writer did not disdain to take up with those vulgar calumnies which Mr. *Locke* had again and again confuted. "Some even," says he, (*Characteristics*, vol. i. p. 80, third edition,) "of our most admired modern philosophers had fairly told us, that virtue and vice had, after all, no other law

But to go on, and consider the nature of this abuse of the Clergy: It is not only an affront to *Religion*, which, by your practice, you seem to regard as one of the essential branches of literary liberty; but likewise, an insult on *civil Society*. For while there is such a thing as a *Church established by law*, its Ministers must needs bear a *sacred*, that is, a *public* character, even on your own principles.* To abuse them, therefore, as a body, is insulting the State which protects them. It is highly injurious likewise, because a Body-politic cannot preserve the reverence necessary for the support of government, longer than its public officers, whether civil or religious, are treated with the regard due to their respective stations.† And here, your apology, when accused of using holy Writ irreverently, is out of doors. You pretend that the Charge is disingenuous, because it takes for granted the thing in dispute. But in the case before us, it is agreed, that the Ministers of the established worship have a *sacred*, that is, a *public* character.

Out of your own mouths likewise, are you condemned. A few instances there are in the first ages of *Christianity*, of something resembling this misconduct; where the intemperance of private zeal now and then gave the affront to the national religion. But who are they that so severely censure this disorder? ‡ that raise such tragic outcries against the factious spirit of primitive *Christianity?* Who, Gentlemen, but Yourselves! The very men who, out of spite and wantonness, daily persist in doing what a misguided devotion, now and then, though rarely, betrayed a martyr to commit.§

or measure than mere fashion and vogue." The case was this: When Mr. *Locke* reasoned against *innate ideas*, he brought it as one argument against them, that virtue and vice, in many places, were not regulated by the nature of things, which they must have been, were there such *innate ideas;* but by mere fashion and vogue. Is this then *fairly told* of *our admired modern philosopher?* But it was crime enough that he laboured to overthrow *innate ideas;* things that the noble author understood to be the foundation of his *moral sense*. (See vol. iii. p. 214.) In vain did Mr. Locke incessantly repeat, that "the divine law is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude." This did but increase his pupil's resentment, who had all his faculties possessed with the MORAL SENSE, as "the only true touchstone of moral rectitude." But the whole Essay itself, one of the noblest, and most original books in the world, could not escape his ridicule: "In reality," says he, vol. i. p. 299, "how specious a study, how solemn an amusement, is raised from what we call philosophical speculations! The formation of ideas! their compositions, comparisons, agreement, and disagreement!—Why do I concern myself in speculations about my ideas? What is it to me, for instance, to know what kind of idea I can form of space? Divide a solid body," *etc.* and so he goes on in Mr. Locke's own words: And lest the reader should not take the satire, a note at the bottom of the page informs us, that "these are the words of the particular author cited." But the invidious Remark on this quotation surpasses all credit. *Thus the atomist, or* EPICUREAN.

* "They also that have authority to teach," *etc.* "are *public ministers.*"—"Leviathan," p. 124. London, 1651, 4to. †Ἄρχουσιν ἡ ὀφειλομένη αἰδὼς, καὶ τιμὴ φυλασσομένη, κόσμον σώζει πόλεως, καὶ διατηρέει.—ANT. SCRIP. apud STOB. *De Rep.* Serm. 41, p. 270. Tiguri, 1559, fol. circa finem. ‡ "The list of Martyrs consisted, I believe, of those who suffered for breaking the Peace. The *primitive clergy* were, under pretence of Religion, a very Lawless Tribe."—LORD BOLINGBROKE, vol. iv. p. 434. § In the lxth canon of the council of Eliberis, held about twenty years before the council of Nice, it is decreed, that they who were slain by the Gentiles for breaking down

But would you read *Christian* antiquity with equal minds, you would not want examples of a better conduct. For in general the Apologists for the *Christian* faith observed a decency and moderation becoming the truth and importance of the cause they had to support. We need only look into *Lactantius* for the modesty of their conduct in this respect.

This eloquent Apologist, who wrote in an age which would have indulged greater liberties, giving in his *divine institutions*, the last stroke to expiring paganism; where he confutes the *national Religion*, spares as much as possible the *Priests;* but in exposing their *Philosophy*, is not so tender of their *Sophists:* For these last having no public character, the State was not concerned to have them managed. Such, I say, was the general behaviour of the first *Christians*.

Nor can you plead, in your excuse, any other necessity, than that inseparable from a weak cause, of committing this violence. The discovery of truth is so far from being advanced by it, that, on the contrary, it carries all the marks of design to retard the search, when you so industriously draw off the reader's attention from the *Cause*, by diverting him at the expence of the *Advocate*.

It is true, that at what time the Clergy so far forgot the nature of their office, and of the cause they were appointed to defend, as to call in the secular arm to support their arguments against wrong opinions, we saw, without much surprise or resentment, You, Gentlemen, in like delusion, that any means were lawful in support of truth, falling without scruple to affront the Public (then little disposed to give you an equal hearing) by the abuse of a Body, whose *private* interests the State had indiscreetly espoused. For where was the wonder, when Government had assumed too much, for those who were oppressed by it, to allow it too little? You thought this a fair return; and your candid enemies confessed, that some indulgence was to be given to the passions of men, raised and inflamed by so unequal a treatment. But now that the *State* hath withdrawn its power, and confined the Administration within its proper office; and that this *learned Body* hath publicly disclaimed its assistance; it will surely be expected, that You, likewise, should return to a better mind, and forsake a practice insolently continued, without any reasonable pretence of fresh provocation.

Your last abuse, Gentlemen, of the liberty of the press, is a certain dissolute habit of mind, regardless both of truth and falsehood, which you betray in all your attacks on Revelation. Who that had not heard of your solemn professions *of the love of liberty, of truth, of virtue, of*

their idols, should not be received by the church into the number of Martyrs, since neither the precepts of the Gospel nor the practice of the Apostles gave any countenance to such licentious behaviour.

your aim at the honour of God, and good of men, could ever believe you had any thing of this at heart, when they see that spirit of levity and dissipation which runs through all your writings?

That you may not say I slander you, I will produce those marks in your works, on which I have formed my accusation of this illiberal temper.

1. The first is an unlimited buffoonry; which suffers no test or criterion to your ridicule, to shew us, when you are in jest, and when in earnest.

2. An industrious affectation in keeping your true character out of sight; and in constantly assuming some new and fictitious personage.

3. To support your chicane, an unnatural mixture of the Sceptic and Dogmatist.

And here, Gentlemen, in illustrating these three circumstances of your guilt, one might detect all your *arts of controversy*, and easily reveal the whole mystery of modern *Free-thinking*. But the limits of this address will only permit me in few words to describe the general nature of each; in order to shew, how certain an indication they are of the turn of mind of which I accuse you.

1. The illimited, UNDISTINGUISHABLE IRONY, which affords no insight into the author's meaning, or so much room as to guess what he would be at, is our first note. This, which is your favourite figure of speech, your noble Apologist owns to be "a dull sort of wit which amuses all alike." * Nay, he even ventures to pronounce it "a gross, immoral, and illiberal way of abuse, foreign to the character of a good writer, a gentleman, or man of worth." † What pity, if he should chance to fall under his own censure! Yet this is certain, he hath so managed his *good humour*, that his admirers may always find a handle either to charge us with credulity, or want of charity, determine as we will of his *true* and *real* sentiments. However, the noble writer hath not aggravated this folly, in the character he hath given of it: For, here forgetful of your own precepts, (your common-place topic against public instructors,) while you prescribe ridicule to be so managed, *as to shew it tends to a serious issue*; you practise it so indiscriminately, as to make one believe you were all the time in jest. While you direct it *to unmask formal hypocrisy*, you suffer it to put sober truth out of countenance; and while you claim its aid, *to find out what is to be laughed at in every thing*, you employ it to bring in every thing to be laughed at.

That a RESTRAINT on free inquiry, will force writers into this vicious manner, we readily allow. Under these circumstances, such a key to ridicule as just writing demands being unsafe; and the only way men

* "Characteristics," vol. i. tract ii. part i. sect. 2. † Idem, vol. iii. Miscel. iv. cap. 2.

have to escape persecution being to cover and intrench themselves in obscurity; it is no wonder that *ridicule* should degenerate into the *buffoonry which amuses all alike:* As in *Italy*, which gave birth to this degenerate species of writing, it is the only way, in which the *poor crampt thinking wretches can discharge a free thought.* But in *Great Britain*, happily for Truth and You, PHILOSOPHY is at her ease; and you may lead her safely back to Paganism, through all the ancient modes of doubting, objecting, and refuting.

It is difficult, therefore, to assign any other likely cause of this extravagance, than that vicious levity of spirit I have charged upon you. For as Man is formed by nature with an incredible appetite for Truth; so his strongest pleasure, in the enjoyment, arises from the actual communication of it to others. Without this, it would be a cold purchase, would abstract, ideal, solitary Truth; and poorly repay the labour and fatigue of the pursuit. Amongst the Ancients, who, you will allow, had high notions of this SOCIAL SENSE, it was a saying recorded by *Cicero* with approbation, "that even heaven would be no happiness, to him who had not some companion or *social Spirit* to share with him in the pleasure of contemplating the great truths of nature there revealed unto him." "Si quis in cœlum ascendisset, naturamque mundi, et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore; quæ jucundissima fuisset, si aliquem, cui narraret, habuisset." * *Seneca* goes yet further: "Nec me ulla res delectabit, licet eximia sit et salutaris, quam mihi uni sciturus sim. Si cum hac exceptione detur sapientia, ut illam inclusam teneam, nec enunciem, rejiciam: nullius boni, sine SOCIO, jucunda possessio est." † It was this passion which gave birth to writing, and brought literary composition to an art; whereby the Public was made a sharer in those important truths, which particulars had with so much toil excogitated for its use and entertainment. The principal object therefore of an author, while his passions are in their right state, must needs be to deliver his sentiments and opinions with all possible clearness; so that no particular cast of composition, or turn of expression, which he held conducive to the embellishment of his work, be suffered to throw an ambiguity on his propositions, which might mislead the reader in judging of his real sentiments. To such a one, nothing can be a greater mortification than to find that this his principal purpose was defeated.

But when, on the contrary, we see a writer, so far from discovering any thing of this care, that an air of negligence appears in every thing he delivers; a visible contempt of his reader's satisfaction; to which he prefers a dull malicious pleasure of misguiding him in the obscurity of an illimited ridicule; we cannot possibly avoid concluding that such a one is far gone in this wretched depravity of heart.

* *De Amicitia.* Edit. Oxon. 4to. tom. iii. pp. 349 et 50. † Ep. vi.

2. Another mark, is Your perpetually assuming some PERSONATED CHARACTER, as the exigence of chicane requires. For the dispute is to be kept on foot; and therefore, when in danger of coming to an issue, a new personage is to be assumed, that the trial of skill may be fought over again with different weapons. So that the modern Free-thinker is a perfect *Proteus*. He is now a Dissenter, or a Papist; now again a Jew or a Mahometan; and, when closely pressed and hunted through all the shapes, he at length starts up in his genuine form, an INFIDEL confessed.*

Indeed where the Magistrate hath confined the liberty of free debate, to one or two Professions of belief, There an unlicensed writer hath no way of publishing his speculations, but under the cover of one of these authorized Sects. But to affect this practice when the necessity is over, is licentious and immoral. For the personated character, only arguing *ad hominem*, embroils, rather than directs us, in the search of truth; has a natural tendency to promote scepticism; and if not this, yet it keeps the dispute from ever coming to an issue; which is attended with great public inconveniencies. For though the discovery of speculative truth be of much importance to the perfection of man's nature, yet the studious lengthening out literary debates is pernicious to Society, as Societies are generally formed. Therefore, though the good of mankind would set an honest man upon publishing what he supposes to be discoveries in truth; yet the same motive would oblige him to take the fairest, and most direct road to their reception.

But I would not have it thought, by this, that I condemn the assuming a *personated character* on all occasions whatsoever. There are seasons when it is fair and expedient. When the dispute is about the PRACTICAL application of some truth to the good of a particular society, there it is prudent to take up a suitable character, and to argue *ad hominem*. For there, the end is a benefit to be gained for that society; and it is not of so great moment on what principles the majority is prevailed upon to make the society happy, as it is, that it should speedily become so. But in the discovery of ABSTRACT SPECULATIVE truth, the affair goes quite otherwise. The business here is *demonstration*, not *persuasion*. And it is of the essence of truth, to be made appear and shine out only by its own lustre.

A familiar example will support this observation. Our great *British* philosopher, writing for *religious liberty*, combats his *intolerant* adversary, all the way, with his own Principles; well knowing that, in such a time of prejudices, arguments built on received opinions would have greatest weight, and make quickest impression on the body of the people, whom it was his business to gain. But the method he employed in defending mere speculative

* Mr. Collins.

truth was very different. A Prelate of great name was pleased to attack his *Essay concerning human understanding;* who, though consummate in the learning of the Schools, yet happened at that time to apply his principles so very awkwardly, as gave our Philosopher the most inviting opportunity of turning them against him. An advantage most to the taste of him who contends only for victory: but he contended for truth; and was too wise to think of establishing it on falsehood; and too honest to affect triumphing over Error by any thing but by its Opposite.

You see then, Gentlemen, you are not likely to escape by this distinction; the dispute with you is about *speculative truth:* Yourselves take care to give the world repeated information of it, as often as you think fit to feign an apprehension of the Magistrate's resentment.

But of as little use as this method, of the *personated character*, is, in itself, to the just end of controversy, you generally add a double share of disingenuity in conducting it. Common sense, as well as Common honesty, requires that he who assumes a *personated character* should fairly stick to it, for that turn at least. But we shall be greatly deceived if we presume on so much condescension: the late famous author of *The Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion*, took it into his head to personate a *Jew*, in the interpretation of some prophecies which he would persuade us are not applicable to *Jesus*. The learned Prelate, who undertook to answer him, having shown that those prophecies had no completion under the Jewish dispensation, concludes very pertinently, *that if they did not belong to* Jesus, *they belong to no one*. What says our impostor *Jew* to this? One would be astonished at his reply: *Suppose they do not*, says he, *I am not answerable for their completion*. What! not as a *Jew?* whose person he assumes, and whose argument he borrows: which argument is not founded on this, That the characters of completion, according to the *Christian* scheme, do not coincide and quadrate; to which, indeed, the above answer would be pertinent; but on this, that there are complete characters of the completion of the prophecies, under the *Jewish* œconomy; and therefore, says the *Jew*, you are not to look for those marks under the *Christian*. The only reasonable way then of replying to this argument, is to deny that there are such marks under the *Jewish* œconomy, which if the *Jew* cannot prove, his objection, founded on a *prior completion*, is entirely overthrown. Instead of this, we are put off with the cold buffoonry of, *I am not obliged to find a meaning for your prophecies.*

3. The third mark of this abandoned spirit, is that unnatural MIXTURE OF THE SCEPTIC AND DOGMATIST, which so monstrously variegates your misshapen works. I do not mean by it, that unrea-

sonable temper of mind, which distinguishes the whole class of Free-thinkers; and suffers you, at the same time that you affect much *scepticism* in rejecting Revelation, to *dogmatize* very positively on some favourite points of civil tradition. The noble author, your Apologist, could not forbear to ridicule his party for this foible.* "It must certainly," says he, "be something else than incredulity which fashions the taste and judgment of many Gentlemen, whom we hear censured as Atheists. Who, if they want a true *Israelitish* faith, can make amends by a *Chinese* or *Indian* one.—Though *Christian* miracles may not so well satisfy them, they dwell with the highest contentment on the prodigies of *Moorish* and *Pagan* countries."

This is ill enough; but the perversity, I speak of, is much worse: and that is, when the same writer, on different occasions, assumes the *Dogmatist* and *Sceptic* on the same question, and so abuses both Characters in all the perversity of self-contradiction.

For instance, how common is it for one of Your writers, when he brings *Pagan* antiquity to contradict and discredit the *Jewish*, to cry up a Greek historian as an evidence, to which nothing can be objected? An imperfect hint from *Herodotus*, or *Diodorus*, though one lived a thousand, and the other fifteen hundred years after the case in question, picked up from any lying traveller the one met with in his rambles, or the other found in his collections, shall now outweigh the circumstantial History of *Moses*, who wrote of his own People, and lived in the times he wrote of. But now turn the tables, and apply the testimony of these Writers, and of others of the best credit of the same nation, to the confirmation of the *Jewish history*, and then nothing is more uncertain and fallacious than classical Antiquity. All is darkness and confusion: then we are sure to hear of,

—— "Quicquid Græcia mendax
Audet in historia."———

Then *Herodotus* is a lying traveller, and *Diodorus Siculus* a tasteless collector.

Again, when the choice and separation of the *Israelites*, for God's peculiar People, is to be brought in question, and made ridiculous, they are represented as the vilest, the most profligate, and perverse race of men: then every indiscreet passage of a *declamatory Divine* is raked up with care to make them odious; and even the hard fate of the great historian *Josephus* pitied, that he had "no better a subject than such an illiterate, barbarous, and ridiculous people." †

But when the Scripture-account of the treatment, which the Holy *Jesus* met with from them, is thought fit to be disputed; these *Jews*

* "Characteristics," vol. i. p. 345, third edition. † "Discourse of Free-thinking," p. 157.

are become an humane and wise Nation; which never interfered with the teachings of sects, or the propagation of opinions, but where the public safety was thought to be in danger by seditious doctrines.

But so it is, even with the BIBLE itself, and its best interpreter, HUMAN REASON. It is generally allowed that the Author of *the Discourse of Free-thinking*, and of *the Grounds and Reasons of the* Christian *Religion*, was one and the same person. Now it being to this man's purpose in the first pamphlet, to blast the credit of the book in general, as a *rule of faith*, the Bible is represented as a most obscure, dark, incomprehensible collection of multifarious tracts. But in his discourse of *The Grounds*, etc. where * he is to obviate the reason of the difficulty in explaining ancient Prophecies, drawn from the genius of the Eastern style, sentiment, and manners; this very book is, on a sudden, become so easy, plain, and intelligible, that no one can possibly mistake its meaning.

Again, the same Writer, where, in his *Essay concerning the Use of Reason*, he thinks fit to discredit the doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity, and other mysteries of the *Christian Faith*, represents human reason as omniscient, and the full measure of all things: but when the proof of the *immateriality of the soul*, from the qualities of MATTER and SPIRIT, is to be obstinately opposed, the scene is shifted, and we are presented with a new face of things: then Reason becomes weak, staggering, and impotent: then we know not but one quality may be another quality; one mode, another mode; Motion may be consciousness; and Matter sentient.†

These, Gentlemen, are the several ways in which you have abused the LIBERTY OF THE PRESS. One might defy you, with all your good will or invention, to contrive a new one, or to go further in the old; You have done your worst. It is time to think of growing better. This is the only inference I would draw from your bad conduct. For I am not one of those who say you should be disfranchised of the Rights you have so wantonly and wickedly abused. *Natural* rights were less precariously bestowed: the *Civil*, indeed, are frequently given on the condition of the Receiver's good behaviour. And this difference, in the security of the possession, is founded in the plainest reason. *Natural* rights are so necessary to our Being, that, without them, Life becomes miserable; but the *Civil* only contributing to our easier accommodation, in some circumstances of it, may be forfeited without injury to our common Nature.

In a word then, all that we desire is your amendment; without any sinister aim of calling upon the Magistrate to quicken your pace. So I leave you, as I dare say will *He*, to yourselves. Nor let any

* "Discourse of Free-thinking," p. 68, and of "The Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion," pp. 81, 82. † See his Answers to Dr. Clarke.

good man be above measure scandalized at your faults; or more impatient for your reformation, than mere charity demands. I do not know what panic the present growth of Infidelity may have thrown some of us into: I, for my part, confide so much in the goodness of our Cause, that I too could be tempted to *laugh* in my turn, while I think of an old story told us by Herodotus,* of your favourite EGYPTIANS; of whom you are like to hear a great deal in the following work. With this tale I shall beg leave to conclude my long address unto you.

He tells us then, that at what time their Deity, the NILE, returns into his ancient channel; and the husbandman hath committed the *good seed* to the opening glebe, it was their custom to turn in whole droves of SWINE; to range, to trample, root up, and destroy at pleasure. And now nothing appeared but desolation, while the ravages of the obscene herd had killed every cheerful hope of future plenty. When on the issue, it was seen, that all their perversity and dirty taste had effected, was only this; that the SEED took better root, incorporated more kindly with the soil, and at length shot up in a more luxuriant and abundant harvest.

I am,

GENTLEMEN, *etc.*

* Lib. ii. cap. 14. *Vide* PLUTARCH. *Symp.* lib. iv. prob. 5. The learned Gale cannot be reconciled to this kind of husbandry. He is therefore for having the word ϚΥς, used by *Herodotus*, not to signify *swine*, but *cows* or *heifers*. His authority for this use of the word is *Hesychius*. But *Plutarch* is a much better for the other signification, who in his *Sympos.* quoted above, speaking to the question Πότερον οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι σεβόμενοι τὴν ὗν, *etc.* mentions this very circumstance of tillage from *Herodotus*, and understands by ὗς *swine*. The truth of the matter seems to be this, *Hesychius* found that ὗς, in some obscure province or other, meant a *Heifer*, as κάπρος amongst the *Tyrrhenians*, we are told, meant a *goat*, and so put it down to inrich his dictionary with an unusual signification.

POSTSCRIPT

TO

THE DEDICATION TO THE FREE-THINKERS;

IN THE EDITION OF 1766.

A POET and a Critic,* of equal eminence, have concurred, though they did not start together, to censure what was occasionally said in this *Dedication* (as if it had been addressed to them) *of the use and abuse of Ridicule*. The Poet was a follower of Lord Shaftesbury's fancies; the Critic a follower of his own. Both Men of TASTE, and equally anxious for the well-doing of RIDICULE. I have given some account of the latter in a note of the *Dedication*.† The other was too full of the subject, and of himself, to be dispatched with so little ceremony: he must therefore undergo an examination apart.

Since it is (says he) *beyond all contradiction evident, that we have a* natural sense or feeling *of the ridiculous, and since so good a Reason may be assigned to justify the supreme Being for bestowing it;* ONE CANNOT WITHOUT ASTONISHMENT *reflect on the conduct of those Men who imagine it for the service of true Religion to vilify and blacken it* WITHOUT DISTINCTION, *and endeavour to persuade us, that it is never applied but in a bad cause.*‡ The Reason here given, to shew, that *Ridicule* and *Buffoonry* may be properly employed on serious and even sacred subjects, is admirable: it is because we have *a natural sense or feeling of the ridiculous*, and because *no sensation was given us in vain;* which would serve just as well to excuse *Adultery* or *Incest*. For have we not as *natural a sense or feeling* of the *voluptuous?* Yes, he will say, but this *sense* has its proper object, *virtuous love*, not *adulterous* or *incestuous:* And does he think, I will not say the same of his *sense of the ridiculous?* Its proper objects are, not weighty and Sacred matters, but the civil customs and common occurrences of life. For he stretched a point when he told the Reader, I *vilified and blackened it without distinction*. The thing I there opposed, was *the abusive way of art and raillery on religious Subjects*. With as little regard to Truth did he say, that *I endeavoured to persuade the Public, that it is never applied but in a bad cause:* For, in that very place, I apologized for an eminent writer who had applied it in a *good* one.

Ridicule (says he) *is not* [i. e. ought not to be] *concerned with*

* See "Pleasures of Imagination," and "Elements of Criticism." † Page 86, &c.
‡ "Pleasures of Imagination," pp. 105, 106.

mere speculative Truth and Falshood. Certainly. And, for that very reason I would exclude it from those Subjects. What need? he will say, for when was it so employed? When, does he ask?—When his Master ridiculed the *Subject* of Mr. Locke's ESSAY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, in the manner there mentioned. When the same noble person ridiculed REVELATION, in the merry Story of the travelling Gentlemen, who put *a wrong bias on their Reason* in order to believe right.*—

He goes on, *It is not in abstract Propositions on Theorems, but in Actions and Passions, Good and Evil, Beauty and Deformity, that we find Materials for it; and all these Terms are relative, implying Approbation or Blame.* The reason here given, why, not *abstract Propositions*, &c. but *Actions and Passions*, &c. are the subject of *ridicule* is, because these latter are *relative Terms implying Approbation and Blame.* But are not the former as much *relative Terms, implying Assent and Denial?* And does not an absurd Proposition as frequently afford materials for Ridicule as an absurd Action? Let the Reader determine by what he finds before him.—*To ask then,* (says he) *whether Ridicule be a Test of truth, is, in other words, to ask whether that which is ridiculous can be morally true; can be just and becoming: or whether that which is just and becoming can be ridiculous. A question that does not deserve a serious answer.* However, in civility to his Master, or rather indeed to his Master's Masters, the ancient *Sophists*, who, we are told† in the *Characteristics*, said something very like it, I shall give it a *serious answer.* For how, I pray, comes it to pass, that to ask, *whether ridicule be a test of truth, is the same thing as to ask whether that which is ridiculous can be morally true?* As if, whatever thing the *test of Ridicule* was applied to, must needs be *ridiculous.* Might not one ask, *Whether the Copel‡ be a test of gold,* without incurring any absurdity in questioning, Whether the matter to which the Copel is applied be standard gold. But he takes a *test of truth* and a *detection of error* to be one and the same thing; and that nothing is brought to *this test* but what was known beforehand, whether it was *true* or *false.* His Master seems much better versed in the use of things.§ *Now, what rule or measure* (says he) *is there in the world, except in considering the real temper of things, to find which are truly serious, and which ridiculous? And how can this be done, unless by applying the ridicule* TO SEE WHETHER IT WILL BEAR?

But if the Reader be curious to see to the bottom of this affair, he must go a little deeper. Lord Shaftesbury, we find, was willing to know, as every honest man would, Whether those things, which had

* "Characteristics," vol. iii. Misc. ii. cap. 3, p. 99. † It was a saying of an ancient sage, "that humour was the only test of ridicule." (Vol. i. p. 74.) ‡ *Copella*, Italian. in English, a *test.* § "Characteristics," vol. i. p. 128.

the appearance of seriousness and sanctity, were indeed what they appeared. The way of coming to this knowledge had been hitherto by the *test of reason*. But this was too dull and tedious a road for this lively genius. He would go a shorter and a pleasanter way to work, and do the business by *ridicule ;* given us, as his Disciple tells us, *to aid the tardy steps of reason*. This the noble Author would needs *apply*, to see *whether the appearances would bear the Touch*. Now it was this ingenious expedient, to which I thought I had cause to object. For when he had applied this *Touch*, and that that, to which it was applied, was found to endure it, what reparation could he make to Truth, for thus placing her in a ridiculous and idle light, in order only, as he pretended, to judge rightly of her? Oh, for that, said his Lordship, she has the amends in her own hands : Let her railley again ; *for why should fair Honesty be denied the use of his Weapon?* * To this so wanton a liberty with sacred Truth, I thought I had many good reasons to oppose ; and so, it seems, thought our Poet likewise : Or why did he endeavour to excuse his Master, by putting another sense on *the application of ridicule as a Test*, which implies that the Truth or Falshood of the thing tried, is *already known*. But the shift is unlucky ; for while it covers his Master, it exposes himself. For now it may be asked, what need of ridicule at all, after the Truth is *known ;* since the sole use of a *test*, according to his Master, consists in enabling us to *discover* the true state of things?

But now he comes to the *Philosophy* of his Criticism on my absurdity. For *it is most evident* (says he) *that as in a metaphysical Proposition offered to the Understanding for its assent, the faculty of Reason examines the terms of the Proposition ; and finding one Idea, which was supposed equal to another, to be in fact unequal, of consequence rejects the Proposition as a falshood : So in Objects offered to the Mind for its esteem or applause, the faculty of ridicule feeling an incongruity in the claim, urges the Mind to reject it with laughter and contempt*. And now, how does this sublime account, of Reason and Ridicule, prove the foregoing Proposition to be absurd? Just as much, I suppose, as the height of St. Paul's proves Grantham Steeple to stand awry.

However, if it cannot *prove* what precedes, he will try to make it *infer* what follows : *When* therefore (says he) *we observe such a claim obtruded upon Mankind, and the inconsistent circumstances carefully concealed from the eye of the Public, it is our business, if the matter be of importance to Society, to drag out those latent circumstances, and, by setting them full in view, convince the World how ridiculous the Claim is ; and thus a double advantage is gained ; for we both detect the moral Falshood sooner than in the way of speculative enquiry, and impress the minds of Men with a stronger sense of the*

* "Characteristics," vol. i. p. 128.

vanity and error of its Authors. And this, and no more, is meant by the application of Ridicule. A little *more*, if we may believe his Master: who says, it is not only to *detect Error*, but to *try Truth*, that is, in his own expression, to see *whether it will bear*. But why all this a-do? for now, we see, nobody mistook what was *meant by the application of Ridicule*, but himself.—As to what he said before, that when *Objects are offered to the Mind for its esteem and applause, the faculty of Ridicule, feeling an incongruity in the Claim, urges the Mind to reject it with laughter and contempt;* it is so expressed, as if he intended it not for the description of the *Use*, but the *essence of Ridicule*. But the dealers in this Trash frequently *urge the Mind to reject* many things with *laughter and contempt*, without *feeling* any other *incongruity*, than in their own pretensions to Truth and Honesty. And this, our Poet seems to be no stranger to.

For now he comes to the point.—*But it is said the practice is dangerous, and may be inconsistent with the regard we owe to Objects of real dignity and excellence. I answer, the practice,* FAIRLY MANAGED, *can never be dangerous.* Who ever thought any thing FAIRLY MANAGED to be dangerous? The danger is in the *abuse* or *unfair management*. The use of Stilleto's and Poisons, FAIRLY MANAGED, can never be dangerous. And yet this has not hindered all wise States, whenever they have found a violent propensity to the handling of these things, to forbid their promiscuous use, under the severest penalties, to prevent abuse and *unfair management*.

However, he allows at length, that *Men may be dishonest in obtruding circumstances foreign to the Object; and we may be inadvertent in allowing those circumstances to impose upon us; but*—but what? Why, *the* SENSE OF RIDICULE ALWAYS JUDGES RIGHT. And, he had told us before, that this is a *natural sense, and bestowed upon us by the supreme Being, to aid our tardy steps in pursuit of Reason.* Why, as he says, who can withstand this? Nothing can be clearer! Writers may be dishonest; Readers may be misled; and the Public judge wrong. But what then, the *sense of Ridicule always judges right*. And while we can support our *Platonic Republic* of *Ideas*, it signifies little what becomes of the People, the *Fæces Romuli*. And so again it is in the use of Poisons: *Men may be dishonest in obtruding them; and we inadvertent enough* to be *imposed upon*. But what then? The Virtue of Poison always does its kind. *It is a natural power, and bestowed upon it by the supreme Being, to aid our tardy steps in pursuit of Vermin.*—In truth, one would imagine, by this extraordinary argument, that the question was not *of the injury to Society* by the abuse of Ridicule, but *of the injury to Ridicule itself.*

But let us hear him out: *The* Socrates *of* Aristophanes *is* (it will be said) *as truly a ridiculous character as ever was drawn. True;*

but it is not the character of Socrates, *the divine Moralist, and Father of ancient Wisdom.* Indeed!—But then, if, like the true *Sosia*, in the other Comedy, *he* must bear the blows of his fictitious Brother, what reparation is there to injured Virtue, to tell us, that he did not deserve them?

Again,—*What then? Did the ridicule of the Poet hinder the Philosopher from detecting and disclaiming those foreign circumstances which he had falsely introduced into his character, and thus rendering the Satirist doubly ridiculous in his turn?* See here again! all his concern, we find, is, lest good Raillery should be beat at its own weapons. No, indeed, I cannot see how it could possibly *hinder the Philosopher from detecting and disclaiming.* But *this* it did, which surely deserves a little consideration, it hindered the *People* from *seeing* what he had *detected and disclaimed*—A mighty consolation, truly, to the illustrious Sufferer, that he *disclaimed* the Fool's Coat they had put upon him!

But what is the Sacrifice of a SOCRATES now and then, to secure to us the *free* use of that inestimable blessing, BUFFOONRY? So thinks our Poet; when all the Answer he gives to so natural, so compassionate an objection as this,—*it nevertheless had an ill influence on the minds of the People,*—is telling us a story of the Atheist Spinoza; while the godlike Socrates is left deserted, in the hands of his Judges; whither RIDICULE, this noble guide of Truth, had safely brought him.

But let us hear the concluding answer which the *respectable* Spinoza is employed to illustrate.—*And so* (says he) *has the reasoning of* Spinoza *made many Atheists; he has founded it indeed on Suppositions utterly false; but allow him these, and his Conclusions are unavoidably true. And if we must reject the use of* Ridicule *because, by the imposition of false circumstances, things may be made to seem ridiculous, which are not so in themselves, Why we ought not in the same manner to reject the use of* Reason, *because, by proceeding on false Principles, conclusions will appear true which are impossible in Nature, let the* vehement and obstinate Declaimers *against Ridicule determine.*

Nay, we dare trust it with any one; whose common sense is not all run to *Taste.* What! because REASON, the guide of Life, the support of Religion, the investigator of Truth, must be still used though it be continually subject to abuse; therefore RIDICULE, the paultry buffoon Mimic of REASON, must have the same indulgence! because a KING must be intrusted with Government, though he may misuse his power; therefore the King's FOOL shall be suffered to play the Madman! But upon what footing standeth this extraordinary Claim? Why, we have a *natural sense of the Ridiculous;* and the *Ridiculous has a natural feeling of the Incongruous;* and then—who can forbear LAUGHING? If

to this, you add *Taste, Beauty, Deformity, Moral-sense, Moral-rectitude, Moral-falshood,* you have then, I think, the whole Theory of the RIDICULOUS. But who would have imagined, that while he was defending Ridicule from the charge of ABUSE, he should be adding fresh exceptions to his own Plea? Not indeed, that the comment disgraced the Text; or that there was much *Incongruity* in pleading for a fault he was just then committing. But so it is, that, where he is poetically marshalling the follies of human Life, he places the whole *body of the Christian Clergy* in the foremost rank. Amongst such, who, he tells us, *assume some desirable quality or possession which evidently does not belong to them.**

> "Others, of graver Mien, behold; adorn'd
> With holy Ensigns, how *sublime* they move,
> And, bending oft their *sanctimonious* Eyes,
> Take homage of the *Simple-minded Throng.*
> AMBASSADORS OF HEAV'N."†

—But let it go for what it is; A poor joke of his Master's,‡ and spoil'd too in the telling. The *dulness of* the *Ridicule* will sufficiently atone for the *abuse* of it.

* Page 49. † Page 96. ‡ "Characteristics," vol. iii. p. 336.

THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES

DEMONSTRATED.

BOOKS I. II. III.

ΑΠΟΚΑΛΥΨΟΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΟΦΘΑΛΜΟΥΣ ΜΟΥ ΚΑΙ
ΚΑΤΑΝΟΗΣΩ ΤΑ ΘΑΥΜΑΣΙΑ ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΜΟΥ ΣΟΥ.—PSAL.

PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION OF THE FIRST THREE BOOKS OF THE

DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES;

MDCCXXXVIII.

THE following sheets make the *first volume* of a work, designed to prove the DIVINE ORIGIN OF THE JEWISH RELIGION. As the author was neither indebted, nor engaged to the Public, he hath done his Readers no injury in not giving them more; and had they not had *this*, neither he nor they, perhaps, had esteemed themselves losers. For writing for no Party, it is likely he will please none; and begging no Protection, it is more likely he will find none: and he must have more of the confidence of a modern Writer than falls to his share, to think of making much way with the feeble effort of his own reason.

Writers, indeed, have been oft betrayed into strange absurd conclusions, from I can't tell what obsolete claim, which LETTERS have to the patronage of the GREAT: a relation, if indeed there ever were any, long since worn out and forgotten; the *Great* now seeming reasonably well convinced, that it had never any better foundation than the rhetorical importunity of Beggars.

But however this claim of Patronage may be understood, there is another of a more important nature; which is the Patronage of RELIGION. The Author begs leave to assure Those who have no time to spare from their attention on the Public, that the Protection of Religion is indispensably necessary to all Governments; and for his warrant he offers them the following volume; which endeavours to shew the necessity of RELIGION in general, and of the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE in particular, to civil Society, from the nature of things and the universal consent of Mankind. The proving this, I make no question, many Politicians will esteem sufficient: But those who are solicitious to have Religion TRUE as well as USEFUL, the author will endeavour to satisfy in the following volumes.

THE

DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES

DEMONSTRATED.

BOOK I.

SECTION I.

THE Writers, in defence of revealed Religion, distinguish their arguments into two sorts: the one they call the INTERNAL, and the other the EXTERNAL Evidence. Of these, the first is, in its nature, more simple and perfect; and even capable of demonstration: while the other, made up of very dissimilar materials, and borrowing aid from without, must needs have some parts of unequal strength with the rest; and, consequently, lie open to the attacks of a willing adversary. Besides, the *internal* evidence is, by its nature, perpetuated; and so fitted for all ages and occasions: while the *external*, by length of time, weakens and decays. For the nature and genius of the religion defended affording the proofs of the first kind, these materials of defence are inseparable from its existence; and so throughout all ages the same. But Time may, and doth efface memorials independent of that existence; out of which the *external* evidence is composed: which evidence must therefore become more and more imperfect, without being affected by that whimsical and partial calculation, to which a certain *Scotchman* * would subject it.† Nay, of such use is the *internal* evidence, that, even the very best of the *external* cannot support itself without it: for when (for

* CRAIG. *Theologiæ Christ. Principia Mathematica*, London, 1699, 4to. † This gradual weakening of the *external evidence* hath in fact actually happened; and was occasioned by the loss of several ancient testimonies, both Pagan and Christian, for the truth of Revelation; which learned men, on several occasions, have frequently lamented. This is the only way, I suppose, the *external evidence* can weaken.—As it is of the nature of *true Religion* to suffer by time, so it is of the nature of the *false* to gain by it. "L'Antiquité convient à la Religion" (says the learned President *de Montesquieu*) "parce que souvent nous croyons plus les choses à mesure qu'elles sont plus reculées; car nous n'avons pas dans la tête des idées accessoires tirées de ces temps-la, qui puissent les contradire."—*L'Esprit des Loix*, lib. xxvi. c. 2. For whatever Religion, thus circumstanced, the Writer had then in his thoughts, he must needs suppose it to be a false one; it being nonsense to suppose the true should ever be attended with any *external evidence* which argued it of falsehood.

instance) the supernatural facts done by the founders of our holy faith, are unquestionably verified by human testimony, the evidence of their divinity will not follow till the nature of that doctrine be examined, for whose establishment they were performed. Indeed, in the instance here given, they must be inforced in conjunction before any conclusion can be drawn for the truth of the Revelation in question. But were there no other benefit arising from the cultivation of the *internal* evidence than the gaining, by it, a more perfect knowledge of God's word; this, sure, would be enough to engage us in a vigorous prosecution of it. That this is one of its fruits I need not tell such as are acquainted with its nature. And it is not without occasion I take notice of this advantage: for who, in this long controversy between us and the Deists, hath not applied to certain advocates of Revelation, what was formerly said of *Arnobius* and *Lactantius, that they undertook the defence of Christianity before they understood it?* A misfortune which probably, the more careful study of the *internal* evidence would have prevented; because no one, well versed in *that*, could have continued ignorant of so important a principle, as that THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION IS OF THE VERY ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. Notwithstanding these superior advantages, it hath so happened, that the *internal* evidence hath been hitherto used as an introduction only to the *external:* and while by the *latter*, men have proved our Religion actually divine, they have gone no further with the *former*, than to shew it worthy indeed of such original.

What may have occasioned this neglect, is not so easy to say. Perhaps it was because Writers have, in general, imagined that the difficulties of prosecuting the *internal* method to effect, are not so easily surmounted as those which attend the other; as supposing that the Writer on the *external* evidence hath only need of the usual provision of church-history, common diligence, and judgment, to become master of his subject; while the reasoner on the *internal* proof, must, besides these, have a thorough knowledge of human Nature, civil Policy, the universal history of Mankind, an exact idea of the *Mosaic* and *Christian* Dispensations cleared from the froth and grounds of school-subtilties, and church-systems; and, above all, should be blessed with a certain sagacity, to investigate the relations of human actions, through all the combinations of natural, civil, and moral complexities. What may suggest this conclusion is, their reflecting, that, in the *external* evidence, each circumstance, that makes for the truth of revealed Religion, is seen to do so, as soon as known: so that the chief labour, here, is to search and pick out such, and to place them in their proper light and situation; but that, in prosecuting the *internal* evidence, the case is widely different: a

circumstance in the frame and composition of this Religion, which perhaps, some time or other, may be discovered to be a Demonstration of its divinity, shall be so far from being generally thought assistant in its proof, that it shall be esteemed, by most, a prejudice against it: of which, I suppose, the subject of the following discourse will afford a remarkable Example. And no wonder, that a Religion of divine original, constituted to serve many admirable ends of Providence, should be full of such complicated mysteries, as filled the learned Apostle with astonishment. On the other hand, this Religion being for the use of man, we need not despair, when we have attained a proper knowledge of man's nature, and the dependencies thereon, of making still growing discoveries, on the *internal* evidence, of the divinity of its original.

Now, though all this may be true; and that, consequently, it would appear a childish arrogance in an ordinary writer, after having seen the difficulties attending this method, to hope to overcome them, by the qualities here said to be required; yet no modest searcher after truth need be discouraged. For there are, in revealed Religion, besides those interior marks of truth, above described, which require the delicate operation of a great Genius and Master-workman to bring out and polish, others also, no less illustrious, but more univocal marks of truth, which God hath been pleased to impress upon his Dispensations; which require no great qualities, but humility, and love of truth, in him, who would from thence attempt *to vindicate the ways of God to man.*

The Subject of this Discourse is one of those illustrious marks; from which, the discoverer claims no merit from any long, learned, or laborious search. It is honour enough for him that he is the first who brings it out to observation; if he be indeed the first. For the demonstration is so strong and beautiful, and, at the same time, appears to be so easy and simple, that one cannot tell whether the pleasure of the discovery, or the wonder that it is now to make, be the greater.

The Medium, I employ, is the Omission of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, in the laws and religion *Moses* delivered to the *Jewish* people. By this, I pretend to carry the *internal* evidence much further than usual; even to the height of which it is capable, moral demonstration.

Why I chuse to begin with the defence of *Moses*, is from observing a notion to have spread very much of late, even amongst many who would be thought *Christians*, that the truth of *Christianity* is independent of the *jewish* Dispensation: a notion, which was, 'till now, peculiar to the *Socinians;* who go so far as to maintain, *that the knowledge of the Old Testament is not absolutely necessary for*

Christians : * and, those who profess to think more soberly, are generally gone into an opinion that the truth of the *jewish* Religion is impossible to be proved but upon the truth of the *Christian*. As to the first sort of people, if they really imagine Christianity hath no dependence on Judaism, they deserve our compassion, as being plainly ignorant of the very elements of the Religion they profess ; however suitable the opinion may be to a modern fashionable notion, not borrowed from, but the same with, the *Socinian*, that *Christianity is only the republication of the religion of Nature*. As for the more sober, it is reasonable to think, that they fell into the mistake from a view of difficulties, in the *jewish* Dispensation, which they judged too stubborn to be removed. I may pretend then to their thanks, if I succeed, by coming so seasonably to their relief ; and freeing their reasonings from a vicious circle, which would first prove the *christian* by the *jewish* ; and then the *jewish*, by the *christian* Religion.

Why I chuse this medium, namely, *the omission of a future state in the jewish Dispensation*, to prove its divine original, is, *First*, for the sake of the DEISTS : being enabled hereby to shew them, 1. That this very circumstance of *Omission*, which they pretend to be such an imperfection, as makes the Dispensation unworthy the Author to whom we ascribe it, is, in truth, a Demonstration that God only could give it. 2. That those several important passages of Scripture, which they charge with obscurity, injustice, and contradiction, are, indeed, full of light, equity, and concord. 3. That their high notions of the antiquity of the Religion and Learning of the *Ægyptians*, which they incessantly produce, as their *palmary argument*, to confront and overturn the history of *Moses*, do, in an invincible manner, confirm and support it.

Secondly, For the sake of the JEWS ; who will, at the same time, be shewn, that the nature of the THEOCRACY here delivered, and the OMISSION of the doctrine of a future state in that Dispensation, evidently obliges them to look for a more perfect revelation of God's Will.

Thirdly, For the sake of the SOCINIANS ; who will find, that *Christianity* agrees neither with itself, nor with *Judaism* ; neither with the Dispensations of God, nor the declared purpose of his Son's Mission, on their principle, of its being only a *republication of the religion of Nature*.

In this Demonstration, therefore, which we suppose very little short of mathematical certainty, and to which nothing but a mere physical possibility of the contrary can be opposed, we demand only this single *Postulatum*, that hath all the clearness of self-evidence ; namely,

* CUPER, *Advers. Tract. Theol. Polit.* lib. i.

"That a skilful Lawgiver, establishing a Religion, and civil Policy, acts with certain views, and for certain ends; and not capriciously, or without purpose or design."

This being granted, we erect our Demonstration on these three very clear and simple propositions:

1. "That to inculcate the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, is necessary to the well being of civil society.
2. "That all mankind, especially the most wise and learned nations of antiquity, have concurred in believing and teaching, that this doctrine was of such use to civil society.
3. "That the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is not to be found in, nor did make part of, the Mosaic dispensation."

Propositions so clear and evident, that one would think we might directly proceed to our Conclusion,

That therefore the law of Moses is of divine original.

Which, one or both of the two following syllogisms will evince.

I. Whatsoever Religion and Society have no future state for their support, must be supported by an extraordinary Providence.

The *Jewish* Religion and Society had no future state for their support:

Therefore, the *Jewish* Religion and Society were supported by an extraordinary Providence.

And again,

II. The ancient Lawgivers universally believed that such a Religion could be supported only by an extraordinary Providence.

Moses, an ancient Lawgiver, versed in all the wisdom of *Egypt*, purposely instituted such a Religion.

Therefore, *Moses* believed his Religion was supported by an extraordinary Providence.

But so capricious are men's passions, now for paradox, and now for system, that these, with all their evidence, have need of a very particular defence; Libertines and Unbelievers denying the major propositions of both these *Syllogisms;* and many Bigots amongst Believers, the minor of the first. These passions, however different with regard to the objects that excite them, and to the subjects in which they are found, have this in common, that they never rise but on the ruins of Reason. The business of the Religionist being to establish, if his understanding be too much narrowed, he contracts himself into *System:* and that of the Infidel, to overturn; if his Will be depraved, he, as naturally, runs out into *Paradoxes.* Slavish, or licentious thinking, the two extremes of free enquiry, shuts them up from all

instructive views, or makes them fly out beyond all reasonable limits. And as extremes fall easily into one another, we sometimes see the opposite writers change hands: the Infidel, to shew something like coherence in his *paradoxes*, represents them as the several parts of a *system*; and the Religionist, to give a relish to his *system*, powders it with *paradoxes*: in which arts, two late *Hibernians*,* the heroes of their several parties, were very notably practised and distinguished.

It was not long then before I found, that the discovery of this important truth would ingage me in a full dilucidation of the *Premisses* of the two *Syllogisms*: the *Major* of both requiring a severe search into the civil Policy, Religion, and Philosophy of ancient times; and the *Minor*, a detailed account of the nature and genius of the *jewish* Dispensation. The present volume† is destined to the first part of this labour; and the following,‡ to the second. Where, in removing the objections which lie in our way, on both sides, we shall be obliged to stretch the inquiry high and wide. But this, always, with an eye to the direction of our great master of reason,§ *to endeavour, throughout the body of this discourse, that every former part may give strength unto all that follow, and every latter bring some light unto all before.*

SECTION II.

THE first proposition, THAT TO INCULCATE THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS IS NECESSARY TO THE WELL-BEING OF CIVIL SOCIETY, I shall endeavour to prove, from the nature of man, and the genius of civil society.

The general appetite of self-preservation being most indispensable to every animal, nature hath made it the strongest of all. And though, in the rational, this faculty alone might be supposed sufficient to answer the end, for which that appetite is bestowed on the others, yet, the better to secure that end, nature hath given man, likewise, a very considerable share of the same instinct, with which she hath endowed brutes so admirably to provide for their preservation. Now whether it was some *plastic Nature* that was here in fault, which *Bacon* says, *knows not how to keep a mean*,‖ or, that it was all owing to the perverse use of human liberty, certain it is, that, borne away with the lust of gratifying this appetite, man, in a state of nature, soon ran into very violent excesses; and never thought he had sufficiently provided for his own being, till he had deprived his fellows of the free enjoyment of theirs. Hence, all those evils of mutual violence, rapine, and slaughter, which, in a state of nature, where all are equal, must needs be abundant. Because, though man, in this state, was not

* See the discourse called *Nazarenus*—"An Epistolary Discourse concerning the Immortality of the Soul."—*Dissertationes Cyprianicæ, &c.* † Books i.—iii. ‡ Books iv.—vi. § HOOKER. ‖ "Modum tenere nescia est."—*Augm. Scient.*

without a law, which exacted punishment on evil-doers, yet, the administration of that law not being in common hands, but either in the person offended, who being a party would be apt to inforce the punishment to excess; or else in the hands of every one, as the offence was against all, and affected the good of each not immediately or directly, would be executed remissly. And very often, where both these executors of the law of nature were disposed, the one to be impartial, and the other not remiss in the administration of justice, they would yet want sufficient power to enforce it. Which together would so much inflame the evils above mentioned, that they would soon become as general, and as intolerable, as the *Hobbeist* represents them in that state to be, were it not for the restraining principle of RELIGION, which kept men from running into the confusion necessarily consequent on the principle of inordinate self-love. But yet Religion could not operate with sufficient efficacy, for want, as we observed before, of a common Arbiter, who had impartiality fairly to apply the rule of right, and power to enforce its operations. So that these two PRINCIPLES were in endless jar; in which, Justice generally came by the worst. It was therefore found necessary to call in the CIVIL MAGISTRATE as the Ally of *Religion*, to turn the balance.

> *Jura inventa metu injusti, fateare necesse est,*
> *Tempora si fastosque velis evolvere mundi.*

Thus was *Society* invented for a remedy against injustice; and a *Magistrate*, by mutual consent, appointed, to give a sanction "to that common measure, to which, reason teaches us, that creatures of the same rank and species, promiscuously born to the same advantages of nature and to the use of the same faculties, have all an equal right." * Where it is to be observed, that though society provides for all those conveniences and accommodations of a more elegant life, which man must have been content to have lived without, in a state of nature; yet it is more than probable that these were never thought of when Society was first established;† but that they were the mutual violences and injustices, at length become intolerable, which set men upon contriving this generous remedy: Because Evil felt hath a much stronger influence on the mind than Good imagined; and the means of removing the one is much easier discovered, than the way to procure the other. And this, by the wise disposition of the Creator; the avoiding pain being necessary to our nature; not so, the procuring pleasure.

* LOCKE. † Though the judicious *Hooker* thinks those advantages were principally intended, when man first entered into society: *this was the cause*, says he, *of men's uniting themselves at first into politique societies.*—"Eccles. Pol." lib. i. sect. 10. p. 25, l. 1. His master *Aristotle*, though extremely concise, seems to hint, that this was but the secondary end of civil society, and that That was the first, which we make to be so. His words are: Γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.—*Pol.* lib. i. cap. 2, p. 396. B. tom. iii. Paris, 1639. fol.

Besides, the idea of those unexperienced conveniencies would be, at best, very obscure: and how unable men would be, before trial, to judge that Society would bestow them, we may guess by observing, how little, even now, the generality of men, who enjoy these blessings, know or reflect that they are owing to society, or how it procures them; because it doth it neither immediately nor directly. But they would have a very lively sense of evils felt; and could see that Society was the remedy, because the very definition of the word would teach them how it becomes so. Yet because *civil Society* so greatly improves human life, this improvement may be called, and not unaptly, the *secondary end* of that Convention. Thus, as *Aristotle* accurately observes in the words below, that which was at first constituted for the sake of *living*, is carried on for the sake of *happy living*.

This is further seen from fact. For we find those savage nations,* which happen to live peaceably out of society, have never once entertained a thought of coming into it, though they perceive all the advantages of that improved condition, in their civilized neighbours, round about them.

Civil Society thus established, from this time, as the poet sings,

absistere bello,
Oppida cœperunt munire, et ponere leges,
Ne quis fur esset, neu latro, neu quis adulter.

But as before bare RELIGION was DO preservative against moral disorders; so NOW, SOCIETY alone, would be equally unable to prevent them.

I. 1. For *first*, its laws can have no further efficacy than to restrain men from open transgression; while what is done amiss in private, though equally tending to the public hurt, escapes their animadversion; and man, since his entering into Society, would have greatly improved his practice in this secret way of mischief. For now an effectual security being provided against *open violence*, and the inordinate principle of self-love being still the same, *secret craft* was the art to be improved; and the guards of Society inviting men to a careless security, what advantages this would afford to those hidden mischiefs which civil laws could not censure, is easy to conceive.

2. But, *secondly*, the influence of civil Laws cannot, in all cases, be extended even thus far, namely, to restrain *open* transgression. It cannot *then*, when the severe prohibition of one irregularity threatens the bringing on a greater: and this will always be the case when the irregularity is owing to the violence of the sensual appetites. Hence it hath come to pass, that no great and opulent Community could ever punish *fornication*, in such a sort as its ill influence on Society was

* See § V. iv. 2, where it is shewn, how it might happen that men, in a state of nature, might live together in peace: though we have there given the reasons why they very rarely do.

confessed to deserve: because it was always found, that a severe restraint of this, opened the way to more flagitious lusts.

3. The very attention of civil Laws to their principal object occasions a further inefficacy in their operations. To understand this we must consider, that the care of the State is for the WHOLE, under which *individuals* are considered but in the second place, as accessaries only to that *whole;* the consequence of which is, that, for the sake of the Aggregate, individuals are sometimes left neglected; which happens when *general*, rather than *particular* views ingross the public attention. Now the care of *Religion* is for PARTICULARS; and a *Whole* has but the second place in its concern. But this is only touched upon to shew, in passing, the natural remedy for the defects here explained.

4. But this was not all, there was a further inefficacy in human Laws: the Legislature, in enquiring into the mutual duties of Citizens, arising from their equality of condition, found those duties to be of two kinds: the first, they intituled the duties of PERFECT OBLIGATION; because civil Laws could readily, and commodiously, and were, of necessity, required to enforce their observance. The other they called the duties of IMPERFECT OBLIGATION; not, that morality does not as strongly exact them, but because, civil Laws could not conveniently take notice of them; and, that they were supposed not so immediately and vitally to affect the being of Society. Of this latter kind are *gratitude, hospitality, charity*, &c. Concerning such, civil Laws, for these reasons, are generally silent. And yet, though it may be true, that these duties, which human Laws thus overlook, may not so directly affect Society, it is very certain, that their violation brings on as fatal, though not so swift destruction, as that of the duties of *perfect obligation*. A very competent judge, and who also speaks the sentiment of Antiquity in this matter, hath not scrupled to say: "Ut scias per se expetendam esse *grati animi adfectionem*, per se fugienda res est *ingratum* esse: quoniam nihil æque concordiam humani generis dissociat ac distrahit quam hoc vitium."*

5. But still further, besides these duties both of *perfect* and *imperfect* obligation, for the encouraging and enforcing of which, civil Society was invented; Society itself begot and produced *a new set of duties*, which are, to speak in the mode of the Legislature, of *imperfect obligation:* the first and principal of which is that antiquated forgotten virtue called the LOVE OF OUR COUNTRY.

6. But *lastly*, Society not only introduced a new set of duties, but likewise increased and inflamed, to an infinite degree, those inordinate appetites, for whose correction it was invented and introduced: like some kind of powerful medicines, which, at the very time they are

* SENECA *De Benef.* lib. iv. cap. 18.

working a cure, heighten the malignity of the disease. For our wants increase, in proportion as the arts of life advance. But in proportion to our wants, so is our uneasiness;—to our uneasiness, so our endeavours to remove it—to our endeavours, so the weakness of *human restraint*. Hence it is evident, that in a STATE OF NATURE, where little is consulted but the support of our being, our wants must be few, and our appetites, in proportion, weak; and that in CIVIL SOCIETY, where the arts of life are cultivated, our wants must be many, and our appetites, in proportion, strong.

II. Thus far concerning the imperfection of civil Society, with regard to the administration of that power which it hath, namely, of *punishing* Transgressors. We shall next consider its much greater imperfection with regard to that power which it wanteth; namely, of *rewarding* the Obedient.

The two great sanctions of all Law and Command are REWARD and PUNISHMENT. These are generally called the two hinges, on which all kinds of Government turn. And so far is certain, and apparent to the common sense of mankind, that whatever laws are not enforced by both these sanctions, will never be observed in any degree sufficient to carry on the ends of civil Society.

Yet, I shall now shew, from the original constitution and nature of this Society, that it neither had, nor could enforce, the SANCTION OF REWARD.

But, to avoid mistakes, I desire it may be observed, that by *reward*, must needs here be meant, *such as is conferred on every one for obeying the laws of his country;* not such as is bestowed on particulars, for any eminent service: as by *punishment* we understand *that which is inflicted on every one for transgressing the laws;* not *that* which is imposed on particulars, for neglecting to do all the service in their power.

I make no doubt but this will be called a paradox; nothing being more common in the mouths of politicians,* than *that the sanctions of reward and punishment are the two pillars of civil government;* and all the modern *Utopias* and ancient systems of speculative politics derive the whole vigour of their laws from these two sources. In support then of my assertion, permit me to inforce the two following propositions:

I. That, by the *original constitution* of civil Government, the sanction of rewards *was not* established by it.

II. That by the very *nature* of civil Government they *could not* be established.

* "Neque solum ut Solonis dictum usurpem, qui et sapientissimus fuit ex septem, et legum scriptor solus ex septem. Is *rempublicam duabus rebus contineri dixit, præmio et pœnâ.*"—CICERO *Ad Brutum*, Ep. 15, edit. Oxon. 4to, tom. ix. pp. 85, 86.

I. The truth of the first proposition appears from hence. On entering into Society, it was stipulated, between the Magistrate and People, that *protection* and *obedience* should be the reciprocal conditions of each other. When, therefore, a citizen obeys the laws, that debt on Society is discharged by the protection it affordeth him. But in respect to disobedience, the proceeding is not analogous; (though protection, as the condition of obedience, implies the withdrawing of it, for disobedience;) and for these reasons: The effect of withdrawing protection must be either expulsion from the Society, or the exposing the offender to all kind of licence, from others, in it. Society could not practise the first, without bringing the body politic into a consumption; nor the latter, without throwing it into convulsions. Besides, the first is no punishment at all, but by accident; it being only the leaving one Society to enter into another: and the second is a very inadequate punishment; for though all obedience be the same, and so, *uniform protection* a proper return for it; yet disobedience being of various kinds and degrees, the withdrawing protection, in this latter sense, would be too great a punishment for some crimes, and too small for others.

This being the case, it was stipulated that the transgressor should be subject to pecuniary mulcts, corporal infliction, mutilation of members, and capital severities. Hence arose the Sanction, and the *only sanction* of civil Laws: for, that protection is no reward, in the sense which these are punishments, is plain from hence, that the one is of the essence of Society itself, the other an occasional adjunct. But this will further appear by considering the opposite to protection, which is *expulsion*, or banishment; for this is the *natural* consequence of withdrawing protection. Now this, as we said, is no punishment but by accident: and so the State understood it; as we may collect, even from their manner of employing it *as a punishment* on offenders: for banishment is of universal use, with other punishments, in all societies. Now where withdrawing protection is inflicted as a punishment, the practice of all States hath been to retain their right to obedience from the banished member; though, according to the nature of the thing, considered alone, that right be really discharged; obedience and protection, as we observed, being reciprocal. But it was necessary all States should act in this manner when they inflicted exile as a punishment, it being no punishment but by accident, when the claim to subjection was remitted with it. They had a *right* to act thus; because it was inflicted on an *offender;* who by his very offence had forfeited all claim of advantage from that *reciprocal condition.*

II. The second proposition is, that by the nature of civil government, *the sanction of rewards could not be enforced by it:* My reason

is, because Society could neither distinguish the objects of its favour; nor reward them, though they were distinguished.

1. First, *Society could not distinguish the objects of its favour.* To inflict punishment, there is no need of knowing the *motives* of the offender; but judicially to confer reward on the obedient, there is.

All that civil judicatures do in punishing is to find whether the act was *wilfully* committed. They enquire not into the intention or motives any further, or otherwise, than as they are the marks of *a voluntary act:* and having found it so, they concern themselves no more with the man's motives or principles of acting; but punish, without scruple, in confidence of the offender's demerit. And this with very good reason; because no one of a sound mind, can be ignorant of the principal offences against right, or of the malignity of those offences, but by some sottish negligence which hath hindered his information; or some brutal passion which hath prejudiced his judgment; both which are highly faulty, and deserve civil punishment.

It is otherwise in rewarding abstinence from transgression. Here the motive must be considered; because as *merely doing ill*, i. e. without any *particular* bad motive, deserves punishment, a crime in the case of wrong judgment being ever necessarily inferred; so *merely abstaining from ill*, i. e. without any *particular* good motive, cannot, for that very reason, have any merit.

In *judicially rewarding*, therefore, the *motives* must be known; but human judicatures cannot know them but by accident: it is only that tribunal, which searches the heart, that can penetrate thus far. We conclude, therefore, *that reward cannot, properly, be the sanction of human laws.*

If it should be said, that though rewards cannot be equitably administred, as punishments may, yet, nothing hinders but that, for the good of Society, all who observe the laws should be rewarded, as all who transgress the laws are punished? The answer will lead us to the proof of the second part of this proposition.

2. That *Society could not* reward, *though it should* discover *the objects of its favour;* the reason is, because no Society can ever find a fund sufficient for that purpose, without raising it on the people as a tax, to pay it back to them as a reward.

But the universal practice of Society confirms this reasoning, and is explained by it; the sanction of *punishments* only having, in all ages and places, been employed to secure the observance of civil laws. This was so remarkable a fact, that it could not escape the notice of a certain admirable Wit and studious observer of men and manners; who speaks of it as an universal defect: *Although we usually* (says

he) *call reward and punishment the two hinges, upon which all government turns, yet I could never observe this maxim to be put in practice by any nation except that of* Lilliput.* Thus he introduceth an account of the laws and customs of an *Utopian* Constitution of his own framing; and, for that matter, as good, perhaps, as any of the rest: and, had he intended it as a satire against such chimerical Commonwealths, nothing could have been more just. For all these political romancers, from *Plato* to this Author, make civil rewards and punishments *the two hinges of government.*

I have often wondered what it was, that could lead them from fact, and universal practice, in so fundamental a point. But without doubt it was this: The design of such sort of writings is to give a perfect pattern of civil Government; and to supply the fancied defects in real Societies. The end of government coming first under consideration; and the general practice of Society seeming to declare this end to be only, what in truth it is, *security to our temporal liberty and property;* the simplicity of it displeased, and the plan appeared defective. They imagined, that, by enlarging the bottom, they should ennoble the structure; and, therefore, formed a romantic project of making civil Society serve for all the good purposes it was even accidentally capable of producing. And thus, instead of giving us a true picture of civil Government, they jumbled together all sorts of Societies into one; and confounded the *religious*, the *literary*, the *mercantile*, the *convivial*, with the CIVIL. Whoever reads them carefully, if indeed they be worth reading carefully, will find that the errors they abound in are all of this nature; and that they arise from the losing, or never having had, a true idea of the simple plan of civil Government: a circumstance which, as we have shewn elsewhere,† hath occasioned many wrong judgments concerning it. No wonder, then, that this mistake concerning the *end* of civil Society, drew after it others, concerning the *means;* and this, amongst the rest, that *reward was one of the sanctions of human laws.*

On the whole then, it appears, that civil Society hath not, in itself, the *Sanction of rewards*, to secure the observance of its laws. So true, in this sense likewise, is the observation of St. *Paul*, that THE LAW WAS NOT MADE FOR THE RIGHTEOUS, BUT FOR THE UNRULY AND DISOBEDIENT.

But it being evident, that the joint sanctions of rewards and punishments are but just sufficient to secure the tolerable observance of Right (the mistaken opinion, that these are the two hinges of government, arising from that evidence) it follows, that, AS RELIGION ONLY CAN SUPPLY THE SANCTION OF REWARDS, WHICH SOCIETY NEEDS,

* "Gulliver's Travels," vol. i. p. 97. † See "The Alliance between Church and State."

AND HATH NOT; RELIGION IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

Thus, on the whole we see, I. That Society, by its own proper power, cannot provide for the observance of above one third part of moral duties; and of that third, but imperfectly. We see likewise, how, by the peculiar influence of its nature, it enlarges the duty of the Citizen, at the same time that it lessens his natural ability to perform it.

II. We see, which is a thing of far greater consequence, that Society totally wants one of those two sanctions which are owned by all to be the necessary hinges on which government turns, and without which it cannot be supported.

To supply these wants and imperfections, some other coactive power must be added, (which hath its influence on the mind of man,) to keep society from running back into confusion. But there is no other than the power of RELIGION; which, teaching an over-ruling Providence, the Rewarder of good men, and the Punisher of ill, can oblige to the duties of *imperfect obligation*, which human laws overlook: and teaching also, that this Providence is omniscient, that it sees the most secret actions and intentions of men, and hath given laws for the perfecting their nature, will oblige to those duties of *perfect obligation*, which human laws cannot reach, or sufficiently enforce.

Thus have we explained in general, the mutual aid, *religion* and *civil policy* lend to one another: not unlike that which two Allies, in the same quarrel, may reciprocally receive against a common enemy: While one party is closely pressed, the other comes up to its relief; disengages the first; gives it time to rally, and repair its force: By this time the assisting party is pushed in its turn, and needs the aid of that which it relieved; which is now at hand to repay the obligation. From henceforth the two parties act in conjunction, and, by that means, keep the common enemy at a stand.

Having thus proved the service of Religion in general, to Society; and shewn after what manner it is performed, we are enabled to proceed to the proof of the proposition in question: For by what hath been said, it appears that Religion doth this service solely, *as it teacheth a Providence, the rewarder of good men, and the punisher of evil:* so that although it were possible, as I think it is not,* that there could be such a thing as a Religion not founded on the doctrine of a Providence; yet, it is evident, such a Religion would be of no manner of use to Society. Whatsoever therefore is necessary for the support of this doctrine is mediately necessary for the well-being of Society.

* St. *Paul* supposes there can no more be a Religion without a Providence, than without a God: *He that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.*—Heb. xi. 6.

Now the doctrine of A FUTURE STATE of rewards and punishments is absolutely and indispensably necessary for the support of the general doctrine of providence, under its present dispensations in this life; as we shall now shew.

Religion establishing a Providence, the rewarder of virtue, and the punisher of vice, men naturally expect to find the constant and univocal marks of such an administration. But the history of mankind, nay even of every one's own neighbourhood, would soon inform the most indiligent observer, that the affairs of men wear a face of great irregularity: the scene, that ever and anon presents itself, being of distressed virtue, and prosperous wickedness; which unavoidably brings the embarrassed Religionist to the necessity of giving up his belief, or finding out the solution of these untoward appearances. His first reflexion might perhaps be with the poet: *

> "Omnia rebar
> Consilio firmata Dei; qui lege moveri
> Sidera, qui fruges diverso tempore nasci,—
> Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
> Adspicerem, lætosque diu florere nocentes,
> Vexarique pios, rursus LABEFACTA CADEBAT
> RELIGIO."

But, on second thoughts, Reason, that, from the admirable frame and harmony of the material universe, taught him that there must needs be a superintending Providence, to influence that order which all its parts preserve, for the sake of the Whole, in their continued revolutions, would soon instruct him in the absurdity of supposing, that the same care did not extend to Man, a creature of a far nobler nature than the most considerable of inanimate beings. And therefore human affairs not being dispensed, at present, agreeably to that superintendence, he must conclude, that Man shall exist after death, and be brought to a future reckoning in another life, where all accounts will be set even, and all the present obscurities and perplexities in the ways of Providence unfolded and explained. From hence Religion acquires resistless force and splendor; and rises on a solid and unshaken basis.†

Now this doctrine of a FUTURE STATE being the only support of Religion under the present and ordinary dispensations of providence, we conclude (which was what we had to prove) that the *inculcating this* doctrine *is* NECESSARY *to the well-being of Society.*

* CLAUDIAN. † Hear an unexceptionable evidence to this whole matter: "Et quidem" (says the free-thinking Lord *Herbert*) "præmium bonis, et supplicium malis, vel hac in vita, vel post hanc vitam dari, statuebant Gentiles.—Nihil mage congruum naturæ divinæ esse docuerant, tum philosophorum, tum theologorum Gentilium præcipuorum scholæ, quam ut bona bonis, mala malis remetiretur Deus. Cæterum quum id quoque cernerent, quemadmodum viri boni calamitatibus miseriisque oppressi heic jacerent; mali improbique e contra lautitiis omnibus affluerent; certissimis ex justitia bonitateque divina argumentis deductis, bonis post hanc vitam præmium condignum, malis pœnam dari credebant: SECUS ENIM SI ESSET, NULLAM NEQUE JUSTITIÆ NEQUE BONITATIS DIVINÆ RATIONEM CONSTARE POSSE."—*De Religione Gentilium*, cap. "Præmium vel Pœna."

That it was the general sentiment of mankind, we shall see hereafter; where it will be shewn, that there never was, in any time or place, a civilized People (the *jewish* only excepted) who did not found their Religion on this doctrine, as being conscious it could not be sustained without it. And as for the necessity of Religion itself to Society, the very enemies of all Religion are the loudest to confess it: For, from this apparent truth, the Atheist of old formed his famous argument against the divine origin of Religion; which makes so great a figure in the common systems of infidelity. Here then, even on our adversary's confession, we might rest our cause; but that we find (so inconstant and perverse is irreligion) some modern Apologists for Atheism have abandoned the system of their predecessors, and chosen rather to give up an argument against the divine original of religion, than acknowledge the civil use of it; which with much frankness and confidence they have adventured to deny.

These therefore having endeavoured to cut away the very ground we stand upon, in proof of our proposition, it will be proper to examine their pretensions.

SECTION III.

The three great Advocates for this paradox are commonly reckoned, Pomponatius, Cardan, and Bayle; who are put together, without distinction: whereas nothing is more certain than that, although *Cardan* and *Bayle* indeed defended it, *Pomponatius* was of a very different opinion: but *Bayle* had entered him into this service; and so great is *Bayle's* authority, that nobody perceived the delusion. It will be but justice then to give *Pomponatius* a fair hearing, and let him speak for himself.

This learned *Italian*, a famous Peripatetic of the fifteenth century, wrote a treatise* to prove that, on the principles of *Aristotle*, it could not be proved that the soul was immortal: But the doctrine of the mortality of the soul being generally thought to have very pernicious consequences, he conceived it lay upon him to say something to that objection. In his xiiith chapter, therefore, he enumerates those consequences; and in the xivth, gives distinct answers to each of them. That which supposeth his doctrine to affect society, is expressed in these words: "*Obj.* 2. In the second place, a man persuaded of the mortality of the soul ought in no case, even in the most urgent, to

* *De Immortalitate Animæ*, printed in 12mo, anno 1534. It is of him chiefly that the celebrated *Melchior Canus* seems to speak, in the following words: "Audivimus Italos quosdam, qui suis et *Aristoteli* et Averroï tantum temporis dant, quantum sacris literis ii, qui maximè sacra doctrina delectantur; tantum vero fidei, quantum Apostolis et Evangelistis ii qui maximè sunt in Christi doctrinam religiosi. Ex quo nata sunt in Italia pestifera illa dogmata *de mortalitate animi* et divina circa res humanas *improvidentia*, si verum est quod dicitur."—*Opera*, lib. x. cap. 5, p. 446. Colon. 1605, 8vo.

prefer death to life: And so, fortitude, which teaches us to despise death, and, when our country, or the public good requires, even to chuse it, would be no more. Nor on such principles should we hazard life for a friend: on the contrary, we should commit any wickedness rather than undergo the loss of it: which is contrary to what *Aristotle* teacheth in his Ethics." * His reply to this, in the following chapter, is, that *virtue requires we should die for our country or our friends; and that virtue is never so perfect as when it brings no dower with it:* But then he subjoins, "Philosophers, and the learned, only know what pleasures the practice of virtue can procure; and what misery attends ignorance and vice:—but men not understanding the excellence of virtue, and deformity of vice, would commit any wickedness rather than submit to death: To bridle therefore their unruly appetites, they were taught to be influenced by hope of reward, and fear of punishment." †—This is enough to show what *Pomponatius* thought of the necessity of Religion to the State. He gives up so much of the objection as urges the ill consequence of the doctrine of the mortality to mankind in general; but in so doing hath not betrayed the cause he undertook: which was to prove that the belief of the mortality of the soul would have no ill influence on the practice of a learned Peripatetic: he pretends not that it would have no evil influence on the gross body of mankind to the prejudice of Society. This appears from the nature and design of the treatise; written entirely on peripatetic principles, to explain a point in that philosophy: by the force of which explanation, whoever was persuaded of the mortality of the soul, must give his assent on those principles; principles only fitted to influence learned men. It was his business therefore to examine, what effects this belief would have on such, and on such only. And this, it must be owned, he hath done with dexterity enough. But that this belief would be most pernicious to the body of mankind in general, he confesses with all ingenuity. And as his own words are the fullest proof that he thought with the rest of the world, concerning the influence of Religion, and particularly of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, on Society, I shall beg leave to transcribe them at large. "There are some men of so ingenuous and well framed a nature, that they are brought to the practice of virtue from the sole consideration of its dignity; and are kept from vice on the bare pros-

* "Secundò, quia stante animi humani mortalitate, homo in nullo casu, quantumcunque urgentissimo, deberet eligere mortem: et sic removere ur fortitudo, quæ præcipit contemnere mortem, et quod pro patria et bono publico debemus mortem eligere: neque pro amico deberemus exponere animam nostram; imo quodcunque scelus et nefas perpetrare magis quam mortem subire: quod est contra Arist. 3 Ethic. et 9 ejusdem.—P. 99.

† "Soli enim philosophi et studiosi, ut dicit Arist. 6 Ethic. sciunt quantam delectationem generent virtutes, et quantam miseriam ignorantia et vitia.—Sed quod homines non cognoscentes excellentiam virtutis et fœditatem vitii, omne scelus perpetrarent, priusquam mori: quare ad refrænandum diras hominum cupiditates, data est spes præmii et timor punitionis."—P. 119.

pect of its baseness: but such excellent persons are very rare. Others there are of a somewhat less heroic turn of mind; and these, besides the dignity of virtue, and the baseness of vice, are worked upon by fame and honours, by infamy and disgrace, to shun evil and persevere in good: These are of the second class of men. Others again are kept in order by the hope of some real benefit, or the dread of corporal punishment; wherefore that such may follow virtue, the Politician hath contrived to allure them by dignities, possessions, and things of the like nature; inflicting mulcts, degradations, mutilations, and capital punishments, to deter them from wickedness. There are yet others of so intractable and perverse a spirit, that nothing even of this can move them, as daily experience shews; for these, therefore, it was, that the Politician invented *the doctrine of a future state;* where eternal rewards are reserved for the virtuous, and eternal punishments, which have the more powerful influence of the two, for the wicked. For the greater part of those who live well, do so, rather for fear of the punishment, than out of appetite to the reward: for misery is better known to man, than that immeasurable good which Religion promiseth: and therefore as this last contrivance may be directed to promote the welfare of men of all conditions and degrees, the Legislator, intent on public good, and seeing a general propensity to evil, established the doctrine of the IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. Little solicitous for *truth*, in all this, but intent only on *utility*, that he might draw mankind to virtue. Nor is he to be blamed: for as the physician deceives his patient in order to restore his health, so the lawgiver invents apologues to form the manners of his people. Indeed were all of that noble turn of mind with those enumerated under the first class, then would they all, even on the supposition of the soul's mortality, exactly perform their mutual duties to one another. *But as there are, upon the matter, none of this disposition*, he must, of necessity, have recourse to arts,* more fitted to the general disposition."

* "Aliqui sunt homines ingenui, et bene institutæ naturæ, adeo quod ad virtutem inducuntur ex sola virtutis nobilitate, et a vitio retrahuntur ex sola ejus fœditate: et hi optimè dispositi sunt, licet perpauci sunt. Aliqui vero sunt minus bene dispositi; et hi præter nobilitatem virtutis, et fœditatem vitii, ex præmiis, laudibus, et honoribus; ex pœnis, vituperiis, et infamia, studiosa operantur, et vitia fugiunt: et hi in secundo gradu sunt. Aliqui vero propter spem alicujus boni, et timore pœnæ corporalis studiosi efficiuntur: quare, ut tales virtutem consequantur, statuunt politici vel aurum, vel dignitatem, vel aliquid tale; ut vitia vero fugiant, statuunt vel in pecunia, vel in honore, vel in corpore, seu mutilando membrum, seu occidendo puniri. Quidam vero ex ferocitate et perversitate naturæ, nullo horum moventur, ut quotidiana docet experientia; ideo posuerunt virtuosis in alia vita præmia æterna, vitiosis vero æterna damna, quæ maxime terrerent: majorque pars hominum, si bonum operatur, magis ex metu æterni damni quam spe æterni boni operatur bonum, cum damna sunt magis nobis cognita, quam illa bona æterna: et quoniam hoc ultimum ingenium omnibus hominibus potest prodesse, cujuscunque gradus sint, respiciens legislator pronitatem viarum ad malum, intendens communi bono, sanxit animam esse immortalem, non curans de veritate, sed tantum de probitate, ut inducat homines ad virtutem. Neque accusandus est politicus: sicut namque medicus multa fingit, ut ægro sanitatem restituat; sic politicus apologos format, ut cives rectificet.—Si omnes

After all this, it is surprizing that Mr. *Bayle* should so far mistake this book, as to imagine the author argues in it *against the usefulness of religion to society:* especially, when we consider that Mr. *Bayle* appears to have examined the book so nearly as to be able to confute a common error concerning it, namely, *that it was wrote to prove the mortality of the soul:* Whereas he shews, that it was wrote only to prove, that, on the principles of *Aristotle*, neither that, nor the contrary, could be demonstrated. But let us hear him: "That which *Pomponatius* hath replied to the reasoning borrowed from hence, that the doctrine of the mortality of the soul would invite men to all sort of crimes, deserves to be considered." * And then he produces those arguments of *Pomponatius*, which we have given above, *of the natural excellence of virtue, and deformity of vice; that happiness consists in the practice of the one, and misery in that of the other, &c.* These he calls *poor solutions:* Indeed *poor* enough, had it been, as Mr. *Bayle* supposes, *Pomponatius's* design to prove that the doctrine of the *mortality* of the soul did not invite the generality of men to wickedness: for the account given by *Pomponatius* himself of the origin of the contrary doctrine, shews, that, but for this, they would have run headlong into vice. But supposing the Peripatetic's design to be, as indeed it was, to prove that the doctrine of the *mortality* would have no ill influence on the learned followers of *Aristotle*, then these arguments, which Mr. *Bayle* calls *poor ones*, will be found to have their weight. But he goes on, and tells us, *that* Pomponatius *brings a better argument from fact, where he takes notice of several, who denied the immortality of the soul, and yet lived as well as their believing neighbours.* This is indeed a good argument to the purpose, for which it is employed by *Pomponatius;* but whether it be so to that, for which, Mr. *Bayle* imagined, he employed it, shall be considered hereafter, when we come to meet with it again in this later writer's apology for atheism. But Mr. *Bayle* was so full of his own *favourite question*, that he did not give due attention to *Pomponatius's;* and having, as I observed above, refuted a vulgar error with regard to this famous tract, and imagining that the impiety, so generally charged on it, was solely founded in that error, he goes on insulting the enemies of *Pomponatius* in this manner: "If the charge of impiety, of which *Pomponatius* hath been accused, was only founded on his book *of the immortality of the soul*, we must needs say there was never any accusation more impertinent or a stronger instance of the iniquitous perversity of the persecutors of the philoso-

homines essent in illo primo gradu enumerato, stante etiam animorum mortalitate, studiosi fierent; sed quasi nulli sunt illius dispositionis; quare aliis ingeniis incedere necesse fuit."—Pp. 123—125.

* "Ce que Pomponace a repondu à la raison empruntée de ce que le dogme de la mortalité de l'ame porteroit les hommes à toutes sortes de crimes, est digne de consideration."—*Dict. Hist. et Crit.* Art. POMPONACE, Rem. (H.)

phers."* But *Pomponatius* will not be so easily set clear: For let him think as he would concerning the soul, yet the account he gives of the origin of Religion, as the contrivance of statesmen, here produced, from this very tract *De immortalitate animæ*, is so highly impious, that his enemies will be hardly persuaded to give it a softer name than downright atheism. Nor is it impiety in general, of which, we endeavour to acquit him, but only that species of it, which teaches *that Religion is useless to Society*. And this we think we have done; although it be by shewing him to have run into the opposite extreme, which would insinuate it was *the creature of politicks*.

Cardan comes next to be considered: and him nobody hath injured. He, too, is under *Bayle's* delusion, concerning *Pomponatius:* For, writing on the same subject,† he borrows the Peripatetic's arguments to prove that *Religion was even pernicious to Society*. This was so bold a stroke, that Mr. *Bayle*, who generally follows him pretty closely, drops him here: Nor do I know that he ever had a second, except it was the unhappy philosopher of *Malmsbury;* who, scorning to argue upon the matter, imperiously pronounced, that he who presumed to propagate Religion in a Society, without leave of the Magistrate, was guilty of the crime of *Lese Majesty*, as introducing a power superior to the *Leviathan's*. But it would be unpardonable to keep the reader much longer on this poor lunatic *Italian, in whom*, as Mr. *Bayle* pleasantly observes, *sense was, at best, but an appendix to his folly*.‡ Besides, there is little in that tract, but what he stole from *Pomponatius;* the strength of which, to support *Cardan's* paradox, hath been considered already; or what Mr. *Bayle* hath borrowed from him; the force of which shall be considered hereafter: But that little is so peculiarly his own, that as no other can claim the property, so no one hath hitherto usurped the use. Which yet, however, is remarkable: for there is no trash so worthless, but what some time or other finds a place in a Free-thinker's system. We will not despair then but that this paltry rubbish may one day or other have an

* "Si l'on n'a fondé les impietéz, dont on l'accuse, que sur son livre *de l'immortalité de l'ame*, il n'y eut jamais d'accusation plus impertinente, que celle-la, ni qui soit une marque plus expresse de l'entetement inique des persecuteurs des philosophes."
† *De Immortalitate Animorum Liber*, Lugd. ap. Gryph. 1545; et *Opera omnia*, fol. Lugduni, 1663, tom. ii. p. 458. ‡ The charming picture he draws of himself, and which he excuses no otherwise than by laying the fault on his STARS, will hardly prejudice any one in favour of his opinions. How far it resembles any other of the brotherhood, they best know, who have examined the genius of modern infidelity. However, thus he speaks of his own amiable turn of mind: "In diem viventem, nugacem, religionis contemptorem, injuriæ illatæ memorem, invidum, tristem, insidiatorem, proditorem, magum, incantatorem, suorum osorem, turpi libidini deditum, solitarium, inamœnum, austerum; sponte etiam divinantem, zelotypum, obscœnum, lascivum, maledicum, varium, ancipitem, impurum, calumniatorem," &c. We have had many *Free-thinkers*, but few such *Free-speakers*. But though these sort of writers are not used to give us so *direct* a picture of themselves, yet it hath been observed, that they have unawares copied from their own tempers, in the ungracious drawings they have made of HUMAN NATURE and RELIGION.

honourable station in some of these fashionable fabricks. And, not to hinder its speedy preferment, I shall here give it the reader in its full force, without answer or reply. He brings the following argument to prove that the doctrine of the *immortality* of the soul is even destructive to society:—"From this flattering notion of a FUTURE STATE, ill men get opportunity to compass their wicked designs: and, on the same account, good men suffer themselves to be injuriously treated. Civil Laws, relying on this fanciful assistance, relax their necessary severity; and *thus* is the opinion productive of much mischief to mankind."* And then, by another argument as good, he shews the benefits accruing to the state from the belief of the soul's *mortality*: "Those who maintain that the soul dies with the body, must needs be, by their principles, honester men than others, because they have a peculiar interest in preserving their reputation; this being the only future property they pretend to: And the Profession of the Soul's mortality being generally esteemed as scandalous as that of usury, such men will be most exact and scrupulous in point of honour, as your usurer, to keep up the credit of his calling, is of all men the most religious observer of his word."†

SECTION IV.

MR. BAYLE, the last supporter of this paradox, is of a very different character from these *Italian* Sophists: A writer, who, to the utmost strength and clearness of reasoning, hath added all the liveliness, and delicacy of wit: who, pervading human nature at his ease, struck into the province of PARADOX, as an exercise for the unwearied vigour of his mind: who, with a soul superior to the sharpest attacks of fortune, and a heart practised to the best philosophy, had not yet enough of real greatness to overcome that last foible of superior minds, the temptation of honour, which the ACADEMIC EXERCISE OF WIT is conceived to bring to its professors.

A writer of this character will deserve a particular regard: For *paradoxes*, which in the hands of a *Toland* or a *Tindal* end in rank offensive impiety, will, under the management of a BAYLE, always afford something for use or curiosity: Thus, in the very work we are about to examine,‡ the many admirable observations on the nature and genius of polytheism, happen to be a full answer to all which the Author of *Christianity as old as the Creation* hath advanced against the use of revelation. For a skilful chemist, though disappointed in his *grand magisterium*, yet often discovers, by the way, some useful and noble medicament; while the ignorant pretender to the art, not

* *De Immortalitate Animorum*, cap. ii. † Cap. xxxiii. ejusd. tract. ‡ "Pensées diverses, ecrites à un docteur de Sorbonne à l'Occasion de la Comete qui parût au Mois de Decembre, 1680, et—Continuation des Pensées diverses, &c. ou Reponse à plusieurs difficultez," &c.

only loses his labour, but fills all about him with the poisonous steams of *sublimate*.

The *professed* design of Mr. *Bayle's* work is to enquire, *which is least hurtful to mankind, ancient idolatry, or modern atheism:* And had he confined himself to that subject, we had had no concern with him, but should have left him in the hands of Mess. *Jacquelot* and *Bernard*. I freely own they are both stark naught: All the difference is, that Atheism directly excludes and destroys the *true* sense of moral right and wrong; and Polytheism sets up a *false* species of it.

But the more particular, though less avowed, purpose of this elaborate treatise is to prove, that *Atheism is not destructive of Society;* and here he falls under our notice, no distinct answer, that I know of, having been yet attempted to this part of his performance.

His arguments in support of this Paradox, are occasionally, and so without any method, interspersed throughout that large work: But, to give them all the advantage they are capable of, I have here collected and disposed them in such order, that they mutually support, and come in to the aid of one another.

It had been generally esteemed a proof of the destructive nature of Atheism to Society, that *this principle excludes the knowledge of moral good and evil;* such knowledge being, as will be seen, posterior to the knowledge of a God. His first argument therefore for the *innocence of Atheism* is,

I. "That an Atheist may have an idea of the moral difference between good and evil, because Atheists, as well as Theists, may comprehend the first principles of morals and metaphysics, from which this difference may be deduced. And in fact" (he says) "both the *Epicurean* atheist, who denied the providence of God, and the *Stratonic* atheist, who denied his Being, had this idea."*

This often repeated argument is so loosely expressed, that it is capable of many meanings; in some of which the assertion is true, but not to the purpose; in others to the purpose, but not true. Therefore before any precise answer can be given to it, it will be necessary to trace up moral duty to its first principles. And though an enquiry of this sort should not prove the most amusing either to myself or my reader, it may be found however to deserve our pains. For a spirit of dispute and refinement hath so entangled and confounded all our conclusions on a subject, in itself, very clear and intelligible, that I am persuaded, were MORALITY herself, of which the *ancients* made a Goddess, to appear in person amongst men, and be questioned concerning her birth, she would be tempted to answer as *Homer* does in *Lucian*, that her commentators had so learnedly

* Voiez les *Pensées diverses*, cap. clxxviii. et suiv. et l'*Addition à ces Pensées*, cap. iv. *Reponse à la* 10 *et à la* 13 *objections*, et la *Continuation des Pens. div.* cap. cxliii.

embarrassed the dispute, that she was now as much at a loss as They to account for her original.

To proceed therefore with all possible brevity: Each animal hath its *instinct* implanted by nature to direct it to its greatest good. Amongst these, man hath his; to which modern philosophers have given the name of,

1. The MORAL SENSE: whereby we conceive and feel a pleasure in right, and a distaste and aversion to wrong, prior to all reflexion on their natures, or their consequences. This is the first inlet to the *adequate idea of morality;* and plainly, the most extensive of all; the Atheist as well as Theist having it. When instinct had gone thus far,

2. The *reasoning faculty* improved upon its dictates: For, men led by reflexion to examine the foundation of this *moral sense*, soon discovered that there were real essential differences in the qualities of human actions, established by nature; and, consequently, that the love and hatred excited by the *moral sense* were not capricious in their operations; for, that in the essential properties of their objects there was a SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE. Reason having gone thus far (and thus far too it might conduct the *Stratonic* atheist) it stopped; and saw that something was still wanting whereon to establish the MORALITY, properly so called, OF ACTIONS, that is, an OBLIGATION on men to perform some, and to avoid others; and that, to find this something, there was need of calling in other principles to its assistance: Because nothing can thus oblige but,

3. A *superior* WILL: And such a *will* could not be found till the being and attributes of God were established; but was discovered with them.

Hence arose, and only from hence, a MORAL DIFFERENCE. From this time human actions became the subject of *obligation*, and not till now: For though INSTINCT felt a difference in actions; and REASON discovered that this difference was founded in the nature of things; yet it was WILL only which could make a compliance with that difference a DUTY.

On these three Principles therefore, namely *the moral sense, the essential difference in human actions*, and the *will of God*, is built the whole edifice of *practical morality:* Each of which hath its distinct motive to enforce it; Compliance with *the moral sense* exciting a pleasurable sensation; compliance with the *essential differences of things* promoting the order and harmony of the universe; and compliance with the *will of God* obtaining an abundant reward.

This, when attentively considered, can never fail of affecting us with the most lively sense of God's goodness to Mankind, who, graciously respecting the imbecility of Man's *nature*, the slowness of his *reason*, and the violence of his *passions*, hath been pleased to

afford three different excitements to the practice of Virtue; that men of all ranks, constitutions, and educations, might find their account in one or other of them; something that would hit their *palate*, satisfy their *reason*, or subdue their *will*. The first principle, which is the *moral sense*, would strongly operate on those, who, by the exact temperature and balance of the passions, were disengaged enough to feel the delicacy of its charms; and have an elegance of mind to respect the nobleness of its dictates. The second, which is the *essential difference*, will have its weight with the speculative, the abstract and profound reasoners, and on all those who excel in the knowledge of human nature. And the third, which resolves itself into the *will of God*, and takes in all the consequences of obedience and disobedience, is principally adapted to the great body of Mankind.

It may perhaps be objected, to what is here delivered, *that the true principle of morality should have the worthiest motive to enforce it: Whereas the Will of God is enforced by the view of rewards and punishments; on which motive, virtue hath the smallest merit.* This character of the true principle of morality is perfectly right; and agrees, we say, with the principle which we make to be the true: For the legitimate motive to virtue, on that principle, is *compliance with the Will of God;* a compliance which hath the highest degree of merit. But this not being found of sufficient power to take in the Generality, the consequences of compliance or non-compliance to this Will, as far as relates to rewards and punishments, were first drawn out to the people's view. In which they were dealt with as the teachers of mathematics treat their pupils; when, to engage them in a sublime demonstration, they explain to them the use and fertility of the theorem.

To these great purposes serve the THREE PRINCIPLES while in conjunction: But now, as in the *civil world* and the affairs of men, our pleasure, in contemplating the wisdom and goodness of Providence, is often disturbed and checked by the view of some human perversity or folly which runs across that Dispensation; so it is here, in the *intellectual*. This admirable provision for the support of virtue hath been, in great measure, defeated by its pretended advocates; who, in their eternal squabbles about the true foundation of morality, and the obligation to its practice, have sacrilegiously untwisted this THREEFOLD CORD; and each running away with the part he esteemed the strongest, hath affixed that to the throne of God, as the golden chain that is to unite and draw all unto it.

This man proposes to illustrate the doctrine of the MORAL SENSE; and then the morality of actions is founded only in that *sense:* with him metaphysics and logic, by which the *essential difference*, in human actions, is demonstrated, are nothing but *words, notions, visions; the*

empty regions and shadows of philosophy. The professors of them are *moon-blind wits;* and *Locke* himself is treated as a schoolman.* To talk of reward and punishment, consequent on the *will of a superior,* is to make the practice of virtue mercenary and servile; from which, pure human nature is the most abhorrent.

Another undertakes to demonstrate the ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES OF THINGS, and their natural fitness and unfitness to certain ends; and then *morality* is solely founded on those differences; and God and his Will have nothing to do in the matter. Then the Will of God cannot make any thing morally good and evil, just and unjust; nor consequently be the cause of any obligation on moral Agents: because the essences and natures of things, which constitute actions good and evil, are independent on that Will; which is forced to submit to their relations like weak Man's. And therefore, if there were no natural justice; that is, if the rational and intellectual nature were, of itself, undetermined and unobliged to any thing, and so destitute of *morality* properly so called, it were not possible that any thing should be made morally good or evil, obligatory or unlawful, or that any moral obligation should be begotten by any Will or positive command whatsoever. —And then our knowledge of moral good and evil is solely acquired by abstract reasoning: And to talk of its coming any other way into the mind, is weak and superstitious, as making God act unnecessarily and superfluously.

A third, who proposes to place *morality* on *the will of a superior,* which is its true bottom, acts yet on the same exterminating model. He takes the other two Principles to be merely visionary: The *moral sense* is nothing but the impression of education; the *love of the species* romantic; and invented by crafty knaves, to dupe the young, the vain, and the ambitious. Nature, he saith, hath confined us to the narrow sphere of *self-love;* and our most pompous pretences of pure disinterestedness, but the more artful disguise of that very passion. He not only denies all *moral difference* in actions, antecedent to the Will of God, which (as we shall show anon) he might well do; but likewise, all *specific difference:* will not so much as allow it to be a RULE to direct us to the performance of God's will; for that the *notions* of fit and unfit proceed not from that *difference,* but from the arbitrary impositions of *Will* only; that God is the free cause of Truths as well as Beings; and then, consequently, if he so wills, two and two would not make four. At length his system shrinks into a vile and abject selfishness; and, as he degrades and contracts his nature, he slips, before he is aware, quite besides his foundation, which he professes to be the *Will of God.*

Thus have men, borne away by a fondness to their own idle systems,

* "Characteristics," passim.

presumptuously broken in upon that TRIPLE BARRIER,* with which God has been graciously pleased to cover and secure Virtue; and given advantage to the cavils of Libertines and Infidels; who on each of these three Principles, thus advanced on the ruins of the other two, have reciprocally forged a scheme of Religion independent on Morality; † and a scheme of Morality independent on Religion; ‡ who, how different soever their employments may appear, are indeed but twisting the same rope at different ends: the plain design of both being to overthrow RELIGION. But as the Moralist's is the more plausible scheme, it is now become most in fashion: So that of late years a deluge of moral systems hath overflowed the learned world, in which either the *moral sense*, or the *essential difference*, rides alone triumphant; which like the chorus of clouds in *Aristophanes*, the Αέναοι Νεφέλαι, the ETERNAL RELATIONS, are introduced into the scene, with a gaudy outside, to supplant *Jupiter*, and to teach the arts of fraud and *sophistry;* but in a little time betray themselves to be empty, obscure, noisy, impious Nothings.

In a word, with regard to the several sorts of *Separatists*, those, I mean, who are indeed friends to Religion, and who detest the Infidel's abuse of their principles, I would recommend to their interpretation the following oracle of an ancient sage. ΟΥ ΓΑΡ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΕΥΡΕΙΝ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗΣ ΑΛΛΗΝ ΑΡΧΗΝ ΟΥΔΕ ΑΛΛΗΝ ΓΕΝΕΣΙΝ, Η ΤΗΝ ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΚΟΙΝΗΣ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ.

This noble truth, *that the only true foundation and original of morality is the Will of God interpreted by the moral sense and essential difference of things*, was a *random* thought of *Chrysippus* the *Stoic*. I give it this term, 1. Because the ancient philosophy teaches nothing certain concerning the true ground of moral obligation. 2. Because *Plutarch's* quoting it amongst *the repugnances of the Stoics*, shews it to be inconsistent with their other doctrine. And indeed the following the ancient philosophers too servilely, hath occasioned the

* St. Paul might have taught them better; who, collecting together and enforcing all the motives for the PRACTICE OF VIRTUE, expresseth himself in this manner: "*Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are* true, *whatsoever things are* honest, *whatsoever things are* just"—Τὸ λοιπὸν, ἀδελφοὶ, ὅσα ἐστὶν ΑΛΗΘΗ, ὅσα ΣΕΜΝΑ, ὅσα ΔΙΚΑΙΑ ἀληθῆ evidently relating to the *essential difference of things*; σεμνὰ (implying something of worth, splendour, dignity) to the *moral sense* which men have of this difference; and δίκαια, *just*, is relative to *Will* or Law. The Apostle proceeds—"*whatsoever things are* pure, *whatsoever things are* lovely, *whatsoever things are of* good report"—ὅσα ἁγνὰ, ὅσα προσφιλῆ, ὅσα εὔφημα. In these three latter characters marking the nature of the three preceding: ἁγνὰ *pure*, referring to *abstract truth*; προσφιλῆ *lovely*, amiable, to *innate or instinctive honesty*; and εὔφημα *of good report*, reputable, to the observation of *Will* or Law. He concludes, "*If there be any* virtue, *and if there be any* praise, *think of these things.*" Εἴ τις ἀρετὴ, καὶ εἴ τις ἔπαινος, ταῦτα λογίζεσθε. That is, If the moral sense and the essential difference of things can make the practice of morality, a *virtue*; or obedience to a *superior Will*, matter of *praise*, *think of these things.* † See "The Fable of the Bees," and confer the *enquiry into the original of Moral virtue*, and the *search into the nature of society*, with the body of the book. ‡ See the fourth Treatise of the "Characteristics," intituled, "An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit."

errors of modern moralists, in unnaturally separating the three principles of practical morality, *Plato* being the patron of the *moral sense; Aristotle* of the *essential differences;* and *Zeno of arbitrary will.*

And now, to come more directly to our Adversary's argument: We say then,

1. That the Atheist can never come to the knowledge of the MORALITY of actions properly so called.
2. That though he be capable of being affected with the *moral sense*, and may arrive to the knowledge of the real *essential differences* in the qualities of human actions; yet this *sense* and these *differences* make nothing for the purpose of Mr. *Bayle's* argument: because these, even in conjunction, are totally insufficient to influence Society in the practice of virtue: which influence is the thing in question.

Both these conclusions, I presume, have been clearly proved from what hath been said above, of *the origin of Society;* and, just before, of *the foundation of moral virtue:* But that nothing may be wanting to the argument, I shall crave leave to examine the matter with a little more exactness.

1. And first, *that an Atheist, as such, can never arrive to the knowledge of the morality of actions properly so called,* shall be further made good against the reasoning which Mr. *Bayle* brings to prove, *that the Morality of human actions may be demonstrated on the principles of a* Stratonicean, or atheistic Fatalist; whom he personates in this manner:* "The beauty, symmetry, regularity, and order seen in the universe, are the effects of a blind unintelligent Nature; and though this Nature, in her workmanship, hath copied after no ideas, she hath nevertheless produced an infinite number of species, with each its distinct essential attribute. It is not in consequence of our opinion, that fire and water differ in species, and that there is a like difference between love and hatred, affirmation and negation. Their specific difference is founded in the nature of the things themselves. But how do we know this? Is it not by comparing the essential properties of one of these beings with the essential properties of another of them? But we know, by the same way, that there is a specific difference between truth and falshood, between good faith and perfidiousness, between gratitude and ingratitude, &c. We may then be assured, that vice and virtue differ specifically by their nature, independent of our opinion." This, Mr. *Bayle* calls their being *naturally* separated from each other: And thus much we allow. He goes on:† "Let us see now by what ways *Stratonic* atheists may come to the knowledge of vice and virtue's being *morally* as well as *naturally* separated. They

* "La beauté, la symétrie, la regularité, l'ordre que l'on voit dans l'univers, sont l'ouvrage d'une nature qui n'a point de connoissance, et qu'encore," &c.—*Contin. des Pensées diverses.* cap. cli.

† "Voions comment ils pouvoient savoir qu'elles etoient outre cela separées moralement. Ils attribuoient," &c.—Idem, *ibid.*

ascribe to the same necessity of nature the establishment of those relations which we find to be between things, and the establishment of those rules by which we distinguish those relations. There are rules of reasoning independent of the will of man: It is not because men have been pleased to fix the rules of syllogism, that therefore those rules are just and true: they are so in themselves, and all the endeavours of the wit of man against their essence and their attributes would be vain and ridiculous." This likewise we grant him. He proceeds: "If then there are certain and immutable rules for the operation of the understanding, there are also such for the determinations of the will." But this we deny. He would prove it thus:* "The rules of these determinations are not altogether arbitrary; some of them proceed from the necessity of nature; and these impose an indispensable obligation. The most general of these rules is this, *that man ought to will what is most conformable to right reason:* For there is no truth more evident than this, that it is fit a reasonable creature should conform to right reason, and unfit that such a creature should recede from it." This is his argument. To which I reply, that from thence, no *moral difference* can arise. He contends that *things are both naturally and morally separable.* He speaks of these ideas as very different (as indeed they are) and proves the truth of them by different arguments. *The natural essential difference of things* then, if we mean any thing by the terms, hath this apparent property; that it creates a *fitness* in the agent to act agreeably thereto: As the *moral difference* of things creates, besides this *fitness*, an *obligation* likewise: When therefore there is an *obligation* in the agent, there is a *moral difference* in the things, and so on the contrary, for they are inseparable. If then we shew, that right reason alone cannot properly *oblige*, it will follow that the knowledge of what is agreeable to right reason doth not induce a *moral difference:* Or that a Stratonicean is not under any *obligation* to act agreeably to right reason; which is the thing Mr. *Bayle* contends for.

1. Obligation, necessarily implies an Obliger: The Obliger must be different from, and not one and the same with, the obliged: To make a man at once the Obliger and obliged, is the same thing as to make him treat or enter into compact with himself, which is the highest of absurdities. For it is an unquestioned rule in law and reason, that whoever acquires a right to any thing from the obligation of another towards him, may relinquish that right. If therefore the Obliger and obliged be one and the same person, in that case all obligation must be void of course; or rather no obligation would have commenced. Yet the *Stratonic* atheist is guilty of this absurdity,

* "Les regles de ces actes-là ne sont pas toutes arbitraires: il y en a qui emanent," &c.—Idem, *ibid.*

when *he* talks of actions being *moral* or *obligatory*. For what *Being* can be found whereon to place this obligation? Will he say *right reason?* But that is the very absurdity we complain of; because *reason* is only an attribute of the person obliged, his assistant to judge of his obligations, if he hath any from another Being: To make *this* then the Obliger, is to make a man oblige himself. If he say, he means by *reason* not every man's particular reason, but *reason in general;* I reply, that *this* reason is a mere abstract notion, which hath no real subsistence: and how that which hath no real subsistence should *oblige*, is still more difficult to apprehend.

2. But farther, *moral obligation*, that is, the obligation of a free agent, implies a *Law*, which enjoins and forbids; but a *Law* is the imposition of an intelligent superior, who hath power to exact conformity thereunto. But blind unintelligent Nature is no lawgiver, nor can what proceeds necessarily from thence come under the notion of a Law: We say indeed, in common speech, the *law of necessity*, and *the law of reason and nature;* but these are merely popular expressions: By the first, we mean only to insinuate, that *necessity* hath, as it were, one property of a *law*, namely, that of *forcing;* and by the second, we mean the rule which the supreme Lawgiver hath laid down for the judging of his Will. And while this light and direction of *reason* or *nature* is considered as a rule only, given by the *God of nature*, the term may be allowed: Those who so considered the term were the first who so used it. After-writers retained the name; but, by a strange absurdity, separated the *Law-giver* from his *Law;* on a fancy of its being of virtue to *oblige* by its own intrinsic excellence, or by the good of which it is productive. But how any thing except a Law, in the proper philosophic sense, can oblige a dependent reasonable Being endued with will, is utterly inconceivable. The fundamental error in Mr. *Bayle's* argument seems to be this: He saw the essential difference of things; he found those differences the adequate object of the *understanding;* and so too hastily concluded them to be the adequate object of the *will* likewise. In this he was mistaken: they are indeed the adequate object of the understanding; because the *understanding* is passive in its perceptions, and therefore under the sole direction of these necessary differences. But the *will* is not passive in its determinations: for instance, that three are less than five, the understanding is necessitated to judge, but the will is not necessitated to chuse five before three: Therefore the essential differences of things are not the adequate object of the *will;* the Law of a Superior must be taken in to constitute *obligation* in choice, or *morality* in actions.

Hobbes seems to have penetrated farther into this matter, than the *Stratonicean* of Mr. *Bayle;* he appeared to have been sensible that

morality implied *obligation*, and obligation a *law*, and a law a *Lawgiver*: Therefore, having (as they say) expelled the Legislator of the universe, that morality of actions might have some foundation, he thought fit to underprop it with his earthly God, the *Leviathan*; and to make him the creator and supporter of *moral right* and *wrong*.

But a favourer of Mr. *Bayle's* paradox may perhaps object, that as he was allowed a *fitness*, and *unfitness* in actions, discoverable by the essential difference of things; and as this fitness and unfitness implies benefit and damage to the actor, and others; it being in fact seen, that the practice of virtue promotes the happiness of the Individual, or at least of the Species, and that vice obstructs it; it may be said, that this will be sufficient to make *morality*, or *obligation*, in the *Stratonic* system; if not in the strict sense of the word, yet as to the nature of the thing. To this I reply, that in that System, whatever advanced human happiness, would be only a natural good; and virtue as merely such, as food and covering: and, that which retarded it, a natural evil, whether it was vice, pestilence, or unkindly seasons. *Natural*, I say, in contradistinction to *moral*, or such a good as any one would be *obliged* to seek or promote. For till it be made appear that Man hath received his being from the *will* of another; and so depending on that other, is accountable to him for it; he can be under no *moral obligation* to prefer good to evil, or even life to death. From the *nature* of any action, MORALITY cannot arise; nor from its *effects*: Not from the first, because, being only reasonable or unreasonable, nothing follows but a *fitness* in doing one, and an *absurdity* in doing the other: Not from the second, because, did the good or evil produced make the action *moral*, brutes, from whose actions proceed both good and evil, would have *morality*.

If it be farther urged, that the observance of these essential differences is promoting the perfection of a particular system, which contributes, in its concentration, to the perfection of the universe; and that therefore a reasonable creature is OBLIGED to conform thereto: I answer, first, that (on the principles before laid down) to make a reasonable creature *obliged* in this case, he must first be enforced by the Whole, of which he is part. This enforcement cannot here be by intentional command, whose object is free agency, because the *Stratonic* Whole, or universal Nature, is blind and unintelligible. It must force then by the necessity of its nature; and this will, indeed, make men obliged as clocks are by weights, but never as free agents are, by the command of an intelligent Superior, which only can make actions *moral*. But secondly, an uniform perfect Whole can never be the effect of blind fate; but is the plain image and impression of one intelligent self-existent Mind. In a word, as it

is of the nature of the *independent* first Cause of all things to be obliged only by his own *wisdom;* so it seems to be of the nature of all *dependent* intelligent beings to be obliged only by the *will* of the first Cause.

"All things therefore" (says the great Master of reason) "do work, after a sort, according to Law: All other things according to a LAW, whereof, some SUPERIOR, to whom they are subject, is Author; only the works and operations of God have him both for their worker, and for the Law whereby they are wrought. The Being of God is a kind of Law to his working; for that perfection which God is giveth perfection to that he DOTH."*

Nor does this contradict what we have asserted, and not only asserted, but proved, in speaking of moral obligation, *that nothing, but Will, can oblige:* Because our whole reasoning is confined to *man's obligation.* And if there be any thing certain, in the first principles of law or reason, this must be confessed to be of the number, *that a man can neither oblige himself, nor be obliged by names and notions;* so that, to create an obligation, the *Will* of some other being must be found out. A principle, which the common conceptions of man, and the universal practice of human life confirms. But, as in our discourse of God, the weakness of our intellects constrains us to explain our conceptions of his nature by human ideas, therefore when we speak of the *morality* of *his* actions, finding them to be founded in no other, or superior Will, we say he is *obliged only by his own wisdom: Obligation,* when applied to God, meaning no more than *direction:* for, that an *independent* being can be subject to obligation in the sense that a *dependent* being is subject, is, by the very terms, an high absurdity. *Obligation,* therefore, when applied to man, being *one* thing; when applied to God *another;* the strictest rules of logic will allow different attributes to be predicated of each. It is confessed, we have a clear and adequate idea of *obligation,* as it relates to man; of *this* obligation, we have affirmed something plain and evident: It is likewise confessed we have a very obscure and inadequate idea of *obligation,* as it relates to God: of *this* obligation, too, we have affirmed something, whose evidence must needs partake of the imperfection of its subject. Yet there have been found Objectors so perverse, who would not only have *clear* conceptions regulated on *obscure;* but what is *simply predicated* of God, to destroy what hath been *proved* of man.

But to set this matter in a fuller light, I will just mention two objections *(not peculiar* to the *Stratoniceans)* against morality's being founded in will.

Obj. 1. It is said, "That, as every creature necessarily pursues hap-

* HOOKER'S "Ecclesiastical Polity," b. i. sec. 2, p. 3, circa finem.

piness, it is *that* which obliges to moral observance, and not the Will of God; because it is to procure happiness that we obey command, and do every other act: and because, if that Will commanded us to do what would make us unhappy, we should be forced to disobey it." To this I answer, that when it is said *morality is founded on Will*, it is not meant that every Will obliges, but that nothing but Will can oblige. It is plain the Will of an inferior or equal cannot be meant by it:* it is not simply Will then, but Will so and so circumstanced: And why it is not as much Will which obliges, when it is the *Will of a superior seeking our good*, as the *Will of a superior simply*, I am yet to learn. To say then that happiness and not Will makes the obligation, seems like saying, that when in mechanics a weight is raised by an engine, the *wheels* and *pullies* are not the cause, but that universal affection of matter called *attraction*. *Obj.* 2. If it be still urged, "that *one* can no more be called the obliger than the *other;* because though happiness could not oblige without Will, on the other hand, Will could not oblige without happiness:" I reply, this is a mistake. Will could not indeed oblige to unhappiness; but it would oblige to what should produce neither one nor the other, though all considerations of the consequence of obeying or disobeying were away.

Obj. 3. It is said, "That if, according to the modern notions of philosophy, the will of God be determined by the eternal relations of things, they are properly those relations" (as Dr. *Clarke* would have it) "which oblige, and not the will of God. For if A impel B; and B, C, and C, D; it is A and not C that properly impels D." But here I suspect the objection confounds *natural cause and effect* with *moral agent and patient;* which are two distinct things, as appears, as on many other accounts, so from their effects; the one implying *natural necessity*, the other, only *moral fitness*. Thus, in the case before us, the eternal relations are, if you will, the *natural cause*, but the will of God is the *moral agency:* And our question is, not *of natural necessity* that results from the former, but of *moral fitness* that results from the latter. Thus that which is not properly the natural cause of my acting, is the moral cause of it. And so on the contrary.

On the whole, then, it appears, that *Will*, and *Will only*, can constitute *obligation;* and, consequently, make actions *moral*, *i. e.* such as deserve *reward* and *punishment*. Yet when men reflect on the affections of their own minds, and find *there* a *sense* of *right* and *wrong* so strongly impressed as to be attended with a *consciousness* that the one deserves *reward* and the other *punishment*, even though there were no God; this so perplexes matters, as to dispose them, in opposition to all

* "Whence comes the restraint [of the Law of Nature]? From a higher Power; nothing else can bind. I cannot bind my selfe, for I may untie my selfe again; nor an equal cannot bind me, for we may untie one another. It must be a superior power, even God Almighty."—SELDEN'S "Table Talk," art. LAW OF NATURE.

those plain *deductions*, to place morality in the *essential difference* of things. But would they consider that *that very sensation*, which so much misleads us in judging of the true foundation of morality, is the plainest indication of WILL, which, for the better support of virtue,* so framed and constituted the human mind; a constitution utterly inconceivable on the supposition of *no God;* would they, I say, but consider this, the difficulty would intirely vanish.

But so it hath happened, this evident truth, that *morality is founded in will*, hath been long controverted even among *Theists*. What hath perplexed their disputes is, that the contenders for this truth have generally thought themselves obliged to deny the *natural essential differences* of things, antecedent to a Law; supposing, that the *morality* of actions would follow the concession. But this is a mistake, which the rightly distinguishing between things *naturally* and *morally* separable (as explained above) will rectify. That the distinction hath not been made or observed, is owing to the unheeded *appetite* and *aversion* of the *moral sense:* And their adversaries being in the same delusion, that the *one* inferred the *other*, never gave themselves any farther trouble, but when they had clearly demonstrated the *natural essential difference*, delivered *that* as a proof of the *moral difference*, though they be, in reality, two distinct things, and independent of each other. More than one of our ablest writers have not escaped this delusion. Dr. S. Clarke going on the Principle, that Obligation was founded in the nature of things, to support it, was perpetually forced to confound *moral* and *natural* fitnesses with one another; which makes him, contrary to his character, very inaccurate and confused:† And Mr. Wollaston,‡ dissatisfied with all the principles, from which the preceding writers of his party had deduced the morality of actions, when he had demonstrated, with greater clearness than any before him, *the natural essential difference of things*, unluckily mistook it for the *moral differ-*

* We have explained above the admirable disposition of things, by the God of nature, for the support of virtue. And it was from this view that an able writer, who is for moderating in the dispute about *moral obligation*, calls the *essential difference of things*, discoverable by reason, the *internal obligation*, and the *will of God*, the *external*. "J'entends (dit-il) par *obligation interne* celle qui est uniquement produite par notre propre raison, considerée comme la regle primitive de notre conduite, et en consequence de ce qu'une action a, en elle-meme, de bon ou de mauvais. Pour *l'obligation externe* ce sera celle qui vient de la volonté de quelque être, dont on se reconnoit dependant, et qui commande ou defend certaines choses, sous la menace de quelque peine."—BURLAMAQUI, *Principes du Droit Naturel*, p. 76.

If he had called the first, *the improper obligation*, and the other the *proper*, his terms had been a great deal more exact. For it being of the essence of the relative term *obligation*, to have an outward respect, or external relation, *internal obligation* must be a very *figurative*, that is to say, a very absurd expression, when applied to man. Perhaps, indeed, that ruling Nature which draws all MACHINES, whether *brutal* or *rational* (if there be any of the latter kind) to pursue *happiness*, may, in a *philosophic* sense, be called the *internal obligation;* but, surely, when applied to *man*, supposed a free-agent, the terms are mere jargon.

† "Evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion," 6th edition, pp. 5—27.

‡ "The Religion of Nature delineated."

ence; and thence made *the formal ratio of moral good and evil, to consist in a conformity of men's actions to the truth of the case, or otherwise.* For it is a principle with him, that things may be denied or affirmed to be what they are, by *deeds* as well as *words.* But had both parties been pleased to consider *this natural essential difference of things,* as, what it must be confessed by both to be, THE DIRECTION WHICH GOD HATH GIVEN HIS CREATURES TO BRING THEM TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS WILL; AND THE RULE OF THAT WILL; the dispute had been at an end: and they had employed *this difference,* not as the atheist does, for the *foundation* of morality; but, as all true theists should do, for the *medium* to bring us to that only sound foundation, the *will* and command of God. Those who imagine, as the author of *the Principles of Natural Law* seems to do, that this is only a dispute about words,* are much deceived. The man who regards the essential difference of things as a command or a Law properly so called, hath a very different idea of it, from him who regards it only as a Rule or a Law improperly so called. And the reason is plain, because these relative terms have an essential difference; a *Rule,* referring singly to those directed by it; but a *Law* has a double reference; to those governed by it, and to the Lawgiver who gave it. He therefore who regards it as a *Rule,* stops short, and rests obligation there, where no obligation can abide: But he who regards it as a *Law* properly so called (for those who consider it as a *mere rule* give it the name of *law,* because they make *obligation* to arise from it) rests obligation in a Lawgiver, and pursues it to its true source, the throne of God. The dispute, therefore, is not about *words,* but *things:* Or if we will needs have it to be about words, it is of the *proper* and *improper* use of them, which intimately concerns *things;* indeed TRUTH itself and COMMON SENSE. We say a *sound is sweet,* or a *colour hot;* and as nobody is misled by these expressions, we hold it foolish to divest them of their figure, and formally to contend that (strictly and philosophically speaking) inconsistent properties are ascribed to them. But should it once be assumed that a *sound* may be the subject of *taste,* and a *colour* the subject of *touch,* it would be time, I suppose, to rectify an absurdity which tends to confound all our *ideas of sensation:* Just so it is, in the expressions of *truth* or *happiness,* OBLIGING: while these were considered as the *rule* or *reward* of actions, given and imposed by a Master on his servants, by a Creator on his creature, the figure was neither forced nor inelegant; and did not deserve to be quarrelled with. But when the question was of *real obligation,* in a meta-

* "Je conclus—que les differences qui se trouvent entre les principaux systemes sur la nature et l'origine de l'obligation, ne sont pas aussi grandes qu'elles le paroissent d'abord. Si l'on examine de pres ces sentimens, l'on verra que des differentes idées, reduites à leur juste valeur, loin de se trouver en opposition, peuvent se rapprocher."—BURLAMAQUI, pp. 75, 76.

physic sense, then, seriously to contend, that it arises from *truth* or *happiness*, or from any thing but WILL, is the very philosophy of *tasting sound* and *feeling colour*; and equally tends to the confusion of all our *ideas of reflexion*.

On the whole then we see, that an Atheist, as such, cannot arrive to the knowledge of MORALITY.*

2. We now come to our second conclusion against Mr. *Bayle's* argument, "that the idea of the *moral sense*, and the knowledge of the *natural essential difference of things*, are, even in conjunction, insufficient to influence Communities in the practice of virtue:" But we must previously observe, that the arguments, which we allow to be conclusive for the *Stratonic* atheist's comprehension of the natural essential difference of things, take in only that species of atheism: the *other*, which derive all from chance and hazard, are incapable of this knowledge; and must be content with only the *moral sense* for their guide. Let us therefore *first* enquire what this *moral sense* is able to do alone, towards influencing virtuous practice; and *secondly*, what new force it acquires in conjunction with the knowledge of the *natural essential difference of things*.

1. Men are misled by the name of *instinct* (which we allow the *moral sense* to be) to imagine that its impressions operate very strongly, by observing their force in brute animals. But the cases are widely different: In Beasts, the instinct is invincibly strong, as it is the sole spring of action: In Man, it is only a friendly monitor of the judgment; and a conciliator, as it were, between Reason and the sensual appetites; all which have their turn in the determinations of the Will. It must consequently be much weaker, as but sharing the power of putting upon action with many other principles. Nor could it have been otherwise, without destroying human liberty. It is indeed of so delicate a nature, so nicely interwoven into the human frame and constitution, and so easily lost or effaced, that some have even denied the existence of a quality, which, in most of its common subjects, they have hardly been able to observe. Insomuch that one would be tempted to liken it to that *candid appearance*, which, as the modern philosophy has discovered to us, is the result of a mixture of all kinds of primitive *colours*: where, if the several sorts be not found in fit proportions, no whiteness will emerge from the composition. So, unless the original passions and appetites be rightly tempered and balanced, the *moral sense* can never shew itself in any strong or sensible effect.

* One would not have imagined any body could be so wild to assert, that, on these principles, it could not be proved, that a vicious Atheist deserved punishment at the hand of God. To such shrewd discerners, I would recommend the following case. Your servant gets drunk; and, in that condition, neglects your orders, forgets your relation to him, and treats it as an imposture. Does he, or does he not, deserve punishment? When this is resolved, the point in question will be so too.

This being the state of *moral instinct*, it must evidently, when alone, be too weak to influence human practice.

When the *moral sense* is made the rule, and especially when it is the only rule, it is necessary that its rectitude, as a rule, should be known and ascertained: But this it cannot be by an Atheist: For till it be allowed there was design in our production, it can never be shewn that one appetite is righter than another, though they be contrarious and inconsistent. The appetite therefore, which, at present, is most importunate to be gratified, will be judged to be the right, how adverse soever to the *moral sense*. But, supposing this *moral sense* not to be so easily confounded with the other appetites; but that it may be kept distinct, as having this peculiar quality so different from the rest, that it is objective to a *whole*, or entire species; whereas the others terminate in *self*, or in the private system (though as to *whole* and *parts*, an Atheist must have very slender and confused ideas); granting this, I say, yet national Manners, the issue of *those appetites*, would, in time, effectually, though insensibly, efface the idea of the *moral sense*, in the generality of men. Almost infinite are the popular Customs, in the several nations and ages of mankind, which owe their birth to the more violent passions of fear, lust, and anger. The most whimsical and capricious, as well as the most inhuman and unnatural, have arisen from thence. It must needs therefore be, that customs of this original should be as opposite to the *moral sense*, as those appetites are, from whence they were derived. And of how great power, Custom is to erase the strongest impressions of Nature, much stronger than those of the *moral sense*, we may learn from that general practice, which prevailed in the most learned and polite countries of the world, of EXPOSING THEIR CHILDREN;* whereby the strong instinctive affection of Parents for their offspring was violated without remorse.

This would lead one into a very beaten common-place. It suffices that the fact is too notorious to be disputed. And what makes more particularly for my argument is, that *Custom* is a power which opposes the *moral sense* not partially, or at certain times and places, but universally. If therefore Custom in the politest States, where a Providence

* Of all the moral painters, TERENCE is the man who seems to have copied human nature with most exactness. Yet, his Citizen of universal benevolence, whom he draws with so much life, in that masterly stroke, "Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto," is the same person who commands his wife to expose her new-born daughter, and falls into a passion with her for having committed that hard task to another, by which means the infant escaped death,—"si meum imperium exequi voluisses, interemptam oportuit." Hence even the divine PLATO reckons the exposing of infants, if not amongst the dictates of nature, yet amongst the prescripts of right reason: For in his *book of laws*, which he composed for the reformation of popular prejudices and abuses in human Policies, he decrees, that if the parents had children, after a certain age, they should *expose* them; and that so effectually, he says, that they should not escape dying by famine. Chremes therefore speaks both the dictates of Philosophy and Custom, when he characterizes such who had any dregs of this natural instinct remaining, as persons—"qui neque jus, neque bonum atque æquum sciunt."

was taught and acknowledged, made such havock of Virtue; into what confusion must things run, where there is no other barrier than the feeble idea of the *moral sense?* Nor can it be replied, that the customs here spoken of, as so destructive to the *moral sense*, are the product of false Religions; which spring and fountain-head of evil, Atheism at once dries up: For the instance here given is of a Custom merely civil; with which Religion had no manner of concern. And so are a vast number of others that are carefully collected by *Sextus Empiricus* and *Montaigne.*

2. But now, secondly, for our *Stratonic* Atheists; in whom, we suppose, the *moral sense*, and the *knowledge of the essential difference of things* act in conjunction to promote virtuous practice. And, in conjunction, they impart mutual strength to one another: For as soon as the *essential difference* is established and applied, it becomes a mark to distinguish the *moral sense* from the other appetites, which are irregular and wrong. And, the *moral sense* being thus carefully kept up and supported, the mind, in its metaphysical reasonings on the *essential difference*, is guarded from running into visionary refinements.

The question then is, "Whether a clear conviction of right and wrong, abstracted from all Will and Command, and consequently, from the expectation of reward and punishment, be sufficient to influence the generality of Men in any tolerable degree?" That it is not, will, I suppose, be clearly seen by the following consideration. All, who have considered human nature attentively, have found,* that it is not enough to make men follow Virtue, that it be owned to be the *greatest* good; which, the *beauty*, *benefit*, or *reasonableness* of it may evince. Before it can raise any desire in them, it must first be brought home to them; and considered by them as a good that makes a necessary part of their happiness. For it is not conceived needful, that a man's happiness should depend on the attainment of the greatest possible good; and he daily forms schemes of complete happiness without it. But the gratification of craving appetites, moved strongly by self-love, being thought to contribute much to human happiness, and being at the same time so opposite to, and inconsistent with Virtue, the generality will never be brought to think, that the uniform practice of it makes a necessary part of human happiness. To balance these appetites, something, then, more interesting must be laid in the scale of Virtue; and this can be only rewards and punishments, which religion proposes by a *morality founded in Will.*

But this may be farther understood by what hath been observed above, concerning the nature and original of civil Society. *Self-interest*, as we there shew, spurring to action by hopes and fears, caused all those disorders amongst men, which required the remedy of civil

* See LOCKE's "Essay," chap. Of Power, sect. 71.

Society. And *self-interest*, again, operating by hopes and fears in Society, afforded means for the redress of those first disorders; so far forth as Society could carry those hopes and fears. For to combat this universal passion of *self-love*, another, at least as strong, was to be opposed to it; but such a one not being to be found in human nature, all that could be done was to turn this very Passion in an opposite direction, and to a contrary purpose. Therefore, because Society failed (from the natural deficiency of its plan) in remedying the disorders it was instituted to correct, and consequently was obliged to call in the aid of Religion, as is above explained; it is evident it must proceed *still* on the same principles of *hopes and fears*. But, of all the three grounds of Morality, the third only thus operating, and an Atheist not having the third, Religion, which only can give it, must be unavoidably necessary for Society. Or in other words, the *moral sense*, and the knowledge of the *natural essential difference of things* in conjunction, will be altogether insufficient to influence the generality in virtuous practice.

SECTION V.

But Mr. *Bayle*, who well understood the force of this Argument, is unwilling to rest the matter here; and so casts about for a motive of more general influence. This, he thinks, he finds in that strong appetite for glory, praise, and reputation, which an Atheist must needs have as well as other men. And this makes his second Argument.

II. "It is most certain,"* (says he,) "that a man devoid of all Religion may be very sensible of worldly honour, and very covetous of praise and glory. If such a one find himself in a country where ingratitude and knavery expose men to contempt, and generosity and virtue are admired, we need not doubt but he will affect the character of a man of honour; and be capable of restoring a trust, even where the Laws could lay no hold upon him. The fear of passing for a knave would prevail over his avarice. And as there are men, who expose themselves to a thousand inconveniencies, and a thousand dangers, to revenge an affront, which perhaps they have received before very few witnesses, and which they would readily pardon, were it not for fear of incurring infamy amongst those with whom they had to do; so I believe the same here; that this person, whom we suppose devoid of Religion, would, notwithstanding all the opposition of his avarice, be capable of restoring a trust, which it could not be legally proved he had withheld; when he sees that his good faith will be attended with the applauses of the whole place where he resides; while his perfidy might, some time or other, be objected to him, or at least so strongly

* "Il est—fort certain, qu'un homme destitué de foi, peut être fort sensible à l'honneur du monde," &c.—*Pens. Diverses*, cap. clxxix.

suspected, that he could not pass in the world's opinion for an honest man: For it is that inward esteem in the minds of others, which we aspire at, above all things. The words and actions, which mark this esteem, please us on no other account, than as we imagine them to be the signs of what passes in the mind: A machine so ordered as to make the most respectful gesticulations, and to pronounce the clearest articulate sounds, in all the detours of flattery, would never contribute to give us a better opinion of ourselves, because we should know they were not signs of esteem in the mind of another. On these accounts therefore, he, of whom I speak, might sacrifice his avarice to his vanity, if he only thought he should be suspected of having violated a trust. And though he might even believe himself secure from all suspicion, yet, still, he could easily resolve to prefer the honourable part to the lucrative, for fear of falling into the inconvenience, which has happened to some, of publishing their crimes themselves, while they slept, or in the transports of a fever. *Lucretius* uses this motive to draw men, without Religion, to virtue."

To this, I reply, 1. That it is indeed true, that commendation and disgrace are strong motives to men to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those, with whom they converse; and that those rules and opinions, in a good measure, correspond, in most civilized countries, with the unchangeable rule of right, whatever *Sextus Empiricus* and *Montaigne* have been pleased to say to the contrary. For virtue evidently advancing, and vice as visibly obstructing the general good, it is no wonder, that *that* action should be encouraged with esteem and reputation, wherein every one finds his account; and *that*, discountenanced, by reproach and infamy, which hath a contrary tendency. But then we say, that seeing this good opinion of the world may be almost as surely gained, certainly with more ease and speed, by a well acted hypocrisy than by a sincere practice of virtue, the Atheist, who lies under no restraints with regard to the moral qualities of his actions, will rather chuse to pursue *that* road to reputation, which is consistent with an indulgence of all his other passions; than *that* whereby they will be at constant war with one another; and where he will be always finding himself under the hard necessity of *sacrificing*, as Mr. *Bayle* well expresses it, *his avarice to his vanity*. Now this inconvenience he may avoid by resolving to be honest only before company, which will procure him enough of reputation; and to play the rogue in secret, where he may fully indulge his avarice, or what other passion he is most disposed to gratify. That this will be his system, who has no motive, but popular reputation, to act virtuously, is so plain, that Mr. *Bayle* was reduced to the hardest shifts imaginable to invent a reason why an Atheist, thus actuated by the love of glory, might possibly behave himself honestly, when he could do the contrary without suspicion.—

"And though he might believe himself secure from all suspicion, yet still he could easily resolve to prefer the honourable part to the lucrative, for fear of falling into the inconvenience which hath happened to some, of publishing their crimes themselves, while they slept, or in the transports of a fever." *Lucretius*, says he, *uses this motive to draw men, without religion, to virtue.* It had been to the purpose to have told us, what man, from the time of *Lucretius* to his own, had been ever *so drawn.* But they must know little of human nature, who can suppose, that the consideration of these remote, possible indeed, but very unlikely accidents, hath ever any share in the determination of the Will, when men are deliberating on actions of importance, and distracted by the shifting uncertain views of complicated Good and Evil. But granting it to be likely, or common; the man, Mr. *Bayle* describes, could never get clear of the danger of that contingency, which way soever he resolved to act. Let us suppose him to take the honourable part, even then, sleep or a fever might as easily deprive him of the reputation he affects: For I believe there is no man, of this turn, but would be as ashamed to have it known, that all his virtuous actions proceeded from a selfish vanity, as to be discovered to have stretched a point of justice, of which civil laws could not take cognizance. It is certain, the *first* makes a man as contemptible, and much more ridiculous in the eyes of others, than the *latter;* because the advantage aimed at is fantastical: And one discovery sleep or a fever is as likely to make as the other.

But, 2. Supposing our Atheist to be of so timid a complexion, as to fear that, even in a course of the best-acted hypocrisy, he may risque the danger of being discovered, yet as this practice, by which he so well covers all the lucrative arts of fraud, enables him to provide well for himself, he will be easily brought to hazard all the inconveniencies of a detection, to which, indeed, the course is liable, but which it can so easily repair: for he has ample experience that though indeed esteem is generally annexed to apparent good actions, and infamy to bad; yet that there is no virtue which so universally procures popular Opinion as *riches and power*, there being no infamy which they will not efface or cover: and this being a road to Opinion which leads him, at the same time, to the gratification of his other passions; there is no doubt but it will be his choice.*

After many detours, Mr. *Bayle* is, at length, brought to own, that Atheism is, indeed, in its natural tendency, destructive of Society; but then, he insists upon it, that it never in fact becomes so.

III. *Because* (and this is his next argument) *men do not act according to their principles*, nor set their practice by their opinions. He

* —Πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ.
Δαίμονι δ' οἷος ἔησθα——— HESIOD. *Opera et Dies*, v. 311, 312.

owns this to have very much of a mystery; but for the fact he appeals to the observation of mankind: "For if it were not so," says he,* "how is it possible that Christians, who know so clearly by a Revelation, supported by so many miracles, that they must renounce vice, if they would be eternally happy, and avoid eternal misery; who have so many excellent preachers—so many zealous directors of conscience—so many books of devotion; how is it possible, amidst all this, that Christians should live, as they do, in the most enormous disorders of vice?" And again,† agreeably to this observation, he takes notice, "that *Cicero* hath remarked, that many *Epicureans*, contrary to their principles, were good friends and honest men; who accommodated their actions, not to their principle, the desire of pleasure, but to the rules of reason." Hence he concludes: "That those lived better than they talked; whereas others talked better than they lived. The same remark," says he, "hath been made on the conduct of the *Stoics:* their principle was, that all things arrived by an inevitable necessity, which God himself was subject to. Now this should naturally have terminated in inaction; and disposed them to abstain from exhortations, promises, and menacing. On the contrary, there was no sect of philosophers more given to preaching; or whose whole conduct did more plainly shew, that they thought themselves the absolute masters of their own destiny." The conclusion he draws from all this, and much more to the same purpose, is,‡ that "therefore Religion doth not do that service towards restraining vice as is pretended; nor Atheism that injury in encouraging it: while each professor acts contrary to his proper principle."

Now from this conclusion, and from words dropped up and down,§ of the mysterious quality of this phænomenon, one would suspect Mr. *Bayle* thought that there was some strange Principle in man, that unaccountably disposed him to act in opposition to his opinions, whatsoever they were. And indeed, so he must needs suppose, or he supposes nothing to the purpose: for if it should be found, that this Principle sometimes disposes men as violently to act *according to* their opinions, as at other times it inclines them to act *against* them, *it* will do Mr. *Bayle's* argument no service. And if this Principle should, after all, only prove to be the violence of the irregular appetites, *it* will conclude directly against him. And by good luck, we have our Adversary himself confessing, that this is indeed the case:

* —"Si cela n'etoit pas, comment," &c.—*Pensées Diverses*, cap. cxxxvi. † "Cicéron l'a remarqué à l'égard de plusieurs Epicuriens," &c. cap. clxvii. ‡ *Contin. des Pens. Diverses*, cap. cxlix. § "Je conçois que c'est une chose bien étrange, qu'un homme qui vit bien moralement, et qui ne croit ni paradis, ni enfer. Mais j'en reviens toujours-là, que l'homme est une certaine creature, qui avec toute sa raison, n'agit pas toujours consequement à sa creance; ce seroit une chose plus infinie que de parcourir toutes les bizarreries de l'homme. Une Monstre plus monstrueux que les Centaures et que la Chimera de la fable."—*Pens. Diverses*, cap. clxxvi.

for though, as I said, he commonly affects to give our perverse conduct a mysterious air, the necessary support of the sophistry of his conclusion; yet, when he is off his guard, we have him declaring the plain reason of it; as where he says,* "The general idea we entertain of a man, who believes a God, a heaven and a hell, leads us to think, that he would do every thing which he knows agreeable to the will of God; and avoid every thing which he knows to be disagreeable to it: But the life of man shews, he does the direct contrary. The reason is this: Man does not determine himself to one action rather than another by the general knowledge of what he ought to do, but by the particular judgement he passes on each distinct case, when he is on the point of proceeding to action. This particular judgement may, indeed, be conformable to those general ideas of *fit* and *right;* but, for the most part, it is not so. *He complies almost always, with the reigning passion of the heart, to the bias of the temperament, to the force of contracted habits,*" &c. Now if this be the case, as in truth it is, we must needs draw from this Principle the very contrary conclusion, That, if *men act not according to their opinions,* and that it is the force of the irregular appetites which causes this perversity, a Religionist will *often act against his principles;* but an Atheist, *always conformably to them:* because an Atheist indulges his vicious passions, while he acts *according to his* principles, in the same manner that a Religionist does, when he acts *against his.* It is therefore only *accidental* that men act contrary to their opinions; then, when they oppose their passions: or in Mr. *Bayle's* words, when *the general knowledge of what one ought to do, doth not coincide with the particular judgement we pass on each distinct case;* which judgement is generally directed by the passions: But that coincidence always happens in an Atheist's determination of himself to action: so that the matter, when stripped of the parade of eloquence, and cleared from the perplexity of the abounding verbiage, lies open to this easy answer.

We allow, men frequently act contrary to their opinions, both *metaphysical* and *moral,* in the cases Mr. *Bayle* puts.

1. *In metaphysical,* where the Principle contradicts common sentiments, as the *stoical fate, and christian predestination:*† there, men rarely act in conformity to their opinions. But this instance doth not at all affect the question, though Mr. *Bayle,* by his manner of urging it, would insinuate, that an Atheist might be no more influenced in practice, by his speculative opinion of *no God,* than a Fatalist by *his,* of *no liberty.* But the cases are widely different: for, as the existence of God restrains all the vicious appetites by enforcing the

* "L'idée générale veut que," &c.—*Pens. Diverses,* cap. cxxxv. † *Pens. Diverses,* cap. clxxvi.

duties of morality, the disbelief of it, by taking off that restraint, would suffer, nay invite, the Atheist to act according to his principles. But the opinion of *fate* having no such effect on the morality of actions, and at the same time contradicting common sentiments, we easily conceive how the maintainers of it are brought to act contrary to their principles. Nay, it will appear, when rightly considered, that the Atheist would be so far from not acting according to his opinions, that were his principle of *no God*, added to the fatalist's of *no liberty*, it would then occasion the fatalist to act according to his opinions, though he acted contrary to them before; at least, if the cause Mr. *Bayle* assigns for men's not conforming their practice to their principles, be true: for the sole reason why the fatalist did not act according to his opinions, was, because they could not be used, while he was a Theist, to the gratification of his passions; because, that though it appeared, if there were no liberty, men could have no merit; yet believing a God, the rewarder and punisher of men, as if they had merit, he would act likewise as if they had. But take away from him the belief of a God, and there would be then no cause why he should not act *according* to his principle of *fate*, as far as relates to moral practice.

2. Next, *in morals*. We own that men here likewise frequently act contrary to their opinions: For the view (as we observed above) of the greatest confessed possible good, which, to a religionist, is the practice of virtue, will never, till it be considered as making a necessary part of our happiness, excite us to the pursuit of it: and our irregular passions, which are of a contrary nature, while they continue importunate, and while one or other is perpetually soliciting us, will prevent us from thus considering virtue as making a necessary part of our happiness. This is the true cause of all that disorder in the life of man, which Philosophers so much admire; which the Devout lament; and for which the Moralist could never find a cure: Where the appetites and reason are in perpetual conflict; and the man's practice is continually opposing his principles. But, on the other hand, an Atheist, whose opinions lead him to conclude, *sensual pleasure to be the greatest possible good*, must, by the concurrence of his passions, consider it as making a necessary part of *his* happiness: and then nothing can prevent his acting *according to his principles*.

We own, however, that the Atheist, Mr. *Bayle* describes, would be as apt, nay apter, to act against his opinions than a Theist: but they are only those slender opinions concerning *the obligation to virtuous practice* which Mr. *Bayle* hath given him: for if men do not pursue the greatest confessed possible good, till they consider it as making a necessary part of their happiness; I ask, which is the likeliest means of bringing them so to consider it? Is it the reflection of *the innate*

idea of the loveliness of virtue; or the more abstract contemplation on its *essential difference* to vice? (and these are the only views in which an Atheist can consider it) or is it not rather the belief, that the practice of virtue, as religion teaches it, is attended with an infinite reward? To these opinions, I say, an Atheist is like enough to run counter: but his principles of impiety, which cherish his passions, we must never look to find at variance with his actions: for our adversary tells us, that the reason why practice and principle so much differ, is the violence of human appetites: from which a plain discourser would have drawn the contrary conclusion; that then, there is the greater necessity to enforce religion, as an additional curb to licentiousness; for, that a curb it is, at least in some degree, is agreed on all hands.

And here, at parting, it may not be amiss to observe, how much this argument weakens one of the foregoing: *There* we are made to believe, that the *moral sense* and *essential differences* are sufficient to make men virtuous: *Here* we are taught, that these, with the *sanction of a Providence* to boot, cannot do it in any tolerable degree.

As to the lives of his *Epicureans*, and other Atheists, which we now come to; the reader is first of all desired to take notice of the fallacy he would here obtrude upon us, in the judgement he makes of the nature of the two different principles, by setting together the effects of *Atheism*, as they appear in the majority of half a score men; and those of *Religion*, as they appear in the majority of infinite multitudes: A kind of sophism, which small sects in religion have perpetually in their mouths, when they compare their own morals with those in large communities, from which they dissent. And now, to come to his palmary argument taken from fact. For,

IV. In the last place, he says,* "that the lives of the several Atheists of antiquity fully shew, that this principle does not necessarily produce depravity of morals." He instances "in *Diagoras, Theodorus, Evemerus, Nicanor*, and *Hippon:*" "whose virtue appeared so admirable to a Father of the Church, that he would enrich Religion with it, and make Theists of them, in spite of all Antiquity." And then descends to "*Epicurus*, and his followers, whom their very enemies acknowledged to be unblameable in their actions, as the *Roman Atticus, Cassius*, and the elder *Pliny:*" and closes this illustrious catalogue with an encomium on the morality of *Vanini* and *Spinosa:* But this is not all; for he tells us farther,† of whole nations of Atheists, "which modern travellers have discovered in the islands or continents of *Afric* and *America*, that, in point of morals, are rather better, not worse, than the idolaters who live around them. It is true, that these Atheists are savages, without laws, magistrate, or civil policy: but this" (he says ‡) "supplies him with an argu-

* *Pens. Diverses*, cap. clxxiv. et *Contin. des Pens. Diverses*, cap. cxliv. † *Contin. des Pens. Diverses*, cap. lxxxv. et cxliv. ‡ Idem, *ibid.* cap. cxviii.

ment *à fortiori :* for if they live peaceably together out of civil society, much rather would they do so in it, where equal laws restrain men from injustice." He is so pleased with this argument, that he reduces it to this enthymeme : *

"Whole nations of atheists, divided into independent families, have preserved themselves from time immemorial without law.

"Therefore, much stronger reason have we to think they would still preserve themselves, were they under one common master, and one common law, the equal distributer of rewards and punishments."

In answer to all this, I say (having once again reminded the reader, that the question between us is, *whether atheism would not have a pernicious effect on the body of a people in society)*

1. That as to the lives of those philosophers, and heads of sects, which Mr. *Bayle* hath thought fit so much to applaud, nothing can be collected from thence, in favour of the general influence of atheism on morality. We will take a view of the several motives those men had to the practice of virtue : for thereby it will be seen, that not one of these motives (peculiar to their several characters, ends, and circumstances) reaches the gross body of a people, seized with the infection of this principle. In *some* of them it was the *moral sense*, and the *essential difference of things*, that inclined them to virtue : but we have fully shewn above, that these are too weak to operate on the generality of mankind ; though a few studious, contemplative Men, of a more refined imagination and felicity of temperament, might be indeed influenced by them. In *others* it was a warm passion for fame, and love of glory. But though all degrees of men have this passion equally strong, yet all have it not equally pure and delicate : so that though *reputation* is what all affect, yet the gross body of mankind is little solicitous from whence it arises ; and reputation, or at least the *marks* of it, which is all the people aspire to, we have shewn, may be easily gained in a road very far from the real practice of virtue : in which road too, the people are most strongly tempted to pursue it. Very small then is the number of those, on whom these motives would operate, as even *Pomponatius*, in his ample confession taken above, hath acknowledged : and yet these are the most extensive motives that these philosophic Atheists had to the practice of virtue : for, in the *rest*, the motive must be owned to have been less legitimate, and restrained to their peculiar ends or circumstances ; as concern for the credit of the sect they had founded, or espoused : which they endeavoured to ennoble by this spurious lustre. It is not easy for a Modern to conceive, how tender they were of the honour of their Principles : The conference between *Pompey* and *Posidonius* the Stoic, is a well-known

* "Des peuples athées divisés en familles independantes se sont," &c.

story: * and if the fear of only appearing ridiculous by their principles were strong enough to make them do such violence to themselves, what must we believe the fear of becoming generally odious would do, where the principle has a natural tendency, as we see *Cardan* frankly confessed, to make the holder of it the object of public abhorrence? But if the sense of shame were not strong enough, self-preservation would force these men upon the practice of virtue: for though, of old, the Magistrate gave great indulgence to philosophic speculations; yet this downright principle of atheism being universally understood to be destructive to Society, He frequently let loose his severest resentment against the maintainers of it: so that such had no other way to disarm his vengeance, than in persuading him by their lives, that the principle had no such destructive tendency. In a word then, these motives being peculiar to the leaders of sects, we see that the virtuous practice arising from thence makes nothing for the point in question.

2. But he comes much closer to it, in his next instance: which is of whole nations of modern Savages, who are all atheists, and yet live more virtuously than their idolatrous neighbours. And their being yet unpolicied, and in a state of nature, makes, he thinks, the instance conclude more strongly for him. Now, to let the truth of the fact pass unquestioned; though *Homer* seemed to have a very different opinion of the matter, when he makes the atheistical *Cyclops* to be the most unjust and violent, as well as most brutal, race of men upon earth. And what faith might be expected from such a people, the poet gives us to understand, in that fine circumstance, where one of them was accosted by *Ulysses*, who was then a stranger to their Principles. This wary hero, imploring the assistance of a *Cyclop*, tells him with great openness who he was, whence he came, and the sum of his adventures. But no sooner had the Monster professed himself a thorough FREE-THINKER, than the experienced traveller lost all hopes of faith or justice from him; and, from that moment, put himself upon his guard, and would not trust him with one word of truth, more.

Ἀλλά μιν ἄψορρον προσέφην δολίοις ἐπέεσσι.

But I say, to let this pass, I shall endeavour to detect the sophistry of his conclusion (which I had before obviated in the second section,† concerning the insufficiency of human Laws alone) in a fuller explanation of that reasoning.

It is notorious, that man in Society, is incessantly giving the affront to the public laws. To oppose which, the Community is as constantly busied in adding new strength and force to its ordinances. If we enquire into the cause of this perversity, we shall find it no other than

* *Tusc. Disp.* lib. ii. cap. 25, edit. Oxon. 4to, tom. ii. p. 297. † See p. 115.

the number and violence of the appetites. The appetites take their birth from our real or imaginary wants: our REAL wants are unalterably the same; and, as arising only from the natural imbecillity of our condition, extremely few, and easily relieved. Our FANTASTIC wants are infinitely numerous, to be brought under no certain measure or standard; and increasing exactly in proportion to our improvements in the arts of life. But the arts of life owe their original to Society: * and the more perfect the Policy, the higher do those improvements arise; and, with them, are our wants, as we say, proportionably increased, and our appetites inflamed. For the violence of these appetites, which seek the gratification of our imaginary wants, is much stronger than that raised by our real wants: not only because those wants are more numerous, which give constant exercise to the appetites; and more unreasonable, which make the gratification proportionably difficult: and altogether unnatural, to which there is no measure; but, principally, because vicious custom hath affixed a *kind of reputation* to the gratification of the fantastic wants, which it hath not done to the relief of the real ones. So that when things are in this state, we have shewn above, that even the most provident Laws, without other assistance, are insufficient. But in a state of nature, unconscious of the arts of life, men's wants are only real; and these wants, few, and easily supplied. For food and covering are all which are necessary to support our Being. And Providence is abundant in its provisions, for these wants: and while there is more than enough for all, it can hardly be, that there should be disputes about each man's share.

And now the reader sees clearly how it might well be, that this rabble of Atheists should live peaceably in a state of nature, though the utmost force of human Laws, in the improved condition of Society, could not hinder them from running into mutual violence. But the sophistry of this enthymeme is further seen from hence. Not even Mr. *Bayle* himself would pretend, that these Atheists, who live peaceably in their present state, without the restraint of human laws, would live peaceably without this restraint, after they had understood and practised the arts of life in credit amongst a civilized people. In Society therefore, which the arts of life inseparably accompany, an imposed curb, he will own, would be necessary. I then argue thus, If a people, who out of Society could live peaceably without the curb of Law, could not live peaceably without that curb in Society; you have no reason to believe, that though out of society they might live peaceably

* There is one remarkable circumstance in the *Mosaic* history, that I should fancy, must needs give our *free-thinkers* a high idea of the *veracity* or *penetration* of the author. It is, where, having represented *Cain* as the first who built a city, or made advances towards civil society, he informs us, that his posterity were the inventors of the arts of life, in the instances he gives of *Jabal, Jubal,* and *Tubal-Cain.*

without the curb of religion, they could live peaceably, without that curb, in Society? The answer to this must bring on again the question, How strong the curb on man, in Society, should be? which we have fully examined in another place. This argument, therefore, proves nothing but the folly of pretending to conclude, concerning man in Society, from what we see of his behaviour, out of it.

And here, in conclusion, once for all, it may not be amiss to observe, the uniform strain of sophistry which runs through all Mr. *Bayle's* reasonings on this head. The question is, and I have been frequently obliged to repeat it, he so industriously affecting to forget or mistake it, *Whether Atheism be destructive to the body of a Society?* And yet he, whose business it is, to prove the negative, brings all his arguments from considerations, which either affect not the gross body of mankind, or affect not that body, in Society: in a word, from the lives of *Sophists* or *Savages;* from the example of a few speculative men far above the view of the common run of *citizens;* or from *that* of a barbarous crew of *savages* much farther below it. All his facts and reasonings then being granted, they still fall short and wide of his conclusion.

But the last stroke of his apology is more extravagant than all the rest: for having proved atheism very consistent with a state of nature, lest it should happen to be found not so consistent with civil society, but that one of them must rise upon the ruins of the other, he gives a very palpable hint which of the two he thinks should be preserved; by making it a serious question, discussed in a set dissertation,* WHETHER CIVIL SOCIETY BE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF MANKIND? † and very gravely resolving it in the negative.—And here let me observe, that these PHILOSOPHERS (as Mess. *Voltaire* and *D'Alembert* call all those who despise Religion) never suffer a good hint to lye unimproved. The famous citizen of *Geneva* building upon this before us, hath since written a large Discourse to shew, that CIVIL SOCIETY IS EVEN HURTFUL TO MANKIND.

SECTION VI.

I HAVE here given, and to the best advantage, all the arguments Mr. *Bayle* hath employed to prove Religion not necessary to civil Society; by which it may be seen, how little the united force of wit and eloquence is able to produce for the support of so outrageous a paradox.

The reader will imagine, that now nothing can hinder us from going on to our *second* proposition; after having so strongly supported the *first*. But we have yet to combat a greater monster in morals before we can proceed.

* *Contin. des Pens. Div.* cap. cxviii.

† "Si les societéz sont absolument necessaires pour conserver le genre humain."

As the great foundation of our proposition, *that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is necessary to civil society*, is this, *that religion is necessary to civil society*; so the foundation of this latter proposition is, *that* VIRTUE *is so*. Now, to the lasting opprobrium of our age and country, we have seen a writer publicly maintain, in a book so intituled, that PRIVATE VICES were PUBLIC BENEFITS. An unheard-of impiety, wickedly advanced, and impudently avowed, against the universal voice of nature: in which *moral virtue* is represented as the invention of knaves; and *christian virtue* as the imposition of fools: in which (that his insult on common sense might equal what he puts on common honesty) he assures his reader, that his book is a system of most exalted morals and religion: And that the *justice of his country*, which publicly accused him,* was pure calumny.

But I shall undertake to shew, and that in very few words, to the admirers of the low buffoonry and impure rhetoric of this wordy declaimer, that his whole fabric is one confused heap of falshoods and absurdities.

I. *First* then, it is to be observed, that though his general position be, *that private Vices are public benefits*, yet, in his proof of it, he all along explains it by *Vice only in a certain measure, and to a certain degree*. And, as all other writers have deduced the necessity on private men in society, to be virtuous, and on the magistrate severely to punish vice, from the *malignity of the nature of Vice*; so he enforces this necessity, on both, from the *malignity of its excess*. And indeed he had been only fit for Bedlam had he not given this restriction to the general sense of his proposition.

However, this is full enough to expose the falshood of that assertion, which his whole book is written to support, namely, *that vice is absolutely necessary for a rich and powerful Society*. For whatsoever is *absolutely necessary* to the well-being of another in matter of morals, must be so, by its essential properties; the use of which thing will be, then, in proportion to its degree. And this the common moralists observe of Virtue with regard to the State. But whatsoever is useful to another, only when in a certain degree, is not so by its essential properties; if not by its essential properties, then, of course, by accident only; and, if by accident, not necessary.

The first part of the former assertion may be proved thus. If A be absolutely necessary to B, it is, because neither C, nor D, nor any thing but A, can supply the wants of B. But if nothing but A can supply these wants, it is because the supplial is afforded by the *essential* properties of A; which essential properties are incommunicable to all other beings; the communication of them to C, D, *&c.* making

* By the Grand-jury of *Middlesex*.

C and D the same as A, which is absurd: for if the supplial of the wants of B were caused by what was not *essential* to A, but *accidental*; then might these wants as well be supplied by C, D, *&c.* as by A; because that which is *accidental* only, may belong in common to several different beings. The second part may be proved thus: These *essential qualities can never be excessive*; as for instance, There can never be too much *Virtue* in a state. *Specific* Virtues, indeed, may be pushed to excess; but then they lose their nature, and become *Vices*; in which state of things, Society will be so far from having too much, that it will have too little Virtue. It is not so with *generic* Virtue; therefore that *essential* Quality in A, which in a lower degree profits B, must in a higher degree be still more useful to B. On the other hand, *accidental Qualities may be excessive*; so that, that *accidental* Quality in A, which profiteth B in a lower degree, may injure B in a higher. This is the case of REAL LUXURY, in its effects on Society; as will be shewn in the progress of this section: for though a specific Virtue carried to an excess becomes Vice, yet a Vice, so pushed on, never becomes Virtue; but, on the contrary, by advancing in malignity, more clearly evinces it's true nature, and exposes its baleful effects.

From all this, it appears, that a great and powerful Community, which is, in itself, a natural good, and, as such, desirable, may procure and preserve its grandeur without Vice, though Vice so frequently produces and supports it: because this utility of Vice not arising from its essential qualities, but from some accidental circumstances attending it, may be supplied by something that is not Vice, attended with the same circumstances. As for instance, the consumption of the *products of art and nature* is the circumstance which makes States rich and flourishing. Now if this consumption may be procured by actions not vicious, then may a State become great and powerful without the assistance of Vice. That it may, in fact, be thus procured, shall now be shewn.

II. The Author, descending to the enumeration of his proofs, appears plainly to have seen, that Vice in general was only *accidentally* productive of good; and therefore avoids entering into an examination of particulars; but selects, out of his favourite tribe, LUXURY, to support his execrable paradox; and on this alone rests his cause. By the assistance of this ambiguous term, he keeps something like an argument on foot, even after he hath left all the rest of his City-crew to shift for themselves. And it must be owned, there is no word more inconstantly and capriciously applied to particular actions; or of more uncertain meaning, when denominating such actions, than the term *Luxury*. For, unapplied, it has, like all other moral modes, an exact and precise signification; and includes in it, *the abuse of the gifts of Providence*. The difficulty is only to know when this question is

abused. Men have two ways of deciding: the one, by the *principles of Natural religion;* the other, by the *positive institutions of Revealed.* In those *Principles*, all men are reasonably well agreed; but, concerning these *Institutions*, when taken separately, and independent on those *Principles*, there are various opinions, which superstition and fanaticism have greatly distorted: consequently, those who estimate *Luxury* by this latter rule, (where obscurity and, of course, confusion, are so difficult to be avoided) will disagree extremely about it: and amongst such diversity of notions, it would be strange indeed, if some or other had not ideas of *Luxury*, which would serve the wildest hypothesis; and much stranger, if so corrupt a Writer did not take advantage of them. He has done it like a master: and with a malice and cunning to intitle him, though he be but a follower, to be a Leader of a sect.

First, in order to perplex and obscure our idea of *Luxury*, he hath laboured in a previous dissertation, on *the origin of moral virtue*, to destroy those very principles, by whose assistance we are only able to clear up and ascertain that idea: where he decries and ridicules the essential difference of things, the eternal notions of right and wrong; and makes VIRTUE, which common moralists deduce from thence, the offspring of craft and pride.

Nothing now being left to fix the idea of *Luxury*, but the positive precepts of *Christianity*, and he having stript these of their only true and infallible interpreter, the principles of *natural Religion;* it was easy for him to make those precepts speak in favour of any absurdities that would serve his purpose, and as easy to find such absurdities supported by the superstition and fanaticism of some or other of those many Sects and Parties of *christianity*, who, despising the principles of the Religion of Nature, as *the weak and beggarly elements*, soon came to regard the natural appetites, as the graceless furniture of *the old man, with his affections and lusts.*

Having got CHRISTIANITY at this advantage, he gives us for Gospel, that meagre Phantom begot by the hypocrisy of *Monks* on the misanthropy of *Ascetics:* which cries out, AN ABUSE! whenever the gifts of Providence are used, further than for the bare support of nature. So that by this rule every thing becomes *Luxury* which is more than *necessary*. An idea of *Luxury* exactly fitted to our Author's hypothesis: for if no State can be rich and powerful while its members seek only a bare subsistence, and, if what is more than a bare subsistence be *Luxury*, and *Luxury* be *Vice;* the consequence, we see, comes in pat, PRIVATE VICES ARE PUBLIC BENEFITS. Here you have the sole issue of all this tumour of words. But it is difficult to think, that a Writer of such depravity of heart, had not farther ends in this wicked representation of *natural* and *revealed* Religion. We

cannot doubt his purpose, when we reflect upon his gains, which are, the fixing of his followers in a propensity for *Vice*, and in a prejudice against *Christianity*. For what can be more in favour of *Vice*, than, that there is no moral duty? What more in discredit of *Christianity*, than, that all the enjoyments of life are condemned by it as evil?

III. But the GOSPEL is a very different thing from what Bigots and Fanatics are wont to represent it. It enjoins and forbids nothing in moral practice, but what natural Religion had before enjoined and forbid. Neither indeed could it, because one of God's Revelations, whether ordinary or extraordinary, cannot contradict another; and because God gave us the first, to judge of others, by it. Accordingly we find, that though it be indeed one of the great ends of *Christianity* (but not the main and peculiar end) to advance the practice of moral virtue amongst men, yet the New Testament doth not contain any regular or complete system or Digest of moral laws; the detached precepts enforced by our divine Master in it, how excellent and perfect soever, arising only from the occasions and circumstances which gave birth to those discourses or writings, in which such precepts are delivered. For the rest, for a general knowledge of the system of moral-duty, the founders of our Religion hold open to us the great Pandect of the law of nature, and bid us search and study that. *Finally*, says the apostle Paul, *whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, think on these things.* But where vicious custom, or perverse Interpreters, had depraved the Religion of Nature, there, particular care was taken to remove the rubbish of time and malice, and to reinstate the injured moralities in their primitive dignity and splendor.

The *Religion of Nature*, then, being restored, and made the rule to explain and interpret the occasional precepts of *Christianity*; what is *Luxury* by *natural* Religion, that, and that only, must be *Luxury* by *revealed*. So that a true and precise definition of it, which this Writer (triumphing in the obscurity which, by these arts, he hath thrown over the idea) thinks it impossible to give, so as not to suit with his hypothesis, is easily settled. LUXURY *is the using the gifts of Providence, to the injury of the User, either in his person or fortune; or to the injury of any other, towards whom the User stands in any relation, which obliges him to aid and assistance.*

Now it is evident, even from the instances this Writer brings of the public advantages of consumption, which he indiscriminately, and therefore falsly, calls *Luxury*, that the utmost consumption may be made, and so all the ends of a rich and powerful Society served, without injury to the User, or any one, to whom he stands related: consequently without *Luxury*, and without *Vice*. When the consump-

tion is attended with such injury, then it becomes *Luxury*, then it becomes a *Vice*. But then, let us take notice, that *this Vice*, like all others, is so far from being advantageous to Society, that it is the most certain ruin of it. It was this *Luxury* which destroyed *Rome*. And the very definition given above, informs us of the manner how it came to pass: namely, by enervating the body, debauching the mind, beggaring the fortune, and bringing in the practice of universal rapine and injustice. But the wretched absurdity of supposing *Luxury* beneficial to society, cannot be better exposed, than by considering, that, as *Luxury* is the abusing the gifts of Providence, to the injury of himself and of those to whom we stand related; and as the *Public* is that, to which every man stands nearest related; the consequence is, that *Luxury* is, at one and the same time, beneficial and injurious to the Public. Nor can the absurdity I here charge upon him, be evaded by saying it is deduced from a proposition of his, and a definition of mine, set together: Because, however we may differ whether the use of things, where no one is injured, be *Luxury*; yet we both agree in this, that where there is that injury in the use, it is *Luxury*; and *Luxury*, in this sense, he holds to be beneficial to Society.

The case I here put, of *Luxury's* injuring the PUBLIC, by depriving the state of that aid and assistance from particulars, which, the relation they stand in to it, requires them to give, is no imaginary or unlikely supposition. This effect of *Luxury* it was which contributed, more immediately than any other, to the destruction of the Roman Commonwealth. For in the last struggles for liberty by a FEW, against the humour of a debauched *luxurious* people, when nothing but a sufficient fund was wanting to enable those godlike men to restore the Republic, the richest citizens, who yet wished well to their Country, could not be prevailed upon to retrench from their private Luxury, to support the Public in this critical exigency: which therefore, having been long shaken by the *Luxury* of its enemies, fell now a sacrifice to the *Luxury* of its friends. Thus the great *Roman patriot* describes the fatal condition of those times: *Nos habemus* LUXURIAM, *atque avaritiam; publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam.*

In a word then, it is not *Luxury*, but the *consumption* of the products of art and nature, which is of so high benefit to Society. That this *consumption* may well be, without *Luxury*, appears plainly from the definition given above. All the difference is, and that a very essential one, when the *consumption* is made without *Luxury*, infinitely greater numbers share in it; when it becomes *Luxury*, it is confined to fewer. The reason of this, and the different effects this different consumption must have on the Public, is very evident. Had the consumption of the commodities and products of Greece when conquered (which indeed were necessary to render the Romans polite and

wealthy) been more equally made by that people, it would have been extremely beneficial. But being unjustly claimed by one part, exclusive of the rest, "omnia virtutis præmia ambitio possidebat," it became luxury and destruction. The Historian shews us how it was brought about: "There" (says he) "the Roman people first began to intrigue, to debauch, to affect a taste for statues, pictures, and high-wrought plate. To come at which, they oppressed the private, plundered the public, violated the temples of the Gods, and polluted and confounded every thing both sacred and profane."* Till at length,

"Sævior armis
LUXURIA incubuit, victumque ulciscitur orbem."

END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

HAVING endeavoured to shew in this and the two following Books, *that* the PRIESTS and LAWGIVERS of former times all concurred in supporting the belief of a FUTURE STATE, I am stopped in the midst of my course, by a late noble Writer, who hath taken advantage of this notorious truth, to represent the labours of those Moderns, who have trode in the same steps, as A CONFEDERACY BETWEEN DIVINES AND ATHEISTS TO DISHONOUR AND DEGRADE THE GOD OF THE UNIVERSE.

"After pleading the cause of natural and revealed Religion," (says his Lordship) "I am to plead the cause of God himself, against DIVINES AND ATHEISTS IN CONFEDERACY.†

"The conduct of Christian Divines has been so far from defending the Providence of God, that they have joined in the clamour against it. Nothing has hindered, even those who pretend to be his Messengers, his Embassadors, his *Plenipotentiaries*, from renouncing their allegiance to him (as they themselves have the FRONT TO AVOW) but the hypothesis of a FUTURE STATE. On *this hypothesis alone*, they insist; and therefore, if this will not serve their turn, God is disowned by them, as effectually as if he was so, in terms."‡ "Divines, if not Atheists, yet are ABETTERS of Atheism."§

"That there were some men who knew not God in all ages, may be true: but the scandalous task of COMBATING HIS EXISTENCE under the mask of Theism, was reserved for Metaphysicians and Theologians."‖

"———Divines are still more to be blamed. A CONFEDERACY

* "Ibi primum insuevit exercitus populi Romani amare, potare, signa, tabulas pictas, vasa cælata mirari, ea privatim ac publicè rapere, delubra spoliare, sacra profanaque omnia polluere." † LORD BOLINGBROKE'S "Works," vol. v. p. 305. ‡ Vol. v. pp. 487, 488. § P. 485. ‖ P. 307.

WITH ATHEISTS becomes ill the professors of Theism. No matter. They PERSIST, and have done their best, in concert with their allies, to DESTROY the belief of the GOODNESS of God:—They endeavour to DESTROY that of his GOODNESS, which is a farther article of their ALLIANCE."*

"The CONFEDERACY between Atheists and Divines appears to have been carried VERY FAR—Nay the Atheist will appear, to that reason, to which they both appeal, more consistent in his absurdity than the Divine."† "Divines UPBRAID God's GOODNESS, and CENSURE his JUSTICE."‡—"INJUSTICE is, in this life, ascribed to God, by Divines."§

"The whole Tribe of Divines, like Wollaston and Clarke, do, in effect, RENOUNCE the God whom you and I adore, as much as the rankest of the Atheistical Tribe. Your Priests and our Parsons will exclaim most pathetically, and RAIL OUTRAGEOUSLY at this assertion. But have a little patience, and I will prove it to their shame to be true."‖

The Reader will give me leave, in a few words, to vindicate the body of Divines from the horrid calumny of this imaginary Confederacy.

He may be pleased then to understand, that ATHEISM has ever endeavoured to support itself, on a FACT, which has indeed all the certainty that the evidence of sense and experience can give it; namely, *the unequal distribution of moral good and evil, here below.*

> "Cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
> Adspicerem, *lætosque diu florere nocentes,*
> *Vexarique pios*——LABEFACTA CADEBAT
> RELIGIO," - - - -

was the common language of the impatient sufferer. From hence the Atheist inferred that the Universe was without an intelligent Ruler; and that all things were driven about by that Fate or Fortune, which first produced them. DIVINES opposed this *Conclusion;* for they did not venture to be so paradoxical as (with his Lordship) to call in question *the Premisses,* a phenomenon which objected itself to all their Senses. They first demonstrated, strictly demonstrated, the Being of a God, and his MORAL ATTRIBUTES: and then shewed, that if the whole of man's existence were included within this life, the present distribution of good and evil would contradict that Demonstration. They, therefore, inferred, on their part, that the whole of man's existence was not included within this life: but that he was reserved for an after-reckoning; in which an *equal distribution of rewards and punishments* would amply vindicate the providence of a righteous Governor.

* LORD BOLINGBROKE'S "Works," vol. v. p. 393. † Pp. 348, 349. ‡ P. 417. § P. 541. ‖ P. 485.

But *Atheists* were not the only enemies whom *Divines* had to deal with. There was a set of men, who allowed an intelligent first Cause, endowed with those MORAL ATTRIBUTES, which the Divines had demonstrated: and, on that account, called themselves DEISTS. Yet they agreed so far with *Atheism*, as to confine the whole of man's existence to the present life. These, the *Divine* combated, in their turn; and with the same arms; but in an inverted order. In disputing with the ATHEISTS, the principle held in common was *the present unequal distribution of Good and Evil.* So that to cut off their conclusion from it, of NO GOD, he *demonstrated* the Being and Attributes: and from that proof inferred that the inequality would be set right. With DEISTS, the common principle was *the Being and Attributes of God.* Therefore, to bring them to the allowance of a FUTURE STATE, he appealed to the present *unequal distribution of good and evil*, (which these Men, as well as his Lordship, were very backward to allow and very industrious not to see;) and from that inequality inferred, that there must be such a State.

This is a short and true account of the DIVINES' contest with ATHEISTS and DEISTS, so far as the subject of a *future state* came in question: In both controversies that *state* is deduced from *the moral attributes:* only with this difference. In the dispute with Atheists, the demonstration of those attributes is *made;* in the dispute with Deists, it is *allowed.* The final purpose against Atheism is to prove the BEING AND ATTRIBUTES of God; the final purpose against Deism is to prove a FUTURE STATE: For neither *natural* nor *revealed* Religion can subsist without *believing that God* IS, *and that he is a* REWARDER *of them that seek him.** Thus, we see, the *question,* in each controversy, being different; the *premisses,* by which each proposition was to be proved, must needs be different. The difference is here explained; the premisses, in the argument against Atheists, were the *moral attributes;* the premisses in the argument against Deists, were the *unequal distribution* of good and evil.

What Enemy to Religion now, could ever hope to see a Calumny either thrive or rise on so unpromising a ground? or flatter himself with the expectation of an Advocate bold enough to tell the World, that this conduct of the DIVINES was a CONFEDERACY WITH ATHEISTS, *to decry God's Providence; to blot out his Attributes of goodness and justice; to combat his Government; and to deny his very Existence?* The RIGHT HONOURABLE Author does all this: And more;—he expects to be believed. It is true, this is a fine believing age: Yet I hardly think he would have carried his confidence in our credulity so far, had he seen his way clear before him.—His Lordship is always sublime, and therefore often cloudy; commonly, at too great a distance to look

* St. Paul. Heb. xi. 6.

into the detail of things, or to enter into their *minuteness:* (for which, indeed, he is perpetually felicitating his Genius.) So that, in his *general view* of Theologic matters, he has jumbled these two Controversies into one; and, in the confusion, hath commodiously slipped in one Fact for another. He, all the way, represents Divines as making *a future State* THE PROOF *of God's moral attributes:* Whereas, we now see, on the very face of the controversy, that they make *the moral attributes* A PROOF *of a future State.* Let us consider how the dispute stands with the *Atheist.* These men draw their argument against a God, from the condition of the moral world: The Divine answers, by demonstrating *God's Being and Attributes:* and, on that demonstration, satisfies the objection. Consider how it stands with the *Deist.* Here, God's Being and Attributes is a common principle: And on this ground the Divine stands, to deduce a *future state* from the unequal distribution of things.—But his misrepresentation was to support his slander of a CONFEDERACY: there was no room to pretend that God's Being was made precarious by proving a *future state* from his Attributes; but could he get it believed, that Divines proved the Attributes from a *future state,* he would easily find credit with his kind Reader, for all the rest.

Well then, the whole amount of his CHIMERICAL CONFEDERACY comes to this, That *Divines and Atheists hold a principle in common;* but, in common too with all the rest of mankind; namely, that there are irregularities in the distribution of good and evil here below. And did any thing forbid *Divines* to employ this common principle, in support of Religion against *Atheism and Deism!* But whatever his Lordship might think proper to disguise in this reasoning, there is one thing, the most careless Reader will never overlook; which is, that, under all this pomp of words and solemnity of accusation, you see lurking that poor species of a Bigot's calumny, which, from *one* principle held in common with an obnoxious Party, charges his Adversary, with *all* the follies or impieties which have rendered that Party odious. This miserable artifice of imposture, had now been long hissed out of learned controversy, when the noble Lord took it up; and, with true political skill, worked it into a SHAM PLOT; to make RELIGION distrust its best Friends, and take refuge in the FIRST PHILOSOPHY.

THE

DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES

DEMONSTRATED.

BOOK II.

SECTION I.

HAVING now proved the first PROPOSITION, *That inculcating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is necessary to the well-being of Society*, by considerations drawn from the *nature of Man*, and the *genius of civil Society*; and cleared it from the objections of licentious Wits;

I proceed to the *second*; which is, THAT ALL MANKIND, ESPECIALLY THE MOST WISE AND LEARNED NATIONS OF ANTIQUITY, HAVE CONCURRED IN BELIEVING AND TEACHING, THAT THIS DOCTRINE WAS OF SUCH USE TO CIVIL SOCIETY.

This I shall endeavour to prove,

I. From the conduct of Lawgivers, and Institutors of civil policy.

II. From the opinions of all the Learners and Teachers of wisdom in the schools of ancient philosophy.

I. FROM THE CONDUCT OF LAWGIVERS, AND INSTITUTORS OF CIVIL POLICY: who never omitted to propagate and confirm Religion, where-ever they established Laws; RELIGION, I say, which was always first in their view, and last in their execution. They used it as the instrument to collect a body politic; and they applied it as the bond to tye and keep that body together: they *taught* it in civilizing man; and *established* it to prevent his return to barbarity and a savage life. In a word, so inseparable, in the ancient World, were the ideas of LAWGIVING and RELIGION, that Plutarch (in his paradoxical preference of atheism to superstition) supposes no other Origin of divine worship than what was the work of the Lawgiver. "How much happier had it been" (says he) "for the Carthaginians, had their first Lawgiver been like Critias or Diagoras, who believed neither Gods nor Demons, rather than such a one as enjoined the public sacrifices to Saturn!"*

* Τί δὲ Καρχηδονίοις οὐκ ἐλυσιτέλει Κριτίαν λαβοῦσιν ἢ Διαγόραν, νομοθέτην ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, μήτε τινὰ θεῶν μήτε δαιμόνων, νομίζειν, ἢ τοιαῦτα θύειν οἷα τῷ Κρόνῳ ἔθυον; —Περὶ Δεισιδ. P. 171, tom. ii. fol. 1599, Francof.

That the Magistrate, as such, hath taken the greatest care and pains to inculcate and support Religion, we shall prove at large: That this care and pains must arise, and was employed, on account of its confessed and experienced utility to the State, will need no proof.

But here it will be necessary to remind the reader of this previous truth, *That there never was, in any age of the world, from the most early accounts of time, to this present hour, any civil-policied nation or people, who had a Religion, of which the chief foundation and support was not the doctrine of a* FUTURE STATE *of rewards and punishments; the* JEWISH PEOPLE *only excepted.* This, I presume, our adversaries will not deny. Mr. *Bayle*, the indulgent foster-father of Infidelity, confesseth it in the fullest manner, and with the utmost ingenuity: "Toutes les religions du monde, tant la vraie que les fausses, roulent sur ce grand pivot, qu'il y a un juge invisible qui punit et qui recompense, *apres cette vie*, les actions de l'homme tant exterieures qu'interieures. C'est de la que l'on suppose que decoule la principale utilité de la religion:" and thinks, it was the utility of this doctrine which set the Magistrate upon inventing a Religion for the State: "C'est le principal motif qui eut animé ceux qui l'auroient inventée." *

This truth, we beg the reader always to have in mind: So that when, in the sequel of this discourse, he meets with ancient testimonies for the necessity of RELIGION to Society, he may be sure, that the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE of rewards and punishments, was the chief idea included in that term. And on this account it is, that frequently, where the Ancients speak of the *source* of those utilities, which can proceed only from the doctrine of a *future state*, they give it the common name of *Religion:* as, on the other hand, they often call *Religion* by the restrictive name of a *future state:* On which account, I have not scrupled, throughout this discourse, to use the same liberty of applying the generic or specific term, one for the other, without any apprehension of being thought not to understand my argument, or of being misunderstood by my reader: Who, when he sees me bring facts and opinions of Antiquity, which shew the utility of religion in general, to prove the utility of the doctrine of a future state in particular, will understand that I speak home to my purpose, and to the full proof of my second proposition.

So that, had I done no more than produce *such facts and opinions*, I had done all that was necessary. But since the bare *necessary* is esteemed almost as poor and unhandsome a thing in literature as in civil life, I have employed the greatest part of the present and following books, to shew, from ancient facts and opinions, the more than ordinary care and concern of all the wise and learned for perpetuating the specific doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.

* *Dict. Crit. et Hist.* art. "Spinoza," Rem. (E.)

Having premised thus much to prevent mistakes, I proceed, in the first place,

1. To shew, *in general*, the civil Magistrate's care in this matter.

The popular doctrine of a Providence, and, consequently, of a future state of rewards and punishments, was, as we have said, so universally received in the ancient world, that we cannot find any civilized country where it was not of national belief. The most ancient *Greek* poets, as *Musæus*,* *Orpheus*,† *Homer*, *Hesiod*, *&c.* who have given systems of theology and religion, on the popular creed of such nations, always reckon the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments as a fundamental article: And all succeeding writers have given testimony to the same concerted plan. *Æschylus*, *Sophocles*, *Euripides*, *Aristophanes*, whose profession it was to represent the manners and opinions of all civilized people, whether *Greeks* or those whom the *Greeks* called *Barbarians*, are full and express to the same purpose. Further, it is recorded in the works of every ancient historian and philosopher, which it would be endless to recite. But *Plutarch*, the most knowing of them all, shall speak for the rest: "Examine,"‡ says he, in his tract against *Colotes* the *Epicurean*, "the face of the globe, and you may find Cities unfortified, unlettered, without a regular Magistrate, or appropriated habitations; without possessions, property, or the use of money, and unskilled in all the magnificent and polite arts of life: But a City without the knowledge of a God, or the practice of Religion: without the use of vows, oaths, oracles, and sacrifices to procure good, or of deprecatory rites to avert evil, no man can or ever will find." And in his consolation to *Apollonius*, he declares it§ was so ancient an opinion, *that good men should be recompensed after death, that he could not reach either to the author or origin[illegible]*. To the same purpose had *Cicero* and *Seneca* declared themselves before him. The first in these words; "As our innate ideas discover to us that there are Gods, whose attributes we deduce from reason; so, *from the consent of all nations and people, we conclude that the soul is immortal.*"‖ The other thus: "When we weigh the question of the immortality of the soul, *the consent of all mankind, in their fears and hopes of a future state*, is of no small moment with us."¶

* PLATO, *Rep.* lib. xi. p. 364, E. tom. ii. edit. Steph. 1578, fol. † PLUTARCH, *Vita Lucul.* ‡ —Εὔροις δ' ἂν ἐπιὼν καὶ πόλεις ἀτειχίστους, ἀγραμμάτους, ἀβασιλεύτους, ἀοίκους, ἀχρημάτους, νομίσματος μὴ δεομένας, ἀπείρους θεάτρων καὶ γυμνασίων ἀνιέρου δὲ πόλεως καὶ ἀθέου, μὴ χρωμένης εὐχαῖς, μηδὲ ὅρκοις, μηδὲ μαντείαις, μηδὲ θυσίαις ἐπ' ἀγαθοῖς, μηδὲ ἀποτροπαῖς κακῶν, οὐδείς ἐστιν οὐδὲ ἔσται γεγονὼς θεατής.—Edit. Francf. fol. tom. ii. p. 1125, E. § —Καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἀρχαῖα καὶ παλαιὰ διατελεῖ νενομισμένα παρ' ἡμῖν ὥστε τὸ παράπαν οὐδεὶς οἶδεν οὐδὲ τοῦ χρόνου τὴν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τὸν θέντα πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα τυγχάνουσι διὰ τέλους οὕτω νενομισμένα. —Edit. Steph. 8vo, 1572, tom. i. p. 201. ‖ "Ut Deos esse naturâ opinamur, qualesque sint ratione cognoscimus; sic permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium."—*Tuscul. Disp.* lib. i. cap. 16, in initio, edit. Oxon. 4to, tom. ii. p. 245. ¶ "Cum de animarum æternitate disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum, aut timentium inferos, aut colentium."—Ep. 117.

In a word, *Sextus Empiricus*, when he would discredit the argument for the being of a God, brought from universal consent, observes that it would prove too much; because it would prove the truth of the *poetic fables of hell*, in which there was as general a concurrence.*

But of all nations, the EGYPTIAN was most celebrated for its care in cultivating Religion in general, and the doctrine of a future state in particular: insomuch that one of the most ancient *Greek* historians affirms, *They were the first who built altars and erected statues and temples to the Gods.—The first who taught that the soul of man was immortal.*† And *Lucian* tells us,‡ *That they were said to be the first who had the knowledge of the Gods.* Which only amounts to this, that they were the first and wisest civil-policied people: as will appear presently.

But, at present, to prove *the Magistrate's care from hence.*—For this account of the antiquity and universality of Religion is not given to evince its *truth;* for which purpose other writers have often and successfully employed it; but to manifest its USE; which will be best done by inquiring what share the Magistrate had in it.

I. Now though no civilized nation was ever without a Religion in general, and this doctrine in particular; and though it was of general belief even before civil policy was instituted amongst mankind; yet were there formerly, as now there are, many savage nations, that when first discovered, appeared to have long lost all traces of Religion: A fact which implies some extraordinary care in the Magistrate for its support and preservation. For if Religion hath been supported in all places, at all times, and under all circumstances, where there was a magistrate and civil policy; and scarce in any place, or under any circumstance, where these were wanting; what other cause than the Magistrate's care and contrivance can be assigned for its support?

If it should be said, which, I think, is the only plausible thing can be said, that the reason why the Citizen had religion, and the Savage none, might be, that, amongst the advantages of civil life, the improvement and cultivation of the mind is one; and this necessarily brings in the knowledge of God and religious observance: It is sufficient to reply, that all the national Religions of the ancient and modern Gentile world are so gross and irrational, that they could not be the product of reflection or improved reason, but were plainly of the Magistrate's fitting up, adapted to the capacity of minds yet rude and uncultivated, which could bear nothing of a finer texture than what was made out

* *Adv. Physicos*, lib. viii. cap. 2. Comment. † Βωμούς τε καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ νηοὺς θεοῖσι ἀπονεῖμαι σφέας πρώτους.—HEROD. *Euterpe*, cap. 4.—Πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπτιοί εισιν οἱ εἰπόντες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι.—Idem, *ibid*, c. 123. ‡ Πρῶτοι μὲν ἀνθρώπων Αἰγύπτιοι λέγονται θεῶν τε ἔννοιην λαβεῖν.—*De Dea Syria*, sect. 2, edit. Reitzii.

of the stuff he found, the genius of the Nation and the nature of the Government.

To give the proof of what we have been saying: The *Mexicans* and *Peruvians* in the South, and the people of *Canada* in *North America*, were on a level with regard to speculative knowledge. Or, if there were any natural advantage, the *Canadians* had it. These, when discovered, seemed to have no rudiments of Religion: the *Mexicans* and *Peruvians* had one formed, digested, and established: but such a religion as discovered something worse than mere ignorance, but never could be the result of improved thinking: However, a religion it was which taught the great articles of the worship of a God, a providence, and a future state. Now how happened it that these two great empires had a Religion, and the *Canadians* none, but that the Lawgivers of the former saw it necessary to countenance, add to, and perpetuate what they found,* for the benefit of the state? which advantage the *Canadians* wanting, they lost, in course of time, the very foot-steps of Religion. If this will not be allowed, it will be difficult to assign a reason.

Let us suppose, according to the objection, that *Gentile* Religion owes its birth to the improved and cultivated mind. Now, if we make collections from the nature of things, it will be found more likely that these northern Savages should longer preserve the notions of God, and the practices of Religion, than the southern Citizens, uninfluenced by their Magistrates.

The way of getting to the knowledge of a God, best suited to the common capacity of man, is that very easy one, the contemplation of the works of nature: For this employment, the Savage would have fitter opportunities given him by his vacant and sedentary life; and by his constant view of nature, which all his labours, and all his amusements, perpetually presented to him naked and unsophisticated. The *Comte de Boulainvilliers*, a writer by no means prejudiced in favour of religion, gives this reason why the *Arabians* preserved so long, and with so much purity, their notions of the Divinity.†

On the other hand, Nature, by which we come to the knowledge of a first Cause, would be quite hid from the southern Citizen, busied in the works of barbarous arts, and inhuman practices; or taken up with the slavish attendance on the will, and a more slavish imitation of the manners of a cruel and capricious Tyrant.

Nor, if we may credit the relations of travellers, do the northern

* See book iii. sect. 6, and book ii. sect. 1, and page antepenult. † *La Vie de Mohammed*, p. 147, ed. Amst. 1731. "Je reviens volontiers à la louange de la solitude des Arabes. Elle a conservé chez eux plus longtems, et avec moins de mêlange, le sentiment naturel de la veritable divinité," &c.

people any more neglect to exercise their reason than the southern: It is constant, they are observed to have sounder intellects than those nearer the sun: which, being owing to the influence of climes, is found to hold all the world over. Notwithstanding this, the issue proved just the contrary; and, as we said, the *Peruvians* and *Mexicans* had a Religion, the *Canadians* none at all.

Who then can doubt but that this was owing to the care and contrivance of the Magistrate? But indeed (which makes this instance the more pertinent) the *fact* confirms the *reasoning*. The Founders of these two monarchies pretended to be the messengers and offspring of the Gods; and, in the manner of the Grecian, and other Legislators (of whom more hereafter) pretended to inspiration, established Religion, and constituted a form of worship.

II. But not only the *existence*, but the *genius* too of pagan Religion, shews the Magistrate's hand in its support.

First, From the *origin* of their Gods.

Secondly, From the *attributes* given to them; and

Thirdly, From the *mode of public worship*.

First, The idolatry of the Gentile States was chiefly the worship of dead men; and these, Kings, Lawgivers, and Founders of civil policy. The benefit accruing to the State both from the *consecration* and the *worship* of such Gods, shews it to be a contrivance of the Lawgiver. For, 1. Nothing could be a greater excitement to good government than to shew the Magistrate that the public benefits, which he should invent, improve, or preserve, would be rewarded with an immortality of fame and glory. *Cicero* gives this as the original of the civil apotheosis. "It may be easily understood, that the reason, why most Cities prosecuted the memory of their valiant men with divine honours, was to spur up their Citizens to virtue, that every the most deserving of them might encounter dangers with the greater cheerfulness, in the service of his country. And for this very cause it was that, at Athens, Erectheus and his daughters were received into the number of the Gods." * 2. Nothing could make the people so observant of their Laws, as a belief that the makers, framers, and administrators of them were become Gods; and did dispense a peculiar providence for their protection and support.

The records of antiquity support this reasoning. The EGYPTIANS were the first people who perfected Civil-policy, and established Religion: And they were the first, too, who deified their kings, lawgivers,

* "Atque in plerisque civitatibus intelligi potest, augendæ virtutis gratiâ, quo libentiùs reipublicæ causa periculum adiret optimus quisque, virorum fortium memoriam honore deorum immortalium consecratum. Ob eam enim ipsam causam Erechtheus Athenis filiæque ejus in numero deorum sunt."—*Natura Deorum*, lib. iii. cap. 19, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. ii. p. 503.

and public benefactors;* as we may collect from the passage of *Herodotus*, quoted above, which says, *they were the first who built altars, and erected* STATUES *and temples to the Gods:* For the erecting *statues* was, by this historian, esteemed a certain mark that the worshippers believed the Gods had *human nature;* as appears from the reason he gives why the Persians had no *statues* of their Gods, namely, *because they did not believe as the Greeks, that the Gods had human natures,*† that is, they did not believe the Gods were dead men deified: This, as we say, was a practice, invented by the *Egyptians;* who, in process of time, taught the rest of the world their mystery.‡ So when arts and civil policy were brought into *Greece* by *Cadmus* and *Ceres* (the first, though a *Phenician* by birth, being an inhabitant of *Thebes* in *Egypt;* and the other, though coming immediately from *Sicily*, was yet a natural *Egyptian*) then, and not till then, began the custom of deifying dead men; which soon over-ran all *Greece* and the rest of *Europe.*§

2. *The attributes and qualities assigned to their Gods*, always corresponded with the nature and genius of the government. If this was gentle, benign, compassionate, and forgiving; goodness and mercy were most essential to the Deity: But if severe, inexorable, captious, or unequal; the very Gods were Tyrants; and expiations, atonements, lustrations, and bloody sacrifices, composed the system of religious worship. In the words of the great Poet,

> "Gods partial, changeful, passionate, unjust,
> Whose attributes were rage, revenge, and lust,
> Such as the souls of cowards might conceive,
> And form'd like tyrants, tyrants would believe."‖

But, 3. *The mode of public worship* was alone sufficient to betray the Mover of the whole machine. The *object* of what we call *Religion*, being God, considered as the creator and preserver of a species of rational beings, the *subject* of it must needs be each individual of that species. This is that idea of Religion, which our common reason

* Ἄλλους δ' ἐκ τούτων ἐπιγείους γενέσθαι φασίν, ὑπάρξαντας μὲν ἀνητοὺς, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίαν τετυχηκότας τῆς ἀθανασίας ὧν ἐνίους καὶ βασιλεῖς γεγονέναι κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον.—DIODORUS SICULUS, lib. i. p. 8. Steph. ed.

† Ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκέειν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρωποφυέας ἐνόμισαν τοὺς θεοὺς, καθάπερ οἱ Ἕλληνες, εἶναι.—*Clio*, cap. 131. And see note A, at the end of this book.

‡ Προδιαρθρῶσαι δὲ ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν αὖθις σαφήνειαν, καὶ τὴν τῶν μετὰ μέρος διάγνωσιν, ὅτι οἱ παλαιότατοι τῶν βαρβάρων, ἐξαιρέτως δὲ Φοίνικές τε καὶ ΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΟΙ, παρ' ὧν καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ παρέλαβον ἄνθρωποι, θεοὺς ἐνόμιζον μεγίστους τοὺς τὰ πρὸς τὴν βιωτικὴν χρεῖαν εὑρόντας, ἢ καὶ κατά τι εὖ ποιήσαντας τὰ ἔθνη. εὐεργέτας τε τούτους καὶ πολλῶν αἰτίους ἀγαθῶν ἡγούμενοι, ὡς θεοὺς προσεκύνουν.—PHILO BIBLIOS apud EUSEB. *Præp. Evang.* lib. ii. cap. 9.

§ Sir Isaac Newton, who, probably, had not this matter in his thoughts, hath yet a remarkable passage to this purpose in his *Chronology of the Greeks:* "Idolatry," says he, "began in *Chaldea* and *Egypt.*—The countries upon the *Tigris* and the *Nile* being exceeding fertile, were first frequented by mankind, and grew first into kingdoms; and THEREFORE began first to adore their dead kings and queens:—Every city set up the worship of its own founder and kings, and by alliances and conquests they spread this worship, and at length the *Phœnicians* and *Egyptians* brought into *Europe* the practice of deifying the dead."—Page 161.

† "Essay on Man."

approves. But now, in ancient paganism, *Religion* was a very different thing: It had for its *subject* not only the *natural man*, that is, each Individual; but likewise the *artificial man*, Society; by and for whom, all the *public* rites and ceremonies of it were instituted and performed. And while that part of pagan Religion, whose *subject* were individuals, bore an inferior part, and was confessed to be under an unequal Providence, the consideration of which brought in the doctrine of a future state for the support of God's government; the other, whose subject was the artificial man, Society, taught a more equal Providence, administred to the State. The consequence of which was, that Religion and Government ran into one another; and prodigies and portents were as familiar as civil edicts; and as constantly bore their share in the public administration: For the Oracles, without which nothing was projected or executed, always denounced them as rational directions, declarative of divine favour, or displeasure; in which *particulars*, as such, were not at all concerned: So that to accept or to avert the omen; to gratulate the mercy, or deprecate the judgment, the constant method was the revival of *old rites*, or the institution of *new*. A reformation of manners, or enforcement of sumptuary laws, never made part of the state's atonement to the Gods.

The oddness and notoriety of this fact so forceably struck Mr. *Bayle's* imagination, that, mistaking this for the whole of Paganism, he too hastily concluded, that *the worship of false Gods in the ancient world, did not at all influence morals:* * And from thence formed an argument to support his favourite question in behalf of Atheism. This was a strange conclusion: For though it be indeed true, that the *public* part of pagan Religion had no influence on morals, it is utterly false that the *private* part had not: For in the doctrine of a future state, which was the foundation of, and inseparable from, this sounder part of pagan Religion whose subject was the *individual*, the merit and demerit, to which rewards and punishments were annexed, was virtue and vice only. This will be proved at large in the fourth section of the present book: Though I am ready to allow, that the nature and administration of the public part of pagan Religion did lead *individuals* into many wrong conclusions concerning the efficacy of exterior acts of worship.

But what seems to have occasioned Mr. *Bayle's* mistake (besides his following the Fathers, who in their *declamations* against paganism have said a great deal to the same purpose†) was his not reflecting

* *Pensées diverses sur un Comete, &c.* And *Reponse aux Questions d'un Provincial.* And *Continuation des Pensées diverses, &c.* † Yet St. Austin himself cannot but own that the MYSTERIES however (of which the Reader will hear a great deal in the 4th Section of this Book) were principally instituted for the promoting of virtue and a good life, even where he is accusing *Paganism* in general for its neglect of moral virtue: "Nec nobis nescio quos susurros paucissimorum auribus anhelatos et arcana velut reli-

that ancient History only presents us with *one* part of the influence of Paganism, that which it had on the Public as a body: The *other*, the influence it had on individuals, it passes over in silence, as not its province.

Whoever now considers the genius of Paganism in this view, (and unless he considers it in this view he will never be able to judge truly of it*) can hardly doubt but that the civil magistrate had a great hand in modelling *Religion*. What it was which enabled him to give this extraordinary cast to Paganism, is not difficult to discover: It could be nothing but that *popular disposition* arising from, and the necessary consequence of, those general notions, which, by his contrivance and encouragement, had overspread the heathen world. 1. That there were local tutelary Deities, who had taken upon themselves, or were intrusted with, the care and protection of particular Nations and People; (of which, more hereafter.) 2. That those great benefactors of mankind, who had reduced the scattered tribes and clans into civil Society, were become Gods. 3. and lastly, That their systems of Laws and civil Institutes were planned and digested by the direction of the legislator's patron-Deity.†

On the whole then, The foregoing considerations of the *preservation* of Religion in general; the *origine* of the pagan Gods; their *attributes*; and the *mode of public worship*, will, I am persuaded, incline the reader to think that, for the *universality of religious belief*, the world was chiefly indebted to the civil Magistrate; how much soever the illegitimate or unnatural constitution of particular States, or the defective views of particular Lawgivers, contributed to deprave the true Religion of *nature*; or, if you will, the *patriarchal*. The learned St. *Austin*, who excelled in the knowledge of antiquity, seems to have been determined by this way of thinking, when he gives it, as

gione traditos jactent, quibus vitæ probitas castitasque discatur."—*De Civitate Dei*, lib. ii. cap. 6.—"Iidem ipsi Dæmones—perhibentur in adytis suis, secretisque penetralibus dare quædam bona præcepta de moribus quibusdam velut electis sacratis suis—Proinde malignitas dæmonum nisi alicubi se, quemadmodum scriptum in nostris litteris novimus, transfiguret in angelos lucis, non implet negotium deceptionis. Foris itaque populis celeberrimo strepitu impietas impura circumsonat, et intus paucis castitas simulata vix sonat: præbentur propatula pudendis, et secreta laudandis: decus latet, et dedecus patet," &c.—Cap. 26.

* What is here said of the genius of Paganism well accounts for a circumstance in ancient history, which very much embarrasses the modern critics. They cannot conceive how it happened, that the best ancient historians, who understood so well what belonged to the nature of a Composition, and how to give every sort of work its due form, and were besides free from all vulgar superstition, should abound so much in descriptions of religious rites and ceremonies; and in relations of omens, prodigies, and portents. Many an idle hypothesis hath been framed to give a solution of this difficulty; and many a tedious work compiled to justify these ancient historians, upon mere modern ideas. But now a plain and easy answer may be given to it. *This part* of pagan Religion was so interwoven with the transactions of State, that it became *essential* to civil history. And how much soever it may be supposed to have deformed ancient story, yet the Critic and Philosopher gain by what disgusts the delicacy of the Politician; the Greek and Roman history being the repository of all that concerns the *public part* of pagan religion. † See the beginning of the next section.

the result of his enquiries; that the civil Magistrate had a large share in pagan superstition. His words are these,* "—Which indeed seems to have been done on no other account but as it was the business of princes, out of their wisdom and civil prudence, to deceive the people in their Religion—princes, under the name of religion, persuaded the people to believe those things true, which they themselves knew to be idle fables. By this means, for their own ease in government, tying them the more closely to civil Society."

But if now it should be objected, that it was natural for the people, left to themselves, to run into those superstitions, we may readily grant it without prejudice to the argument: For they are always such notions as are apt to be entertained and cherished by vulgar minds, whose current the wise Magistrate is accustomed to turn to his advantage. For to think him capable of new modelling the human mind, by *making* men religious whom he did not *find* so, is, as will be shewn hereafter, a senseless whimsy, entertained by the Atheist to account for the origin of Religion. And, when it is seen that all these various modes of superstition concurred to promote the Magistrate's purpose, it can hardly be doubted but he gave them that general direction. The *particular* parts of Gentile Religion, which further strengthen and confirm this reasoning, are not here to be insisted on. Their original will be clearly seen, when we come to shew the several methods which the Magistrate employed for this great purpose. What these methods were, the course of the argument now leads us to consider.

SECTION II.

It hath been shewn in general, from the EFFECT, that Lawgivers and founders of civil policy did indeed support and propagate Religion. We shall now endeavour to explain the CAUSES of that effect, in a particular enumeration of the arts they employed to that purpose.

I. The FIRST step the Legislator took, was to pretend a Mission and revelation from some God, by whose command and direction he had framed the Policy he would establish. Thus *Amasis* and *Mneves*, lawgivers of the *Egyptians* (from whence this custom spread over *Greece* and *Asia)* pretended to receive their laws from *Mercury; Zoroaster* the lawgiver of the *Bactrians*, and *Zamolxis* lawgiver of the *Getes*, from *Vesta; Zathraustes* the lawgiver of the *Arimaspi*, from a good spirit or genius; and all these most industriously and

* —"Quod utique non aliam ob causam factum videtur, nisi quia hominum principum velut prudentium et sapientium negotium fuit populum in religionibus fallere—Homines principes ea, quæ vana esse noverint, religionis nomine populis tanquam vera suadebant: Hoc modo eos civili societati velut arctius alligantes, quo subditos possiderent."—*De Civitate Dei*, lib. iv. cap. 32.

professedly propagated the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. *Rhadamanthus* and *Minos* lawgivers of *Crete*, and *Lycaon* of *Arcadia*, pretended to an intercourse with *Jupiter*; *Triptolemus* lawgiver of the *Athenians*, affected to be inspired by *Ceres*; *Pythagoras* and *Zaleucus*, who made laws for the *Crotoniates* and *Locrians*, ascribed their institutions to *Minerva*: *Lycurgus* of *Sparta*, professed to act by the direction of *Apollo*; and *Romulus* and *Numa* of *Rome* put themselves under the guidance of *Consus*, and the Goddess *Egeria*.* In a word, there is hardly an old Lawgiver on record, but what thus pretended to revelation, and the divine assistance. But had we the lost books *of Legislators* written by *Hermippus*, *Theophrastus*, and *Apollodorus*,† we should have had a much fuller list of these inspired statesmen, and doubtless, many further lights on the subject. The same method was practised by the founders of the *great outlying empires*, as Sir *William Temple* calls them. Thus the first of the *Chinese* monarchs was called *Fayfour* or *Fanfur*, the *son of Heaven*, as we are told by the jesuits, from his pretensions to that relation. The *royal commentaries of Peru* inform us, that the founders of that empire were *Mango Copac*, and his wife and sister *Coya Mama*, who proclaimed themselves the son and daughter of the *Sun*, sent from their father to reduce mankind from their savage and bestial life, to one of order and society. *Tuisco*, the founder of the German nations, pretended to be sent upon the same message, as appears from his name, which signifies the interpreter,‡ that is, of the Gods. *Thor* and *Odin*, the lawgivers of the *Western Goths*, laid claim likewise to inspiration and even to divinity.§ The *Revelations* of *Mahomet* are too well known to be insisted on. But the race of these inspired Lawgivers seems to have ended in *Genghizcan*, the founder of the *Mogul empire*.‖

Such was the universal custom of the ancient world, to make *Gods* and *Prophets* of their first kings and lawgivers. Hence it is, that *Plato* makes *legislation* to have come from God, and not from man:¶ and that the constant epithets to kings, in *Homer*, are

* DIODORUS SICULUS, lib. i. et v. EPHORUS apud Strabonem, lib. x., teste veteri scriptore apud Suidam in Ανκάων.—ARIST. apud Schol. Pind. ad. Olymp. x. † ATHEN. lib. xiv. D. LAERTIUS. ‡ Vide SHERINGHAM, *De Anglorum Gentis Origine*, p. 86. § "Olim quidam magicæ artis imbuti, Thor videlicet et Othinus,—obtentis simplicium animis, divinitatis sibi fastigium arrogare cœperunt.—Adeo namque fallaciæ eorum effectus percrebuit, ut in ipsis cæteri quandam numinum potentiam venerantes, eosque deos vel *deorum complices* autumantes, veneficiorum auctoribus solennia vota dependerent, et errori sacrilego respectum sacris debitum exhiberent."—SAXO-GRAMMATICUS, lib. vi. *Histor.* p. 93. Francof. 1576. fol. ‖ "Ils ont attribué des revelations à *Genghizcan*; et pour porter la veneration des peuples aussi loin qu'elle pouvoit aller, ils lui ont donné de la divinité. Ceux qui s'interessoient à son elevation eurent même l'insolence de le faire passer pour fils de Dieu. Sa mere, plus modeste, dit seulement qu'il etoit FILS DU SOLEIL."—M. PETIT DE LA CROIX, (le pere,) *Histoire du Genghizcan*, c. 1. ¶ Θεὸς ἤ τις ἀνθρώπων ὑμῖν, ὦ ξένοι, εἴληφε τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν νόμων διαθέσεως; ΚΛ. Θεὸς, ὦ ξένε, θεὸς, ὥς γε τὸ δικαιότατον εἰπεῖν.—*De Legibus*, lib. i. lin. i.

ΔΙΟΓΕΝΕΙΣ *born of the Gods,* and ΔΙΟΤΡΕΦΕΙΣ *bred* or *tutored by the Gods.**

From this general pretence to revelation we may collect the sentiments of the ancient lawgivers concerning the use of Religion to Society. For we must always have in mind what *Diodorus Siculus* so truly observes, *That they did this, not only to beget a veneration to their laws, but likewise to establish the opinion of the superintendency of the Gods over human affairs.*† One may venture to go farther, and say, that to *establish this superintendency* was their principal and direct aim, in all their pretensions to inspiration.

The reader may observe, that *Diodorus* does not so much as suspect them of having a third end, distinct from these two; that is to say, the advancement of their own private interest. And this with great judgment. He knew well the difference between a LAWGIVER and a TYRANT; though the World soon after seems to have lost the memory of that distinction.‡ Such views became not the former; they destroyed his character, and changed him into his direct opposite; who applied every thing to his own interest; and this amongst the rest. *Aristotle,* in his maxims for setting up, and supporting a tyranny, lays this down for one, *to seem extremely attached to the worship of the Gods, for that men have no apprehension of injustice from such as they take to be religious and to have a high sense of providence. Nor will the people be apt to run into plots and conspiracies against those, whom they believe the Gods will, in their turn, fight for, and support.*§ And here it is worth noting, that, anciently, *Tyrants,* as well as Lawgivers, gave all encouragement to Religion; and endeavoured to establish their irregular Wills, not by convincing men that there was no

* Θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέος βασιλῆος.—*Ilias* B'. ver. 196, which title of διοτρεφέος is not given, says Eustathius on the place, to signify that such a one is descended from Jupiter, but that he receives his honour and authority from him. Ἑφερμηνεύει διατί ΔΙΟΓΕΝΕΙΣ καὶ ΔΙΟΤΡΕΦΕΙΣ τοὺς βασιλεῖς λέγει, οὐχ ὅτι ἐκ Διὸς τὸ γένος ἕλκουσι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ΕΞ ΕΚΕΙΝΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ Η ΤΙΜΗ. † Μετὰ γὰρ τὴν παλαιὰν τοῦ κατ' Αἴγυπτον βίου κατάστασιν, τὴν μυθολογουμένην γεγονέναι ἐπί τε τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἡρώων, πεῖσαι φασὶ πρῶτον ἀγράπτοις νόμοις χρήσασθαι τὰ πλήθη βίουν τὸν Μνεύην, ἄνδρα καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ μέγαν καὶ τῷ βίῳ κοινότατον τῶν μνημονευομένων, προσποιηθῆναι δὲ αὐτῷ τὸν Ἑρμῆν δεδωκέναι τούτους. ὡς μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ἐσομένους· καθάπερ παρ' Ἕλλησι ποιῆσαι φασὶν ἐν μὲν τῇ Κρήτῃ Μίνωα, παρὰ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις Λυκοῦργον· τὸν μὲν παρὰ Διὸς, τὸν δὲ παρ' Ἀπόλλωνος φήσαντα τούτους εἰληφέναι· καὶ παρ' ἑτέροις δὲ πλείοσιν ἔθνεσι παραδέδοται τοῦτο τὸ γένος τῆς ἐπινοίας ὑπάρξαι, καὶ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον γεν'σθαι τοῖς πεισθεῖσιν—εἴτε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ δύναμιν τῶν εὑρεῖν λεγομένων, τοὺς νόμους ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ὄχλον, μᾶλλον ὑπακούσεσθαι διαλαβόντας.—Lib. i. p. 59, edit. Steph. ‡ QUINTILIAN, lib. viii. cap. 6, p. 415, edit. Oxon. 1693, 4to, *De Tropis,* says that *Pastor Populi,* though used by Homer, is so POETICAL that he would not venture to use it in an oration: and ranks it with Virgil's—"Volucres pennis remigare." What could occasion so strange a piece of Criticism, but that when Quintilian wrote under the *Tyrants* of Rome, the People had lost the very idea of the *Kingly Office?* § Ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως, ἧττόν τε γὰρ φοβοῦνται, τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐὰν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φροντίζειν τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἧττον, ὡς συμμάχους ἔχοντι καὶ τοὺς θεούς.—*Politic.* lib. v. cap. 11, tom. iii. p. 547. D. E. edit. Paris. fol. 1639.

just nor unjust in actions; but by persuading them that the privilege of *divine right* exempted the Tyrant from all moral obligation. Hence may be seen the absurdity of *Hobbes's* scheme of Politics, who, for the sake of the Magistrate, was for eradicating Religion. But the ancients knew better; and so too did some of the moderns.*

The question then is, whether these pretensions of the ancient Lawgivers were feigned in *the first intention*, for the sake of Society or of Religion? For it is no question, but that what we here shew was contrived by the Magistrate for the service of Religion, was done *ultimately* for the sake of Civil Government. Or in other words, the question, I say, is, Whether this pretence to inspiration was made to establish a *civil* or a *religious* Society? If a *civil*; the ends aimed at must be the *reception of his policy*, or *provision for its perpetuity*. I speak not here of that third end, *the securing a veneration, for them, to posterity*; and for a good reason, because *this* is the very thing I contend for; such *veneration* being only to be procured by the influence of Religion; the peculiar mode of which, the pretended inspiration introduces. The ends then in question, are *reception for the policy*; *or* provision for the perpetual *duration* of it.

1. For the *reception*, there would be small need of this expedient. 1. Civil laws are seen by all to be so necessary for the well-being of every individual, that one can hardly conceive any need of the belief of divine command or extraordinary assistance to bring men to embrace a scheme for associating, or to manifest the right they have of so doing. *For* (as the great *Geographer* says) *Man was born with this inclination to associate. It is an appetite common both to* Greeks *and* Barbarians: *for, being by nature a civil animal, he lives readily under one common policy or law.*† Besides several of these Legislators gave laws to a *willing people*, on the strength of their personal character of virtue and wisdom; and were called upon to that office, in which nothing was wanting to beget the necessary veneration to him who discharged it. And though it might possibly have happened to a people to be so far sunk into brutality, as to be disinclined towards the recovery of a reasonable nature, like those with whom it is said *Orpheus* had to deal; who *(being* savages, *without the knowledge of morality or law)* reduced them into society, *by recommending to them piety to the Gods, and instructing them in the ways of superstition*: ‡ yet this was not the case of the generality of those with whom these Lawgivers were con-

* "Et non è cosa piu necessaria à parere d'havere che questa ultima qualita (religione) perche gli huomini in universale giudicano piu a gli occhi che alle mani, perché tocca à vedere a ciascuno a sentire à pochi."—MACHIAVEL *Del Principe*, cap. 18.

† Πέφυκε γὰρ οὕτω. Καὶ κοινόν ἐστι τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ τοῖς Βαρβάροις· Πολιτικοὶ γὰρ ὄντες, ἀπὸ προστάγματος κοινοῦ ζῶσιν.—STRABO, *Geogr.* lib. xvi. edit. Casaub. p. 524, lin. 16.

‡—Ὅτι θηριώδεις ὄντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ οὔτε ἔθη, οὔτε νόμους, εἰδότας εἰς δεισιδαιμονίαν ἀγαγὼν, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ εὐσεβεῖν παρακαλέσας.—HERACLITUS *De Incred.* cap. 23.

cerned: and therefore if we would assign a cause *of this pretence to revelation* as extensive as the fact, it must be that which is here given. But, 2dly, we find, that where Religion was previously settled, no inspiration was pretended. On this account neither *Draco* nor *Solon*, Lawgivers of Athens, laid claim to any: for they found Religion well secured by the institutions of *Triptolemus* and *Ion*. And we know, that, had *pretended inspiration* been only, or principally, for the easier introduction and reception of civil policy, the sanguinary laws of *Draco* had stood in more need of the sanction of a revelation, than any other of antiquity. Indeed, *Maximus Tyrius* goes so far as to say, that *Draco* and *Solon* prescribed nothing in their laws, concerning the Gods, and their worship;* which, if true, would make as much against us, on the other hand. But in this he is mistaken. *Porphyry* quotes an express law of *Draco's* concerning the mode of divine worship. *Let the Gods and our own country heroes be publicly worshipped, according to the established rites; when privately, according to every man's abilities, with terms of the greatest regard and reverence; with the first fruits of their labours, and with annual libations.*† *Andocides*‡ quotes another of *Solon*, which provides for the due and regular celebration of the ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES. *Athenæus* does the same. And how considerable a part these were of divine worship, and of what importance to the very essence of religion, we shall see hereafter.

2. As to *a provision for the perpetuity of national laws and institutions;* This entered not into the intention of the old *Greek* legislation; nor, if it had, could it have been obtained by giving them a divine original. Amongst the wild projects of the barbarous eastern policy, one might find, perhaps, something like a system of *immutable* laws; but the *Grecian* Lawgivers were too well acquainted with the nature of man, the genius of Society, and the vicissitude of human things, ever to conceive so ridiculous a design. Besides, the *Egyptian* legislation, from which they borrowed all their civil wisdom, went upon very different principles. It directed public laws to be occasionally accommodated to the variety of times, places, and manners. But had they aimed at perpetuity, the belief of a divine imposition would not have served the turn; for it never entered their heads, that civil institutes became irrevocable by their issuing from the mouth of a God; or that the divinity of the sanction altered the mutability of their

* Ποῦ γὰρ Ἀθηναίοις συνιέναι,—τὶ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον, πῶς δὲ τιμητέον; οὐ γὰρ τῷ κυάμῳ λαχόντες δίκασται χίλιοι ταῦτα ἐξετάζουσιν, οὐδὲ Σόλων τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν γέγραφεν, οὐδὲ οἱ Δράκοντος σεμνοὶ νόμοι.—Dissert. xxxix. p. 383, edit. Lugd. 1630, 8vo.

† Θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ Ἥρωας ἐγχωρίους ἐν κοινῷ, ἑπομένως νόμοις πατρίοις, ἰδία κατὰ δύναμιν σὺν εὐφημίᾳ καὶ ἀπαρχαῖς καρπῶν, καὶ πελάνοις ἐπετείοις.—*De Abst.* lib. iv. § 22, (edit. Cantabr. 1655, 8vo,) according to the emendations of Petit and Valentinus.—The law is thus introduced, Θεσμὸς αἰώνιος τοῖς Ἀτθίδα νεμομένοις, Κύριος τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον.

‡ Orat. Περὶ Μυστηρίων, apud decem Orat.

nature: the honour of this discovery is due to certain modern writers, who have found out that divine authority reduces all its commands to one and the same species. We have a notable instance of this in the conduct of *Lycurgus*. He was the only exception to the general method, and singular in the idle attempt of making his laws perpetual. For his whole system being forced and unnatural, the sense of that imperfection, it is probable, put him upon the expedient of tying them on an unwilling people. But then *he did not apply* divine authority to this purpose; for, though he pretended to inspiration like the rest, and had his revelations from *Apollo*, yet he well knew that the authority of *Apollo* would not be thought sufficient to change the nature of positive laws: and therefore he bound the People by an oath, to observe his policy till his return from a voyage, which he had determined beforehand never to bring to that period.

Having shewn that there was no need of a pretence to revelation, for the establishment of *civil Policy*, it follows, that it was made for the sake of *Religion*.

SECTION III.

THE SECOND step the Legislators took to propagate and establish *Religion*, was to make the general doctrine of a Providence (with which they prefaced and introduced their laws) the great sanction of their institutes. To this, *Plutarch*, in his tract against *Colotes* the *Epicurean*, refers, where he observes, that *Colotes himself praises it; that, in civil Institutes, the first and most important article is the belief of the Gods. And so it was* (says he) *that, with vows, oaths, divinations, and omens,* Lycurgus *sanctified the* Lacedemonians, Numa *the* Romans, *ancient* Ion *the* Athenians, *and* Deucalion *all the* Greeks *in general: And by* HOPES *and* FEARS *kept up amongst them the awe and reverence of religion.** On this practice was formed the precept of the celebrated *Archytas* the *Pythagorean;* which sect, as we shall see hereafter, gave itself up more professedly to legislation; and produced the most famous founders of civil policy. This Lawgiver, in the fragments of his work *de lege*, preserved by *Stobæus*, delivers himself in this manner: *The first law of the Constitution should be for the support of what relates to the Gods, the Dæmons and our Parents, and, in general, of whatsoever is good and venerable.*† And in this manner, if we may believe Antiquity, all their civil institutes were

* —Ἀλλὰ μὲν ἥς γε καὶ Κολώτης ἐπαινεῖ διατάξεως τῶν νόμων, πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἡ περὶ θεῶν δόξα, καὶ μέγιστον. ἣ καὶ Λυκοῦργος Λακεδαιμονίους, καὶ Νοῦμας Ῥωμαίους, καὶ Ἴων ὁ παλαιὸς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ Δευκαλίων Ἕλληνας ὁμοῦ τοι πάντας καθωσίωσαν εὐχαῖς, καὶ ὅρκοις, καὶ μαντεύμασι, καὶ φήμαις, ἐμπαθεῖς πρὸς τὰ θεῖα δι' ἐλπίδων ἅμα καὶ φόβων κατασταθέντες.—Edit. Francof. fol. 1599, p. 1225, D. † Δεῖ τὸν νόμον τὰ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ δαίμονας καὶ γονέας, καὶ ὅλως τὰ καλὰ καὶ τίμια πρῶτα τίθεσθαι.—STOB. *De Rep.* Serm. xli. p. 269, lin. 13, Tiguri, fol. 1599.

prefaced; its constant phrase being, when speaking of a Lawgiver, ΔΙΕΚΟΣΜΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΝ ΑΠΟ ΘΕΩΝ ΑΡΧΟΜΕΝΟΣ.

The only things of this kind now remaining, are the PREFACES to the laws of ZALEUCUS and CHARONDAS, Lawgivers of the *Locrians* and of the *Chalcidic* cities of Italy and Sicily, contemporaries with Lycurgus.* These, by good fortune, are preserved in Diodorus and Stobæus. A great Critic has indeed arraigned their authority; declared them spurious; and adjudged them for an imposture of the *Ptolemaic* Age.† And were it as he supposes, the fragments would be rather stronger to our purpose: for, in that case, we must needs conclude, the very learned SOPHISTS who forged them had copied from the general practice of antiquity: And that very learned they were, appears both from the excellence of the composition, and the age of the pretended composers. Whereas, if the fragments be genuine, they do not so directly prove the *universality*, as the *antiquity*, of the practice. But as my aim is truth, and truth seeming to bear hard against this learned Critic's determination, we must hold to the common opinion, and examine what hath been offered in discredit of it.

The universal current of antiquity runs in favour of these remains, and for the reality of their authors' legislative quality. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Tully, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch, the most learned and inquisitive writers of their several ages, declare for their being genuine. However, TIMÆUS thought fit to deny that *Zaleucus* had given laws to the *Locrians;* nay, that there was ever such a Lawgiver existing. We shall be the less surprised at this paradox, when we come to know the character and studies of the man: he was by profession an historian, but turned his talents to invent, to aggravate, and expose the faults and errors of all preceding writers of name and reputation. Polybius, Strabo, and Diodorus Siculus, three of the wisest and most candid historians of Greece, have concurred to draw him in the most odious colours. The first speaks of him in this manner: *How he came to be placed amongst the principal writers of history, I know not.—He deserves neither credit nor pardon of any one; having so manifestly trangressed all the rules of decency and decorum in his excessive calumnies, springing from an innate malignity of heart.*‡ This envious rabid temper, joined to a perversity of mind, delighting in contradiction, gained him the title of EPITIMÆUS, the CALUMNIATOR. And, what is a certain mark of a base and abject heart, he was as excessive in his flattery; as when he makes *Timoleon greater*

* ARISTOTELES, lib. ii. cap. 12, p. 449, edit. Du Val. † "Dissertation on the Epistles of Phalaris, with an Answer to the Objections of Mr. Boyle." ‡ Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐκφέρεται δόξαν, ὡς ἔλκων τὴν τούτου συγγραφέως προστασίαν,—Ἐκεῖνος δ' ἂν οὐκ εἰκότως τυγχάνοι συγγνώμης οὐδὲ πίστεως ὑπ' οὐδενὸς, διὰ τὸ προφανῶς ἐν ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἐκπίπτειν τοῦ καθήκοντος, διὰ τὸν ἔμφυτον πικρίαν.—Excerpt. ex lib. xii. Hist.

*than the greatest Gods.** He took so much pleasure in contradicting the most received truths, that he wrote a long treatise, with great fury and ill language, to prove that the bull of Phalaris was a mere fable. And yet Diodorus and Polybius, who tell us this, tell us likewise, that the very bull itself was existing in their time: To all which, he was so little solicitous about truth, that Suidas says, he was nicknamed ΓΡΑΟΣΥΛΛΕΚΤΡΙΑ, *a composer of old wives' fables. Polybius* informs us with what justice it was given him. *In censuring the faults of others, he puts on such an air of severity and confidence, as if he himself were exempt from failings, and stood in no need of indulgence. Yet are his own histories stuffed with dreams and prodigies, with the most wild and improbable fables. In short, full of old wives' wonders, and of the lowest and basest superstition.*† Agreeable to all this, Clemens Alexandrinus gives him as the very pattern of a fabulous and satyric writer. And he appeared in every respect of so ill a character to Mr. Bayle, that this excellent Critic did not scruple to say, that, "in all appearance, he had no better authority when he denied that *Zaleucus* had given laws to the *Locrians*."‡ To say all in a word, he was the OLDMIXON§ of the Greeks; and yet this is the man whom the learned writer hath thought fit to oppose to all antiquity, against *Zaleucus's* legislation and existence. It appears the more extraordinary, because he himself hath furnished his reader with a violent presumption against Timæus's authority, where he says, *That* Polybius *charges him with false representations relating to the* Locrians. He adds indeed, *that nothing is now extant that shews* Polybius *thought* Timæus *mistaken concerning* Zaleucus. But since Polybius quotes a law as a law of *Zaleucus*, it seems a proof, in so exact a writer, of his being well assured that, amongst Timæus's falsehoods concerning the *Locrians*, one was his denying *Zaleucus* to be their Lawgiver.

Timæus's reasons are not come down to us from Antiquity: But the fragments of Polybius,¶ mentioning his outrageous treatment of Aristotle concerning the origin of the *Locrians*, speak of one Echecrates a *Locrian*, from whom Timæus boasted he had received information on certain points in question: Hence the learned Critic, as it would seem, concludes this to have been a part of the *Locrian's* intelligence, *that there was no such man as Zaleucus.*** As if, because

* SUIDAS *in Timæo.* Τίμαιος δὲ μείζω ποιεῖν Τιμολέοντα τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων Θεῶν.
† Οὗτος γὰρ ἐν μὲν ταῖς τῶν πέλας κατηγορίαις πολλὴν ἐπιφαίνει δεινότητα καὶ τόλμαν· ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἰδίαις ἀποφάσεσιν ἐνυπνίων καὶ τεράτων καὶ μυθῶν ἀπιθάνων, καὶ συλλήβδην καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας ἀγεννοῦς καὶ τερατείας γυναικώδους ἐστὶ πλήρης.—Excerpt. de Virt. et Vit. ex lib. xii.
‡ "Et apparemment il ne fut pas mieux fondé, quand il nia que Zaleucus eût donné des loix à ce peuple [les Locriens]." Timée, Rem. F.
§ See "Clarendon and Whitlock compared."
‖ "Dissertation upon Phalaris," p. 337.
¶ Excerpta ex Polybio de Virt. et Vitiis, ex lib. xii.
** P. 336, "Dissertation upon Phalaris."

Timæus relied on Echecrates's information in the dispute between him and Aristotle, therefore Echecrates must, of necessity, support all his paradoxes concerning that people. But admit Echecrates to have been of the same opinion with Timæus, in this matter; Is he, who, for aught we know, might be as singular and as whimsical, in his love of contradiction, as Timæus himself, an evidence to be opposed to Cicero's? who tells us, that his Clients the *Locrians* had, in his time, a Tradition of *Zaleucus's* legislation.* And we may well presume, that Cicero, inquisitive, and even curious, as he was in matters of antiquity, would examine this point with care: and, had their archives reclaimed it, he had hardly thought it worth his while to mention their Tradition. But, says the learned Critic, *if* Echecrates, *in that age, did not believe there was any* Zaleucus, *he is certainly as credible as* Cicero's Locrians, *who came so many generations afterwards, after so many revolutions and changes in their Government.*† This reasoning has small force, because, from the same premisses, we may argue just the other way, and say, that if the Tradition kept its ground through all those changes and revolutions of State, it would seem to have had a very strong foundation.

The authority then of Timæus against the existence and legislation of *Zaleucus* in general, is of no weight. Let us next see what the learned Critic hath to urge against the authenticity of those laws which go under *Zaleucus's* name. His arguments are of two sorts: the one drawn from the *dialect*, and from the use of several *words*, which are indeed later than his time; the other, from *Zaleucus's* being no Pythagorean.

1. The *words* objected to, are these; Λεπτὰς καὶ παχείας—ἰσομιλήσιον—Κόσμον—Τραγῳδίαις. This, and the fragments being written in the *common dialect*, instead of the *Doric*, are, in the Critic's opinion, sufficient evidence of the forgery.

He has employed a deal of good‡ learning, to prove the *words* to be all later than the time of *Zaleucus*.

Let us see then the most that can be made of this sort of argument. And because it is the best approved, and readiest at hand, for the detection of forgery, and supposed by some not a little to affect the sacred writings themselves, we will enquire into its force in general.

It must be owned, that an instrument offered as the writing of any certain person, or age, which hath words or phrases posterior to its date, carries with it the decisive marks of forgery. A public Deed, or Diploma, so discredited, is lost for ever. And to such, was this canon of criticism first applied with great success. This encouraged

* *De Legibus*, lib. ii. cap. 6, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. iii. p. 141. † P. 336, "Dissertation upon Phalaris." ‡ From p. 346 to 356 of the "Dissertation."

following critics to try it on writings of another kind; and then, for want of a reasonable distinction, they began to make very wild work indeed. For though in compositions of *abstract speculation*, or of *mere fancy and amusement*, this touch might be applied with tolerable security, there being, for the most part, no occasion or temptation to alter the diction of such writings, especially in the ancient languages, which suffered small and slow change, because one sort of these works was only for the use of a few learned men; and the principal rarity, and often the beauty, of the other sort, consisted in the original phrase; yet in public and practical writings of Law and Religion, this would be found a very fallacious test: It was the matter only which was regarded here. And, as the matter respected the whole people, it was of importance that the words and phrases should be neither obscure, ambiguous, nor equivocal: This would necessitate alterations in the style, both as to words and phrases. Hence it appears to me, that the answer, which commentators give to the like objection against the PENTATEUCH, is founded in good sense, and fully justified by the solution here attempted. The Religion, Law, and History of the Jews were incorporated; and consequently, it was the concern of every one to understand the Scriptures. Nor doth the superstitious regard, well known to have been long paid to the *words*, and even *letters* of Scripture, at all weaken the force of this argument: for that superstition arose but from the time when the masoret doctors fixed the reading, and added the vowel points. I have taken the opportunity, the subject afforded me, to touch upon this matter, because it is the only argument of moment, urged by Spinosa, against the antiquity of the *Pentateuch;* on which antiquity the general argument of this work is supported.

The application of all this is very easy to the case in hand: The fragment of *Zaleucus* was part of a body of Laws, which the people were obliged to understand; so that a change of old words and obsolete phrases would be necessary: and to make *this* an argument against the antiquity of the fragment, would be the same good reasoning as to suppose, that the remains of the *Twelve Tables*, or the earlier laws in our common *Statute books*, were the forgeries of later times, because full of words unknown to the respective ages in which those laws were composed and enacted. But, indeed, the change of obscure words, or obsolete phrases, for others more clear and intelligible, was a common practice amongst the Pagan writers. Porphyry, making a collection of heathen oracles, professes to have given them just as he found them, without the least alteration; except, says he, changing an obscure word, now and then, for one more clear: a practice, which, for its fairness and frequency, he ranks with amending a corrupted

word, or reforming the metre.* But this licence was not confined to the Ancients; for, being encouraged by the reason of things, it was likely enough (as is, in fact, the case) that all times should afford examples of it. One of the editors of *Froissart*, speaking of his author's text, says, "touchant le stile, et ancienne maniere d'escrire de nostre auteur, je ne doute point qu'il n'ayt esté quelques autrefois changé et aucunement renouvellé selon les temps."† All the Editions of Jomville's life of St. Louis bear testimony to the same practice; which was so general that Pasquier says, "s'il y eut un bon livre composé par nos Ancêtres, lorsqu'il fut question de le transcrire, les Copistes le copioient non selon la naïfe langue de l'Auteur, ains selon la leur."‡

As to the change of *dialect*, the great Critic thus expresses himself: *The last argument I shall offer against the Laws of* Zaleucus, *is this, that the Preface of them which* Stobæus *has produced, is written in the common dialect, whereas, it ought to be in the* Doric, *for that was the language of the* Locri.—*The Laws of* Zaleucus *therefore are commentitious, because they are not in* Doric.§

What hath been said above will shew this argument to have small force; but it is urged with a peculiar ill grace by the learned Critic, who, in his *Dissertation upon Phalaris*, hath discovered, that Ocellus Lucanus wrote the treatise *Of the nature of the universe* in *Doric*:‖ and from thence rightly concludes, it ought *to be acknowledged for a genuine work, which hitherto learned men have doubted of, from this very business of its being writ in the* common *dialect. For we now see that every word of the true book is faithfully preserved; the* Doric *being only changed into the ordinary language, at the fancy of some copier.*¶ Now, surely, the rash suspicious of those *learned men* in the case of Ocellus Lucanus, should have made him more cautious in indulging his own. He should have concluded, if this liberty was taken with books of mere speculation, it was more likely to be indulged in works so necessary to be understood as a body of laws; especially when he had observed (after Porphyry) *that the* Doric *is always clouded with obscurity.***

Hence, doubtless, *trans-dialecting* was no rare practice. For, besides this instance of Ocellus Lucanus, we have another, in the poems going under the name of Orpheus: which, Jamblichus says, were written in the *Doric* dialect. But now the fragments of these

* Ἐπεὶ κἀγώ τι θεοὺς ματρύρομαι, ὡς οὐδὲν οὔτε προστέθεικα, οὔτε ἀφεῖλον τῶν χρησθέντων νοημάτων· εἰ μή που λέξιν ἡματρημένην διώρθωσα, ἢ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΣΑΦΕΣΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΕΤΑΒΕΒΛΗΚΑ, ἢ τὸ μετρὸν ἐλλεῖπον ἀνεπλήρωσα, ἤ τι τῶν μὴ πρὸς τὴν πρόθεσιν συντεινόντων διέγραψα.—PORPH. apud EUSEB. *Præp. Evang.* lib. iii. cap. 7.

† DENNIS SAUVAGE, Avertisement aux Lecteurs. ‡ *Recherches*, liv. viii. chap. 3.

§ P. 135 and 358. ‖ P. 47. ¶ P. 49. ** P. 317.

poems, left us by those who did not write in *Doric*, are in the common dialect. It is plain then, they have been *trans-dialected.*

2. The learned Critic's other argument for the imposture runs thus: *The Report of* Zaleucus *being a* Pythagorean, *was gathered from some passages in the system of laws ascribed to him, for where else could they meet with it? so that, if it can be proved he was more ancient than* Pythagoras, *this false story of his being a* Pythagorean *being taken from that system, must convict it of being a cheat.** He then proceeds to prove him more ancient than Pythagoras; which he does, on the whole, with great force of learning and reasoning, though his arguments are not all equally well chosen. As where he brings this for a proof that *Zaleucus* was no scholar of Pythagoras, "Because he ascribed all his laws to Minerva, from whom he pretended to receive them in dreams: which (in the learned Critic's opinion) has nothing of a Pythagorean in it. For Pythagoras's scholars ascribed every thing to their master: it was always αὐτὸς ἔφα with them, *he said it.* Therefore, if *Zaleucus* had been of that society, he would certainly have honoured his master, by imputing his laws to his instructions."† But this argument is of no weight: for, 1. From what has been said above of the genius of ancient legislation, it appears, that the general practice required, and the nature of the thing disposed the Lawgiver to ascribe his laws to the inspiration of some God. 2. As to the famous αὐτὸς ἔφα, it was not peculiar to the Pythagoreans, but common to all the sects of *Greece, jurare in verba magistri.* A device to keep them distinct and separate from each other; and a compendious way of arguing amongst those of the same school. It would then have been ridiculous to have urged its authority to any out of the sect; more so, to the common people; and most of all, to them, upon public and practical matters; the αὐτὸς ἔφα being used only in points of speculation, and in the schools of philosophy. Indeed, so unlucky is this argument, that, on the contrary, the reader will be apt to conclude, that this very circumstance of *Zaleucus's* ascribing his laws to Minerva, was one of the things that gave rise and credit to the report of his being a Pythagorean. And, doubtless, it would have much weight with those who did not carefully enough attend to the chronology. For *Zaleucus*, in this, might be thought to follow both the example and the precept of Pythagoras, who himself pretended to be inspired by Minerva; and taught it to his scholars as the most efficacious way of establishing civil justice, *to propagate the opinion of the Gods having an intimate intercourse with mankind.*‡

But notwithstanding the defect of this argument, the learned critic, as we said, proves his point with great clearness, that *Zaleucus*

* P. 337. † P. 338. ‡ See JAMBLICHUS's "Life of Pythagoras," p. 147, edit. Kust.

was earlier than Pythagoras: and, in conclusion, draws the inference above mentioned, in these terms: *It was generally reported* Zaleucus *was a* Pythagorean; *it is proved he was not. This will refute the book itself. For if any intimation was given in the book, that the author was a* Pythagorean, *the imposture is evident.* "*And yet it is hard to give any other reason, that should induce the later writers to call him a* Pythagorean." *Some impostor, therefore, made a system of laws under the name of* Zaleucus, *and in it gave a broad hint that he was a scholar of* Pythagoras.

Here he rests his point. *If, then, it be not hard to give another reason, that should induce the later writers to call him a Pythagorean,* his long discourse to prove *Zaleucus* the earlier of the two, is of no kind of use to convict the pretended laws of imposture. I have already hinted at another not improbable reason, which was his having the same inspiring Goddess with Pythagoras: And this will be much strengthened by the observation, that Minerva became the peculiar patroness of the Pythagorean Lawgivers, on account of the assistance she had given to their master. To which we may add these further circumstances, that the laws were in *Doric* (and supposing them genuine, they certainly were so) which idiom was peculiar to the Pythagoric school:* and, that the whole proem of *Zaleucus's* laws was formed agreeably to the precepts of Pythagoras in this matter; who directs, that, next after the worship of the Gods, *Dæmon*, and *Parent* worship should be enjoined.† Now, later writers, seeing these two visible marks of a Pythagorean, might, without further reflection, be reasonably disposed to think *Zaleucus* of that sect. But, as the learned critic has well made out, from sure chronological evidence, that this was a mistake, we must seek for some other cause of the uniformity between them; which I take to be this: *Zaleucus*, when Pythagoras flourished, was in the highest repute in Greece for legislation; which might incline this philosopher to imitate him, both in his inspiring Goddess, and in the proem of his laws: so that posterity only mistook the copy for the original. This they might very well do; for Pythagoras and his sect had soon engrossed all the glory in the practice of lawgiving: and this leads me to another probable cause of the common opinion of *Zaleucus's* being a Pythagorean: The character of this sect, as will be seen hereafter, was so great for legislation, that after-ages thought nothing could be done to purpose in that way, which had not a Pythagorean for its author. So, besides *Zaleucus*, the ancients supposed Charondas, Numa,‡ Zamolxis,§ Phytius, Theocles, Elicaon, Aris-

* See note B, at the end of this book. † Μετὰ δὲ τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, πλεῖστον ποιεῖσθαι λόγον γονέων.—JAMBLICHUS, *Vita Pythagor.* cap. xxx. p. 148.

‡ "Quinetiam arbitror propter *Pythagoreorum* admirationem, Numam quoque regem *Pythagoreum* a posterioribus existimatum."—TULLII *Tusc. Disp.* lib. iv. cap. 1, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. ii. p. 331.

§ HEROD. lib. iv. cap. 95, edit. Gale.

tocrates, nay the very DRUIDS,* the legislators of Gaul, and, in a word, all the eminent Lawgivers who lived any where about the time of Pythagoras, to be instructed by him. But will the learned Critic say, that, *therefore*, all these Legislators were imaginary persons, and did not give laws to their several cities? This notion, arising from Pythagoras's great character and reputation, was nursed up and improved by his followers themselves, to beget honour to their master; as, in fact, appears from several passages in Jamblichus's life of that Philosopher. So that was there no more in it than this; as *Zaleucus's* Institutions were in great repute, we might very naturally account for the mistake.

But, lastly, it is, indeed, very true, (as the learned Critic suspected) that the principal ground *of the report of* Zaleucus *being a* Pythagorean, *was from some passages in the system of laws ascribed to him.* He is only too hasty in his conclusion, that therefore *these must needs convict the system of a cheat.* What hurried him on, was his supposing, that no such *report could be gathered from passages in the system*, but such as must be *an intimation that the author was a Pythagorean:* and that there is no difference between *giving* and *taking* an intimation. If, then, this report might be gathered from passages which contained no *intimation*, and if the reader might understand that to be such which the writer never intended; the consequence will be, that the credit of these fragments will remain unshaken, though we grant the learned Critic his whole premises, and all the facts he contends for.

It seems, then, to be certain, that the report of *Zaleucus's* being a Pythagorean arose principally from a passage in his system of laws. And it was not difficult to discover what it was. *Zaleucus* in his preface speaks of an EVIL GENIUS or *Dæmon*, ΔΑΙΜΩΝ ΚΑΚΟΣ, as influencing men to wickedness. This, though a notion of the highest† antiquity, whose origin and author are much disputed, yet became at length the distinguishing doctrine of the Pythagoreans. Plutarch, speaking of Pythagoras's opinion of the first principle, says, that that philosopher called the *Monad*, God, and *Duad*, the EVIL GENIUS.‡ Which *Duad* the Pythagoreans used extremely to vilify, as the cause

* AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, lib. xv. cap. 9, p. 75, edit. Gronov. fol. 1693.

† Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πρεσβυτέρους εἶναι (Μάγους) τῶν Αἰγυπτίων· καὶ δύο κατ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀρχὰς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα, καὶ ΚΑΚΟΝ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ.—DIOG. LAERT. *Vit. Phil.* Proœm. seg. 8, edit. Amstel. 1692. 4to. Οὐκ οἶδα μὴ τῶν ΠΑΝΥ ΠΑΛΑΙΩΝ τῶν ἀποπώτατον ἀναγκασθῶμεν προσδέχεσθαι λόγον ὡς τὰ φαῦλα δαιμόνια καὶ βάσκανα, προσφθονοῦντα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ἀνιστάμενα, παραχὰς καὶ φόβους ἐπάγει, σείοντα καὶ σφάλλοντα τὴν ἀρετήν· ὡς μὴ διαμείναντες ἀπτῶτες ἐν τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀκέραιοι, βελτίονος ἐκείνων μοίρας μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν τύχωσιν.—PLUTARCHI *Vita Dionis*, in initio.

‡ Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν μονάδα θεὸν, καὶ τ' ἀγαθὸν ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς· τὴν δ' ἀόριστον δυάδα, ΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ, καὶ τὸ ΚΑΚΟΝ, περὶ ἣν ἐστι τὸ ὑλικὸν πλῆθος.—*De Plac. Phil.* lib. i. cap. 7, p. 1624, E. S. (Tom. ii. p. 881, D. edit. Francof. 1599. fol.)

of all evil, under the name of the BAD PRINCIPLE, as Plutarch would make us believe.* The application of this doctrine I suppose Pythagoras might borrow from *Zaleucus*, and here again posterity be mistaken only in the original author. However, we may collect from the same Plutarch, that that opinion was cultivated by all the ancient Lawgivers. For this learned man, who favoured the notion of TWO PRINCIPLES, the one good, the other evil, affects, I observe, to draw every ancient writer, who but mentions an *evil dæmon*, into his own sect. In his treatise of Isis and Osiris, he speaks to this purpose, "That it was a most ancient opinion, delivered as well by LAWGIVERS as Divines, that the world was neither made by Chance, neither did one Cause govern all things, without opposition." †

This notion therefore, delivered in the proem of *Zaleucus's* law, might be very well *taken* for an *intimation of the author's being a* Pythagorean, and yet, not being so *given*, it has not the least tendency to discredit the compilation.

On the whole then, I presume, it appears, that the credit of these remains stands unshaken by any thing the learned Critic has advanced to the contrary; and that we may safely produce them as of the antiquity they lay claim to.

Thus *Zaleucus* begins his preface: "Every inhabitant, whether of town or country, should first of all be firmly persuaded of the being and existence of the Gods: which belief he will be readily induced to entertain, when he contemplates the heavens, regards the world, and observes the disposition, order, and harmony of the universe; which can neither be the work of blind chance, nor of man. These Gods are to be worshipped as the cause of all the real good we enjoy. Every one therefore should so purify, and possess his mind, as to have it clear of all kinds of evil; being persuaded that God is not honoured by a wicked person, nor acceptably served, like miserable man, with sumptuous ceremonies, or taken with costly sacrifices, but with Virtue only, and a constant disposition to good and just actions. On which account, every one should labour all he can to become good, both in practice and principle, whereby he will render himself dear and acceptable to God; should fear more that which leads to ignominy and dis-

* Οἱ μὲν Πυθαγορικοὶ διὰ πλειόνων ὀνομάτων κατηγοροῦσι, τοῦ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἓν πεπερασμένον, τὸ μένον, τὸ εὐθὺ, τὸ περισσὸν, τὸ τετράγωνον, τὸ δεξιὸν, τὸ λαμπρὸν· τοῦ δὲ ΚΑΚΟΥ, τὴν ΔΥΑΔΑ, τὸ ἄπειρον, τὸ φερόμενον, τὸ καμπύλον, τὸ ἄρτιον, τὸ ἑτερόμηκες, τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ ἀριστερὸν, τὸ σκοτεινόν· ὥστε ταύτας ἀρχὰς γενέσεως ὑποκειμένας.—Περὶ ΙΣ. καὶ ΟΣΙΡ. p. 660, St. ed. I suppose the reason, why Δυὰς was amongst the ill names said to be given by the Pythagoreans, to the *bad principle*, was, because, in their superstitious designations of the various qualities of numbers, this Δυὰς is very heavily loaded. Ὅτι ἡ μὲν ΜΟΝΑΣ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα καὶ τὸ μέτρον λαμβάνεται· ἡ δὲ Δυὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν.—Anon. *De Vita Pythag.* apud PHOTIUM, edit. Hœschelii, fol. 1612, pag. 1314.

† Διὸ καὶ παμπάλαιος αὕτη κάτεισιν ἐκ Θεολόγων καὶ ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΩΝ—ὡς οὔτ' ἄνουν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀκυβέρνητον αἰωρεῖται τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ πᾶν, οὔτε εἷς ἐστιν ὁ κρατῶν καὶ κατευθύνων, ὥσπερ οἴαξιν ἤ τισι πειθηνίοις χαλινοῖς λόγος.—PLUTARCHUS *De* Isσ. *et* Osιρ. p. 658.

honour, than that which leads to loss of wealth and fortune; and esteem him the best Citizen, who gives up his worldly goods, rather than renounce his honesty and love of justice: But those, whose headstrong appetites will not suffer them to be restrained within the limits of these things, and whose hearts are turned with a natural bias towards evil, whether they be men or women, citizens or sojourners, should be told, to have the Gods always in mind, to think upon their nature, and of the judgments they have in store for wicked men; to *set before themselves the dreadful hour of death*, a period they must all arrive at; *when the memory of evil actions past will seize the sinner with remorse, accompanied with the fruitless wish, that he had submitted his actions to the rules of justice.* Every one, therefore, should so watch over his behaviour, *as if that hour were still present with him*, and attended all his motions: which will be the way to keep up in himself an exact regard to right and justice. BUT IF THE WICKED DEMON BE INSTANT TO INFLUENCE HIM TO EVIL, let him fly to the altars and temples of the Gods, as the surest asylum from that cruelest and wickedest of tyrants, EVIL, and implore their assistance to drive her far from him. To this end, let him also have recourse to those, whose reputations are high for probity and virtue; * whom he may hear discourse of the happiness of good, and the vengeance attending evil men." †

One would wonder, that any man, who had attentively considered this admirable fragment, could think it the forgery of a Sophist. It

* Meaning the men set apart for the service of religion, such as Virgil describes in his Elysium, *Æneid.* lib. vi. p. 265, l. 21, edit. Venet. 8vo, 1638.

"Quique sacerdotes casti, dum vita manebat;
Quique pii vates et Phœbo digna locuti."

Which not only shews the Legislator's sense of their use, but of the necessity of their practising what they teach to others.

† Τοὺς κατοικοῦντας τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χάραν, πάντας πρῶτον πεπεῖσθαι χρὴ, καὶ νομίζειν θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ ἀναβλέποντας ἐς οὐρανὸν, καὶ τὸν κόσμον, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς διακόσμησιν, καὶ τάξιν· οὐ γὰρ τύχης, οὐδ' ἀνθρώπων εἶναι δημιουργήματα· σέβεσθαι δὲ τούτους καὶ τιμᾶν, ὡς αἰτίους ὄντας ἁπάντων ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν, τῶν κατὰ λόγον γιγνομένων. Ἕκαστον οὖν ἔχειν καὶ παρασκευάζειν δεῖ τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχὴν, πάντων τῶν κακῶν καθαράν· ὡς οὐ τιμάται θεὸς ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου φαύλου, οὐδὲ θεραπεύεται δαπάναις, οὐδὲ τραγῳδίαις τῶν ἀλισκομένων, καθάπερ μοχθηρὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἀρετῇ καὶ προαιρέσει τῶν καλῶν ἔργων καὶ δικαίων. Διὸ ἕκαστον δεῖ εἰς δύναμιν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καὶ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸν μέλλοντα ἕσεσθαι θεοφιλῆ· καὶ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὰς εἰς χρήματα ζημίας μᾶλλον τῶν εἰς αἰσχύνην τεινόντων· καὶ πολίτην ἀμείνονα ὀνομάζειν τὸν τὴν οὐσίαν προιέμενον μᾶλλον τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου· ὅσοις δὲ μὴ ῥᾴδιον πρὸς ταῦτα τὴν ὁρμὴν πεπεῖσθαι, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἔχουσιν εὐκίνητον πρὸς ἀδικίαν, ὡδ' ἡμῖν παρηγγέλθω· πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις πολίταις, καὶ πολίτισι, καὶ ξενοίκοις μεμνῆσθαι θεῶν ὡς ὄντων, καὶ δίκας ἐπιπεμπόντων τοῖς ἀδίκοις, καὶ τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀμμάτων τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον, ἐν ᾧ γίνεται τὸ τέλος ἑκάστῳ τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ ζῆν· πᾶσι γὰρ ἐμπίπτει μεταμέλεια τοῖς μέλλουσι τελευτᾶν, μεμνημένοις ὧν ἀδικήκασι, καὶ ὁρμὴ τοῦ βούλεσθαι πάντα πεπράχθαι δικαίως αὐτοῖς· Διὸ δεῖ ἕκαστον παρ' ἑκάστην πράξιν ἀεὶ συνοικειοῦν τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον, ὡς δὴ παρόντα· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ δικαίου φροντιεῖν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ παραστῇ ΔΑΙΜΩΝ ΚΑΚΟΣ τρέπων πρὸς ἀδικίαν διατρίβειν πρὸς ναοῖς καὶ βωμοῖς καὶ τεμένεσι, φεύγοντα τὴν ἀδικίαν ὡς δέσποιναν ἀσεβεστάτην καὶ χαλεπωτάτην ἱκετεύοντα τοὺς θεοὺς συναποτρέπειν αὐτήν· ἰέναι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας δόξαν ἔχοντας ἐπ' ἀνδραγαθίᾳ ἀκουσόμενος περὶ εὐδαίμονος βίου, καὶ κακῶν ἀνδρῶν τιμωρίας ἵνα ἀποτρέπῃ τῶν ἀδίκων ἔργων.— Apud STOBÆUM, Serm. xlii. p. 279, lin. 13, Tiguri, fol. 1559.

is plain, the author of it understood human nature and society at another rate. He hath not only given us an exact portrait of natural Religion; but, in applying it to the State, hath explained the use and subserviency of its parts to the three great classes of mankind. He hath recommended the intrinsic excellence of virtue, and compliance with the *Will* and example of the Gods, to those who are of so ingenuous and well-framed a nature as to be always disposed to embrace truth and right: to others, of a less heroic turn of mind, such who idolize their *honour*, he holds out fame and ignominy, as the inseparable attendants of good and evil actions: and, to the common run of more intractable and perverse tempers, he preaches up the doctrine of *future rewards and punishments*.* I will only observe, it appears to have been from hence, that POMPONATIUS borrowed the beautiful passage, which is quoted at large, in the first book of this discourse.

Thus ZALEUCUS. And much in the same fashion does CHARONDAS introduce his Laws.

In imitation of the practice, PLATO likewise, and CICERO, both preface their *Laws* with the sanctions of Religion. And though these two great men were not, strictly speaking, Lawgivers in form; yet we are not to suppose that what they wrote in this science, was like the dreams of the Sophists, for the amusement of the idle and curious. They were both well practised in affairs, and deeply conversant in human nature; and they formed their speculative Institutes on the plan, and in the spirit and views of ancient legislation: the foundation of Plato's being the *Attic Laws;* and the foundation of Cicero's, the *Twelve Tables:* who himself takes care to warn us of this particular. "In imitation of Plato, the most learned, and, at the same time, the wisest of the philosophers, who wrote best† of a republic, and likewise, separately, of the laws thereof, I think it will be proper, before I give the law itself,‡ to say somewhat in recommendation of

* See note C, at the end of this book. † I read here, with Turnebus, *qui princeps de rep. conscripsit.* Lambin objects to this reading, because we gather from Aristotle, that *Plato was not the first who wrote of a republic;* he supposing *princeps* signified *primus*, whereas it means *optimus*. This was Tully's opinion of Plato, as may be gathered from many places in his writings. And in this sense, Turnebus, without doubt, understood the word; a sense familiar to his author, as *in Ver.* lib. iv. cap. 49, "in qua [*Patria*] multis virtutibus et beneficiis floruit PRINCEPS." But the word *primus* itself is sometimes used in *this* sense of *princeps;* as in Virgil,

"Prima quod ad Trojam"———

‡ "Ut priusquam ipsam *legem* recitem, de ejus legis *laude* dicam." This passage is not without its difficulty. If by LEX be meant the whole system of his laws, which the tenor of the discourse leads one to suppose; then, by LAUS, the *recommendation* of it, we are to understand his shewing, as he does in the following chapter, that the Gods interested themselves very much in the observance of civil laws; which implies, that they were indeed their laws: and so Tully calls them, in the 4th chapter of this book: "Ita principem legem illam, et ultimam, mentem esse dicebant, omnia ratione aut cogentis, aut vetantis Dei; ex qua illa lex quam Dii humano generi dederunt, recte est LAUDATA." And the shewing that civil laws came originally from the Gods, was the highest recommendation of them. But if by LEX we are to understand only the *first*

it: which, I observe, was the method of Zaleucus and Charondas. For their system of laws was not an exercise of wit, or designed for the amusement of the indolent and curious, but composed for the use of the public in their several cities. *These, Plato imitated;* as thinking this likewise to be the business of Law; to gain somewhat of its end by the gentler methods of persuasion, and not carry every thing by mere force and fear of punishment." *

Here, we see, he intimates, that Plato and himself had the same view, in writing laws, with Zaleucus and Charondas: namely, the service of a Public. The difference between them was, that the two Originals were employed by their country; and the two Copiests generously undertook an office they were not called to.

However, Plato and Cicero are the greatest authorities antiquity could afford, and the most deserving to be heard in this matter. Plato makes it the necessary introduction to his laws, to establish the *being and providence of the Gods* by a law against SACRILEGE. And he explains what he means by *sacrilege*, in the following words: "Either the denial of the being of the Gods; or, if that be owned, the denial of their providence over men; or, thirdly, the teaching, that they are flexible, and easy to be cajoled by prayer and sacrifice." † And afterwards; "It is not of small consequence, that what we here reason about the Gods, should, by all means, be made probable; as, that they ARE; and, that they are GOOD; and that their concern for justice takes place of all other human considerations. For this, in our opinion, seems to be the noblest and best PREFACE that can be made to a body of laws." ‡ In compliance with this declaration, Cicero's *Preface* to his laws, is conceived in the following terms: "Let our citizen then be first of all firmly persuaded of the government and dominion of the Gods; that they are the lords and masters of the world; that all things are disposed by their power, direction, and providence; and that the whole race of mankind is in the highest manner indebted to them; that they are intimately acquainted with every one's state and condition; that they know

law of the system, which begins, "Ad Divos adeunto caste," &c. then by LAUS is meant his shewing, as he does likewise in the following chapter, the use and service of religion to civil society.

* "Sed, ut vir doctissimus fecit Plato, atque idem gravissimus philosophorum omnium, qui princeps de republica conscripsit, idemque separatim de legibus ejus, id mihi credo esse faciendum; ut priusquam ipsam legem recitem, de ejus legis laude dicam. Quod idem et Zaleucum et Charondam fecisse video; cum quidem illi non studii et delectationis, sed reipublicæ causa leges civitatibus suis scripserunt. Quos imitatus Plato, videlicet hoc quoque legis putavit esse, persuadere aliquid, non omnia vi ac minis cogere."—*De Legibus*, lib. ii. cap. 6, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. iii. p. 141. † Ἀλλὰ ἓν δή τι τῶν τριῶν πάσχων, ἢ τοῦτο οὐχ ἡγούμενος, ἢ τὸ δεύτερον ὄντας, οὐ φροντίζειν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τρίτον, εὐπαραμυθήτους εἶναι, θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς παραγομένους.—*De Legibus*, lib. x. p. 885, B. tom. ii. edit. H. Steph. fol. ‡ Διαφέρει δ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἀμωσγέπως πιθανότητά τινα τοὺς λόγους ἡμῶν ἔχειν, ὡς θεοί τ' εἰσι, καὶ ἀγαθοί, δίκην τιμῶντες διαφερόντως ἀνθρώπων· σχεδὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τῶν νομῶν κάλλιστόν τε καὶ ἄριστον προοίμιον ἂν εἴη.—Idem, *ibid.*

what he does, what he thinks; with what disposition of mind, and with what degree of piety he performs the acts and offices of religion; and that, accordingly, they make a distinction between the good and bad. The mind being imbued with these opinions, will never deviate from TRUTH and UTILITY. And what *truth* is more evident than this, that no one should be so stupidly arrogant, as to suppose, there is Mind and Reason in himself, and yet none in the Heavens and the World; or, that those things, whose uses and directions can scarce be comprehended with the utmost stretch of human faculties, may yet perform their motions without an understanding Ruler? But, He whom the courses of the heavenly bodies, the vicissitudes of day and night, the orderly temperature of the seasons, and the various blessings which the earth pours out for our sustenance and pleasure, will not excite, nay compel to gratitude, is unfit even to be reckoned in the number of men. And since things endowed with reason, are more excellent than those which want it; and that it is impiety to say, any particular is more excellent than the universal Nature; we must needs confess this Nature to be endowed with reason. That these opinions are likewise *useful*, who can deny, when he considers what stability is derived to the Public from within, by the religion of an oath; and what security it enjoys from without, by those holy rites which affirm national treaties and conventions: how efficacious the fear of divine punishment is, to deter men from wickedness; and what purity of manners must reign in that Society, where the immortal Gods themselves are believed to interpose both as judges and witnesses? Here you have the PROEM of the law: for so Plato calls it."*

And then follow the laws themselves; the first of which is conceived in these words: "Let those who approach the Gods, be pure and undefiled; let their offerings be seasoned with piety, and all ostentation of pomp omitted: the God himself will be his own

* "Sit igitur jam hoc a principio persuasum civibus, dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores Deos, eaque quæ gerantur, eorum geri ditione, ac numine, eosdemque optime de genere hominum mereri; et qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pietate colat religiones, intueri; piorumque et impiorum habere rationem. His enim rebus imbutæ mentes, haud sane abhorrebunt ab utili, et a vera sententia. Quid est enim verius, quàm neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se rationem et mentem putet inesse, in cœlo mundoque non putet? aut ut ea, quæ vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putet? Quem vero astrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque vicissitudines, quem mensium temperatio, quemque ea, quæ gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum esse cogant, hunc hominem omnino numerari qui decet? Cumque omnia, quæ rationem habent, præstent iis, quæ sint rationis expertia, nefasque sit dicere, ullam rem præstare naturæ omnium rerum: rationem inesse in ea confitendum est. Utiles esse autem opiniones has, quis neget, cum intelligat, quàm multa firmentur jurejurando, quantæ salutis sint fœderum religiones, quàm multos divini supplicii metus a scelere revocarit; quàmque sancta sit societas civium inter ipsos, Diis immortalibus interpositis tum judicibus tum testibus. Habes legis procemium; sic enim hoc appellat Plato."—*De Legibus*, lib. ii. cap. 7, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. iii. p. 141, 142.

avenger on transgressors. Let the Gods, and those who were ever reckoned in the number of Celestials, be worshipped; and those likewise, whom their merits have raised to heaven; such as HERCULES, BACCHUS, ÆSCULAPIUS, CASTOR, POLLUX, and ROMULUS. And let chapels be erected in honour to those qualities, by whose aid mortals arrive thither, such as REASON, VIRTUE, PIETY, and GOOD-FAITH."*

SECTION IV.

THE NEXT step the Legislator took, was to support and affirm the general doctrine of a PROVIDENCE, which he had delivered in his laws, by a very circumstantial and popular method of inculcating the belief of a *future state of rewards and punishments.*

This was by the institution of the MYSTERIES, the most sacred part of pagan Religion; and artfully framed to strike deeply and forcibly into the minds and imaginations of the people.

I propose, therefore, to give a full and distinct account of this whole matter: and the rather, because it is a thing little known or attended to: the Ancients, who wrote expressly on the *Mysteries*, such as Melanthius, Menander, Hicesius, Sotades, and others, not being come down to us. So that the modern writers on this subject are altogether in the dark concerning their origine and end; not excepting Meursius himself: to whom, however, I am much indebted, for abridging my labour in the search of those passages of antiquity, which make mention of the ELEUSINIAN *Mysteries*, and for bringing the greater part of them together under one view.†

To avoid ambiguity, it will be proper to explain the term. Each of the *pagan* Gods had (besides the *public* and *open*) a *secret worship*‡ paid unto him: to which none were admitted but those who had been selected by preparatory ceremonies, called INITIATION. This *secret worship* was termed the MYSTERIES.

But though every God had, besides his *open* worship, the *secret* likewise; yet this latter did not *every where* attend the former; but only *there*, where he was the patron God, or in principal esteem. Thus, when in consequence of that intercommunity of paganism, which will be explained hereafter, one nation adopted the Gods of

* "Ad divos adeunto castè; pietatem adhibento; opes amovento. Qui secus faxit, Deus ipse vindex erit.—Divos, et eos qui cœlestes semper habiti, colunto: et ollos, quos endo cœlo merita vocaverint, Herculem, Liberum, Æsculapium, Castorem, Pollucem, Quirinum. Ast olla, propter quæ datur homini adscensus in cœlum, mentem, virtutem, pietatem, fidem, earumque laudum delubra sunto."—*De Legibus*, lib. ii. cap. 8, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. iii. p. 142, 143. † *Eleusinia: sive de Cereris Eleusinæ Sacro.*

‡ STRABO, in his tenth book of his "Geography," p. 716, Gron. ed. writes thus: Κοινὸν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐστὶ, τὸ τὰς ἱεροποιίας μετὰ ἀνέσεως ἑορταστικῆς ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς μὲν σὺν ἐνθουσιασμῷ, τὰς δὲ χωρὶς· καὶ ταῖς μὲν μετὰ μουσικῆς, τὰς δὲ μή· ΚΑΙ ΤΑΣ ΜΕΝ ΜΥΣΤΙΚΩΣ, ΤΑΣ ΔΕ ΕΝ ΦΑΝΕΡΩι· καὶ τοῦθ' ἡ φύσις οὕτως ὑπαγορεύει.

another, they did not always take in at the same time, the *secret worship* or *Mysteries* of that God: so, in Rome, the public and open worship of Bacchus was in use long before his *Mysteries* were admitted. But, on the other hand again, the worship of the strange God was sometimes introduced only for the sake of his *Mysteries*: as, in the same city, that of Isis and Osiris. Thus stood the case in general; the particular exceptions to it, will be seen in the sequel of this dissertation.

The first and original *Mysteries*, of which we have any sure account, were those of Isis and Osiris in EGYPT; from whence they were derived to the GREEKS,* under the presidency of various Gods,† as the institutor thought most for his purpose: Zoroaster brought them into Persia: Cadmus and Inachus into Greece at large: ‡ Orpheus into Thrace; Melampus into Argis; Trophonius into Bœotia; Minos into Crete; Cinyras into Cyprus; and Erechtheus into Athens. And as in Egypt they were to Isis and Osiris; so in Asia they were to Mithras; in Samothrace to the Mother of the Gods; in Bœotia to Bacchus; in Cyprus to Venus; in Crete to Jupiter; in Athens to Ceres and Proserpine; in Amphissa to Castor and Pollux; in Lemnos to Vulcan, and so to others, in other places, the number of which is incredible.§

But their end, as well as nature, was the same in all; to teach the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE. In this, Origen and Celsus agree; the

* DIODORUS SICULUS, lib. i. Eudoxus said, as Plutarch informs us, that the Egyptians invented this fable concerning Jupiter Ammon, or the Supreme God,—That his Legs being unseparated, very shame drove him into solitude; but that Isis split and divided them, and by that means set him at liberty to walk about the World. Φησὶ περὶ τοῦ Διὸς ὁ Εὔδοξος, μυθολογεῖν Αἰγυπτίους, ὡς τῶν σκελῶν συμπεφυκότων αὐτῷ μὴ δυνάμενος βαδίζειν, ὑπ' αἰσχύνης, ἐρημίᾳ διέτριβεν. Ἡ δὲ Ἴσις διατεμοῦσα καὶ διαστήσασα τὰ μέρη ταῦτα τοῦ σώματος, ἀρτίποδα, τὴν πορείαν παρέσχει.—*De Is. et Osir.* vol. i. p. 670, edit. Steph. 8vo. The moral of the fable is plainly this, as we shall see more plainly hereafter, That the FIRST CAUSE was kept unknown, till the Egyptian *Mysteries* of Isis revealed him amongst their ἀπόῤῥητα· which *Mysteries* were communicated to the Greeks, and, through them, to the rest of mankind. But the Image under which the fable is conveyed, was taken from the form of the Egyptian Statues of the Gods, which the workmen made with their Legs undivided. When the Greek Artists first shewed them how to form their Gods in a walking Posture, the attitude so alarmed their Worshippers, that they bound them with Chains, lest they should desert their own Country. For the People imagined that their Gods, on the least ill humour or disgust, had a strange propensity to shew them a fair pair of heels.

† Ὅτι δὲ τῶν Διονυσίων, καὶ τῶν Παναθηναίων, καὶ μέντοι τῶν Θεσμοφορίων, καὶ τῶν Ἐλευσινίων τὰς τελετὰς Ὀρφεὺς, ἀνὴρ Ὀδρύσης, εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐκόμισεν, καὶ εἰς ΑΙΓΥΠΤΟΝ ἀφικόμενος, τὰ τῆς Ἴσιδος καὶ τοῦ Ὀσίριδος εἰς τὰ τῆς Δηοῦς καὶ τοῦ Διονύσου μετατέθεικεν ὄργια.—THEODORETUS, *Therapeut.* i.

‡ Ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔσχε τὰ παρ' Ἕλλησι μυστήριά τε καὶ τελεταί· πρότερον παρ' ΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΟΙΣ, καὶ παρὰ Φρυξὶ, καὶ Φοινιξὶ, καὶ Βαβυλονίοις, κακῶς ἐπινενοημένα μετενεχθέντά τε εἰς Ἕλληνας ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΩΝ χώρας ὑπὸ Κάδμου καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἰνάκου. Ἄπιδος πρότερον κληθέντος, καὶ οἰκοδομήσαντος τὴν Μέμφιν.—EPIPHANIUS *Adv. Hær.* lib. i. Hæres. iv.

§ "Postulat quidem magnitudo materiæ, atque ipsius defensionis officium, ut similiter cæteras turpitudinum species persequamur: vel quas produnt antiquitatis historiæ, vel mysteria illa continent sacra, quibus initiis nomen est, et quæ non omnibus vulgo, sed paucorum taciturnitatibus tradi licet. Sed *Sacrorum innumeri ritus*, atque affixa deformitas singulis, corporaliter prohibet universa nos exequi."—ARNOBIUS *Adv. Gentes*, lib. v. p. 165, edit. Plantini, 8vo, 1582.

two most learned writers of their several parties. The first, minding his adversary of the difference between the *future life* promised by the Gospel, and that taught in Paganism, bids him compare the Christian doctrine with what all the sects of Philosophy, and all the *Mysteries*, amongst Greeks and Barbarians, taught concerning it:* And Celsus, in his turn, endeavouring to shew that christianity had no advantage over paganism in the efficacy of stronger sanctions, expresses himself to this purpose: "But now, after all, just as you believe eternal punishments, so do the Ministers of the sacred rites, and those who initiate into, and preside in the *Mysteries*."†

They continued long in religious reverence: some were more famous and more extensive than others; to which many accidents concurred. The most noted were the ORPHIC, the BACCHIC, the ELEUSINIAN, the SAMOTHRACIAN, the CABIRIC, and the MITHRIAC.

Euripides makes Bacchus say, in his tragedy of that name,‡ that the *Orgies* were celebrated by all foreign nations, and that he came to introduce them amongst the Greeks. And it is not improbable, but several barbarous nations might have learned them of the Egyptians long before they came into Greece. The Druids of Britain, who had, as well as the Brachmans of India, divers of their religious rites from thence, celebrated the *Orgies* of Bacchus, as we learn from Dionysius the African. And Strabo having quoted Artemidorus for a fabulous story, subjoins, "But what he says of Ceres and Proserpine is more credible, namely, that there is an island near Britain, where they perform the same rites to those two Goddesses as are used in Samothrace."§ But, of all the MYSTERIES, those which bore that name, by way of eminence, the ELEUSINIAN, celebrated at Athens in honour of Ceres, were by far the most renowned; and, in course of time, eclipsed, and almost swallowed up the rest. Their neighbours round about very early practised these *Mysteries* to the neglect of their own: in a little time all Greece and Asia Minor were initiated into them: and at length they spread over the whole Roman empire, and even beyond the limits of it. "I insist not," says Tully, "on those sacred and august rites of ELEUSIS, where, from the remotest regions, men came to be initiated."‖ And we are told in Zosimus,

* —Καθ' ἑκάστην φιλοσόφων αἵρεσιν ἐν Ἕλλησιν ἢ Βάρβαροις ἢ ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΩΔΗ.—ORIGEN. *Contra Cels.* lib. iii. p. 160, Sp. ed. † Μάλιστα μέν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὥσπερ σὺ κολάσεις αἰωνίους νομίζεις· οὕτω καὶ οἱ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐκείνων ἐξηγηταὶ τελεσταί τε καὶ μυσταγωγοί.—Lib. viii. p. 408. And that nothing very heterodox was taught in the mysteries concerning a future state, I collect from the answer Origen makes to Celsus, who had preferred what was taught in the Mysteries of Bacchus on that point, to what the Christian Religion revealed concerning it—Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν Βακχικῶν τελετῶν εἴτε τίς ἐστι ταύτας λόγος, εἴτε μηδεὶς τοιοῦτος.—Lib. iv. p. 167. ‡ Act. ii. § Περὶ δὲ τῆς Δήμητρος καὶ τῆς κόρης ταύτης ἱστότερα· ὅτι φησὶν εἶναι νῆσον πρὸς τῇ Βρεττανικῇ, καθ' ἣν ὁμοια τοῖς ἐν Σαμοθράκῃ περὶ τὴν Δήμητραν καὶ τὴν Κόρην ἱεροποιεῖται.—STRABONIS *Geogr.* lib. iv. p. 137, lin. 26, edit. Casaub. The nature of these Samothracian rites is explained afterwards. ‖ "Omitto ELEUSINAM sanctam illam et augustam: ubi initiantur gentes orarum ultimæ."—*Nat. Deor.* lib. i. c. 42, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. ii. p. 432.

that "these most holy rites were then so extensive, as to take in the whole race of mankind."* Aristides calls Eleusis, *the common temple of the earth.*† And Pausanias says, the rites performed there for the promotion of piety and virtue, as much excelled all other rites, as the Gods excelled the Heroes.‡

How this happened, the nature and turn of the People, who introduced these *Mysteries,* will account for. Athens was a city the most devoted to Religion of any upon the face of the earth. On this account their poet Sophocles calls it *the sacred building of the Gods,*§ his figure of speech alluding to its fabulous foundation. Nor was it a less compliment St. Paul intended to pay the Athenians, when he said, Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κατὰ πάντα ὡς δεισιδαιμονεστέρους ὑμᾶς θεωρῶ.‖ And Josephus tells us, that *they were universally esteemed the most religious people of Greece.*¶ Hence, in these matters, Athens became the pattern and standard to the rest of the world.

In discoursing, therefore, of the MYSTERIES in general, we shall be forced to take our ideas of them chiefly from what we find practised in the *Eleusinian.* Nor need we fear to be mistaken; the END of all being the same, and all having their common ORIGINAL from Egypt.

To begin with the general purpose and design of their Institution. This will be understood, by shewing what they *communicated* promiscuously to all.

To support the doctrine of a PROVIDENCE, which, they taught, governed the world,** they inforced the belief of a FUTURE STATE of rewards and punishments,†† by every sort of contrivance. But as this did not quite clear up the intricate ways of Providence, they added the doctrine of a METEMPSYCHOSIS, or the belief of a *prior state:* as we learn from Cicero, and Porphyry;‡‡ the latter of whom informs us, that it was taught in the *Mysteries* of the Persian Mithras. This was an ingenious solution, invented by the Egyptian Lawgivers, to remove all doubts concerning the moral attributes of God;§§ and so,

* Τὰ συνέχοντα τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος ἁγιώτατα μυστήρια.—Lib. iv. † Ὅστις οὐ κοινόν τι τῆς γῆς τέμενος τὴν Ἐλευσῖνα ἡγεῖτο.—ARISTIDIS *Eleusinia,* in initio. ‡ Οἱ γὰρ ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων τελετὴν τὴν Ἐλευσινίαν πάντων ὁπόσα ἐς εὐσέβειαν ἥκει, τοσούτῳ ἦγον ἐντιμότεραν, ὅσῳ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπιπροσθὲν ἡρώων.—*Phocica,* lib. x. cap. 31, p. 876. In this elegant similitude he seems plainly to allude to the *secret* of the *mysteries;* which, as we shall see, consisted in an explanation of the *origin of hero-worship,* and the *nature of the deity.* § *Electra,* act. ii. sc. i. ΑΘΗΝΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΘΕΟΔΜΗΤΩΝ. ‖ Acta Apostol. xvii. 22. ¶ —Εὐσεβεστάτους τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἅπαντες λέγουσιν.—*Contra Apion.* lib. ii. tom. ii. edit. Oxon. folio, 1720, cap. 15, p. 1373, lin. 12. ** PLUTARCH. *De Is. et Osir.* †† "[Mysteriis] neque solum," &c.—"Sed etiam cum SPE MELIORE MORIENDI."—TULLIUS *De Legibus,* lib. ii. cap. 14, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. iii. p. 148. ‡‡ Καὶ γὰρ δόγμα πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν πρώτων, τὴν ΜΕΤΕΜΨΥΧΩΣΙΝ εἶναι· ὃ καὶ ἐμφαίνειν ἐοίκασιν ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Μίθρα μυστηρίοις.—*De Abst.* lib. iv. § 16, edit. Cantabr. 1655, 8vo. §§ So TULLY. "Ex quibus humanæ vitæ erroribus et ærumnis sit, ut interdum veteres illi sive vates, sive in sacris INITIISQUE tradendis divinæ mentis interpretes, qui nos ob aliqua scelera suscepta in vitâ superiore, pœnarum luendarum caussa, natos esse dixerunt, aliquid vidisse videantur." *Fragm. ex Lib. de Philosophia.*

by adding a *prior* to a *future state*, to establish the firm belief of his Providence. For the Lawgiver well knew how precarious that belief was, while the moral attributes of God remained doubtful and uncertain.

In cultivating the doctrine of a *future life*, it was taught, that the *Initiated* should be happier in that state than all other mortals: that while the souls of the profane, at their leaving the body, stuck fast in mire and filth, and remained in darkness, the souls of the *Initiated* winged their flight directly to the happy islands, and the habitations of the Gods.* This doctrine was as necessary for the support of the *Mysteries*, as the *Mysteries* were for the support of the doctrine. But now, lest it should be mistaken, that *initiation* alone, or any other means than a virtuous life, intitled men to this future happiness, the *Mysteries* openly proclaimed it as their chief business, to restore the soul to its original purity. "It was the end and design of *initiation*," says Plato, "to restore the soul to that state, from whence it fell, as from its native seat of perfection."† They contrived that every thing should tend to shew the necessity of virtue; as appears from Epictetus. "Thus the *Mysteries* become useful; thus we seize the true spirit of them; when we begin to apprehend that every thing therein was instituted by the Ancients, for instruction and amendment of life."‡ Porphyry gives us some of those moral precepts, which were inforced in the Mysteries, as *to honour their parents, to offer up fruits to the Gods, and to forbear cruelty towards animals.*§ For the accomplishment of this purpose, it was required in the *Aspirant* to the Mysteries, that he should be of a clear and unblemished Character, and free even from the suspicion of any notorious crime. To come at the truth of his Character, he was severely interrogated by the Priest or Hierophant, impressing on him the same sense of obligation to conceal nothing, as is now done at the Roman Confessional.¶ Hence it was, that when Nero, after the

* PLATO *in Phædone*, p. 69, C, p. 81, A, tom. i. edit. Henr. Stephani.—ARISTIDES, *Eleusinia*, tom. i. p. 454, edit. Canteri, 8vo, et apud Stobæum, Serm. 119, &c.—SCHOL. ARIST. *in Ranis*.—DIOG. LAERT. *in Vita Diog. Cynici*. † Σκοπὸς τῶν τελετῶν ἐστιν, εἰς τέλος ἀναγαγεῖν τὰς ψυχὰς ἐκεῖνο ἀφ' οὗ τὴν πρώτην ἐποιήσαντο κάθοδον, ὡς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς.—*In Phadone*. ‡ Οὕτως ὠφέλιμα γίνεται τὰ μυστήρια· οὕτως εἰς φαντασίαν ἐρχόμεθα· ὅτι ἐπὶ παιδίᾳ καὶ ἐπανορθώσει τοῦ βίου κατεστάθη πάντα ταῦτα ἀπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν.—*Apud* ARRIAN. *Dissert.* lib. iii. cap. 21. My reason for translating εἰς φαντασίαν, in this manner, was, because I imagined the author, in this obscure expression, alluded to the custom in the Mysteries of calling those who were initiated only in the lesser, Μύσται· but those, in the greater, Ἐπόπται. § Γονεῖς τιμᾶν, Θεοὺς καρποῖς ἀγάλλειν. ζῶα μὴ σίνεσθαι.—*De Abst.* lib. iv. § 22, edit. Cant. 1655, 8vo. ‖ Οὗτοι γὰρ τά τ' ἄλλα καθαροῖς εἶναι τοῖς μύσταις ἐν κοινῷ προαγορεύουσιν, οἷον τὰς χεῖρας τὴν ψυχὴν--εἶναι.—LIBANIUS, Decl. xix. p. 495, D. edit. Morelli, fol. 1606. ¶ As appears from the repartee which Plutarch records, in his Laconic apophthegms of Lysander, edit. Francof. 1599, tom. ii. p. 229, D. when he went to be initiated into the Samothracian mysteries: Ἐν δὲ Σαμοθρᾴκῃ χρηστηριαζομένῳ αὐτῷ ὁ ἱερεὺς ἐκέλευσεν εἰπεῖν ὅ, τι ἀνομώτατον ἔργον αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ πέπρακται; πότερον οὖν σοῦ τοῦτο κελεύσαντος ἢ τῶν θεῶν, τοῦτο δεῖ ποιεῖν; ἐπηρώτησε. Φαμενὸν δὲ, Τῶν θεῶν, Σὺ τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἐκποδὼν μὲν κατάστηθι, κἀκείνοις ἐρῶ ἐὰν

murder of his mother, took a journey into Greece, and had a mind to be present at the celebration of the *Eleusinian Mysteries*, the conscience of his parricide deterred him from attempting it.* On the same account, the good emperor M. Antoninus, when he would purge himself to the world of the death of Avidius Cassius, chose to be initiated into the *Eleusinian Mysteries*;† it being notorious, that none were admitted into them, who laboured under the just suspicion of any heinous immorality. And Philostratus tells us, that Apollonius was desirous of being initiated in these *Mysteries*; but that the Hierophant refused to admit him, because he esteemed the Aspirant to be no better than a Magician: for the *Eleusinian* stood open to none who did not approach the Gods with a pure and holy worship.‡ This was, originally, an indispensable condition of *initiation*, observed in common, by all the Mysteries; and instituted by Bacchus, or Osiris himself, the first inventer of them; who, as Diodorus tells us, initiated none but pious and virtuous men.§ During the *celebration* of the Mysteries, they were enjoined the greatest sanctity, and highest elevation of mind. "When you sacrifice or pray" (says Epictetus in Arrian) "go with a prepared purity of mind, and with dispositions so previously ordered, as are required of you when you approach the ancient *rites and Mysteries*."‖ And Proclus tells us that the Mysteries and the Initiations drew the souls of men from a material, sensual, and merely human life, and joined them in *communion* with the Gods.¶ Nor was a less degree of purity required of the Initiated for their *future* conduct.** They were obliged by solemn engagements to commence a new life of strictest piety and virtue; into which they were entered by a severe course of penance, proper to purge the mind of its natural defilements. Gregory Nazianzen tells us, that "no one could be initiated into the *Mysteries of Mithras*, till he had undergone all sorts of mortifying trials, and had approved himself holy and impassible."†† The consideration of all this made Tertullian say, that, in the *Mysteries*, "Truth herself took on every shape, to oppose

πυνθάνωνται.—Why initiation into these Mysteries is called, enquiring of the oracle, will be seen afterwards.

* "Peregrinatione quidem Græciæ, Eleusiniis sacris, quorum initiatione impii et scelerati voce præconis submoverentur, interesse non ausus est."—SUETONIUS, *Vita Neronis*, cap. 34, § 12, edit. Pitisci. † JUL. CAPIT. *Vita Ant.*; PHIL. and DION CASS. ‡ Ὁ δὲ ἱεροφάντης οὐκ ἐβούλετο παρέχειν τὰ ἱερὰ, μὴ γὰρ ἄν ποτε μυῆσαι γόητα, μὴ δὲ τὴν Ἐλευσῖνα ἀνοῖξαι ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ καθαρῷ τὰ Δαιμόνια.—*De Vita Apollonii Tyanensis*, lib. iv. cap. 18, edit. Olearii, fol. § —Καταδείξαι δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς, καὶ μεταδοῦναι τῶν μυστηρίων τοῖς εὐσεβέσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δίκαιον βίον ἀσκοῦσι.—Lib. iii. p. 138, St. ed. ‖ Καὶ μετὰ θυσίας δὲ, καὶ μετ' εὐχῶν, καὶ προηγνευκότα, καὶ προδιακείμενον τῇ γνώμῃ, ὅτι ἱεροῖς προσελεύσεται καὶ ἱεροῖς παλαιοῖς.—ARRIANI *Dissert.* lib. iii. cap. 21. ¶ Τά τε μυστήρια καὶ τὰς τελετὰς ἀνάγειν μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνύλου καὶ θνητοειδοῦς ζωῆς τὰς ψυχὰς, καὶ συνάπτειν τοῖς θεοῖς.—*In Remp. Plat.* lib. i. ** Καὶ τῶν μυστηρίων ἀξιωθεὶς ἐδεόμην καὶ τῆς παρ' ὑμῶν ἀρίστης παιδεύσεως.—*Quidam apud* SOPATRUM, *in Div. Quæst.* †† Οὐδεὶς δὲ δύνασθαι τελεῖσθαι τὰς τοῦ Μίτρου τελετὰς, εἰ μὴ διὰ πασῶν τῶν καλάσεων παρέλθοι, καὶ δείξει ἑαυτὸν ἀπαθῆ καὶ ὅσιον.—1 *Orat. cont. Julian.*

and combat Truth."* And St. Austin, "That the devil hurried away deluded souls to their destruction, when he promised to *purify* them by those ceremonies, called INITIATIONS."†

The *initiated*, under this discipline, and with these promises, were esteemed the only happy amongst men. Aristophanes, who speaks the sense of the people, makes them exult and triumph after this manner: "On us only does the sun dispense his blessings; we only receive pleasure from his beams: we, who are *initiated*, and perform towards citizens and strangers all acts of piety and justice." ‡ And Sophocles, to the same purpose, "LIFE, only is to be had there: all other places are full of misery and evil."§ "Happy" (says Euripides) "is the man who hath been initiated into the greater *Mysteries*, and leads a life of piety and religion." || And the longer any one had been *initiated*, the more honourable was he deemed.¶ It was even scandalous not to be initiated: and however virtuous the person otherwise appeared, he became suspicious to the people: As was the case of Socrates, and, in after-times, of Demonax.** No wonder, then, if the superior advantages of the *Initiated*, both here and hereafter, should make the *Mysteries* universally aspired to. And, indeed, they soon grew as comprehensive in the numbers they embraced, as in the regions and countries to which they extended: men, women, and children ran to be initiated. Thus Apuleius†† describes the state of the Mysteries even in his time: "Influunt turbæ, sacris divinis initiatæ, viri fœminæque, omnis ætatis et omnis dignitatis." The Pagans, we see, seemed to think *initiation* as necessary, as the Christians did *baptism*. And the custom of initiating children appears from a passage of Terence,‡‡ to have been general.

> "Ferietur alio munere, ubi hera pepererit;
> Porro autem alio, ubi erit puero natalis dies,
> Ubi INITIABUNT."

Nay they had even the same superstition in the administration of it, which some Christians had of Baptism, to defer it till the

* "Omnia adversus veritatem de ipsa veritate constructa sunt."—*Apol.* cap. 47.
† "Diabolum—animas deceptas illusasque præcipitasse—quum polliceretur purgationem animæ per eas, quas ΤΕΛΕΤΑΣ appellant."—*De Trinitate*, lib. iv. cap. 10.
‡ Μόνοις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἥλιος
Καὶ φέγγος ἱλαρόν ἐστιν,
Ὅσοι μεμυήμεθ', εὐ-
σεβῆ τε διήγομεν
Τρόπον, περί τε ξένους
Καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας.—Chorus in *Ranis*, act. i. in fine.
§ Τοῖς δὲ μόνοις ἐκεῖ
Ζῆν ἐστι· τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πανθ' ἑκεῖ κακά.
|| Ὦ μάκαρ ὅστις εὐδαίμων τελετὰς θεῶν
Εἰδὼς, βιοτὰν ἁγιστεύει.—*Bacch.*
¶ Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀρτιτελὴς μύστης ἀτιμότερος τοῦ πάλαι μύστου.—ARISTIDES *in Orat. Περὶ Παραφθέγματος.* ** LUCIAN. *Vit. Dem.* tom. ii. p. 374, et seq., edit. Reitzii, 4to, Amstel. 1743. †† *Met.* lib. xi. p. 959, edit. Lugd. 1587, 8vo. ‡‡ *Phorm.* act. i. sc. i. And Donatus, on the place, tells us, the same custom prevailed in the Samothracian mysteries: "Terentius Apollodorum sequitur, apud quem legitur, in insula Samothracum a certo tempore pueros initiari, more Atheniensium."

approach of death; so the honest farmer Trygæus, in the *Pax* of Aristophanes:

Δεῖ γὰρ μυηθῆναί με πρὶν τεθνηκέναι.

The occasion of this solicitude is told us by the scholiast on the *Ranæ* of the same poet. "The Athenians believed, that he who was initiated, and instructed in the *Mysteries*, would obtain celestial honour after death: and THEREFORE all ran to be initiated." * Their fondness for it became so great, that at such times as the public Treasury was low, the Magistrates could have recourse to the *Mysteries*, as a fund to supply the exigencies of the State. "Aristogiton" (says the commentator on Hermogenes) "in a great scarcity of public money, procured a law, that in Athens every one should pay a certain sum for his *initiation*."†

Every thing in these rites was mysteriously conducted, and under the most solemn obligations to secrecy.‡ Which how it could agree to our representation of the *Mysteries*, as an institution for the use of the people, we shall now endeavour to explain.

They were hidden and kept secret for two reasons:

I. Nothing excites our curiosity like that which retires from our observation, and seems to forbid our search. Of this opinion we find the learned Synesius, where he says, "The people will despise what is easy and intelligible, and therefore they must always be provided with something wonderful and mysterious in Religion, to hit their taste, and stimulate their curiosity."§ And again, "The ignorance of the mysteries preserves their veneration: for which reason they are entrusted only to the cover of night."‖ "The veil or mist" (says Clemens Alex.) "through which things are only *permitted to be seen*, renders the truths contained under it more venerable and majestic."¶ On these principles the *Mysteries* were framed. They were kept secret, to excite curiosity: They were celebrated in the night, to

* Λόγος γὰρ ἐκράτει παρ' Ἀθηναίοις, ὡς ὁ τὰ μυστήρια διδαχθεὶς, μετὰ τὴν ἐνθένδε τελευτὴν θείας ἠξιοῦτο τιμῆς· διὸ καὶ πάντες πρὸς τὴν μύησιν ἔσπευδον. † Ἀριστογείτων ἐν σπάνει χρημάτων, γράφει νόμον, παρ' Ἀθηναίοις μισθοῦ μυεῖσθαι.—SYRIANUS. ‡ "Cum ignotis hominibus Orpheus sacrorum ceremonias aperiret, nihil aliud ab his quos initiabat in primo vestibulo nisi jurisjurandi necessitatem, et cum terribili quadam auctoritate religionis, exegit, ne profanis auribus inventæ ac compositæ religionis secreta proderentur."—FIRMICUS in limine lib. vii. *Astronom.* "Nota sunt hæc Græcæ superstitionis Hierophantis, quibus inviolabili lege interdictum erat, ne hæc atque hujusmodi Mysteria apud eos, qui his sacris minimè initiati essent, evulgarent."—NICETAS in GREGORII NAZIANZENI Orat. Εἰς τὰ Ἅγια Φῶτα. This obligation of the initiated to secrecy was the reason that the *Egyptian hieroglyphic* for them, was a grass-hopper, which was supposed to have no mouth. See HORAPOLLO, *Hieroglyph.* lib. ii. cap. 55, edit. Pauw, 1727, 4to. § Τὸ δὲ ῥᾷστον καταγελάσεται ὁ δῆμος· δεῖται γὰρ τερατείας. To the same purpose, NICEPHORUS GREGORAS, *Hist.* lib. v. p. 72, edit. Basil. fol. 1562. Τὰ γὰρ τοῖς πᾶσι πρόχειρα κόρον τε ἔσχε, καὶ ἀχρηστία σφίσιν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ περικέχυται. ‖ Ἀγνωσία σεμνότης ἐστὶ τελετῶν· καὶ νὺξ τοῦτο πιστεύεται τὰ μυστήρια.—Libro *De Providentia.* ¶ Ἄλλως τε καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα διὰ τίνος παρακαλύμματος ὑποφαίνεται, μείζονά τε καὶ σεμνοτέραν δείκνυσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν.—*Strom.* lib. v. p. 419, lin. 3, edit. Sylburgh.

impress veneration and religious horror: * And they were performed with variety of shews and representations (of which more hereafter) to fix and perpetuate these impressions.† Hitherto, then, the *Mysteries* are to be considered as invented, not to *deter*, but to *invite* the curiosity of the people. But,

II. They were kept secret from a necessity of teaching the Initiated some things, improper to be communicated to ALL. The learned Varro in a fragment of his book *Of Religions*, preserved by St. Augustin, tells us, that "There were many truths, which it was inconvenient for the State to be generally known; and many things, which, though false, it was expedient the People should believe; and that therefore the Greeks shut up their MYSTERIES in the silence of their sacred inclosures."‡

Now to reconcile this seeming contradiction, in supposing the *Mysteries* to be instituted to invite the People into them, and, at the same time, to keep them from the People's knowledge, we are to observe, that in the *Eleusinian rites* there were two celebrations of the Mysteries, the GREATER and the LESS.§ The end of the *less* must be referred to what we said of the Institutor's intention to invite the people into them; and of the *greater*, to his intention of keeping some truths from the people's knowledge. Nor is this said without sufficient warrant: Antiquity is very express for this distinction. We are told that the *lesser Mysteries* were only a kind of preparatory purification for the *Greater*,‖ and might be easily communicated to all.¶ That four years** was the usual time of probation for those *greater* Mysteries; in which (as Clemens Alexandrinus expressly informs us) the SECRETS were deposited.††

However, as it is very certain, that both the *greater* and *lesser* Mysteries were instituted for the benefit of the State, it follows, that the DOCTRINES taught in both, were equally for the service of Society; only with this difference; some without inconvenience might be taught promiscuously, others could not.

On the whole, the secret in the *lesser* Mysteries was principally

* Euripides, in the Bacchantes, act ii. makes Bacchus say, that the orgies were celebrated in the night, because darkness has something solemn and august in it, and proper to fill the mind with sacred horror. † Διὸ καὶ τὰ μυστήρια ἐν ΑΛΛΗΓΟΡΙΑΙΣ λέγεται, ὡρὸς ἔκπληξιν καὶ φρίκην, ὥσπερ ἐν ΣΚΟΤΩι, καὶ ΝΥΚΤΙ· ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀλληγορία τῷ σκότῳ καὶ τῇ νυκτί.—DEMET. PHALEREUS *De Elocutione*, § 110. ‡ "Multa esse vera, quæ vulgo scire non sit utile; multaque, quæ, tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat. Et ideo Græcos TELETAS ac MYSTERIA taciturnitate parietibusque clausisse."—*Civ. Dei*, lib. iv. cap. 31. § Ἦσαν τὰ μὲν μεγάλα τῆς Δήμητρος· τὰ δὲ μικρὰ Περσεφόνης τῆς αὐτῆς θυγατρός.—INTERP. GRÆC. ad *Plut.* ARISTOPHANIS. ‖ Ἔστι τὰ μικρὰ ὥσπερ προκάθαρσις καὶ προάγνευσις τῶν μεγάλων.—SCHOL. ad *Plut.* secund. ARISTOPH. ¶ Ἐπενόησαν μυστήρια εὐμετάδοτα.—SCHOL. ARISTOPH. ** —Cùm epoptas ante quinquennium instituunt, ut opinionem suspendio cognitionis ædificent.—TERTUL. *Adv. Valentinianos*, in initio. †† Μετὰ ταῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια, διδασκαλίας τινὰ ὑπόθεσιν ἔχοντα, καὶ προπαρασκευὴς τῶν μελλόντων· τὰ δὲ μεγάλα περὶ τῶν συμπάντων οὐ μανθάνειν ἔτι ὑπολείπεται, ἐποπτεύειν δὲ, καὶ περινοεῖν τήν τε φύσιν, καὶ τὰ πράγματα.—*Strom.* v. p. 424, C. edit. Sylburgii.

contained in some hidden *rites and shews* to be kept from the open view of the people, only to invite their curiosity: And the secret in the *greater*, some hidden *doctrines* to be kept from the people's knowledge, for the very contrary purpose. For the *Shews* common both to the *greater* and *lesser mysteries*, were only designed to engage the attention, and raise their devotion.

But it may be worth while to enquire more particularly into the HIDDEN DOCTRINES of the *greater* Mysteries: for so religiously was the secret kept, that the thing seems still to lie involved in darkness. We shall, therefore, proceed cautiously: and try, from the obscure hints dropped up and down in antiquity,

"Pandere res alta terra et caligine mersas."

First, as to the general nature of these *hidden doctrines*, it appears, they must needs be such which, if promiscuously taught, would bring prejudice to the State; Why else were they secreted? and, at the same time, benefit, if communicated with caution and prudence; Why else were they taught at all?

From their general nature, we come by degrees to their particular. And first,

I. To the certain knowledge of what they were not: which is one step to the knowledge of what they were.

1. They were not the common doctrines of a Providence and future state; for ancient testimony is express, that these doctrines were taught promiscuously to all the initiated; and were of the very essence of these Rites—These doctrines were not capable of being hid and secreted, because they were of universal credit amongst the civilized part of mankind. There was no need to hide them; because the common knowledge of them was so far from being detrimental to Society, that, as we have shewn, Society could not even subsist without their being generally known and believed.

2. These secret doctrines could not be the metaphysical speculations of the Philosophers concerning the *Deity*, and the *human soul*. 1. Because this would be making the *hidden doctrines* of the *schools* of Philosophy, and of the *mysteries* of Religion, one and the same; which they could not be, because their ends were different: the end of pagan Philosophy being only Truth; the end of pagan Religion, only Utility. These indeed were their professed ends. But Both being ignorant of this important verity, *That Truth and general Utility do coincide*,* they Both, in many cases, missed shamefully of their end. The Philosopher, while he neglected *utility*, falling into the most absurd and fatal errors concerning the nature of God and of the Soul: † And the Lawgiver, while so little solicitous of *truth*, encouraged a Polytheism very mischievous to Society. However, as we shall now see, he invented

* See book iii. sect. 2. † See book iii. sect. 4.

and successfully employed these *Mysteries* to remedy the disorders arising from it.—2. Because revealing such metaphysical speculations to the members of civil Society, with what caution soever, would be injurious to the State, and productive of no good to Religion; as will be seen when we come, in the third book, to examine what those metaphysical speculations were.—3. Because such speculations (as we shall then see) would overthrow every thing taught to ALL, in the *Mysteries*, concerning a Providence, and a future state: And yet we are told by the Ancients, that the doctrines of a Providence, and future state, were the FOUNDATION of the more *secret* ones, after which we are now enquiring.

I have been the more particular in refuting this notion, that the secret doctrines of the *Schools*, and of the *Mysteries* might be the same; because I find it to be an error, into which some, even of the most knowing of the Ancients, were apt to fall. What misled them, was, 1. That the *Schools* and *Mysteries* both pretended *to restore the soul to its original purity and perfection*. We have seen how much the *Mysteries* pretended to it. As to the Philosophers, Porphyry, speaking of Pythagoras, tells us, that "he professed philosophy, whose end is to free and vindicate the soul from those chains and confinements, to which its abode with us hath made it subject."* 2. That the Schools and Mysteries had each their *hidden* doctrines, which went under the common name of ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ; and that, which had a common name, was understood to have a common nature. 3. And chiefly, that the Philosopher and Lawgiver, being frequently in one and the same person, and, consequently, the Institutions of the *Mysteries* and the Schools established by the same hand, it appeared reasonable to think, that the ἀπόῤῥητα, in both, were the same; they not distinguishing the twofold character of the ancient Sage, which shall be explained hereafter.†

II. Having, from the discovery of the general end and purpose of these SECRETS, seen what they could not be, we shall now be enabled to find what, in fact, they were.

To begin with a passage of Clemens Alexandrinus.—"After these" (namely, lustrations) "are the LESSER *Mysteries*, in which is laid the FOUNDATION of the *hidden doctrines*, and preparations for what is to come afterwards."‡ From a knowledge of the *foundation*, we may be able to form an idea of the *superstructure*. This foundation (as hath been shewn) was the belief of a Providence, and future state; and, its

* Φιλοσοφίαν δ' ἐφιλοσόφησεν, ἧς ὁ σκοπὸς, ῥύσασθαι καὶ διελευθερῶσαι τῶν τοιούτων εἱργμῶν τε καὶ συνδέσμων τὸν κατακεχωρισμένον ἡμῖν νοῦν.—*De Vita Pythag.* edit. Cantabr. 1655, 8vo, p. 201. † See book iii. sect. 2. ‡ Μετὰ ταῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια, διδασκαλίας τινὰ ὑπόθεσιν ἔχοντα, καὶ προπαρασκευὴς τῶν μελλόντων.—*Strom.* v. p. 424. Ἀγὼν γὰρ καὶ ὁ προάγων, καὶ μυστήρια τὰ πρὸ μυστηρίων.—*Strom.* i. p. 203, lin. 7, edit. Sylburgh.

consequence on practice, inducement to a virtuous life. But there was one insuperable obstacle to a life of purity and holiness, the vicious examples of their Gods. EGO HOMUNCIO HOC NON FACEREM? * was the absolving Formula, whenever any one was resolved to give a loose to his appetites.† But the mischief went still farther; They not only thought themselves excused by the example, but even drawn, by a divine impulse of their Gods. When the young man in the Aulularia of Plautus apologises to Euclio for having debauched his Daughter, he says,

"Deus mihi IMPULSOR fuit, Is me ad illam ILLEXIT." ‡

And by a passage in his Amphitruo, where he makes Mercury joke upon the office of a Parasite in the description he gives of his own obsequiousness to his father Jupiter, we see it was grown up into an avowed Principle:

"Amanti [patri] supparasitor, hortor, asto, admoneo, gaudeo.
Siquid patri volup' est, voluptas ea mihi multo maxima est.
Amat, sapit: recte facit, animo quando obsequitur suo." §

He then addresses himself to the audience, and tells them gravely, that men, in like manner, after the example of Jupiter, should indulge their passions, where they can do it decently.—

"Quod omnes homines facere OPORTET, dum id modo fiat bono."

And the licentious rites, in the OPEN worship of their Gods, gave still greater encouragement to these conclusions. Plato, in his book *Of Laws*, forbids drinking to excess: unless, says he, during the feasts of Bacchus, and in honour of that God.‖ And Aristotle, in his *Politics*, having blamed all lewd and obscene images and pictures, excepts those of the Gods, which Religion had sanctified. When St. Austin ¶ had quoted the *Ego homuncio hoc non facerem*, to shew his adversaries what mischief these stories did to the morals of the people; he makes the defenders of Paganism reply, that it was true; but then (say they) these things were only taught in the Fables of the poets, which, an attention to the MYSTERIES would rectify: "At enim non traduntur ista SACRIS deorum, sed Fabulis poetarum." **

* TERENCE, *Eun.* act. iii. sc. 6.—Euripides puts this argument into the mouth of several of his speakers, up and down his tragedies. Helen, in the fourth act of the Trojan Dames, says, "How could I resist a Goddess, whom Jupiter himself obeys?" Ion, in his play of that name, in the latter end of the first act, speaks to the same purpose: and in the fifth act of Hercules Furens, Theseus comforts his friend by the examples of the crimes of the Gods. See likewise his Hippolytus, act ii. sc. 2. The learned and ingenious Mr. Seward, in his tract of *the Conformity between Popery and Paganism*, has taken notice of a difficult passage in this tragedy, which he has very ably explained, on the system here delivered of the detection of Polytheism in the sacred *Mysteries*.

† —Ὁ δὲ πολὺς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφητος ὄχλος ἐπὶ τὰ χείρω λαμβάνειν φιλεῖ τοὺς περὶ αὐτῶν λόγους, καὶ πάσχει θάτερον, ἢ καταφρονεῖν τῶν θεῶν, ὡς ἐν πολλῇ κακοδαιμονίᾳ κυλινδουμένων· ἢ τῶν αἰσχίστων τε καὶ παρανομωτάτων οὐδενὸς ἀπέχεται, θεοῖς ὁρῶν αὐτὰ προσκείμενα.—DION. HALICAR. apud EUSEBII *Præp. Evang.* lib. ii. cap. 8.

‡ Act. iv. sc. 10. § Act. iii. sc. 4. ‖ Lib. vi. ¶ *Civ. Dei*, lib. ii. cap. 7, in fine, et 8, in initio. ** This the *Father* could not deny; but observes, however, that in the THEN *corrupt state* of the *Mysteries* the remedy was become part of the disease: "Nolo dicere ILLA MYSTICA quam ista *theatrica* esse turpiora."

For the *Mysteries* professed to exact nothing difficult, of the initiated,* which they would not assist him to perform. It was necessary, then, to remedy this evil; which they did, by striking at the root of it. So that, such of the *Initiated* as were judged capable, were made acquainted with the whole delusion. The MYSTAGOGUE taught them, that Jupiter, Mercury, Bacchus, Venus, Mars, and the whole rabble of licentious Deities, were only DEAD MORTALS; subject, in life, to the same passions and infirmities with themselves; but having been, on other accounts, Benefactors to mankind, grateful Posterity had deified them; and, with their virtues, had indiscreetly canonized their vices. The fabulous Gods being thus routed, the supreme cause of all things naturally took their place. HIM they were taught to consider as the Creator of the Universe, who pervaded all things by his virtue, and governed all by his power. But here it must be observed, that the discovery of this *supreme Cause* they made to be consistent with the notion of local tutelary Deities, Beings superior to men, and inferior to God, and by him set over the several parts of his creation. This was an opinion universally holden by learned Antiquity, and never brought into question by any Theist. What the ἀπόῤῥητα overthrew in their reformed theology, was the vulgar polytheism, the worship of dead men. From this time, the initiated had the title of ΕΠΟΠΤΗΣ, by which was meant *one that sees things as they are, and without disguise;* whereas, before, he was called ΜΥΣΤΗΣ, which has a contrary signification.

But, besides the prevention of vice, their bringing the Initiated acquainted with the national Gods had another important use, which was to excite them to HEROIC VIRTUE, by shewing them what honours the benefactors of nations had acquired, by the free exercise of it. And this (as will be shewn hereafter) was the chief reason why Princes, Statesmen, and Leaders of colonies and armies, all aspired to be partakers of the GREATER MYSTERIES.

Thus we see, how what was taught and required in the *lesser Mysteries*, became the foundation of instruction in the GREATER: the obligation to a good life *there*, made it necessary to remove the errors of vulgar polytheism *here;* and the doctrine of a Providence taught previously in *those*, facilitated the reception of the sole cause of all things, when finally revealed in *these*.

Such were the TRUTHS which Varro, as quoted above, tells us it was inexpedient for the People to know: for indeed he supposed, the error of vulgar Polytheism to be so inveterate, that it was not to be expelled without throwing Society into convulsions. But Plato spoke out: he

* Ἀλλ' ἔσομαι διὰ τὴν τελετὴν πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἑτοιμότατος.—SOPAT. *in Div. Quæst.* Καθάπερ ἄλλῳ μυστηρίῳ προτελεσθεὶς τῇ σιωπῇ, τῶν ἄλλων ἁμαρτημάτων λοιπὸν τὸν ἑμαυτοῦ βίον ἐκάθαιρον, καὶ, πρὸς τὴν θείαν τῶν θεῶν τελετὴν ἐπειγόμενος, ἐκκλίνειν τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἐσπούδαζον.—SOPAT. *ibidem.*

owned it to be "difficult to find the Father and Creator of the universe: and, when found, impossible to discover him to all the world."*

Besides, there was another reason why the Institutors of the *Mysteries*, who were LAWGIVERS, should be for secreting this truth. They themselves had the chief hand in the rise of vulgar Polytheism.† They contrived it for the sake of the State; and to keep the people in awe, under a greater veneration for their laws. *This* Polytheism, the poets had depraved, by inventing or recording vicious stories of the Gods and Heroes, which the Lawgivers were willing should be stifled.‡ And they were only *such* stories, that, in their opinion, (as may be seen in Plato) made Polytheism hurtful to the State.

Scævola, that most learned Pontifex, as St. Austin calls him, gives this very account of the matter, where he says, There were three Systems concerning the GODS, the *Poetic*, the *Philosophic*, and the *Civil*: the first, he says, was *nugatory*, and therefore hurtful to the virtue of the State: the second *incongruous* to public establishments, by creating disorder and confusion in the speculative opinions of the People; such as the teaching them, promiscuously, that the Popular Gods were dead men deified. The directors of the *third* System therefore prevented the mischiefs of the *first* by such a partial communication of the *second* System, as was necessary for that purpose.§

That this account of the SECRET, in the *greater Mysteries*, is no precarious hypothesis, standing on mere conjecture, I shall now endeavour to shew,

First, from the clear evidence of Antiquity, which expressly informs us of these two particulars; That the ERRORS OF POLYTHEISM were detected, and the DOCTRINE OF THE UNITY was taught and explained in the *Mysteries*. But here it is to be observed, that when the Ancients speak of *Mysteries* indefinitely, they generally mean the *greater*.

* Τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον. καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν.—*In Timæo.* † See the second section of this book. ‡ Plato has a remarkable passage to this purpose. Speaking, in the beginning of his twelfth book Of Laws, concerning theft, and fraud, and rapine, he takes notice of the popular stories told of Mercury, as if he delighted in such things, and patronized those who did; the philosopher says they are not true; and cautions men from being led away by such pretended examples. However, to make all sure, he takes up the method of the *mysteries*, and adds, that if, indeed, Mercury did, or encouraged such things, he was neither a God, nor of celestial original.—Κλοπὴ μὲν χρημάτων, ἀνελεύθερον, ἁρπαγὴ δὲ, ἀναίσχυντον· τῶν Διὸς δὲ υἱεῶν οὐδεὶς οὔτε δόλοις, οὔτε βίᾳ χαίρων ἐπιτετήδευκε τούτοιν οὐδέτερον· μηδεὶς οὖν ὑπὸ ποιητῶν, μηδ' ἄλλως ὑπὸ τινῶν μυθολόγων, πλημμελῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐξαπατώμενος ἀναπειθέσθω· καὶ κλέπτων ἢ βιαζόμενος, οἰέσθω μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἅπερ αὐτοὶ θεοὶ δρῶσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀληθὲς, οὔτ' εἰκὸς· ἀλλ' ὅστις δρᾷ τοιοῦτον παρανόμως, οὔτε θεὸς, οὔτε παῖς ἐστί ποτε θεῶν. § "Relatum est in literis, doctissimum Pontificem Scævolam disputasse tria genera tradita Deorum; unum a poetis, alterum a philosophis, tertium a principibus civitatis. Primum genus nugatorium dicit esse—Secundum non congruere civitatibus, quod habeant aliqua—quæ obsint populis nosse—Quæ sunt autem illa quæ prolata in multitudinem nocent? 'Hæc,' inquit; 'non esse deos Herculem, Æsculapium, Castorem, Pollucem: proditur enim a doctis, quod homines fuerint, et humana conditione defecerint.'"—AUGUSTINUS *De Civit. Dei*, lib. iv. cap. 27, in initio.

It hath been shewn, that the Grecian and Asiatic *Mysteries* came originally from Egypt. Now of the EGYPTIAN, St. Austin giveth us this remarkable account.—"Of the same nature, too, are those things which Alexander of Macedon wrote to his mother, as revealed unto him by one LEO,* chief Hierophant of the Egyptian *Mysteries*: whereby it appeared, that not only such as Picus, and Faunus, and Æneas, and Romulus, nay Hercules, and Æsculapius, and Bacchus the son of Semele, and Castor, and Pollux, and all others of the same rank, had been advanced, from the condition of mortal Men, into Gods; but that even those Deities of the higher order, the *Dii majorum gentium*, those whom Cicero, without naming, seems to hint at, in his *Tusculans*, such as Jupiter, Juno, Saturn, Neptune, Vulcan, Vesta, and many others (whom Varro endeavours to allegorize into the elements or parts of the world) were, in truth, only deceased mortals. But the Priest being under great fears and apprehensions, while he was telling this, as conscious that he was betraying the SECRET OF THE MYSTERIES, begged of Alexander, when he found that he intended to communicate it to his mother,† that he would enjoin her to burn the letter, as soon as she had read it."‡

To understand the concluding part, we are to know, that Cyprian (who has also preserved this curious anecdote) tells us, it was the dread of Alexander's power which extorted the secret from the hierophant.§

* It is not unlikely but this might be a name of office. Porphyry, in his fourth book Of Abstinence, § 16, edit. Cantabr. 1655, 8vo, informs us, that the priests of the *Mysteries* of Mithras were called *Lions*; the priestesses *Lionesses*; and the inferior ministers, *Ravens*. Τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ὀργίων μύστας, Λέοντας καλεῖν· τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας, Λεαίνας· τοὺς δὲ ὑπηρετοῦντας, Κόρακας· for there was a great conformity, in the practices and ceremonies of the several *Mysteries*, throughout the whole pagan world. And this conjecture is supported by a passage in Eunapius, which seems to say, that it was unlawful to reveal the *name* of the Hierophant.—Τοῦ δὲ Ἱεροφάντου, κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὅστις ἦν, τοὔνομα οὔ μοι θέμις λέγειν.—*In Maximo*, p. 74, edit. Comelini, 8vo, 1616.—It looks as if the corruptions and debaucheries of some of the *Mysteries*, in later times, had made this further provision for *secrecy*.

† I suppose this communication to his Mother, might be with a purpose to let her understand, that he was no longer the dupe of her fine story of Jupiter's invasion, and the intrigue of his divine original. For Eratosthenes, according to Plutarch, edit. Francof. fol. 1599, tom. i. p. 665, E, says, that Olympias, when she brought Alexander on his way to the army, in his first military expedition, acquainted him, in private, with this secret of his birth: and exhorted him to behave himself as became the son of Jupiter Hammon. This, I suppose, Alexander might boast of to the Priest, and so the murder came out.

‡ "In eo genere sunt etiam illa—quæ Alexander Macedo scribit ad matrem, sibi a magno antistite sacrorum Ægyptiorum quodam LEONE patefacta: ubi non Picus et Faunus, et Æneas et Romulus, vel etiam Hercules et Æsculapius, et Liber Semele natus, et Tyndaridæ fratres, et si quos alios ex mortalibus pro diis habent; sed ipsi etiam majorum gentium dii, quos Cicero in Tusculanis, tacitis nominibus, videtur attingere, Jupiter, Juno, Saturnus, Neptunus, Vulcanus, Vesta, et alii plurimi, quos Varro conatur ad mundi partes sive elementa transferre, homines fuisse produntur. Timens enim et ille quasi revelata mysteria, petens admonet Alexandrum, ut cum ea matri conscripta insinuaverit, flammis jubeat concremari."—*De Civit. Dei*, lib. viii. cap. 5.

§ —"Metu suæ potestatis proditum sibi de diis hominibus a sacerdote SECRETUM."—*De Idol. Ven.* circa initium. But this is a mistake, at least it is expressed inaccurately. What was extorted by the dread of Alexander's power, was not the *secret* (which the initiated had a right to) but the Priest's consent that he should *communicate* the secret to another, which was contrary to the laws of the *Mysteries*. Plutarch, in his life of Alexander, edit. Francof. fol. 1599,

But Tully brings the matter home to the ELEUSINIAN *Mysteries* themselves. "What" (says he) "is not almost all Heaven, not to carry on this detail any further, filled with the Human race? But if I should search and examine Antiquity, and from those things which the Grecian writers have delivered, go to the bottom of this affair, it would be found, that even those very Gods themselves who are deemed the *Dii majorum gentium*, had their original here below; and ascended from hence into Heaven. Enquire, to whom those Sepulchres belong, which are so commonly shewn in Greece.* REMEMBER, for you are initiated, WHAT YOU HAVE BEEN TAUGHT IN THE MYSTERIES; you WILL THEN AT LENGTH UNDERSTAND HOW FAR THIS MATTER MAY BE CARRIED."† Indeed, he carries it further himself; for he tells us, in another place, that not only the *Eleusinian Mysteries*, but the *Samothracian* likewise, and the *Lemnian*, taught the error of Polytheism, agreeably to this system; which supposes all the *Mysteries* derived from the same original, and instituted for the same ends. "What think you" (says he) "of those who assert, that valiant, or famous, or powerful men have obtained divine honours after death; and that these are the very Gods, now become the object of our worship, our prayers, and adoration? EUHEMERUS tells us, when these Gods died, and where they lie buried. *I forbear to speak of the sacred and august rites of* ELEUSIS—*I pass by* Samothrace, *and the* Mysteries *of* Lemnos, *whose hidden rites are celebrated in darkness, and amidst the thick shades of groves and forests.*"‡

Julius Firmicus speaks much to the same purpose, and even more directly, "Adhuc supersunt aliæ superstitiones, quarum secreta pandenda sunt, Liberi et Liberæ, quæ omnia sacris sensibus vestris specialiter intimanda sunt, ut in istis profanis religionibus sciatis MORTES ESSE HOMINUM CONSECRATAS. *Liber* itaque, Jovis fuit filius regis scil. Cretici," &c.§

p. 680, E, appears to refer to this very epistle of Alexander to his Mother, where he says, —'Αλέξανδρος ἐν ἐπιστολῇ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα, φησὶν γεγονέναι τινὰς αὐτῷ μαντείας ἀπορρήτους, ἃς ἐπανελθὼν φράσει πρὸς μόνην ἐκείνην. "Alexander in the Epistle says that there were certain Oracular Mysteries imparted to him, which on his return he would communicate to her under the same seal of secrecy." For at this time the *Mysteries* foretold the future, as well as revealed the past.

* Alluding to that of Jupiter in Crete.

† "Quid? totum prope cœlum, ne plures persequar, nonne humano genere completum est? Si vero scrutari vetera, et ex his ea, quæ scriptores *Græciæ* prodiderunt, eruere coner; ipsi illi, majorum gentium Dii qui habentur, hinc a nobis profecti in cœlum reperiuntur. Quære, quorum demonstrantur sepulchra in *Græcia:* REMINISCERE, QUONIAM ES INITIATUS, QUÆ TRADANTUR MYSTERIIS; TUM DENIQUE QUAM HOC LATE PATEAT, INTELLIGES."—*Tusc. Disp.* lib. i. cap. 12, 13, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. ii. p. 243.—See note D, at the end of this book.

‡ "Quid, qui aut fortes, aut claros aut potentes viros tradunt, *post mortem ad Deos venisse*, eosque esse ipsos, quos nos colere, precari, venerarique soleamus?—Ab Euhemero *et mortes et sepulturæ demonstrantur deorum*—Omitto *Eleusinam* sanctam illam et augustam—Prætereo *Samothraciam*, eaque, quæ

'Lemni nocturno aditu occulta coluntur
Silvestribus sæpibus densa.'"—*De Nat. Deor.* lib. i. cap. 42. edit. Ox. 4to, tom. ii. p. 432, 433.—See note E, at the end of this book.

§ *De Errore profan. Relig.* cap. vi. edit. Oxon. 1662, 16mo, p. 9.

What hath been here said, will let us into the meaning of Plutarch's hint, in the following words of his tract *Concerning the ceasing of oracles*. "As to the *Mysteries*, in whose representations the true NATURE OF DEMONS is clearly and accurately held forth, a sacred silence, to use an expression of Herodotus, is to be observed."* All this well illustrates a passage in Lucian's *Council of the Gods;* when, after Momus had ridiculed the monstrous Deities of Egypt, Jupiter replies, "It is true, these are abominable things, which you mention of the Egyptian Worship. But then, consider, Momus, that much of it is *enigmatical;* and so, consequently, a very unfit subject for the buffoonry of the Prophane and Uninitiated." To which, the other answers with much spirit, "Yes, indeed, we have great occasion for the MYSTERIES, to know that Gods are Gods, and monsters, monsters."†

Thus far in detection of the vulgar Polytheism.—With regard to the other part of the SECRET, the *doctrine of the* UNITY, Clemens Alexandrinus informs us, that the Egyptian Mystagogues taught it amongst their *greater secrets*. "The Egyptians" (says he) "did not use to reveal their *Mysteries* indiscriminately to all, nor expose their truths concerning their Gods to the Prophane, but to those only who were to succeed to the administration of the State: and to such of the Priests as were most approved, by their education, learning, and quality."‡

But, to come to the Grecian *Mysteries*. Chrysippus, as quoted by the author of the *Etymol. magnum*, speaks to this purpose. "And Chrysippus says, that the secret doctrines concerning divine matters, are rightly called ΤΕΛΕΤΑΙ, for that these are the last things the initiated should be informed of: The soul having gained an able support, and, being possessed of her desires,§ can keep silent before the Uninitiated and Prophane."‖ To the same purpose, Clemens: "The doctrines delivered in the *greater Mysteries*, are concerning the UNIVERSE. Here all instruction ends. Things are seen as they are; and Nature, and the things of Nature, are given to be comprehended."¶

* Περὶ τῶν μυστικῶν ἐν οἷς τὰς μεγίστας ἐμφάσεις καὶ διαφάσεις λαβεῖν ἐστι τῆς περὶ δαιμόνων ἀληθείας, εὔστομά μοι κείσθω, καθ' Ἡρόδοτον.—P. 742, lin. 3, Steph. edit.
† Αἰσχρὰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα φὴς τὰ περὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων· ὅμως δ' οὖν, ὦ Μῶμε, τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν αἰνίγματά ἐστι καὶ οὐ πάνυ χρὴ καταγελᾶν ἀμύητον ὄντα· ΜΩΜ. Πάνυ γοῦν ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΩΝ, ὦ Ζεῦ, δεῖ ἡμῖν, ὡς εἰδέναι θεοὺς μὲν τοὺς θεούς· κυνοκεφάλους δὲ τοὺς κυνοκεφάλους.—Edit. Reitzii, tom. iii. p. 534.
‡ Αἰγύπτιοι οὐ τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσι τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀνετίθεντο μυστήρια, οὐδὲ μὴν βεβήλοις τὴν τῶν θείων εἴδησιν ἐξέφερον, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνοις γε τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν προϊέναι· καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τοῖς κριθεῖσιν εἶναι δοκιμωτάτοις ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς παιδείας καὶ τοῦ γένους.—*Strom.* lib. v. p. 566, edit. Lut. [p. 413, l. 16, edit. Sylburg.]
§ i. e. mistress of herself.
‖ Χρύσιππος δὲ φησὶ, τοὺς περὶ τῶν θείων λόγους εἰκότως καλεῖσθαι τελετάς· χρῆναι γὰρ τούτους τελευταίους, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι διδάσκεσθαι· τῆς ψυχῆς ἐχούσης ἔρμα, καὶ κεκρατημένης, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀμυήτους σιωπᾶν δυναμένης· μέγα γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἄθλον, ὑπὲρ θεῶν ἀκοῦσαί τε ὀρθὰ, καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς γενέσθαι αὐτῶν.—*Etymol.* AUCTOR in ΤΕΛΕΤΗ.
¶ Τὰ δὲ μεγάλα περὶ τῶν συμπάντων· οὐ μανθάνειν ἔτι ὑπολείπεται, ἐποπτεύειν δὲ καὶ περινοεῖν τήν τε φύσιν καὶ τὰ πράγματα.—*Strom.* v. p. 424, C, edit. Sylburgh.

Strabo having said,* that *Nature dictated to men the institution of the Mysteries*, as well as the other rites of Religion, gives this remarkable reason for his assertion, "that the secret celebration of the *Mysteries* preserves the majesty due to the Divinity, and, at the same time, imitates its nature, which hides itself from our senses."† A plain intimation of what kind the *secret* was. But had there been any ambiguity, he presently removes it, where, speaking of the different faculties exercised in the different rites of Religion, he makes *Philosophy* to be the object of the *Mysteries*.‡ Plutarch expresly says, that the FIRST CAUSE of all things is communicated to those who approach the temple of Isis with prudence and sanctity.§ By which words he means, the *necessary qualifications for Initiation*.

We have seen Tully expresly declaring, that the *Eleusinian* and *Samothracian Mysteries* were partly employed in detecting the error of Polytheism. We shall now find Galen intimating, not obscurely, that the doctrine of the divine nature was taught in those very *Mysteries*. In his excellent tract *Of the use of the parts* of the human body, he has these words—"The study, therefore, of *the use of the parts*, is not only of service to the mere physician, but of much greater to him who joins Philosophy to the art of healing; and, in order to perfect himself in this *Mystery*, labours to investigate the *universal Nature*. They who *initiate* themselves here, whether private men or bodies, will find, in my opinion, nobler instruction than in the rites either of ELEUSIS or SAMOTHRACE."‖ By which he means, that the study of the *use of the parts of animals*, leads us easier and sooner up to the knowledge of the FIRST CAUSE, than the most venerable of the *Mysteries*, such as the *Eleusinian* and *Samothracian*. A clear implication, that to lead men thither was their special business.

But this seems to have been so well known to the learned in the time of EUSEBIUS, that where this writer takes occasion to observe, that the Hebrews were the only people whose object, in their *public and national worship*, was the GOD OF THE UNIVERSE, he suits his whole expression, by one continued metaphor, to the usages of the *Mysteries*. "For the Hebrew people alone" (says he) "was reserved

* Ἡ φύσις οὕτως ὑπαγορεύει.—Lib. x. p. 467, edit. Paris. 1620, fol. † Ἥτε κρύψις ἡ μυστικὴ, τῶν ἱερῶν σεμνοποιεῖ τὸ θεῖον, μιμουμένη τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ ἐκφεύγουσαν ἡμῶν τὴν αἴσθησιν.—*Ibid.* Here Strabo takes in all that is said, both of the *Gods*, and of *nature*, in the two preceding passages from Chrysippus and Clemens; and shews that by *nature* is not meant the *cosmical* but *theological* nature. ‡ —Καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν. § —Ὀνομάζεται γὰρ Ἴσειον ὡς εἰσόμενον τὸ ὄν, ἂν μετὰ λόγου καὶ ὁσίως εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ παρέλθωμεν τῆς θεοῦ.—ΙΣ. καὶ ΟΣ. edit. Franc. fol. 1599, tom. ii. p. 352, A, in initio libri. ‖ Οὐκ οὖν ἰατρῷ μόνον ἡ περὶ χρείαις μορίων ἐστὶ πραγματεία χρησίμη, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἰατρῷ φιλοσόφῳ, τῆς ὅλης φύσεως ἐπιστήμην κτήσασθαι σπεύδοντι, καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν χρὴ τελεῖσθαι τὴν τελευτὴν, ἅπαντας γὰρ, ὡς οἶμαι, καὶ κατ' ἔθνος, καὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀνθρώπους, ὅσοι τι μυῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς, οὐδὲν ὅμοιον ἔχουσιν Ἐλευσινίοις τε καὶ Σαμοθρακίοις ὀργίοις.—GALEN. *De Usu Part.* lib. xvii. cap. 1, p. 702, E, F, edit. Charterii, fol. Paris. 1679. Petit, instead of ὅσοι τιμῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς, reads very ingeniously ὅσοι τι μυῶσιν ἑαυτούς. Charterius, ὅσοι τιμῶσι θεοὺς.

the honour of being INITIATED into the knowledge of God the Creator of all things, and of being instructed in the practice of true piety towards him."* Where, ΕΠΟΠΤΕΙΑ, which signifies *the inspection of the secret;* ΘΕΩΡΙΑ, the *contemplation* of it; and ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΟΣ, the *Creator*, the subject of it, are all words appropriated to the *secret* of the *greater Mysteries*.

JOSEPHUS is still more express. He tells Apion, that that high and sublime knowledge, which the Gentiles with difficulty attained unto, in the rare and temporary celebration of their *Mysteries*, was habitually taught to the Jews, at all times. And what was this sublime knowledge, but the doctrine of the UNITY? "Can any Government" (says he) "be more holy than this? or any Religion better adapted to the nature of the Deity? Where, in any place but in this, are the whole People, by the special diligence of the Priests, to whom the care of public instruction is committed, accurately taught the principles of true piety? So that the body-politic seems, as it were, one great *Assembly*, constantly kept together, for the celebration of some sacred *Mysteries*. For those things which the Gentiles keep up for a few days only, that is, during those solemnities they call MYSTERIES and INITIATIONS, we, with vast delight, and a plenitude of knowledge, which admits of no error, fully enjoy, and perpetually contemplate through the whole course of our lives. If you ask" (continues he) "the nature of those things, which in our sacred rites are enjoined and forbidden; I answer, they are simple, and easily understood. The first instruction relates to the DEITY, and teaches that GOD CONTAINS ALL THINGS, and is a Being every way perfect and happy: that he is self-existent, and the SOLE CAUSE of all existence; the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things," &c. †

Nothing can be more explicit than the testimony of this learned Jew. He not only alludes to the *greater Mysteries*, by the direct term of τελετῆς and μυστήρια, but uses several expressions relative to what the gentile *Mystagogues* taught therein; such as ἀλλόφυλοι φυλάττειν οὐ δύνανται, referring to the unfitness of the doctrine of the unity for general instruction: such as μετὰ πολλῆς ἡδονῆς, in contradiction to what they taught of the labours, pain, and difficulties

* Μόνῳ δὲ τῷ Ἑβραίων γένει τὴν ΕΠΟΠΤΕΙΑΝ ἀνατεθεῖσθαι τῆς ΘΕΩΡΙΑΣ τοῦ τῶν ὅλων ποιητοῦ καὶ ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΟΥ Θεοῦ, καὶ τῆς εἰς αὐτὸν ἀληθοῦς εὐσεβείας.—*Præp. Evang.* lib. i. cap. 9. See note F, at the end of this book. † Τίς ἂν οὖν ἀρχὴ γένοιτο ταύτης ὁσιωτέρα; τίς δὲ Θεῷ τιμὴ μᾶλλον ἁρμόζουσα, πάντὸς μὲν τοῦ πλήθους κατεσκευασμένου πρὸς τὴν εὐσέβειαν, ἐξαίρετον δὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἱερέων πεπιστευμένων, ὥσπερ δὲ τελετῆς τινος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας οἰκονομουμένης; ἃ γὰρ ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἀλλόφυλοι φυλάττειν οὐ δύνανται, μυστήρια καὶ τελετὰς ὀνομάζοντες, ταῦτα μετὰ πολλῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ γνώμης ἀμεταπείστου φυλάττομεν ἡμεῖς διὰ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος· τίνες οὖν εἰσιν αἱ προρρήσεις καὶ ἀπαγορεύσεις; ἁπλαῖ τε καὶ γνώριμοι· πρώτη δ' ἡγεῖται περὶ Θεοῦ, λέγουσα, ὁ Θεὸς ἔχει τὰ πάντα παντελὴς καὶ μακάριος, αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ καὶ πᾶσιν αὐτάρκης, ἀρχὴ καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλος πάντων.—*Contra Apion.* lib. ii. cap. 22, p. 1379, lin. 30.

to be encountered by those who aspired to the knowledge of the first cause; such as ἁπλαῖ καὶ γνώριμοι, in contradiction to what they taught of the great intricacy and obscurity of the question; and such, again, as ὁ Θεὸς ἔχει τὰ πάντα, the characteristic of the ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΟΣ of the *Mysteries*.

Thus, I think, it appears, that the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ, in the *greater mysteries*, were the detection of the origine of vulgar *Polytheism*;* and the discovery of the doctrine of the *Unity*.†

But now I have gone thus far, I will venture one step further; and undertake to give the very HISTORY repeated, and the very HYMN sung, on these occasions, to the *initiated*. In the *first* of which was delivered the true origine and progress of VULGAR POLYTHEISM; and in the *other*, the doctrine of the UNITY.

For I am much mistaken, if that celebrated fragment of SANCHONIATHO, the Phœnician, translated by Philo-Byblius, and preserved by Eusebius, containing a genealogical account of the first ages, be not that very HISTORY; as it was wont to be read to the *initiated*, in the celebration of the *Egyptian* and *Phœnician Mysteries*. The purpose of it being to inform us, that their popular Gods (whose chronicle is there given according to their generations) were only dead men deified.

And as this curious and authentick *record* (for such we shall find it was) not only serves to illustrate the subject we are now upon, but will be of use to support what is said hereafter of the rise, progress, and order of the several species of ancient idolatry, it may not be improper to give a short extract of it in this place.

I. He tells us then, that, "of the two first mortals, Protogonus and Æon, (the latter of whom was the author of seeking and procuring food from forest-trees) were begotten Genos and Genea. These, in the time of great droughts, stretched their hands upwards to the SUN, whom they regarded as a God, and sole ruler of the heavens. From these, after two or three generations, came Upsouranios and his brother Ousous. One of them invented the art of building cottages of reeds and rushes; the other the art of making garments of the skins of wild beasts. In their time, violent tempests of wind and rain having rubbed the large branches of the forest-trees against one another, they took fire, and burnt up the woods. Of the bare trunks of trees, they first made vessels to pass the waters; they consecrated two pillars to FIRE and WIND, and then offered bloody sacrifices to them as to Gods."‡ And here let it be observed, that this

* See note G, at the end of this book. † See this account supported, and the objections to it clearly confuted, in a well reasoned tract lately printed, intitled, "A Dissertation on the ancient Pagan Mysteries." ‡ Αἰῶνα καὶ Πρωτόγονον ἀνητοὺς ἄνδρας, οὕτω καλουμένους· εὑρεῖν δὲ τὸν Αἰῶνα τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν δένδρων τροφήν· ἐκ τούτων τοὺς γενομένους κληθῆναι Γένος, καὶ Γενεὰν—αὐχμῶν δε γενομένων, τὰς χεῖρας

worship of the Elements and heavenly Bodies is truly represented as the FIRST species of idolatry.

II. "After many generations, came Chrysor; and he likewise invented many things useful to civil life; for which, after his decease, he was worshipped as a God.* Then flourished Ouranos and his sister Ge; who deified and offered sacrifices to their father, Upsistos, when he had been torn in pieces by wild beasts.† Afterwards Cronos consecrated Muth his son, and was himself consecrated by his subjects."‡ And this is as truly represented to be the SECOND species of idolatry; the *worship of dead men.*

III. He goes on, and says, that "Ouranos was the inventor of the Bætylia, a kind of animated stones, framed with great art.§ And that Taautus formed allegoric figures, characters, and images of the celestial Gods and elements."‖ In which is delivered the THIRD species of idolatry, *statue and brute worship.* For by the animated stones, is meant stones cut into a human shape;¶ brute, unformed stones being before this invention consecrated and adored. As by Taautus's invention of allegoric figures, is insinuated (what was truly the fact) the origine of brute worship** from the use of HIEROGLYPHICS.

This is a very short and imperfect extract of the *Fragment;* many particulars, to avoid tediousness, are omitted, which would much support what we are upon, particularly a minute detail of the principal arts invented for the use of civil life. But what has been selected on this head will afford a good comment to a celebrated passage of Cicero, quoted, in this section, on another occasion.—As the two important doctrines, taught *in secret*, were the detection of *Polytheism*, and the discovery of the *Unity;* so, the two capital doctrines taught more *openly*, were the origine of Society with the arts

ὁρέγειν εἰς οὐρανοὺς πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, τοῦτον γὰρ, φησὶ, θεὸν ἐνόμιζον μόνον οὐρανοῦ κύριον—εἶτά φησι τὸν Ὑψουράνιον οἰκῆσαι Τύρον, καλύβας τε ἐπινοῆσαι ἀπὸ καλάμων, καὶ θρύων, καὶ παπύρων· στασιάσαι δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν Οὐσωὼ· ὃς σκέπην τῷ σώματι πρῶτος ἐκ δερμάτων ὧν ἴσχυσε συλλαβεῖν θηρίων εὗρε, βαγδαίων δὲ γινομένων ὄμβρων καὶ πνευμάτων παρατριβέντα τὰ ἐν τῇ Τύρῳ δένδρα πῦρ ἀνάψαι, καὶ τὴν αὐτόθι ὕλην καταφλέξαι· δένδρου δὲ λαβόμενον τὸν Οὐσωὼ καὶ ἀποκλαδεύσαντα πρῶτον τολμῆσαι εἰς θάλασσαν ἐμβῆναι· ἀνιερῶσαι δὲ δύο στήλας πυρί τε καὶ πνεύματι καὶ προσκυνῆσαι, ἅμα τε σπένδειν αὐταῖς, ἐξ ὧν ἤγρευε θηρίων.

* —Ἐξ ὧν γενέσθαι δύο ἀδελφοὺς σιδήρου εὑρετὰς, καὶ τῆς τούτου ἐργασίας· ὧν θάτερον τὸν Ἥφαιστον· εὑρεῖν δὲ καὶ ἄγκιστρον, καὶ δέλεαρ, καὶ ὁρμιὰν, καὶ σχεδίαν· πρῶτόν τε πάντων ἀνθρώπων πλεῦσαι· διὸ καὶ ὡς θεὸν αὐτὸν μετὰ θάνατον ἐσεβάσθησαν. † Ὁ δὲ τούτων πατὴρ ὁ Ὕψιστος ἐκ συμβολῆς θηρίων τελευτήσας ἀφιερώθη, ᾧ καὶ χοὰς καὶ θυσίας οἱ παῖδες ἐτέλεσαν. ‡ —Καὶ μετ' οὐ πολὺ, ἕτερον αὐτοῦ παῖδα ἀπὸ Ῥέας ὀνομαζόμενον Μοῦθ ἀποθανόντα ἀφιεροῖ—Κρόνος τοίνυν, βασιλεύων τῆς χώρας, καὶ ὕστερον μετὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου τελευτὴν εἰς τὸν τοῦ Κρόνου ἀστέρα καθιερωθείς. § Ἔτι δὲ, φησὶν, ἐπενόησε Θεὸς Οὐρανὸς Βαιτύλια, λίθους ἐμψύχους μηχανησάμενος— ‖ —Πρὸ δὲ τούτων θεὸς Τααυτὸς μιμησάμενος τὸν Οὐρανὸν τῶν θεῶν ὄψεις, Κρόνου τε καὶ Δαγῶνος, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν διετύπωσεν τοὺς ἱεροὺς τῶν στοιχείων χαρακτῆρας, &c. ¶ So when the Egyptians first saw the Grecian artists separate the legs of their statues, they put fetters on them, to prevent their running away. ** See "Divine Legation," book iv. § 4.

of life, and the existence of the soul after death, in a state of reward or punishments. These latter doctrines Tully hints at in the following words:—"mihi cum multa eximia divinaque videntur Athenæ peperisse—tum nihil melius illis *Mysteriis*, quibus ex AGRESTI immanique vita EXCULTI ad humanitatem et mitigati sumus:—neque solum cum lætitia vivendi rationem accepimus, sed etiam cum spe meliore moriendi."* The Fragment explains what Tully meant by *men's being drawn by the Mysteries from an irrational and savage life, and tamed, as it were, and broken to humanity*. It was, we see, by the information given them, concerning the origine of SOCIETY, and the Inventors of the ARTS OF LIFE; and the rewards they received from grateful Posterity, for having made themselves Benefactors to mankind. Tully, who thought this a strong excitement to public virtue, provides for it in his *Laws*:—"Divos, et eos, qui cælestes semper habiti, colunto: et ollos, quos endo cælo MERITA vocaverint Herculem, Liberum, Æsculapium," &c.†

The reasons which induce me to think this Fragment the very *History* narrated to the Ἐπόπται, in the celebration of the *greater Mysteries*, are these:

1. It bears an exact conformity with what the Ancients tell us that *History* contained in general, namely, an instruction, that all the national Gods, as well those *majorum* (such as Hypsistus, Ouranos, and Cronos) as those *minorum gentium*, were only dead men deified: together with a recommendation of the advantages of civil life above the state of nature, and an excitement to the most considerable of the initiated (the *summatibus viris*, as Macrobius calls them) to procure it. And these two ends are served together, in the history of the rise and progress of idolatry as delivered in this Fragment. In the date it gives to the origine of idolatry, they were instructed that the two first mortals were not idolaters, and consequently, that idolatry was the corruption of a better Religion; a matter of importance, where the purpose was to discredit Polytheism. The History shews us too, that this had the common fate of all corruptions, of falling from bad to worse, from *elementary* worship to *human*, and from *human* to *brutal*. But this was not enough; it was necessary too to expose the unreasonableness of all these modes of superstition. And as this could be only done by shewing what gave birth to the several species's, we are told that not any occult or metaphysic influences of the heavenly or elementary Bodies upon men, but their common physical effects felt by us, occasioned the first worship to be paid unto them: that no imaginary Divinity in the minds of patriarchs and heroes occasioned Posterity to bring them into the number of the

* *De Legibus*, lib. ii. cap. 14, edit. Oxon. 4to, tom. iii. p. 148. † *Ibid.* lib. ii. cap. 8.

Gods; but a warm sense of gratitude for what they had invented for the introduction and promotion of civil life: and that even *brute-worship* was brought in without the least consideration to the animal, but as its figure was a symbol only of the properties of the two other species's. Again, in order to recommend civil life, and to excite men to promote it's advantages, a lively picture is given of his miserable condition; and how obnoxious he was, in that state, to the rage of all the elements, and how imperfectly, while he continued in it, he could, with all his industry, fence against them, by food of acorns, by cottages of reeds, and by garments of skins: a matter the *Mysteries* thought so necessary to be impressed, that we find, by Diodorus Siculus, there was a scenical representation of this state exhibited in their SHEWS. And what stronger excitement had heroic minds, than to be taught, (as they are in this Fragment) that public benefits to their fellow-creatures were rewarded with immortality? As all these things, therefore, so essential to the instruction of the *Mysteries*, are here taught with an art and disposition peculiarly calculated to promote those ends, we have reason to conclude, that this History was composed for the use of the *Mysteries*.

2. My second reason for supposing it to be that very History, is our being told, that Sanchoniatho transcribed the account from secret records, kept in the penetralia of the temples, and written in a sacred sacerdotal character, called the Ammonean,* from the place where they were first deposited; (which, as Marsham reasonably supposes, was Ammonno, or Thebes, in Egypt†) a kind of writing employed, as we have shewn elsewhere, by the Hierophants of the *Mysteries*.

3. Thirdly, we are informed, that this sacred commentary was composed by the CABIRI, at the command, and by the direction, of Thoth.‡ Now These were the principal Hierophants of the *Mysteries*. The name CABIRI is, indeed, used by the Ancients, to signify indifferently three several persons; the GODS, in whose honour the *Mysteries* were instituted; the INSTITUTORS of the *Mysteries*; and the principal HIEROPHANTS who officiated in them. In the first sense we find it used by Herodotus, who speaks of the images of the *Cabiri* in the Egyptian temples;§ and by the scholiast on Apollonius, who tells us, there were four samothracian *Cabiri*, Axieros, Axiokersa, Axiokersos, and Casmilus; that is to say, Ceres, Proserpine, Pluto, and Mercury. Pausanias, in his *Beotics*, uses the word in the second

* —Ὁ δὲ συμβαλὼν τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδύτων εὑρεθεῖσαν ἀποκρύφοις Ἀμμοννέων γράμμασι συγκειμένοις, ἃ δὴ οὐκ ἦν πᾶσι γνώριμα, τὴν μάθησιν ἀπάντων αὐτὸς ἤσκησε. † *Chronicus Canon*, p. 234, Lond. edit. ‡ Ταῦτα δὲ, φησὶ, πρῶτοι πάντων ὑπεμνηματίσαντο οἱ ἑπτὰ Συδὲκ παῖδες KABEIPOI, καὶ ὕγδοος αὐτῶν ἀδελφὸς Ἀσκληπιὸς, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἐνετείλατο Θεὸς Τααυτός. § Καμβύσης—ἐσῆλθε δὲ καὶ ἐς τῶν Καβείρων τὸ ἱρὸν, ἐς τὸ οὐ θεμιτόν ἐστι ἐσιέναι ἄλλον γε ἢ τὸν ἱρέα· ταῦτα δέ τ' ἀγάλματα καὶ ἐνέπρησε, πολλὰ κατασκώψας.—Lib. iii. cap. 37, p. 176, edit. Gale.

sense, where he makes mention of the *Cabiri* Prometheus and his son Ætnæus, to whom was committed the sacred deposit of the *Mysteries* by Ceres.* And Strabo uses it in the third sense, where he speaks of the *Cabiri* as Ministers in the sacred *Mysteries*.† It is no wonder there should be this difference amongst the ancients in their accounts of these Wights. *Cabiri* was a sacred appellation, which was transferred from the *God* of the Mysteries, through the *Institutors* of them, down to the *Ministers* who officiated in them. And in this last sense it is used by Sanchoniatho. The same kind of confusion, and proceeding from the same cause, we find in the ancient accounts concerning the founder of the *Eleusinian Mysteries*, as we shall see hereafter; Some ascribing the institution to Ceres or Triptolemus, the Gods in whose honour they were celebrated; others, to Erechtheus, who indeed founded them: others again, to Eumolpus and Musæus, the first who ministred there in the office of Hierophants.

4. But, fourthly and lastly, We are told, that when this genealogical history came into the hands of a certain son of Thabion, the first Hierophant on record amongst the Phœnicians, he, after having corrupted it with allegories, and intermixed physical and cosmical affections with historical (that is, made the one significative of the other) DELIVERED IT TO THE PROPHETS OF THE ORGIES, AND THE HIEROPHANTS OF THE MYSTERIES; who left it to their successors (one of which was Osiris) and to the Initiated.‡ So that now we have an express testimony for the fact here advanced, that this was the very *history* read to the ΕΠΟΠΤΑΙ in the celebration of the *great Mysteries*.

But one thing is too remarkable to pass by unobserved: and that is, Sanchoniatho's account of the corruption of this History with *allegories* and *physical affections*, by one of his own countrymen; and of it's delivery, in that state, to the Egyptians, (for Isiris is the same as Osiris) who corrupted it still more. That the Pagan Mythology was, indeed, thus corrupted, I have shewn at large, in several parts of this work: but I believe, not so early as is here pretended; which makes me suspect that Sanchoniatho lived in a later age than his interpreter, Philo, assigns to him. And what confirms me in this

* Πόλιν γάρ ποτε ἐν τούτῳ φασὶν εἶναι τῷ χωρίῳ, καὶ ἄνδρας ὀνομαζομένους Καβείρους. Προμηθεῖ δὲ ἑνὶ τῶν Καβειραίων καὶ Αἰταίᾳ τῇ Προμηθέως ἀφικομένην Δήμητραν ἐς γνῶσιν παρακαταθέσθαι σφίσιν· ἥτις μὲν δὴ ἦν ἡ παρακαταθήκη, καὶ τὰ ἐς αὐτὴν γενόμενα, οὐκ ἐφαίνετο ὅσιόν μοι γράφειν. Δημητρὸς γοῦν Καβειραίοις δῶρόν ἐστιν ἡ τελετή.—*Bœot.* lib. ix. cap. 25, p. 758, 759, edit. Kuhnii, fol. Lips. 1696. † —Τῶν μὲν, τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῖς Κορῆσι τοὺς Κορύβαντας καὶ ΚΑΒΕΙΡΟΥΣ καὶ Ἰδαίους Δακτύλους, καὶ Τελχῖνας ἀποφαινόντων· τῶν δὲ συγγενεῖς ἀλλήλων, καὶ μικράς τινας ἀυτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφορὰς διαστελλόντων.—Lib. x. p. 466, C, edit. Paris. folio, 1620. ‡ Ταῦτα πάντα ὁ Θαβίωνος παῖς, πρῶτος τῶν ἀπ' αἰῶνος γεγονότων Φοινίκων ἱεροφάντης ἀλληγορήσας, τοῖς τε φυσικοῖς καὶ κοσμικοῖς πάθεσιν ἀναμίξας, παρέδωκε τοῖς ΟΡΓΙΩΣΙ καὶ ΤΕΛΕΤΩΝ κατάρχουσι ΠΡΟΦΗΤΑΙΣ· οἱ δὲ τὸν τύφον αὔξειν ἐκ παντὸς ἐπινοοῦντες, τοῖς αὐτῶν διαδόχοις παρέδωσαν καὶ τοῖς ἐπεισάκτοις· ὧν εἷς ἦν Ἴσιρις.

suspicion, is that mark of national vanity and partiality, common to after-times, in making the *Mysteries* of his own country original, and conveyed from Phœnicia to Egypt. Whereas it is very certain, they came first from Egypt. But of this elsewhere. However, let the reader take notice, that the question concerning the *antiquity* of Sanchoniatho does not at all affect our inference concerning the nature and use of this History.*

We now come to the HYMN celebrating the Unity of the Godhead, which was sung in the *Eleusinian Mysteries* by the Hierophant, habited like the CREATOR.† And this, I take‡ to be the little ORPHIC poem quoted by Clemens Alexandrinus§ and Eusebius;‖ which begins thus: "I will declare a SECRET to the Initiated; but let the doors be shut against the profane. But thou, O Musæus, the offspring of bright Selene, attend carefully to my song; for I shall deliver the truth without disguise. Suffer not, therefore, thy former prejudices to debar thee of that happy life, which the knowledge of these sublime truths will procure unto thee: but carefully contemplate this divine Oracle, and preserve it in purity of mind and heart. Go on, in the right way, and contemplate THE SOLE GOVERNOR OF THE WORLD: HE IS ONE, AND OF HIMSELF ALONE; AND TO THAT ONE ALL THINGS OWE THEIR BEING. HE OPERATES THROUGH ALL, WAS NEVER SEEN BY MORTAL EYES, BUT DOES HIMSELF SEE EVERY ONE."¶

The reasons which support my conjecture are these: 1. We learn from the scholiast on Aristophanes and others, that hymns were sung in the mysteries, and what were the subject of them. And Dion.

* See note H, at the end of this book. † Ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατ' ΕΛΕΥΣΙΝΑ *μυστηρίοις, ὁ μὲν Ἱεροφάντης εἰς εἰκόνα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἐνσκευάζεται.*—EUSEBII *Præp. Evang.* lib. iii. A passage in Porphyry well explains this of Eusebius, and shews by what kind of personage the *Creator* was represented; and that this, like all the rest, was of Egyptian original; and introduced into these secret mysteries, for the reason above explained. Τὰ δὲ τῶν ΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΩΝ *πάλιν τοιαῦτά φησιν ἔχειν σύμβολα. Τὸν* ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΟΝ, *ὃν Κνὴφ, οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι προσαγορεύουσιν* ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΕΙΔΗ, *τὴν δὲ χροιὰν ἐκ κυανοῦ μέλανος ἔχοντα, κρατοῦντα ζώνην καὶ σκῆπτρον· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κεφαλῆς, πτερὸν βασίλειον περικείμενον,* ΟΤΙ ΛΟΓΟΣ ΔΥΣΕΥΡΕΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΚΕΚΡΥΜΜΕΝΟΣ, ΚΑΙ ΟΥ ΦΑΝΟΣ, *καὶ ὅτι ζωοποιὸς, καὶ ὅτι βασιλεὺς, καὶ ὅτι νοερῶς κινεῖται· διὸ ἡ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ κεῖται.*—Apud EUSEB. *Præp. Evang.* lib. iii. cap. 11. ‡ M. Voltaire, in his remarks on his fine Tragedy of Olympia, has done me the honour of advancing this conjecture into a certainty; and what is more, of a known and acknowledged fact. "On chantait" (says he) "*l' Hymne de Orphée*"—and then gives it as he finds it here.— § *Admonitio ad Gentes*, p. 36, B, edit. Sylburgh. ‖ *Præp. Evang.* lib. xiii.

¶ *Φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστι, θύρας δ' ἐπίθεσθε βεβήλοις*
Πᾶσιν ὁμῶς· σὺ δ' ἄκουε, φαεσφόρου ἔκγονε μήνης,
Μουσαῖ', ἐξερέω γὰρ ἀληθέα, μηδέ σε τὰ πρὶν
Ἐν στήθεσσι φανέντα φίλης αἰῶνος ἀμέρσῃ·
Εἰς δὲ λόγον θεῖον βλέψας, τούτῳ προσέδρευε,
Ἰθύνων καρδίης νοερὸν κύτος· εὖ δ' ἐπίβαινε
Ἀτραπιτοῦ, μοῦνον δ' ἐσόρα κόσμοιο ἄνακτα.
Εἷς δ' ἔστ' αὐτογενής, ἑνὸς ἔκγονα πάντα τέτυκται,
Ἐν δ' αὐτοῖς αὐτὸς περιγίσσεται· οὐδέ τις αὐτὸν
Εἰσοράα θνητῶν, αὐτὸς δέ γε πάντας ὁρᾶται.

Chrys. in his Oration "De divina Civitate aut Gubernatione," says expressly, that in the Mithriac Mysteries the Magi sung an awful Hymn in which the glories of the supreme God who governs all things were celebrated.*—And further says, that this knowledge of the *One supreme* was kept a SECRET amongst the *initiated* Persians. 2. Orpheus, as we have said, first brought the *Mysteries* from Egypt into Thrace, and even Religion itself: hence it was called Θρησκεία, as being supposed the invention of the Thracian. 3. The verses, which go under the name of Orpheus, are, at least, more ancient than Plato and Herodotus; though since interpolated. It was the common opinion, that they were genuine; and those who doubted of that, yet gave them to the earliest Pythagoreans.† 4. The subject of them are the *Mysteries*, under the several titles of‡ Θρονισμοὶ μητρῷοι, τελεταὶ, ἱερὸς λόγος, and ἡ εἰς ᾅδου κατάβασις. 5. Pausanias tells us, that Orpheus's hymns were sung in the rites of Ceres, in preference to Homer's though more elegant, for the reasons given above.§ 6. This hymn is addressed to Musæus, his disciple, who was said, though falsely, to institute the *Mysteries* at Athens, as his master had done in Thrace;‖ and begins with the *formula* used by the Mystagogue on that occasion, warning the PROPHANE to keep at distance: and in the fourth line, mentions that *new life* or *regeneration*, to which the Initiated were taught to aspire. 7. No other original than singing the hymns of Orpheus in the *Eleusinian Mysteries*, can be well imagined of that popular opinion, mentioned by Theodoret, that Orpheus instituted *those Mysteries*,¶ when the Athenians had such certain records of another Founder. 8. We are told that one article of the Athenians' charge against Diagoras for revealing the *Mysteries*, was his making the *Orphic-speech*, or hymn, the subject of his common conversation.** 9. But lastly, the account, which Clemens gives of this hymn, seems to put the matter out of question: his words are these: "But the Thracian Mystagogue, who was at the same time a poet, *Orpheus*, the son of Oeager, after he had opened the *Mysteries*, and sung the whole THEOLOGY OF IDOLS, recants all he had said, and introduceth TRUTH. The Sacreds then

* Μῦθος ἐν ἀπορρήτοις τελεταῖς ὑπὸ Μάγων ἀνδρῶν ᾄδεται Θαυμαζόμενος· οἱ τὸν θεὸν τοῦτον ὕμνουσιν ὡς τελείοντε καὶ πρῶτον ἡνίοχον τοῦ τελειοτάτου ἅρματος. † LAERTIUS in *Vita Pythag.* and SUIDAS, voce Ὀρφεύς. ‡ The following passage of DION. CHRYS. will explain the meaning of this Θρονισμὸς—Καθάπερ εἰώθασιν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ ΘΡΟΝΙΣΜΩι, καθίσαντες τοὺς μυουμένους οἱ τελοῦντες, κύκλῳ περιχορεύειν.—*Orat.* xii. § Ὅστις δὲ περὶ ποιήσεως ἐπολυπραγμόνησεν, ἤδη τοὺς Ὀρφέως ὕμνους οἶδεν ὄντας, ἕκαστόν τε αὐτῶν, ἐπὶ βραχύτατον, καὶ τὸ σύμπαν οὐκ ἐς ἀριθμὸν πολὺν πεποιημένους. Λυκομῆδαι δὲ ἴσασί τε καὶ ἐπᾴδουσι τοῖς δρωμένοις· κόσμῳ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἐπῶν δευτερεῖα φέροιντο ἄν, μετὰ Ὁμήρου γε τοὺς ὕμνους· τιμῆς δὲ ἐκ τοῦ θείου καὶ ἐς πλέον ἐκείνων ἔχουσι.—PAUSANIAS, lib. ix. cap. 30, sub fin. p. 770, edit. Kuhnii, fol. Lips. 1696; and again, to the same purpose, cap. 27. ‖ TERTULLIANI *Apologet.* ¶ See note †, p. 194. ** Διαγόρᾳ μὲν γὰρ εἰκότως ἐνεκάλουν Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ μόνον τὸν ΟΡΦΙΚΟΝ εἰς μέσον κατατιθέντι ΛΟΓΟΝ, καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι, καὶ τὰ τῶν Καβείρων δημεύοντι μυστήρια.—ATHENAGORAS in *Legat.*

truly begin, though late, and thus he enters upon the matter."* To understand the force of this passage, we are to know, that the Mystagogue explained the representations in the *Mysteries;* where, as we learn from Apuleius,† the supernal and infernal Gods passed in review. To each of these they sung an hymn; which Clemens calls the *theology of images,* or *idols.* These are yet to be seen amongst the works ascribed to Orpheus. When all this was over, then came the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ, delivered in the HYMN in question. And, after that, the Assembly was dismissed, with these two barbarous words, ΚΟΓΞ ΟΜΠΑΞ, which shews the *Mysteries* not to have been originally Greek. The learned Mr. Le Clerc well observes, that this seems to be only an ill pronunciation of *kots* and *omphets,* which, he tells us, signify in the Phœnician tongue, *watch and abstain from evil.*‡

Thus the reader is brought acquainted with the end and use both of the *greater* and *lesser Mysteries;* and sees that, as well in what they *hid,* as in what they *divulged,* all aimed at the benefit of the State. To this end, they were to draw in as many as they could to their general participation; which they did by spreading abroad the doctrine of a Providence, and a future state; and how much happier the Initiated should be, and what superior felicities they were entitled to, in another life. It was on this account that Antiquity is so full and express in this part. But then, they were to make those, they had got in, as virtuous as was possible; which they did, by discovering, to such as were judged capable of the *secret,* the whole delusion of Polytheism. Now this being supposed the shaking of foundations, was to be done with all possible circumspection, and under the most tremendous seal of secrecy.§ For they taught, that the Gods themselves punished the *revealers of the* SECRET; and not them only, but the *hearers* of it likewise.‖ Nor did they altogether trust to that alone: for, more effectually to curb an ungovernable curiosity, the State decreed capital punishment against the betrayers of the *Mysteries,* and inflicted it with merciless severity.¶ The case of Diagoras, the Melian, is too remarkable to be omitted. This man

* Ὁ δὲ Θρᾴκιος ἱεροφάντης καὶ ποιητὴς ἅμα, ὁ τοῦ Οἰάγρου Ὀρφεύς, μετὰ τὴν τῶν Ὀργίων ἱεροφαντίαν, καὶ τῶν εἰδώλων τὴν θεολογίαν, παλινῳδίαν ἀληθείας εἰσάγει, τὸν ἱερὸν ὄντως ὀψέ ποτε, ὅμως δ' οὖν ἄδων λόγον.—*Admonitio ad Gentes,* p. 36, A, edit. Sylburgh. † "Accessi confinium mortis, deos inferos, et deos superos accessi coram, et adoravi de proximo."—*Met.* lib. xi. p. 1000, circa finem, edit. Lugd. 1587, 8vo. ‡ *Bibliotheque Universelle,* tom. vi. p. 86. § See cap. 20 of MEURSIUS's *Eleusinia.* ‖ —"Quæras forsitan satis anxie, studiose lector, quid deinde dictum, quid factum? Dicerem, si *dicere* liceret; cognosceres, si liceret *audire;* sed parem noxam contraherent *aures et linguæ temerariæ curiositatis.*"—APUL. *Met.* lib. xi. p. 1000, edit. Lugd. 8vo, 1587. ¶ "Si quis arcanæ mysteria Cereris sacra vulgàsset, lege morti addicebatur. Τὸν ἐξειπόντα τὰ μυστήρια τεθνάναι. Meminit hujus legis Sopater in Divisione quæsticnis."—SAM. PETIT, *In Leges Atticas,* p. 33.

had revealed the *Orphic* and *Eleusinian Mysteries:* and so, passed with the people for an Atheist: which at once confirms what hath been said of the object of the *secret doctrines,* and of the mischief which would attend an indiscreet communication of them. For the charge of ATHEISM was the common lot of all those who communicated their knowledge of the *one only God;* whether they learnt it by natural light, or were afterwards taught it by *Revelation.* He likewise dissuaded his friends from being initiated into these rites: the consequence of which was, that the city of Athens proscribed him, and set a price upon his head.* While Socrates, who preached up the latter part of this doctrine (and was on that account a reputed Atheist likewise) and Epicurus, who taught the former (and was a real one) were suffered, because they delivered their opinions only as points of philosophic speculation, amongst their followers, to live a long time unmolested. And to avoid the danger of those laws, which secured the *secret* of the Mysteries, was perhaps the reason why Socrates declined initiation.† And this appearing a singular affectation, exposed him to much censure.‡ But he declined it with his usual prudence. He remembered, that Æschylus,§ on a mere imagination of his having given a hint of something in the *Mysteries,* had like to have been torn in pieces on the stage by the people; and only escaped by an appeal to the Areopagus: which venerable court acquitted him of this dangerous Charge, on his proving that he had never been initiated. The famous EUHEMERUS, who assumed the same office of Hierophant to the People at large, with more boldness than Socrates, and more temper than Epicurus, employed another expedient to screen himself from the laws, though he fell, and not (like the rest) undeservedly,‖ under the same imputation of *Atheism.* This man gave a fabulous relation of a voyage to the imaginary island of Panchæa,¶ a kind of ancient Utopia; where, in a temple of Jupiter, he found a genealogical record, which discovered to him the births and deaths of the greater Gods; and, in short, every thing that the Hierophant revealed to the Initiated on this subject. Thus he too avoided the suspicion of a *betrayer of the Mysteries.* A character infamous in social life. And to this the Son of Sirach alludes, where he speaks of this species of infidelity in general**—"Whoso discovereth SECRETS [μυστήρια], loseth his credit, and shall never find friend to his mind." This, therefore, is the reason why so little is to be met with, concern-

* SUIDAS, voce Διαγόρας ὁ Μήλιος—et etiam ATHENAGORAS in *Legatione.*
† For that he had a good opinion of the *Mysteries* appears from the *Phædo* of Plato.
‡ Κατηγοροῦντες—οὔτε ἐμυήθη μόνος ἁπάντων ταῖς Ἐλευσινίαις.—LUCIANUS, *Demonacte,* tom. ii. p. 380, edit. Reitzii, 4to, Amstel. 1743.
§ CLEMENS ALEX. *Strom.* ii. p. 283, B, edit. Sylburg. et ARIST. lib. iii. cap. 1, *Nicom. Eth.*
‖ See note I, at the end of this book.
¶ EUSEB. *Præp. Evang.* lib. ii. cap. 2.
** Ὁ ἀποκαλύπτων ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΑ, ἀπώλεσε πίστιν, καὶ οὐ μὴ εὕρῃ φίλον πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ.—Cap. xxvii. ver. 17.

ing the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ. Varro and Cicero, the two most inquisitive persons in antiquity, affording but a glimmering light. The *first* giving us a short account of the *cause* only of the SECRET, without mentioning the *doctrine;* and the *other*, a hint of the *doctrine*, without mentioning the *cause*.

But now a remarkable exception to all we have been saying, concerning the *secrecy* of the *Mysteries*, obtrudes itself upon us, in the case of the CRETANS; who, as Diodorus Siculus assures us, celebrated their *Mysteries* OPENLY, and taught their ἀπόῤῥητα without reserve. His words are these: "At Cnossus in Crete, it was provided for, by an ancient law, that these *Mysteries* should be shewn openly to all: and that those things, which in other places were delivered in secret, should be hid from none who were desirous of knowing them."* But, as contrary as this seems to the principles delivered above, it will be found, on attentive reflection, altogether to confirm them. We have shewn, that the *great secret* was the detection of Polytheism; which was done by teaching the original of the Gods; their birth from mortals; and their advancement to divine honour, for benefits done to their Country or Mankind. But it is to be observed, that the Cretans proclaimed this to all the world, by shewing, and boasting of the tomb of Jupiter himself, the *Father of Gods and Men*. How then could they tell that as a secret in their *Mysteries*, which they told to every one out of them? Nor is it less remarkable that the Cretans themselves, as Diodorus, in the same place, tells us, gave this very circumstance of their celebrating the *Mysteries openly* as a proof of their being the first who had consecrated dead mortals. "These are the old stories which the Cretans tell of their Gods, who, they pretend to say, were born amongst them. And they urge this as an invincible reason to prove that the adoration, the worship, and the MYSTERIES of these Gods were first derived from Crete to the rest of the world; for, whereas, amongst the Athenians, those most illustrious *Mysteries* of all, called the *Eleusinian*, those of Samothrace, and those of the Ciconians in Thrace, of Orpheus's institution, are all celebrated in SECRET: yet in Crete"†—and so on as above. For it seems the Cretans were proud of their invention; and used this method to proclaim and perpetuate the notice of it. So when Pythagoras, as Porphyry ‡ informs us, had been initiated into the *Cretan*

* Κατὰ δὲ τὴν Κρήτην ἐν Κνωσσῷ νόμιμον ἐξ ἀρχαίων εἶναι φανερῶς τὰς τελετὰς ταύτας πᾶσι παραδίδοσθαι, καὶ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν ἀποῤῥήτῳ παραδεδομενα, παρ' αὐτοῖς μηδένα κρύπτειν τῶν βουλομένων τὰ τοιαῦτα γινώσκειν.—*Biblioth.* lib. v.

† Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν θεῶν οἱ Κρῆτες τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς λεγομένων γεννηθῆναι τοιαῦτα μυθολογοῦσι· τὰς δὲ τιμὰς καὶ θυσίας καὶ τὰς περὶ τὰ μυστήρια τελετὰς ἐκ Κρήτης εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους παραδεδόσθαι λέγοντες, τοῦτο φέρουσιν, ὡς οἴονται, μέγιστον τεκμήριον· τήντε γὰρ παρ' Ἀθηναίοις ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι γινομένην τελετὴν, ἐπιφανεστάτην σχεδὸν οὖσαν ἁπασῶν, καὶ τὴν ἐν Σαμοθράκῃ, καὶ τὴν ἐν Θράκῃ ἐν τοῖς Κικόσιν (ὅθεν ὁ καταδείξας Ὀρφεὺς ἦν) μυστικῶς παραδίδοσθαι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν Κρήτην— ‡ *De Vita Pythag.* n. xvii.

mysteries, and had continued in the *Idean* cave three times nine days, he wrote this epigram on the tomb of Jupiter,

Ὧδε θανὼν κεῖται Ζᾶν, ὃν Δία κικλήσκουσιν.

Zan, whom men call Jupiter, lies here deceased.

It was this which so much exasperated the other Grecians against them; and gave birth to the common proverb of ΚΡΗΤΕΣ ΑΕΙ ΨΕΥΣΤΑΙ,* *The Cretans are eternal liars.* For nothing could more affront these superstitious idolaters than asserting the fact, or more displease the politic protectors of the *Mysteries* than the divulging it.†

The MYSTERIES then being of so great service to the state, we shall not be surprized to hear the wisest of the Ancients speaking highly in their commendation; and their ablest Lawgivers, and reformers, providing carefully for their support. "Ceres" (says Isocrates) "hath made the Athenians two presents of the greatest consequence: corn, which brought us out of a state of brutality; and the MYSTERIES, which teach the initiated to entertain the most agreeable expectations touching death and eternity."‡ And Plato introduceth Socrates speaking after this manner; "In my opinion, those who established the MYSTERIES, whoever they were, were well skilled in human nature. For in these rites it was of old signified to the aspirants, that those who died without being initiated, stuck fast in mire and filth: but that he who was purified and initiated, should, at his death, have his habitation with the Gods."§ And Tully thought them of such use to Society, for preserving and propagating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, that in the law where he forbids nocturnal sacrifices offered by women, he makes an express exception for the *Mysteries* of Ceres, as well as for the sacrifices to the GOOD GODDESS. "Nocturna mulierum sacrificia ne sunto, præter olla, quæ pro populo rite fiant. Neve quem initianto, nisi, ut assolet, Cereri, Græco sacro." Which law he thus comments:—"*M.* But now, Titus, as to what follows, I would fain know how you can give your assent, or I blame you for withholding it? *A.* What is that, I pray you? *M.* The law concerning the nocturnal sacrifices of women. *A.* I assent to it, especially as there is an express exception to the public

* Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται· καὶ ΓΑΡ τάφον, ὦ ἄνα, σεῖο
Κρῆτες ἐτεκτήναντο.—CALLIMACHI *Hymn. in Jovem.*
And NONNUS: Οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ παρέμιμνε Διὸς ΨΕΥΔΗΜΟΝΙ ΤΥΜΒΩι.
Τερπομένη Κρήτεσσιν, ἐπεὶ πέλον ἠπεροπῆες.—*Dionys.* lib. viii.
And LUCAN: "Tam mendax Magni tumulo, quam Creta Tonantis."—Lib. viii.

† See note K, at the end of this book. ‡ Δήμητρος — δούσης δωρεὰς, διττὰς, ἅπερ μέγιστα τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι· τούς τε καρποὺς οἳ τοῦ μὴ θηριωδῶς ζῆν ἡμᾶς αἴτιοι γεγόνασι· καὶ τὴν τελετὴν, ἧς οἱ μετέχοντες περί τε τῆς τοῦ βίου τελευτῆς, καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος αἰῶνος ἡδίους τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν.—*Panegyr.* § Καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες, οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι, ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος, καὶ ἀτέλεστος, εἰς ᾅδου ἀφίκεται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται· ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος, ἔκεισε ἀφικόμενος, μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει.—*In Phædone.*

and solemn sacrifice. *M.* What then will become of our *Eleusinian Rites*, those reverend and august *Mysteries*, if, indeed, we take away nocturnal celebrations? *For our laws are calculated, not only for the Roman, but for all just and well established policies.* *A.* I think you except those, into which we ourselves have been initiated. *M.* Doubtless I do: for as, in my opinion, your Athens hath produced many excellent and even divine inventions, and applied them to the use of life: so has she given nothing better than those *Mysteries*, by which we are drawn from an irrational and savage life, and tamed, as it were, and broken to humanity. They are truly called INITIA, for they are indeed the beginnings of a life of reason and virtue. From whence we not only receive the benefits of a more comfortable and elegant subsistence here, but are taught to *hope for, and aspire to a better life hereafter*. But what it is that displeases me in nocturnal rites, the comic poets will shew you.* Which liberty of celebration, had it been permitted at Rome, what wickedness would not HE† have attempted, who came with a premeditated purpose of indulging his lust, to a Sacrifice where even the misbehaviour‡ of the eye was deeply criminal."§

We have seen, that the other exception to this law against nocturnal sacrifices, was in favour of the rites performed to the GOOD GODDESS, called *the public and solemn sacrifice*. This was offered *pro populo*, for the safety of the people. So that Cicero, ranking the *Eleusinian* with these rites, appears to have thought them in the number of such as were celebrated for the public safety. Solon, the famous lawgiver of Athens, long before him, had the same high opinion of these *Mysteries*, as is seen by the care he took of their regulation; and so had Prætextatus, a most accomplished Roman Magistrate, long after him: For when his master, Valentinian, had divided the Empire with his brother, and projected a general reform of the laws, and, amongst the rest, had forbid NOCTURNAL SACRIFICES; he was per-

* See note L, at the end of this book. † See note M, at the end of this book.

‡ The ancients esteemed *that* to be the greatest misbehaviour of the eye, where the sight of *men* obtruded, though only by accident, upon those *Mysteries*, which it was only lawful for *women* to behold.

§ "*M.* At vero, quod sequitur, quomodo aut tu assentiare, aut ego reprehendam, sane quæro, Tite. *A.* Quid tandem id est? *M.* De nocturnis sacrificiis mulierum. *A.* Ego vero assentior, excepto præsertim in ipsa lege solenni sacrificio ac publico. *M.* Quid ergo aget Iacchus Eumolpidæque vestri [nostri *alii*], et augusta illa mysteria, siquidem sacra nocturna tollimus? non enim populo Romano, sed omnibus bonis firmisque populis leges damus. *A.* Excipis, credo, illa, quibus ipsi initiati sumus. *M.* Ego vero excipiam. Nam mihi cum multa eximia divinaque videntur Athenæ tuæ peperisse, atque in vita hominum attulisse, tum nihil melius illis mysteriis, quibus ex agresti immanique vita exculti ad humanitatem, et mitigati sumus; *initiaque*, ut appellantur, ita revera principia vitæ cognovimus; neque solum cum lætitia vivendi rationem accepimus, sed etiam cum spe meliore moriendi. Quid autem mihi displiceat IN NOCTURNIS, Poëtæ indicant Comici. Qua licentia Romæ data, quidnam egisset ille, qui in sacrificium cogitatam libidinem intulit, quo ne imprudentiam quidem oculorum adjici fas fuit?"—*De Legibus*, lib. ii. cap. 14, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. iii. pp. 148, 149.

suaded by Prætextatus, who governed for him in Greece, to make an exception for the *Mysteries of Ceres;* which had been brought to Rome very early,* and incorporated into the national worship,† and long afterwards regulated anew by the wise emperor Hadrian.‡

Zosimus tells the story in this manner: "The supreme power being thus divided, Valentinian entered on his new command with a more serious attention to his office. He reformed the Magistracy, he regulated the Revenue, and, by a rigid exaction of the Duties, secured the pay of the soldiery, which arose out of that fund: and having determined likewise to new model and promulge the imperial Institutes, *beginning*, as they say, from the foundation, he forbad the celebration of all NOCTURNAL rites and sacrifices; with design to obviate the enormities which the opportunity of these seasons gave birth to, and enflamed. But when Prætextatus, a man adorned with every virtue both of public and private life, who then governed Greece in quality of proconsul, had given him to understand that this law would occasion great disorders in Greece, and even throw the inhabitants into despair, when they should find that they were forbidden to celebrate, according to ancient custom, those most holy *Mysteries*, which had now taken in the whole race of mankind, he gave leave to a suspension of his law, with regard to These; on condition, however, that every thing should be reduced to the primitive purity and simplicity." § Thus the ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES got a reprieve, till the reign of Theodosius the elder, when they were finally abolished. The terms Prætextatus used to shew the ill consequence of the suppression, are very remarkable: he said, the Greeks would, from thenceforth, lead ΑΒΙΩΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ, *a comfortless lifeless life.* But this could not be said, with any truth, or propriety, of the taking away a mere religious rite, how venerable soever it was become by its antiquity. To apprehend the force of the expression, we must have in mind what hath been said of the doctrines taught in those Rites, namely, a *Providence*, and a *future state of rewards and punishments*, on whose sole

* As appears by Tully's Oration for Corn. Balbus, and by a passage in his second book, cap. 24, "Of the Nature of the Gods," quoted above; and likewise from DIONYS. HAL. *Antiq.* lib. i. cap. 33. Ἱδρύσαντα δὲ καὶ Δήμητρος ἱερὸν, καὶ τὰς θυσίας αὐτῇ διὰ γυναικῶν τε καὶ νηφαλίους ἔθυσαν, ὡς Ἕλλησι νόμος, ὧν οὐδὲν ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἤλλαξε χρόνος. † SUETONIUS, *Vita Aug.* cap. 93, tom. i. p. 354, edit. Pitisci, 1714, 4to. ‡ AURELIUS VICTOR *in Hadrian.* § Τῆς τοίνυν ἀρχῆς οὕτω διαιρεθείσης ὁ Οὐαλεντινιανὸς ἐμβριθέστερον τῇ ἀρχῇ προσελθὼν, ἄρχοντάς τε ἐν κόσμῳ προῆγεν, καὶ περὶ τὰς εἰσπράξεις τῶν εἰσφορῶν, καὶ τὰς ἐκ τούτων χορηγουμένας στρατιωτικὰς σιτήσεις, ἀκριβέστατος ἦν· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νόμων εἰσφορὰς ἐγνώκει ποιήσασθαι, ἀφ' ἑστίας ὥσπερ ἀρξάμενος, τὰς νυκτερινὰς ἐκώλυε θυσίας ἐπιτελεῖσθαι, τοῖς μυσαρῶς μὲν οὖν πραττομένοις ἐμποδὼν διὰ τοῦ τοιοῦδε νόμου γενέσθαι βουλόμενος· ἐπεὶ δὲ Πραιτεξτάτος, ὁ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὴν ἀνθύπατον ἔχων ἀρχὴν, ἀνὴρ ἐν πάσαις διαπρέπων ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, τοῦτον ἔφη τὸν νόμον ΑΒΙΩΤΟΝ τοῖς Ἕλλησι καταστήσειν τὸν ΒΙΟΝ, εἰ μέλλοιεν κωλύεσθαι τὰ συνέχοντα τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος ἁγιώτατα μυστήρια κατὰ θεσμὸν ἐκτελεῖν ἐπέτρεψεν. ἀργοῦντος τοῦ νόμου· πράττεσθαι δὲ πάντα κατὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάτρια.—Lib. iv. *Hist. Novæ.*

account the Rites were instituted. Now these doctrines being in themselves of the most engaging nature; taught here in the most interesting manner; and receiving from hence their chief credit; it was no wonder that the Greeks should esteem the abolition of the MYSTERIES as the greatest evil: the life of man being, indeed, without the comfort and support of these doctrines, no better than a *living death*: hence it was, that the sage Isocrates called the MYSTERIES, *the thing, human nature principally stands in need of.** And that Aristides said, *the welfare of Greece was secured by the Eleusinian Mysteries alone.*† Indeed the Greeks seemed to place their chief happiness in them: so Euripides makes Hercules say,‡ *I was blest when I got a sight of the mysteries*: and it was a proverbial speech, when any one thought himself in the highest degree happy, to say, *I seem as if I had been initiated in the higher mysteries.*§

1. But now, such is the fate of human things, These MYSTERIES, venerable as they were, in their first institution, did, it must be owned, in course of time, fearfully degenerate; and those very provisions made by the State, to enable the *Mysteries* to obtain the end of their establishment, became the very means of defeating it. For we can assign no surer CAUSE of the horrid abuses and corruptions of the *Mysteries* (besides time, which naturally and fatally depraves and vitiates all things) than the SEASON in which they were represented; and the profound SILENCE in which they were buried. For NIGHT gave opportunity to wicked men to attempt evil actions; and SECRECY, encouragement to perpetrate them: and the inviolable nature of that secrecy, which encouraged abuses, kept them from the Magistrate's knowledge so long, till it was too late to reform them. In a word, we must own, that these *Mysteries*, so powerful in their first institution for the promotion of VIRTUE and KNOWLEDGE,‖ became, in time, horribly subservient to the gratification of LUST and REVENGE.¶ Nor will this appear at all strange after what hath been said above. A like corruption, from the same cause, crept even into the CHURCH, during the purest ages of it. The primitive christians, in *imitation*, perhaps, of these pagan rites, or from the *same kind of spirit*, had a custom of celebrating VIGILS in the night; which, at first, were performed with all becoming sanctity: but, in a little time, they were so overrun with abuses, that it was necessary to abolish them. The account Bellarmine gives of the matter, is this: "Quoniam occasione

* Οὗ πρῶτον ἡ φύσις ἡμῶν ἐδεήθη.—*Panegyr.* † Μόνοις Ἐλευσινίοις ὑγίαινεν ἡ Ἑλλάς—*Eleus.* ‡ Τὰ μυστῶν δ' ὄργι' εὐτύχησ' ἰδών.—*Herc. furens*, ver. 613. § Ἐποπτεύειν μοι δοκῶ. ‖ —Τὰ μυστήρια—ὅτι ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ καὶ ἐπανορθώσει τοῦ βίου κατεστάθη πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν. ¶ Ἡ γὰρ τεκνοφόνους ΤΕΛΕΤΑΣ, ἡ ΚΡΥΦΙΑ ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΑ, ἢ ἐμμανεῖς ἐξ ἄλλων δεσμῶν κώμους ἄγοντες, Οὔτε βίους οὔτε γάμους καθαροὺς ἔτι φυλάσσουσιν, ἕτερος δ' ἕτερον ἢ ΛΟΧΩΝ ΑΝΑΙΡΕΙ, ἢ ΝΟΘΕΥΩΝ ΟΔΥΝΑι.—*Wisdom of Solomon*, xiv. 23, 24.

nocturnarum vigiliarum abusus quidam irrepere cœperant, vel potius flagitia non raro committi, placuit ecclesiæ nocturnos conventus et vigilias proprie dictas intermittere, ac solum in iisdem diebus celebrare jejunia." * And the same remedy, Cicero † tells us, Diagondas the Theban was forced to apply to the disorders of the *Mysteries*.

2. However, this was not the only, though it was the most powerful cause of the depravation of the *Mysteries*. Another doubtless was their being sometimes under the patronage of those Deities, who were supposed to inspire and preside over sensual passions, such as Bacchus, Venus, and Cupid; for these had all their *Mysteries:* And where was the wonder, if the *Initiated* should be sometimes inclined to give a loose to those vices, in which the patron God was supposed to delight? And in this case, the HIDDEN DOCTRINE came too late to put a stop to the disorder. However, it is remarkable, and confirms what hath been said concerning the origin of the *Mysteries*, and of their being invented to perpetuate the doctrine of a future state, that this doctrine continued to be taught even in the most debauched celebrations of the Mysteries of Cupid ‡ and Bacchus. § Nay, even that very flagitious part of the mysterious rites when at worst, *the carrying the* ΚΤΕΙΣ *and* ΦΑΛΛΟΣ *in procession*, was introduced but under pretence of their being *emblems* ‖ of the mystical regeneration and new life, into which the Initiated had engaged themselves to enter.

3. The last *cause* to which one may ascribe their corruption, was the Hierophant's withdrawing the *Mysteries* from the care and

* *De Eccl. Triumph.* lib. iii. cap. ult. † —Atque omnia nocturna, ne nos duriores forte videamur, in media Græcia Diagondas Thebanus lege perpetua sustulit.—*De Legibus*, lib. ii. cap. 15, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. iii. p. 149. ‡ Ἀγαθὸν μέν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τῆς ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι τελετῆς μετασχεῖν, ἐγὼ δὲ ὁρῶ τοῖς ΕΡΩΤΟΣ ὀργιασταῖς καὶ μύσταις ἐν ᾅδου βελτίονα μοῖραν οὖσαν.—PLUTARCHUS Ἐρωτικῷ. § Κέλσος —οἵεταί γε ἐπὶ ᾄσμει τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ταῦθ' ἡμας ποιεῖν, οὐχὶ δὲ τἀληθῆ περὶ κολάσεων λέγοντας ἀναγκαίων τοῖς ἡμαρτηκόσι· διόπερ ἐξομοιοῖ, ἡμᾶς τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ΒΑΚΧΙΚΑΙΣ τελεταῖς τὰ φάσματα καὶ δείματα προεισάγουσι.—ORIGEN. *Contra Celsum*, lib. iv. p. 167, Spenc. ‖ Καὶ γὰρ αἱ τελεταὶ, καὶ τὰ ὄργια, τὰ τούτων εἶχεν ΑΙΝΙΓΜΑΤΑ. Τὴν κτένα μὲν ἡ Ἐλευσὶς, ἡ φαλλαγωγία δὲ τὸν Φαλλόν.—THEODORET. *Therapeut.* lib. i. Here the father uses the word *αἰνίγματα* ironically, and in derision of the Pagans, who pretended, that these processions were mystical, symbolical, and enigmatical; otherwise he had used the word improperly; for the *κτεὶς* and *φαλλὸς* could never be the *αἰνίγματα* of the pollutions committed by them: *αἴνιγμα* signifying the obscure imitation of a thing represented by a *different* image.—So Tertullian against the Valentinians says, "Virile membrum totum esse MYSTERIUM." Jamblichus gives another reason for these things: Διὰ τοῦτο ἔν τε κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωρῶντες, ἴσταμεν τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη, καὶ μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα, καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν· ἔν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς, θεάμασί τισι καὶ ἀκούσμασι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ἀπολυόμεθα τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ἀπ' αὐτῶν συμπιπτούσης βλάβης.—*De Mysteriis*, sect. i. cap. 11. However, in common life, *figuram pudendi virilis ad fascini omne genus expugnandum multum valere crederent.* A superstition, which, without doubt, arose from its *enigmatic* station in the *mysteries;* and to this day keeps its hold amongst the common people in Italy.—"On les portoit comme des préservatifs contre les charmes, les mauvais regards et les enchantements.—Cette practique superstitieuse ne s'en est pas moins conservée usqu'à present dans le bas peuple du Royaume de Naples. L'on m'a fait voir plusieurs de ces Priapes, que des gens ont la simplicité de porter au bras ou sur la poitrine."—WINKELMAN *Sur les Découvertes d'Herculaneum*, p. 41.

inspection of the civil Magistrate; whose original Institution they were: and therefore, in the purer ages of Greece, the deputies of the States presided in them: and, so long, they were safe from notorious abuses. But in aftertimes it would happen, that a little priest, who had borne an inferior share in these rites, would leave his society and country, and set up for himself; and in a clandestine manner, without the allowance or knowledge of the Magistrate, institute and celebrate the *Mysteries* in private Conventicles. From rites so managed it is easy to believe, many enormities would arise. This was the original of those horrid impieties committed in the *Mysteries of Bacchus* at Rome; of which the historian Livy has given so circumstantial an account: for, in the beginning of his story, he tells us, the mischief was occasioned by one of these priests bringing the *Mysteries* into Etruria, on his own head, uncommissioned by his superiors in Greece, from whom he learnt them; and unauthorized by the State, into which he had introduced them. The words of Livy shew that the *Mysteries* were, in their own nature, a very different affair; and invented for the improvement of Knowledge and Virtue. "A Greek of mean extraction" (says he)* "a little priest and soothsayer, came first into Etruria, WITHOUT ANY SKILL OR WISDOM IN MYSTERIOUS RITES, MANY SORTS OF WHICH, THAT MOST IMPROVED PEOPLE HAVE BROUGHT IN AMONGST US, FOR THE CULTURE AND PERFECTION BOTH OF MIND AND BODY."† It is farther observable, that this priest brought the *Mysteries* pure with him out of Greece, and that they received their corruption in Italy; for as Hispala tells the story to the Consul, at first WOMEN only celebrated the Rites; till Paculla Minia Campana became priestess; who, on a sudden, as by order of the Gods, made a total alteration in the Ceremonies, and initiated her SONS; which gave occasion to all the debaucheries that followed.‡ The consequence of this discovery was the abo-

* "Græcus ignobilis in Etruriam primum venit, NULLA CUM ARTE EARUM, QUAS MULTAS AD ANIMORUM CORPORUMQUE CULTUM NOBIS ERUDITISSIMA OMNIUM GENS INVEXIT, sed sacrificulus et vates."—*Hist.* lib. xxxix. † What Livy means by the *culture of the body*, will be seen hereafter, when we come to speak of the probationary and toilsome trials undergone by those *aspirants* to the *Mysteries*, called the SOLDIERS OF MITHRAS. ‡ Hispala's confession will fully instruct the reader in the nature and degree of these corruptions.—"Tum Hispala originem sacrorum expromit. Primo sacrarium id fœminarum fuisse, nec quemquam virum eo admitti solitum.—Pacullam sacerdotem omnia, tanquam Deûm monitis, immutâsse: nam et viros eam primam suos filios initiâsse: et nocturnum sacrum ex diurno, et pro tribus in anno diebus quinos singulis mensibus dies initiorum fecisse. Ex quo in promiscuo sacra sint, et permisti viri fœminis, et noctis licentia accesserit; nihil ibi facinoris, nihil flagitii prætermissum; plura virorum inter sese, quam fœminarum esse stupra. Si qui minus patientes dedecoris sint, et pigriores ad facinus, pro victimis immolari: nihil nefas ducere. Hanc summam inter eos religionem esse; viros velut mente capta cum jactatione fanatica corporis vaticinari—Raptos a Diis homines dici, quos machinæ illigatos ex conspectu in abditos specus abripiant; eos esse, qui aut conjurare, aut sociari facinoribus, aut stuprum pati noluerint. Multitudinem ingentem, alterum jam prope populum esse: in his nobiles quosdam viros, fœminasque. Biennio proximo institutum esse, ne quis major viginti annis initiaretur; captari ætatis et erroris et stupri patientes."

lition of the *Rites of Bacchus* throughout Italy, by a decree of the Senate.*

However, it is very true, that in Greece itself the *Mysteries* became abominably abused: † a proof of which we have even in the conduct of their Comic writers, who frequently lay the action of the Drama (such as the rape of a young girl, and the like) at the celebration of a religious *Mystery;* and from that *Mystery* denominate the Piece.‡ So that, in the time of Cicero, the terms *mysteries* and *abominations* were almost synonymous. The *Academic* having said they had secrets and *Mysteries*, Lucullus replies, "Quæ sunt tandem ista MYSTERIA? aut cur celatis, quasi TURPE aliquid, vestram sententiam?" § However, in spite of all occasions and opportunities, some of these *Mysteries*, as the ELEUSINIAN particularly, continued for many ages pure and undefiled. The two capital corruptions of the Mysteries were MAGIC and IMPURITIES. Yet, so late as the age of Apollonius Tyan; the *Eleusinian* kept so clear of the first imputation, that the hierophant refused to initiate that impostor, because he was suspected to be a Magician.‖ And, indeed, their long-continued immunity, both from one and the other corruption, will not appear extraordinary, if we consider, that, by a law of Solon, the senate was always to meet the day after the celebration of these Mysteries, to see that nothing had been done amiss during the performance.¶ So that these were the very last that submitted to the common fate of all human institutions.**

It is true, if uncertain report were to be believed, the *Mysteries* were corrupted very early: for Orpheus himself is said to have abused them.†† But this was a figment which the debauched *Mystæ* of later times invented to varnish over their enormities; as the detestable Pæderasts of after-ages scandalized the blameless Socrates. Besides, the story is so ill laid, that it is detected by the surest records of Antiquity: for, in consequence of the crime which they fabled Orpheus committed in the *Mysteries*, they pretended, that he was torn in pieces by the women: whereas it appeared from the inscription on his monument at Dium in Macedonia, that he was struck dead with lightning, the envied death of the reputed favourites of the Gods.‡‡

And here the christian FATHERS will hardly escape the censure of those who will not allow high provocation to be an excuse for an

* See note N, at the end of this book. † See CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS, in his *Admonitio ad Gentes.* ‡ See FABRICIUS'S *Notitia Comicorum deperditorum*, in his first volume of the *Bibl. Græc.* lib. ii. cap. 22. § *Acad. Quæst.* lib. i. ‖ Ὁ δὲ Ἱεροφάντης οὐκ ἐβούλετο παρέχειν τὰ ἱερὰ, μὴ γὰρ ἂν ποτε μνήσαι γόητα, μὴ δὲ τὴν Ἐλευσῖνα ἀνοίξαι ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ καθαρῷ τὰ δαιμόνια.—PHILOSTRATUS, lib. iv. cap. 18. ¶ Ἡ γὰρ βουλὴ ἐκεῖ καθεδεῖσθαι ἔμελλε, κατὰ τὸν Σόλωνος νόμον, ὃς κελεύει, τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ, τῶν μυστηρίων ἕδραν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ Ἐλευσινίῳ.—ANDOCIDIS *Orat.* ** See note O, at the end of this book. †† See DIOG. LAERT. *Proœmium*, segm. 5. ‡‡ Idem, *ibid.*

unfair representation of an adversary. I say, they will hardly escape censure, for accustoming themselves to speak of the *Mysteries* as gross impieties and immoralities in their very original.* Clemens Alexandrinus, in a heat of zeal, breaks out, "Let him be accursed, who first infected the world with these impostures, whether it was Dardanus—or—&c. These I make no scruple to call wicked authors of impious fables; the fathers of an execrable superstition, who, by this Institution, sowed in human life the seeds of vice and corruption."† But the wisest and best of the pagan world invariably hold, that the *Mysteries* were instituted pure; and proposed the noblest end, by the worthiest means. And even though the express testimony of these writers, supported by the reason of the thing, should be deemed insufficient, yet the character and quality of their Institutor must put the matter out of all doubt. This Institutor, as will be seen presently, was no other than the Lawgiver or CIVIL MAGISTRATE himself. Wherever the *Mysteries* found public admittance, it was by his introduction; and as oft as ever they were celebrated, it was under his inspection. Now virtue is as essential to the preservation, and vice to the destruction of that Society, over which he presides, as obedience and disobedience are to his office and authority. So that to conceive him disposed to bring in, and to encourage, immoral practices under the mask of Religion, is the same thing as to suspect the Physician of mixing Poisons with his antidotes.

The truth of the matter was this: the *Fathers* bore a secret grudge to the *Mysteries* for their injurious treatment of Christianity on its first appearance in the world. We are to observe, that ATHEISM, by which was meant a contempt of the Gods, was reckoned, in the *Mysteries*, amongst the greatest crimes. So, in the sixth book of the *Æneis* (of which more hereafter) the hottest seats in Tartarus are allotted to the Atheist, such as Salmoneus, Tityus, and the Titans, &c. Now the Christians, for their contempt of the national Gods, were, on their first appearance, deemed Atheists by the people; and so branded by the Mystagogue, as we find in Lucian,‡ and exposed amongst the rest in Tartarus, in their solemn shews and representations. This may be gathered from a remarkable passage in Origen, where Celsus thus addresses his adversary: "But now, as you, good man, believe eternal punishments, even so do the interpreters of these holy *Mysteries*, the Hierophants and Initiators; you threaten others with these

* See note P, at the end of this book.

† Ὅλλοιτο οὖν ὁ τῆσδε ἄρξας ἀπάτης ἀνθρώποις· εἴτε ὁ Δάρδανος—εἴτε—τούτους ἐγὼγ' ἂν ἀρχικακοὺς φήσαιμι μύθων ἀθέων, καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας ὀλεθρίου πατέρας, σπέρμα κακίας καὶ φθορᾶς ἐγκαταφυτεύσαντας τῷ βίῳ τὰ μυστήρια.—*Admonitio ad Gentes*, p. 8, A, B, edit. Sylburg.

‡ Καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ [τῆς τελετῆς ἡμέρᾳ] προρρήσις ἦν, ὥσπερ Ἀθήνῃσι, τοιαύτη· εἴ τις ἄθεος, ἢ ΧΡΙΣΤΙΑΝΟΣ, ἢ Ἐπικούρειος, ἥκει κατάσκοπος τῶν ὀργίων, φευγέτω.—*Pseudomantis*, tom. ii. p. 244, edit. Reitzii, 4to, Amstel. 1743.

punishments: THESE, on the contrary, THREATEN YOU."* This explains a passage in Jerom's catalogue of ecclesiastical writers; and will be explained by it. The Father, speaking of Quadratus, says; "Cumque Hadrianus Athenis exegisset hiemem invisens Eleusinem, et omnibus pene Græciæ sacris initiatus, dedisset occasionem iis, qui Christianos oderunt, absque præcepto Imperatoris vexare credentes, porrexit ei librum pro religione nostra." Now what *occasion* was afforded at this juncture to the enemies of Christianity, but only this, That, the Grecian *Mysteries* representing the Faithful in an odious light, the Emperor (who but just then had been initiated into almost all of them) might be reasonably thought estranged and indisposed towards Christianity; and so the easier drawn to countenance, or connive at, any injustice done unto it?

This, without doubt, was what sharpened the Fathers against the *Mysteries;* and they were not over tender in loading what they did not approve. On this account they gave easy credit to what had been told to them of the abominations in the *Mysteries;* and the rather, perhaps, on account of the *secrecy* with which they were celebrated. The same *Secrecy* in the Christian Rites, and the same language introduced by the Fathers in speaking of them, as we see below, procured as easy credit to those calumnies of murder and incest charged upon them by the Pagans. Nay, what is still more remarkable, those specific enormities, in which their own *Mysteries* were known to offend, they objected to the Christians. "Alii eos [Christianos] ferunt ipsius Antistitis ac Sacerdotis colere genitalia."† But here comes in the strange part of the story; that, after this, they should so studiously and formally transfer the terms, phrases, rites, ceremonies, and discipline of these *odious Mysteries* into our holy Religion; and, thereby, very early vitiate and deprave, what a pagan writer ‡ could see, and acknowledge, to be ABSOLUTA et SIMPLEX, as it came out of the hands of its Author. Sure then it was some more than ordinary veneration the People had for these *Mysteries*, that could incline the Fathers of the Church to so fatal a counsel: however, the thing is notorious,§ and the effects have been severely felt.

We have all along supposed the *Mysteries* an invention of the Lawgiver: and, indeed, we had nothing to do with them, but in that view. Now though, from what hath been said, the intelligent reader will collect, we have not supposed amiss, yet since the pertinency of the whole discourse, as here applied, depends upon it, he may perhaps expect us to be a little more particular.

* Μάλιστα μὲν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὥσπερ σὺ κολάσεις αἰωνίους νομίζεις· οὕτω καὶ οἱ τῶν ἱερῶν ἐκείνων ἐξηγηταὶ, τελεσταί τε, καὶ μυσταγωγοί· ἃς σὺ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπειλεῖς, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ σοί.—Lib. viii. † Cæcil. apud MINUT. in *Octav.* ‡ AMM. MARCELLINUS, lib. xxi. cap. 16, *Hist.* § See note Q, at the end of this book.

That the *Mysteries* were invented, established, and supported by LAWGIVERS, may be seen,

1. From the place of their original; which was EGYPT. This. Herodotus, Diodorus, and Plutarch, who collect from ancient testimonies, expresly affirm; and in this all Antiquity concurs: the *Eleusinian* Mysteries, particularly, retaining the very *Egyptian* Gods, in whose honour they were celebrated; Ceres and Triptolemus being only two other names for Isis* and Osiris: as we have seen above from Theodoret: and so Tibullus,—

> "Primus aratra manu sollerti fecit OSIRIS,
> Et teneram ferro sollicitavit humum."†

Hence it is, that the UNIVERSAL NATURE, or the *first Cause*, the object of all the *Mysteries*, yet disguised under diverse NAMES, speaking of herself in Apuleius, concludes the enumeration of her various mystic rites, in these words,—"Priscaque doctrina pollentes ÆGYPTII, CEREMONIIS me prorsus PROPRIIS‡ percolentes, appellant VERO NOMINE reginam ISIDEM."§

But the similitude between the Rites practised, and the Doctrines taught in the Grecian and Egyptian *Mysteries*, would be alone sufficient to point up to their original: such as the *secrecy* required of the Initiated; which, as we shall see hereafter, peculiarly characterized the Egyptian teaching; such as the doctrines taught of a *metempsychosis*, and a future state of rewards and punishments, which the Greek writers agree to have been first set abroach by the Egyptians; ‖ such as *abstinence* enjoined from domestic fowl, fish, and beans,¶ the peculiar superstition of the Egyptians; such as the Ritual composed in *hieroglyphics*, an invention of the Egyptians.** But it would be endless to reckon up all the particulars in which the Egyptian and Grecian Mysteries agreed: it shall suffice to say, that they were in all things the same.††

Again; nothing but the supposition of this common original to all the Grecian *Mysteries* can clear up and reconcile the disputes which arose amongst the Grecian States and Cities, concerning the original

* Ἶσις δέ ἐστι κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλήνων γλῶσσαν Δημήτηρ.—HERODOT. lib. ii. cap. 59. And again, cap. 156: Δημήτηρ δὲ Ἶσις. † See note R, at the end of this book. ‡ See note S, at the end of this book. § *Metam.* lib. xi. ‖ Timæus the Locrian, in his book "Of the Soul of the World," speaking of the necessity of inculcating the doctrine of future punishments, calls them TIMΩPIAI ΞENAI, FOREIGN TORMENTS: by which name both Latin and Greek writers generally mean, *Egyptian*, where the subject is Religion. ¶ See PORPHYRIUS *De Abstin.* ** Senex comissimus ducit me protinus ad ipsas fores ædis amplissimæ, rituque solenni aspersionis celebrato mysterio, ac matutino peracto sacrificio, de opertis adyti profert quosdam libros, literis ignorabilibus prænotatos; partim FIGURIS CUJUSCEMODI ANIMALIUM, CONCEPTI SERMONIS COMPENDIOSA VERBA SUGGERENTES, partim nodosis, et in modum rotæ tortuosis, capreolatimque condensis apicibus."—APULEII *Metam.* lib. xi. †† Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αἱ τελεταὶ καὶ τὰ μυστήρια ταύτης τῆς θεοῦ [Δήμητρος] τότε κατεδείχθησαν ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι, τά τε περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχαιότητας ὡσαύτως ἔχειν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους.—DIOD. SIC. lib. i.

of these rites; every one claiming to be the Prototype to the rest. Thus Thrace pretended that they came first from thence; Crete contested the honour with those barbarians; and Athens claimed it from both. And at that time, when they had forgotten the true original, it was impossible to settle and adjust their differences: for each could prove that he did not borrow from others; and, at the same time, seeing a similitude in the Rites,* would conclude that they had borrowed from him. But the owning EGYPT for their common Parent, clears up all difficulties: by accounting for that general likeness which gave birth to every one's pretensions.

Now, in Egypt, all religious Worship being planned and established by Statesmen, and directed to the ends of civil policy, we must conclude, that the *Mysteries* were originally invented by LEGISLATORS.

2. The Sages who brought them out of Egypt, and propagated them in Asia, in Greece, and Britain, were all Kings or Lawgivers; such as Zoroaster, Inachus, Orpheus,† Melampus, Trophonius, Minos, Cinyras, Erechtheus, and the Druids.

3. They were under the superintendence of the State. A Magistrate intitled ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ, or King, presided in the *Eleusinian Mysteries*. Lysias informs us, that this King was to offer up the public prayers, according to their country Rites; and to see that nothing impious or immoral crept into the celebration.‡ This title given to the President of the *Mysteries*, was, doubtless, in memory of the first Founder: to whom were joined four officers, chosen by the people, called ΕΠΙΜΕΛΗΤΑΙ or Curators; § the priests were only under-officers to these, and had no share in the direction: for this being the Legislator's favourite institution, he took all possible care for its support; which could not be done more effectually, than by his watching over it himself. On the other hand, his interfering too openly in religious matters would have defeated his end; and the people would soon have come to regard this high solemnity as a mere engine of State; on which account he carefully kept behind the curtain. For though it be now apparent that the *Mysteries* were the invention of the Civil Magistrate, yet even some Ancients, who have mentioned the *Mysteries*, seemed not to be apprized of it; and their ignorance hath occasioned great embroilment in all they say on this subject. The reader may see by the second chapter of Meursius's *Eleusinia*, how much the Ancients were at a

* —Καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τρόπον τινὰ κοινοποιεῖσθαι· ταῦτά τε, καὶ τῶν Σαμοθρᾳκων, καὶ τὰ ἐν Λήμνῳ, καὶ ἄλλα πλείω· διὰ τὸ τοὺς προσπόλους λέγεσθαι τοὺς αὐτούς.—STRABO, lib. x. p. 466, D. edit. Paris. 1620, fol. † Of whom ARISTOPHANES says, Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετὰς θ' ἡμῖν κατέδειξε, φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι· "Orpheus taught us the *Mysteries*, and to abstain from murder," i. e. from a life of rapine and violence, such as men lived in the *state of nature*. ‡ —Καὶ εὔχας εὔξεται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια —ὅπως ἂν μηδεὶς ἀδικῇ, μηδὲ ἀσεβῇ περὶ τὰ ἱερά.—IN ANDOC. § See MEURSIUS's *Eleusinia*, cap. xv.

loss for the true founder of those *Mysteries;* some giving the institution to Ceres; some to Triptolemus; others to Eumolpus; others to Musæus; and some again to Erechtheus. How then shall we disengage ourselves from this labyrinth, into which Meursius hath led us, and in which, his guard of Ancients keep us inclosed? This clue will easily conduct us through it. It appears, from what has been said, that Erechtheus, KING of Athens, established the *Mysteries;* * but that the people unluckily confounded the Institutor, with the PRIESTS, Eumolpus and Musæus, who first officiated in the rites; and with Ceres and Triptolemus, the DEITIES, in whose honour they were celebrated. And these mistakes were natural enough: † the poets would be apt, in the licence of their figurative style, to call the Gods, in whose name the *Mysteries* were performed, the Founders of those *Mysteries;* and the people, seeing only the ministry of the officiated priests (the Legislator keeping out of sight) in good earnest believed those Mystagogues to be the founders. And yet, if it were reasonable to expect from Poets or People, attention to their own fancies and opinions, one would think they might have distinguished better, by the help of that mark, which Erechtheus left behind him, to ascertain his title; namely, the erection of the officer called βασιλεὺς, or *King.*

4. But this original is still further seen from the qualities required in the aspirants to the *Mysteries.* According to their original institution, neither *slaves* nor *foreigners* were to be admitted into them.‡ Now if the *Mysteries* were instituted, primarily for the sake of teaching religious truths, there can be no reason given why every man, with the proper moral qualifications, should not be admitted: but supposing them instituted by the State for civil purposes, a very good one may be assigned; for *slaves* and *foreigners* have there, neither property nor country. When afterwards the Greeks, by frequent confederations against the Persian, the common enemy of their liberties, began to consider themselves as one people and Community, the *Mysteries* were extended to all who spoke the GREEK LANGUAGE. Yet the Ancients, not reflecting on the original and end of their institution, were much perplexed for the reasons of an exclusion so apparently capricious. Lucian tells us, in *The life of* his friend *Demonax,* that this great phi-

* And so says DIODORUS SICULUS, lib. i. *Bibl.* † They were committed where no Mystery was affected, in what concerned the open worship of their Gods. TACITUS, speaking of the Temple of the Paphian Venus, says, "Conditorem Templi Regem Aërian vetus memoria, quidam ipsius Deæ nomen id perhibent."—*Hist.* lib. ii. ‡ —Ἦλθε [Ἡρακλῆς] πρὸς Εὔμολπον εἰς Ἐλευσῖνα, βουλόμενος μυηθῆναι· ἦν δὲ οὐκ ἐξὸν ΞΕΝΟΙΣ, τότε μυεῖσθαι.—SCHOL. HOM. *Ilias* Θ. It was the same in the Cabiric Mysteries, as we learn from DIODORUS SICULUS, lib. v. who speaks of the like innovation made there.—Δοκεῖ δὲ οὗτος πρῶτος ΞΕΝΟΤΣ μυῆσαι. As to slaves, hear ARISTOPHANES in his Θεσμοφόριαζ·

—— Σὺ δ' ἄπιθ', ὦ Θρᾶττ', ἐκπυδών·
ΔΟΤΛΟΙΣ γὰρ οὐκ ἔξεστ' ἀκούειν τῶν λόγων.

losopher had the courage, one day, to ask the Athenians, why they excluded barbarians from their *Mysteries*, when Eumolpus, a barbarous Thracian, had established them.* But he does not tell us their answer. One of the most judicious of our modern critics was as much at a loss; and therefore thinks the restraint ridiculous, as implying, that the Institutors supposed that speaking the Greek tongue contributed to the advancement of piety.†

5. Another proof of this original may be deduced from what was taught promiscuously to all the Initiated; which was, *the necessity of a virtuous and holy life, to obtain a happy immortality*. Now this, we know, could not come from the sacerdotal warehouse: the priests could afford a better penny-worth of their Elysium, at the easy expence of oblations and sacrifices: for, as our great Philosopher well observes (who, however, was not aware of this extraordinary institution for the support of virtue, and therefore concludes too generally) "The Priests made it not their business to teach the people virtue: if they were diligent in their observations and ceremonies, punctual in their feasts and solemnities, and the tricks of religion, the holy tribe assured them that the Gods were pleased, and they looked no further: few went to the schools of Philosophers, to be instructed in their duty, and to know what was good and evil in their actions: the Priests sold the better penny-worths, and therefore had all the custom: for lustrations and sacrifices were much easier than a clean conscience and a steady course of virtue; and an expiatory sacrifice, that atoned for the want of it, much more convenient than a strict and holy life."‡ Now we may be assured, that an Institution, which taught the necessity of a strict and holy life, could not but be the invention of Lawgivers, to whose schemes moral virtue was so necessary.

6. Another strong presumption of this original is the great use of the *Mysteries* to the State: so amply confessed by the wisest writers of antiquity, and so clearly seen from the nature of the thing itself.

7. But, lastly, we have the testimony of the knowing Plutarch for this original; who, in his treatise *Of Isis and Osiris*, expresly tells us, that it was "a most ancient opinion, delivered down, from LEGISLATORS and Divines, to Poets and Philosophers, the author of it

* Ἐτόλμησε δέ ποτε καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἐρωτῆσαι δημοσίᾳ, τῆς παροῤῥήσεως ἀκούσας, διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν ἀποκλείουσι τοὺς βαρβάρους· καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ τὴν τελετὴν αὐτοῖς καταστησαμένου Εὐμόλπου, βαρβάρου καὶ Θρᾳκὸς ὄντος. But the fact, that they were not a *Grecian*, but a *foreign*, that is, barbarous invention, is proved by their very name, μυστήρια, from the eastern dialect, *mistor*, or *mistur*, "res aut locus absconditus."

† "Auctor est Libanius in Corinthiorum actione, mystagogos summa diligentia initiandos ante omnia monuisse, ut manus puras animumque sibi servarent purum: καὶ τὴν φωνὴν Ἕλληνας εἶναι; *et ut in voce* sive *sermone Græcos se præstarent:* hoc quidem profecto ridiculum, quasi faceret ad veram pietatem, Græca potius quam alia lingua loqui.—Is. CASAUBONI *Exercit.* xvi. *ad Annales Eccl. Baron.*

‡ LOCKE'S "Reasonableness of Christianity."

entirely unknown, but the belief of it indelibly established, not only in tradition, and the talk of the vulgar, but in the MYSTERIES and in the sacred offices of religion, both amongst Greeks and Barbarians, spread all over the face of the globe, That the Universe was not upheld fortuitously, without Mind, Reason, or a Governor to preside over its revolutions."*

It is now submitted to the candid reader, Whether it be not fairly proved, that the MYSTERIES *were invented by the* LEGISLATOR, *to affirm and establish the general doctrine of a Providence, by inculcating the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments.* Indeed, if we may believe a certain Ancient, who appears to have been well versed in these matters, they gained their end, by clearing up all doubts concerning the righteous government of the Gods.†

We have seen in general, how fond and tenacious ancient Paganism was of this extraordinary Rite, as of an Institution supremely useful both to SOCIETY and RELIGION. But this will be seen more fully in what I now proceed to lay before the Public; an examination of two celebrated pieces of Antiquity, the famous SIXTH BOOK OF VIRGIL'S ÆNEIS, and the METAMORPHOSIS OF APULEIUS: The first of which will shew us of what use the *Mysteries* were esteemed to SOCIETY; and the second, of what support to RELIGION.

An inquiry into Æneas's adventure to the Shades, will have this farther advantage, the instructing us in the *shews and representations of the* MYSTERIES; a part of their history, which the form of this discourse hath not yet afforded us an opportunity of giving. So that nothing will be now wanting to a perfect knowledge of this most extraordinary and important Institution.

For, the descent of Virgil's Hero into the infernal regions, I presume, was no other than a figurative description of an INITIATION; and particularly, a very exact picture of the SPECTACLES in the ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES; where every thing was done in shew and machinery; and where a representation‡ of the history of Ceres afforded opportunity of bringing in the scenes of heaven, hell, elysium, purgatory, and whatever related to the future state of men and heroes.

* Διὸ καὶ παμπάλαιος αὕτη κάτεισιν ἐκ θεολόγων καὶ ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΩΝ εἷς τε ποιητὰς καὶ φιλοσόφους δόξα, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδέσποτον ἔχουσα, τὴν δὲ πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ δυσεξάλειπτον, οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον, οὐδὲ ἐν φήμαις, ἀλλὰ ἔν τε ΤΕΛΕΤΑΙΣ, ἔν τε θυσίαις, καὶ βαρβάροις καὶ Ἕλλησι πολλαχοῦ περιφερομένην, ὡς οὔτ' ἄνουν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἀκυβέρνητον αἱρεῖται τῷ αὐτομάτῳ τὸ πᾶν.—Edit. Francof. fol. tom. ii. p. 369, B.

† Ὁ δὲ τοῖς μυστικοῖς ἐγκαρτερῆσαι παραγγέλμασιν ὑπομείνας, καὶ πρὸς τὰς τελετὰς αὐτὰς εὐσεβὴς καθὸ δεισιδαίμων γενόμενος· περὶ οὐδενὸς ἔτι τὴν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἔχει θρησκείαν ἀμφίβολον.—SOPATER *in Divis. Quæst.*

‡ —Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Πλουτεὺς τὴν Κόρην ἥρπασε· καὶ ἡ Δήμητρα ἀλωμένη κατὰ τὰς ἐρήμους τὸ τέκνον ἐζήτει. Καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μῦθον εἰς ὕψος ἤγαγε τὸ ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι τῦρ.—JUST. MART. *Orat. ad Græc.* prope init. Δηὼ δὲ καὶ Κόρη δρᾶμα ἤδη ἐγενέσθην μυστικόν· καὶ τὴν πλάνην, καὶ τὴν ἁρπαγὴν, καὶ τὸ πένθος αὐταῖν Ἐλευσὶς δαδουχεῖ.—CLEMENS ALEX. *in Protreptico*, p. 7, E, edit. Sylburgh.

But to soften this paradox all we can, it may be proper to enquire into the nature of the *Æneis*.

Homer's two poems had each a plain and entire story, to convey as plain and simple a moral: and in this, he is justly esteemed excellent. The Roman poet could make no improvements here: the Greek was complete and perfect; so that the patrons of Virgil, even Scaliger himself, are forced to seek for his superior advantages in his episodes, descriptions, similies, and in the chastity and correctness of his thoughts and diction. In the mean time they have all overlooked the principal advantage he had over his great Exemplar.

Virgil found the epic poem in the first rank of human compositions; but this was too narrow a circuit for his enlarged ambition: he was not content that its subject should be to instruct the world in MORALS; much less did he think of PHYSICS, though he was fond of natural enquiries, and Homer's Allegorizers had opened a back-door to let in the Philosopher with the Poet; but he aspired to make it a SYSTEM OF POLITICS. On this plan he wrote the *Æneis*; which is, indeed, as compleat an Institute in verse, by EXAMPLE, as the *Republics* of Plato and Tully were in prose by PRECEPT. Thus he enlarged the bounds, and added a new province to epic poesy. But though every one saw that AUGUSTUS was shadowed in the person of ÆNEAS, yet it being supposed that those political instructions, which the poet designed for the service of mankind, were solely for the use of his Master, they missed of the true nature of the poem. And in this ignorance, the succeeding epic writers, following a work whose genius they did not understand, wrote worse than if they had only taken Homer, and his simpler plan, for their direction. A great modern Poet, and best judge of their merit, assures us of this fact; and what has been said will help us to explain the reason of it: "The other epic poets" (says this admirable writer) "have used the same practice" [that of Virgil, of running two fables into one] "but generally carry it so far, as to superinduce a multiplicity of fables, destroy the unity of action, and lose their readers in an unreasonable length of time." *

Such was the revolution Virgil brought about in this noblest region of poesy; an improvement so great, that the truest poet had need of all the assistance the sublimest genius could lend him: nothing less than the joint aid of the Iliad and Odysses being able to furnish out the execution of his great idea: for a *system of Politics* delivered in the example of a great Prince, must shew him in every public adventure of life. Hence Æneas was, of necessity, to be found voyaging, with Ulysses, and fighting, with Achilles.

But if the improved nature of his subject compelled him to depart from that simplicity in the fable, which Aristotle, and his best inter-

* Preface to the Iliad of Homer.

preter, Bossu, find so divine in Homer;* he gained considerable advantages by it in other circumstances of the composition: for now, those ornaments and decorations, for whose insertion the critics could give no other reason than to raise the *dignity* of the Poem, become *essential* to the Subject. Thus the choice of Princes and Heroes for his personages, which were, before, only used to grace the scene, now constitute the nature of the action:† and the machinery of the Gods, and their intervention on every occasion, which was to create the MARVELLOUS, becomes, in this improvement, an indispensable part of the poem. A *divine interposition* is in the very spirit of ancient legislation; where, we see, the principal care of the Lawgiver was to possess the people with the full belief of an over-ruling Providence. This is the true reason of so much machinery in the Æneis: for which, modern critics impeach the author's judgment, who, in a poem written in the refined and enlightened age of Rome,‡ followed the *marvellous* of Homer so closely. An excellent writer, speaking of Virgil in this view, says, "If there be any instance in the Æneid liable to exception upon this account, it is in the beginning of the third book, where Æneas is represented as tearing up the myrtle that dropped blood. This circumstance seems to have the *marvellous* without the probable, because it is represented as proceeding from natural causes without the interposition of any God, or rather, supernatural power capable of producing it." § But surely this instance was ill chosen. The poet makes Æneas say, on this occasion,

> "Nymphas venerabar agrestes,
> Gradivumque patrem, Geticis qui præsidet arvis,
> Rite secundarent visus OMENque levarent." ||

Now *omens* were of two kinds,¶ the natural and supernatural. This in question, was of the latter sort, produced by the intervention of the Gods, as appears by his calling this adventure, MONSTRA DEUM: it was of the nature of those *portentous showers of blood* so frequently occurring in the Roman history. And the poet was certainly within the bounds of the probable, while he told no more than what their gravest writers did not scruple to record in their annals.

But this was not done merely to raise admiration. He is here (as

* "Nous ne trouverons point, dans la fable de l'Eneide, cette simplicité qu'Aristote a trouvée si divine dans Homére."—*Traité du Poeme epique*, lib. i. cap. xi.

† —"Le retour," says Bossu, "d'un homme en sa maison, et la querelle de deux autres, n'ayant rien de grand en soi, deviennent des actions illustres et importantes, lorsque dans le choix des noms, le poete dit que c'est l'Ulysse qui retourne en Ithaque, et que c'est Achille et Agamemnon qui querellent."—He goes on, "Mais il y a des actions qui d'elles mêmes sont très importantes, comme *l'establissement, ou la ruine d'un etat, ou d'une religion.* Telle est donc l'action de l'Eneide."—Lib. ii. cap. 19. He saw here a remarkable difference in the subjects; it is strange this should not have led him to see that the *Æneis* is of a different species.

‡ "Ce qui est beau dans Homére pourroit avoir été mal reçû dans les ouvrages d'un poete du tems d'Auguste." —Idem, lib. iii. cap. 8, *De l'admirable.*

§ MR. ADDISON'S "Works," vol. iii. p. 316, quarto edit. 1721.

|| Lib. iii.

¶ See note T, at the end of this book.

we observe) in his legislative character; and writes to possess the people of the interposition of the Gods, in OMENS and PRODIGIES. This was the method of the old Lawgivers. So Plutarch, as quoted above, tells us, "that with divinations and OMENS, Lycurgus sanctified the Lacedemonians, Numa the Romans, Ion the Athenians, and Deucalion all the Greeks in general; and by hopes and fears kept up in them the awe and reverence of Religion." The scene of this adventure is laid, with the utmost propriety, on the uncivilized inhospitable shores of Thrace, to inspire horror for *barbarous manners*, and an appetite for social life. On this account it is that our poet here deserts the Mythologists, and makes the age of CIVIL POLICY, (the time when men were first brought out of a state of nature) *the golden age*, and SATURN to govern in it. Thus Evander says,

"Hæc nemora indigenæ fauni nymphæque tenebant—
Queis neque mos, neque cultus erat; neque jungere tauros,
Aut componere opes norant, aut parcere parto:
Sed rami, atque asper victu venatus alebat.
Primus ab æthereo venit SATURNUS Olympo—
Is genus indocile, ac dispersum montibus altis,
COMPOSUIT, LEGESQUE DEDIT."*

Whereas Ovid, who speaks the sense of the Mythologists, makes the *golden age* to be *the state of nature*, and SATURN to govern there, before the erection of *civil policy*.

"Aurea prima sata est ætas, quæ, vindice nullo,
Sponte sua, SINE LEGE fidem rectumque colebat.
Pœna metusque aberant: NEC VERBA MINACIA FIXO
Ære legebantur: nec supplex turba timebant
JUDICIS ora sui.—
Ipsa quoque immunis rastroque intacta, nec ullis
Saucia vomeribus, per se dabat omnia tellus:
Contentique cibis nullo cogente creatis,
Arbuteos fœtus, montanaque fraga legebant,
Cornaque et in duris hærentia mora rubetis,
Et quæ deciderant patula Jovis arbore glandes.
Ver erat æternum—
Postquam SATURNO tenebrosa in Tartara misso—
Tum primum subiere domos—
Semina tum primum longis Cerealia sulcis
Obruta sunt, pressique jugo gemuere juvenci."†

For it served the grave purpose of the philosophic Poet to decry the state of nature; and it suited the fanciful paintings of the mythologic Poet to recommend it.

But every thing in this poem points to great and public ends. The turning *the ships into sea-deities*, in the ninth book, has the appearance of something infinitely more extravagant, than the *myrtle dropping blood*, and has been more generally and severely censured; and indeed, if defended, it must be on other principles. The philosophic commentators of Homer's poem, had brought the fantastic refinement of Allegory into great vogue. We may estimate the capacity of Vir-

* Lib. viii. † *Metam.* lib. i.

gil's judgment in not catching at so alluring a bait, by observing that some of the greatest of the modern epic poets, who approached nearest to Virgil in genius, have been betrayed by it. Yet here and there, our poet, to convey a political precept, has employed an ingenious allegory in passing. And the adventure in question is, I think, of this number. By the transformation of the ships into sea-deities, he would insinuate, I suppose, the great advantages of cultivating a naval power; such as extended commerce, and the dominion of the Ocean; which, in poetical language, is becoming *deities of the sea*.

"Mortalem eripiam formam, magnique jubebo
Æquoris esse Deas"—

He explains the allegory more clearly in the following book, where he makes these transformed sea-nymphs accompany Æneas, and his fleet of auxiliaries, through the Tyrrhene sea.

"Atque illi medio in spatio chorus, ecce, suarum
Occurrit comitum: nymphæ, quas alma Cybele
Numen habere maris, nymphasque e navibus esse
Jusserat—
Agnoscunt longe regem lustrantque choreïs."

This Ministerial hint was the more important and seasonable, as all Octavius's traverses, in his way to Empire, were from his want of a sufficient naval Power; first in his War with Brutus and Cassius, and afterwards with Sextus, the son of Pompey the Great. Nor was it, at this time, less flattering to Augustus; to whom the Alexandrians erected a magnificent Temple, Porticoes, and sacred Groves, where he was worshipped under the title of CÆSAR THE PROTECTOR AND PATRON OF SAILORS. So he became a *Sea-God* and at the head of these *Goddesses*. For as one of his Flatterers said,

"Præsenti tibi MATUROS largimur honores:
Jurandasque TUUM PER NOMEN ponimus aras."

As the not taking the true scope of the *Æneis*, hath occasioned mistakes, to Virgil's disadvantage, concerning the *plan and conduct* of the poem; so hath it likewise, concerning the *Characters*. The PIETY of Æneas, and his high veneration for the Gods, so much offends a celebrated French writer,* that he says, *the hero was fitter to found a religion*† *than a monarchy*. He did not know, that the image of a perfect Lawgiver is held out to us in Æneas: and had he known that, he had perhaps been ignorant, that it was the office of such a one to found *religions* and colleges of priests,‡ as well as states and corporations. And Virgil tells us this was the office of his hero,

* MONSIEUR DE ST. EVREMOND. † I. e. a community of monks.

‡ Ἔνθα Προμηθεὺς
Ἰαπετιονίδης ἀγαθὸν τέκε Δευκαλίωνα,
Ὃς πρῶτος ΠΟΙΗΣΕ ΠΟΛΕΙΣ καὶ ΕΔΕΙΜΑΤΟ ΝΗΟΥΣ
ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΙΣ, πρῶτος δὲ καὶ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣΕΝ.

"Dum conderet URBEM,
Inferretque DEOS Latio"—

On the other hand Turnus, whose manners are contrasted with those of our Hero, is, on his very first appearance, marked out by his irreverence to the Priestess of Juno. But the humanity of Æneas offends this critic as well as his piety; he calls him a mere St. Swithin, always raining. The beauty of that circumstance escaped him. It was proper to represent a perfect Lawgiver as quickly touched with all the affections of humanity: and the example was the rather to be inforced, because vulgar Politicians are but too generally seen divested of these common notices; and the habit of vulgar heroism is apt to induce passions very opposite to them. Thus Virgil having painted Turnus in all the colours of Achilles, and Æneas in those of Hector (for the subject of the *Iliad* being the destruction of a vicious and corrupt Community, the fittest instrument was a brutal warrior, *acer, iracundus*, such as Achilles; and the subject of the *Æneid* being the erection of a great and virtuous Empire, the fittest instrument was a pious patriot, like Hector,) Turnus, I say, was to be characterized as one delighting in blood and slaughter.

"Sævit amor ferri, et SCELERATA insania belli,
Ira super" *—

And, to make this passion the more detestable, the Poet tells us it was inspired into him by a Fury. But when he represents Æneas as accepting the favourable signs from Heaven, which pushed him on to war, he draws him, agreeable to such a character, compassionating the miseries which his very enemies, by their breach of faith, were to suffer in it.

"Heu, quantæ miseris cædes Laurentibus instant!
Quas pœnas mihi, Turne, dabis! quam multa per undas
Scuta virûm, galeasque, et fortia corpora volves,
Tibri pater! poscant acies, et fœdera rumpant." †

But the circumstances of his Mistress, as well as those of his Rival, are artfully contrived to set off His PIETY. On excusing his departure to the enraged Queen of Carthage, as forced by the command of the Gods, she is made to answer him with this Epicurean scoff,

"Scilicet is superis LABOR est, ea *cura* QUIETOS
SOLLICITAT"‡—

very properly put into the mouth of a Woman immersed in voluptuous pleasures. Yet the Poet takes care to tell us, that her impiety, like Turnus's delight in blood and slaughter, was inspired by the Furies.

"Heu! Furiis incensa feror"—

But there is a further beauty in this circumstance of the Episode.

* Lib. vii. 461. † Lib. viii. 537. ‡ Lib. iv.

These two Lovers are made the Founders of the two Hostile States of Rome and Carthage. So, this was to insinuate (in support of the author's main purpose) That it was want of religion which occasioned the *Punica Fides;* and the pious culture of it, which created the

Alta Mœnia Romæ.

Again, the Hero was to be drawn no less master of himself, under the charms of the softer passions, than under the violence of the rougher and more horrid. M. Voltaire says,

"Virgile orne mieux la raison,
A plus d' art, autant d' harmonie;
Mais il s' epuise avec Didon,
Et rate à la fin Lavinie."

But this ingenious man did not consider, that the Episode of Dido and Æneas, was not given to ornament his poem with an amusing tale of a love adventure, but to expose the public mischiefs which arise from Rulers' indulging themselves in this voluptuous weakness, while they become

"Regnorum immemores, turpique cupidine captos."

The Poet therefore had defeated his own design, if when he had recovered his Hero from this weakness, and made him say of his destined Empire in Italy,

—"hic Amor, hæc Patria est"—

if when he had perfected his Character, and brought him to the end of his labours, he had still drawn him struggling with this impotent and unruly passion.

Nor is the view, in which we place this poem, less serviceable to the vindication of the Poet's other characters. The learned author of the *Enquiry into the life and writings of Homer,* will allow me to differ from him, in thinking that those *uniform manners* in the Æneis, which he speaks of, was the effect of design, not, as he would have it, of custom and habit: "Virgil," says he, "had seen much of the splendour of a court, the magnificence of a palace, and the grandeur of a royal equipage: accordingly his representations of that part of life, are more august and stately than Homer's. He has a greater regard to decency, and those polished manners, that render men so much of a piece, and make them all resemble one another in their conduct and behaviour." * For the Æneis being a system of Politics, what this writer calls *the eternity of a government, the form of a magistrature, and plan of dominion,* must needs be *familiar with the Roman poet;* and nothing could be more to his purpose, than a representation of *polished manners;* it being the Legislator's office to tame and break men to humanity; and to make them disguise, at least, if they cannot be brought to lay aside, their savage habits.

* Page 325.

But this key to the Æneis not only clears up many passages obnoxious to the critics, but adds infinite beauty to a great number of incidents throughout the whole poem; of which take the following instances, the one, in *Religion*, and the other, in *civil Policy*.

1. Æneas, in the eighth book, goes to the Court of Evander, in order to engage him in a confederacy against the common enemy. He finds the king and his people busied in the celebration of an annual sacrifice. The purpose of the voyage is dispatched in a few lines, and the whole episode is taken up in a matter altogether foreign to it, that is to say, the sacrifice, the feast, and a long history of Hercules's adventure with Cacus. But it is done with great art and propriety; and in order to introduce, into this political poem, that famous institute of Cicero, (in his book Of Laws) designed to moderate the excess of labouring superstition, the *ignotæ ceremoniæ*, as he calls them, which at that time so much abounded in Rome—"Divos et eos, qui cœlestes semper habiti, colunto, et ollos, QUOS ENDO COELO MERITA VOCAVERINT, HERCULEM, Liberum, Æsculapium, Castorem, Pollucem, Quirinum"—Thus copied by Virgil, in the beginning of Evander's speech to Æneas.

> "Rex Evandrus ait: Non hæc solemnia nobis,
> Has ex more dapes, hanc tanti numinis aram
> VANA SUPERSTITIO VETERUMQUE IGNARA DEORUM
> Imposuit. *Sævis*, hospes Trojane, *periclis*
> Servati facimus, MERITOSQUE novamus HONORES"—

A lesson of great importance to the pagan Lawgiver. This *Vana superstitio ignara veterum deorum* was, as we have shewn, a matter he took much care to rectify in the *Mysteries*; not by destroying that species of idolatry, the worship of dead men, which was indeed his own invention, but by shewing *why* they paid that worship; namely, for benefits done to the whole race of mankind, by those deified Heroes.

> "Quare agite, O juvenes! *tantarum in munere laudum*," &c.

The conclusion of Evander's speech,

> "COMMUNEMQUE VOCATE DEUM, et date vina volentes,"

alludes to that other institute of Cicero, in the same book Of Laws. "SEPARATIM nemo habessit Deos: neve NOVOS, neve advenas, nisi publice adscitos, PRIVATIM colunto." Of which he gives the reason in his comment, "suosque Deos, aut Novos aut Alienigenas coli, confusionem habet religionum, et ignotas ceremonias."

Nor should we omit to observe a further beauty in this episode; and, in imitation, still, of Cicero; who, in his book Of Laws, hath taken the best of the Roman Institutes for the foundation of his system: For the worship of HERCULES, as introduced by Evander, and administered by the POTITII on the altar called the ARA MAXIMA, was,

as Dion. Hal. and Livy tell us, the oldest establishment in Rome; and continued for many ages in high veneration. To this the following lines allude,

"Hanc ARAM luco statuit, quæ MAXIMA semper, &c.
—Jamque sacerdotes, primusque POTITIUS, ibant."

But Virgil was so learned in all that concerned the Roman ritual, that it was a common saying, (as we collect from Macrobius) *Virgilius noster Pontifex maximus videtur:* And that writer not apprehending the reason of so exact an attention to sacred things, being ignorant of the nature of the poem, says, "MIRANDUM est hujus poetæ et circa nostra et circa externa sacra doctrinam." *

2. In the *ninth* book we have the fine episode of Nisus and Euryalus; which presents us with many new graces, when considered (which it ought to be) as a representation of one of the most famous and singular of the Grecian Institutions. CRETE, that ancient and celebrated School of legislation, had a civil custom, which the Spartans first, and afterwards all the principal cities of *Greece*,† borrowed from them, for every man of distinguished valour or wisdom to adopt a favourite youth, for whose education he was answerable, and whose manners he had the care of forming. Hence Nisus is said to be

"ACERRIMUS ARMIS,
Hyrtacides;"

And Euryalus,

"COMES Euryalus, quo PULCHRIOR alter
Non fuit Æneadum, Trojana neque induit arma;
Ora PUER prima signans INTONSA JUVENTA."

The LOVERS (as they were called) and their YOUTHS always served and fought together;—so Virgil of these:

"His amor unus erat, pariterque in bella ruebant,
Tum quoque communi portam statione tenebant."

The Lovers used to make presents to their favourite youths.—So Nisus tells his friend:

"Si, TIBI, quæ POSCO promittunt (nam *mihi* facti
Fama sat est)" &c.

The states of Greece, where this Institution prevailed, reaped so many advantages from it, that they gave it the greatest encouragement by their laws: so that Cicero, in his book *Of a republic*, observed, "opprobrio fuisse adolescentibus si amatores non haberent?" Virgil has been equally intent to recommend it by all the charms of poetry and eloquence. The amiable character, the affecting circumstance, the tenderness of distress, are all inimitably painted.

The youth so educated, were found to be the best bulwark of their country, and most formidable to the enemies of civil liberty. On

* *Saturn.* lib. iii. cap. 6. † See note U, at the end of this book.

which account, the Tyrants, wherever they prevailed, used all their arts to suppress an Institution so opposite to private interest and ambition. The annals of ancient Greece afford many examples of the bravery of these Bands, who chearfully attempted the most hazardous adventures.* So that Virgil did but follow the custom of the best policied States (which it was much for his honour to do) when he put these two friends on one of the most daring actions of the whole war; as old Aletes understood it:

> "Di patrii, quorum semper sub numine Troja est,
> Non tamen omnino Teucros delere paratis,
> Cum tales animos juvenum, et tam certa tulistis
> Pectora."

Plutarch, speaking of the Thebans, in the *Life of Pelopidas*, says, that "Gorgias first enrolled the SACRED BAND, consisting of three hundred chosen men; and that this corps was said to be composed of LOVERS and their FRIENDS. It is reported," says he, "that it continued unconquered till the battle of Chæronea; and when, after that action, Philip was surveying the dead, and came to the very spot where these three hundred fell, who had charged in close order so fatally on the Macedonian lances, and observed how they lay heaped upon one another, he was amazed, and being told, that this was the band of *Lovers* and their *Friends*, he burst into tears, and said, *Accursed be they who can suspect that these men either did or suffered any thing dishonest.* But certainly" (continues my author) "this institution of Lovers did not arise in Thebes, as the poets feigned, from the PASSION of Laius, but from the WISDOM of Legislators."† Such was the Friendship our poet would here represent, where he says,

> "Nisus AMORE PIO pueri"—

and where he makes Ascanius call Euryalus,

> "VENERANDE puer"—

The one dies in defence of the other; revenges his death; and then falls with him, like the Lovers in the SACRED BAND:

> "moriens animam abstulit hosti.
> Tum super exanimem sese projecit AMICUM
> Confossus, placidaque ibi demum morte quievit."

And here let it be observed, that, as this episode is given for a picture of this Institution in it's purity; so, in the Enemies' quarter, he hath

* See note X, at the end of this book.

† Τὸν δ' ἱερὸν λόχον, ὥς φασιν, συνετάξατο Γοργίδας πρῶτος, ἐξ ἀνδρῶν ἐπιλέκτων τριακοσίων,—ἔνιοι δέ φασιν ἐξ ἐραστῶν καὶ ἐρωμένων γενέσθαι τὸ σύστημα τοῦτο.—λέγεται δὲ διαμεῖναι μέχρι τῆς ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχης ἀήττητον· ὡς δὲ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐφορῶν τοὺς νεκροὺς ὁ Φίλιππος, ἔστη κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον, ἐν ᾧ συνετύγχανε κεῖσθαι τοὺς τριακοσίους ἐναντίους ἀπηντηκότας ταῖς σαρίσσαις ἅπαντας ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς ὅπλοις, καὶ μετ' ἀλλήλων ἀναμιγνυμένους, θαυμάσαντα, καὶ πυθόμενον ὡς ὁ τῶν ἐραστῶν καὶ τῶν ἐρωμένων οὗτος εἴη λόχος, δακρύσαι, καὶ εἰπεῖν, Ἀπόλοιντο κακῶς οἱ τούτους τι ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν αἰσχρὸν ὑπονοοῦντες. Ὅλως δὲ τῆς περὶ τοὺς ἐραστὰς συνηθείας, οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι, Θηβαίοις τὸ Λαΐου πάθος ἀρχὴν παρέσχεν, ἀλλ' οἱ NOMOΘETAI. —Tom. i. p. 287, B, et E, Francof. edit. fol. 1599. (Vol. ii. pp. 218, 219, ed. Brian.)

given another drawing of it, in it's degeneracy and corruption: for the SACRED BAND, like the MYSTERIES, underwent the common fate of time and malice.

> —"Tu quoque flaventem prima lanugine malas
> Dum sequeris Clytium infelix, nova gaudia, Cydon,
> Dardania stratus dextra, securus amorum
> Qui juvenum tibi semper erant, miserande, jaceres."*

The poet hath observed the same conduct, as we shall see hereafter, with regard to the *pure* and the *corrupt* MYSTERIES.

Before I leave these previous circumstances, permit me only to take notice, that this was the *second species* of the EPIC POEM; our own country-man, Milton, having produced the *third*: for just as Virgil rivaled Homer, so Milton was the emulator of both. He found Homer possessed of the province of MORALITY; Virgil of POLITICS: and nothing left for him, but that of RELIGION. This he seized, as ambitious to share with them in the Government of the poetic world: and by means of the superior dignity of his subject, hath gotten to the head of that Triumvirate which took so many ages in forming. These are the *three species* of the Epic poem; for its largest sphere is HUMAN ACTION; which can be only considered in a *moral*, a *political*, or *religious* view: and these the three great MAKERS; for each of their Poems was struck out at a heat, and came to perfection from its first essay. Here then the grand Scene was closed: and all further improvements of the Epic at an end.

It being now understood, that the Æneis is in the style of ancient legislation, it would be hard to think that so great a master in his art, should overlook a DOCTRINE, which, we have shewn, was the foundation and support of ancient Politics; namely a *future state of rewards and punishments*. Accordingly he hath given us a complete system of it, in imitation of his models, which were Plato's *vision of Erus*, and Tully's *dream of Scipio*. Again, as the Lawgiver took care to support this *Doctrine* by a very extraordinary Institution, and to commemorate it by a RITE, which had all the allurement of spectacle; and afforded matter for the utmost embellishments of poetry, we cannot but confess a description of such a Scene would add largely to the grace and elegance of his work; and must conclude he would be invited to attempt it. Accordingly, we say, he hath done this likewise, in the allegorical descent of Æneas into Hell; which is no other than an enigmatical representation of his INITIATION INTO THE MYSTERIES.

Virgil was to represent an Heroic Lawgiver in the person of Æneas; now, INITIATION into the *Mysteries* was what sanctified his Character and enobled his Function. Hence we find all the ancient

* Lib. x. 324.

Heroes and Lawgivers were, in fact, initiated.* And it was no wonder the Legislator should endeavour by his example to give credit to an institution of his own creating.

Another reason for the Hero's initiation was the important instructions the founders of Empire received in matters that concerned their office,† as we may see in the second section of the third book.

A third reason for his initiation, was their custom of seeking support and inspiration from the God who presided in the *Mysteries*.‡

A fourth reason for his initiation, was the circumstance in which the poet has placed him, unsettled in his affairs, and anxious about his future fortune. Now, amongst the uses of initiation, the advice and direction of the ORACLE was not the least: and an oracular bureau was so necessary an appendix to some of the *Mysteries*, as particularly the *Samothracian*, that Plutarch, speaking of Lysander's initiation there, expresses it by a word that signifies *consulting the oracle*, Ἐν δὲ Σαμοθράκῃ χρηστηριαζόμενος, &c. On this account, Jason, Orpheus, Hercules, Castor, and (as Macrobius says§) Tarquinius Priscus, were every one of them initiated into the *Mysteries*.

All this the poet seems clearly to have intimated in the speech of Anchises to his son:

> "Lectos juvenes, fortissima corda,
> Defer in Italiam.—Gens dura atque aspera cultu
> *Debellanda tibi Latio est. Ditis tamen ante*
> INFERNAS *accede* DOMOS—
> Tum genus omne tuum, et, *quæ dentur mœnia*, DISCES." ||

A fifth reason was the conforming to the old popular tradition, which said, that several other Heroes of the Trojan times, such as Agamemnon and Ulysses, had been initiated.¶

A sixth and principal was, that AUGUSTUS, who was shadowed in the person of Æneas, had been initiated into the ELEUSINIAN *Mysteries*.**

While the *Mysteries* were confined to Egypt, their native country, and while the Grecian Lawgivers went thither to be initiated, as a

* Δεῖξεν Τριπτολέμῳ τε Διόκλει τε Πληξίππῳ
Εὐμόλπου τε βίῃ, Κελεῷ θ' ἡγήτορι λαῶν,
Δρησμοσύνην ἱερῶν, καὶ ἐπέφραδεν ὀργία πᾶσιν.
HOMERI *Fragm. Hymn. in Cer.* apud PAUS. *Corinth.*

† —Γίνεσθαι δέ φασι καὶ εὐσεβεστέρους καὶ δικαιοτέρους καὶ κατὰ πάντα βελτίονας ἑαυτῶν τοὺς τῶν μυστηρίων κοινωνήσαντας· διὸ καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἡρώων τε καὶ ἡμιθέων τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους προφιλοτιμῆσθαι μεταλαβεῖν τῆς τελετῆς· καὶ γὰρ Ἰασίωνα καὶ Διοσκούρους, ἔτι δ' Ἡρακλέα καὶ Ὀρφέα μυηθέντας ἐπιτυχεῖν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς στρατείαις, διὰ τὴν τῶν θεῶν τούτων ἐπιφάνειαν.— DIOD. p. 224. ‡ Lib. ii. cap. 4. § The rhetor Sopater, in his Διαιρήσεις Ζητημάτων, makes Pericles say, Πιστεύω ταῖς ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι θεαῖς, τοῦτόν μοι ἐκβεβηκέναι τὸν νοῦν, καὶ τὸ στρατήγημα τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνακτόρων δοῦναι τῶν μυστικῶν. || *Æneis* v. 729, et seq. ¶ Ἀγαμέμνονά φασι μεμνημένον, ἐν ταραχῇ ὄντα πολλῇ κατὰ Τροίαν, δι' ἀκαταστασίαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, παῦσαι τὴν στάσιν, πορφυρίδα ἔχοντα—Ὀδυσσέα φασὶ μεμνημένον ἐν Σαμοθράκῃ χρήσασθαι τῷ κρηδέμνῳ ἀντὶ ταινίας.—*Scholia* APOLLON. RHOD. *Arg.* lib. i. 916.
Ὄφρα δαέντες
Ἀῤῥήκτους ἀγανῇσι τελεσφορίῃσι θεμίστας—
** SUETONII *Octavius*, cap. xciii. See note Y, at the end of this book.

kind of designation to their office, the ceremony would be naturally described, in terms highly allegorical. This was, in part, owing to the genius of the Egyptian manners; in part, to the humour of Travellers; but most of all, to the policy of Lawgivers; who, returning home, to civilize a barbarous people, by Laws and Arts, found it useful and necessary (in order to support their own characters, and to establish the fundamental principle of a FUTURE STATE) to represent *that* initiation, in which, was seen the condition of departed mortals in machinery, as AN ACTUAL DESCENT INTO HELL. This way of speaking was used by Orpheus, Bacchus, and others: and continued even after the *Mysteries* were introduced into Greece, as appears by the fables of Hercules, Castor, Pollux, and Theseus's *descent into hell*. But the allegory was generally so circumstanced, as to discover the truth concealed under it. So Orpheus is said to get to hell by the power of his harp:

"Threïcia fretus cithara, fidibusque canoris:"

that is, in quality of Lawgiver; the harp being the known symbol of his laws, by which he humanized a rude and barbarous people. So again, in the lives of Hercules and Bacchus, we have the true history, and the fable founded on it, blended and recorded together. For we are told, that they were in fact initiated into the *Eleusinian Mysteries*; and that it was just before their descent into Hell, as an aid and security in that desperate undertaking.* Which, in plain speech, was no more, than that they were initiated into the *lesser Mysteries* before they were admitted into the *greater*. The same may be said of what is told us of Theseus's adventure. Near Eleusis there was a Well, called Callichorus; and, adjoining to that, a *stone*, on which, as the tradition went, Ceres sat down, sad and weary, on her coming to Eleusis. Hence the stone was named Agelastus, the *melancholy stone*.† On which account it was deemed unlawful for the Initiated to sit thereon. "For Ceres" (says Clemens) "wandering about in search of her daughter Proserpine, when she came to Eleusis, grew weary, and sat down melancholy on the side of a well. So that, to this very day, it is unlawful for the Initiated to sit down there, lest they, who are now become perfect, should seem to imitate her in her desolate condition."‡ Now let us see what they tell us concerning Theseus's descent into hell. "There is also a stone" (says the scho-

* —Καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ἡρακλέα τε καὶ Διόνυσον, κατιόντας εἰς ᾅδου, πρότερον λόγος ἐνθάδε μυηθῆναι, καὶ τὸ θάρσος τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας παρὰ τῆς Ἐλευσινίας ἐναύσασθαι.—AUCTOR *Axiochi*.

† Ἀγέλαστος πέτρα. So OVID:

"Hic primum sedit gelido mœstissima saxo;
Illud Cecropidæ nunc quoque *triste* vocant."

‡ Ἀλωμένη γὰρ ἡ Δηὼ κατὰ ζήτησιν τῆς θυγατρὸς τῆς κόρης, περὶ τὴν Ἐλευσῖνα,—αὐτοκάμνει, καὶ φρέατι ἐπικαθίζει λυπουμένη. Τοῦτο τοῖς μεμυημένοις ἀπαγορεύεται εἰσέτι νῦν, ἵνα μὴ δοκοῖεν οἱ τετελεσμένοι μιμεῖσθαι τὴν ὀδυρομένην.—CLEMENS, *Protrept.* p. 10, A, edit. Sylburg.

liast on Aristophanes) "called by the Athenians, Agelastus; on which, they say, Theseus sat when he was meditating his descent into hell. Hence the stone had its name. Or, perhaps, because Ceres sat there, weeping, when she sought Proserpine."* All this seems plainly to intimate, that the *descent* of Theseus was his *entrance* into the *Eleusinian Mysteries*. Which entrance (as we shall see hereafter) was a fraudulent intrusion.

Both Euripides and Aristophanes seem to confirm our interpretation of *these descents into hell*. Euripides, in his Hercules furens, brings the hero, just come from hell, to succour his family, and destroy the tyrant Lycus. Juno, in revenge, persecutes him with the Furies; and he, in his transport, kills his wife and children, whom he mistakes for his enemies. When he comes to himself, he is comforted by his friend Theseus; who would excuse his excesses by the criminal examples of the Gods: a consideration which, as I have observed above, greatly encouraged the people in their irregularities; and was therefore obviated in the Mysteries, by the detection of the vulgar errors of polytheism. Now Euripides seems plainly enough to have told us what he thought of the fabulous descents into hell, by making Hercules reply, like one just come from the celebration of the Mysteries, and entrusted with the ἀπόῤῥητα. "The examples" (says he) "which you bring of the Gods, are nothing to the purpose. I cannot think them guilty of the crimes imputed to them. I cannot apprehend, how one God can be the sovereign of another God.—A God, who is truly so, stands in need of no one. Reject we then these idle fables, which the poets teach concerning them." A *secret*, which we must suppose, Theseus (whose entrance into the *Mysteries* was only a fraudulent intrusion) had not yet learnt.

The comic poet, in his *Frogs*, tells us as plainly what he too understood to be the ancient heroes' descent into hell, by the equipage, which he gives to Bacchus, when he brings him in, enquiring the way of Hercules. It was the custom at the celebration of the *Eleusinian* mysteries, as we are told by the scholiast on the place, to have what was wanted in those rites, carried upon asses. Hence the proverb, *Asinus portat mysteria:* accordingly the poet introduces Bacchus, followed by his buffoon servant Xanthius bearing a bundle in like manner, and riding on an ass. And, lest the meaning of this should be mistaken, Xanthius, on Hercules's telling Bacchus, that the inhabitants of Elysium were the Initiated, puts in, and says, "And I am *the ass carrying Mysteries*." This was so broad a hint, that it seems to have awakened the old dreaming scholiast; who, when he comes

* Ἔστι δὲ καὶ Ἀγέλαστος πέτρα καλουμένη παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὅπου καθίσαι φασὶ Θησέα μέλλοντα καταβαίνειν εἰς ᾅδου· ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα τῇ πέτρᾳ· ἢ ὅτι ἐκεῖ ἐκάθισεν ἡ Δημήτηρ κλαίουσα, ὅταν ἐζήτει τὴν κόρην.—SCHOL. *Equit.* ARISTOPH. l. 782.

to that place, where the Chorus of the Initiated appear, tells us, we are not to understand this scene as really lying in the ELYSIAN FIELDS, but in the ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES.*

Here then, as was the case in many other of the ancient fables, the pomp of expression betrayed willing posterity into the *marvellous*. But why need we wonder at this in the genius of more ancient times, which delighted to tell the commonest things in a highly figurative manner, when a writer of so late an age as Apuleius, either in imitation of Antiquity, or perhaps in compliance to the received phraseology of the *Mysteries*, describes his *initiation* in the same manner. "Accessi confinium mortis; et calcato Proserpinæ limine, per omnia vectus elementa remeavi: nocte media vidi solem candido coruscantem lumine, Deos inferos et deos superos. Accessi coram, et adoravi de proximo."† Æneas could not have described his night's journey to his companions, after he had been let out of the ivory gate, in properer terms, had it been indeed to be understood of a journey into Hell.

Thus, we see, Virgil was obliged to have his Hero initiated; and he actually had the authority of Antiquity to call this initiation *A Descent into Hell*, Ἡ ΕΙΣ ΑΔΟΥ̓ ΚΑΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ. Hence some of the pretended Orphic odes, sung at the celebration of the *Mysteries*, bore this title, a name equivalent to ΤΕΛΕΤΑΙ, or ἹΕΡΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ. And surely he made use of his advantages with great judgment; for such a fiction animates the relation, which, delivered out of allegory, had been too cold and insipid for epic poetry.

We see, from Æneas's urging the example of those Heroes and Lawgivers, who had been initiated before him, that his request was only for an *initiation*:

> "Si potuit manis arcessere conjugis Orpheus,
> Threïcia fretus cithara fidibusque canoris:
> Si fratrem Pollux alterna morte redemit,
> Itque reditque viam toties: quid Thesea magnum,
> Quid memorem Alciden? et mi genus ab Jove summo."

It is to be observed, that Theseus is the only one of these ancient Heroes not recorded in history to have been initiated, though we have shewn that *his descent into hell* was, like that of the rest, only a view of the *Mysteries*. The reason is, his entrance was a violent intrusion.

Had an old poem, under the name of Orpheus, intituled, A DESCENT INTO HELL, been now extant, it would, probably, have shewn us, that no more was meant than Orpheus's *initiation*; and that the idea of this sixth book was taken from thence.

But further, it was customary for the poets of the Augustan age to

* Ἰστέον δὲ, ὅτι εἰ καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἐν ᾅδου μύστας φαίνεται λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τοὺς ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι, ἐνταῦθα καὶ ὑφίστατο ἡ σκηνὴ τοῦ δράματος.—In ver. 357.

† Lib. xi. prope finem.

exercise themselves on the subject of the *Mysteries*, as appears from Cicero, who desires Atticus, then at Athens, and *initiated*, to send to Chilius, a poet of eminence,* an account of the *Eleusinian* mysteries; in order, as it would seem, to insert into some poem he was then writing.† Thus it appears, that both the ancient and contemporary poets afforded Virgil a pattern for this famous episode.

Even Servius saw thus far into Virgil's design, as to say, that *many* things were here delivered *according to the profound learning of the Egyptian theology*.‡ And we have shewn, that the doctrines taught in the *Mysteries*, were invented by that people. But though I say this was our poet's general design, in this famous episode, I would not be supposed to mean, that he followed no other guides in the particular circumstances of it. Several of them are borrowed from Homer: and several from the philosophic notions of Plato: some of these will be taken notice of, in their place.

The great Agent in this affair is the SIBYL: and, as a Virgin, she sustains two principal and distinct parts: that of the inspired *Priestess*, to pronounce the ORACLE (whose connexion with the *Mysteries* is spoken of above); and that of *Hierophant*, to conduct the Initiated through the whole CELEBRATION.

Her first part begins,

> "Ventum erat ad limen, cum Virgo, *Poscere fata*
> Tempus, ait. Deus, ecce, Deus—
> O tandem magnis pelagi defuncte periclis," &c.

and ends,

> "Ut primum cessit furor, et rabida ora quierunt."

Her second part begins at,

> "Sate sanguine divûm,
> Tros Anchisiade," &c.

and continues through the whole book. For as we have observed, the Initiated had a guide or conductor, called Ἱεροφάντης, Μυσταγωγὸς, Ἱερεὺς, indifferently of either sex,§ who was to instruct him in the preparatory ceremonies, and lead him through, and explain to him, all the shews and representations of the *Mysteries*. Hence Virgil calls the Sibyl MAGNA SACERDOS, and DOCTA COMES, words of equivalent signification: and this, because the *Mysteries* of Ceres were always celebrated in Rome by female priests.‖ And as the

* See lib. i. ep. 16, *ad Atticum*, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. iii. p. 23. † "Chilius te rogat et ego ejus rogatu ΕΥΜΟΛΠΙΔΩΝ ΠΑΤΡΙΑ."—Lib. i. epist. 9, *ad Atticum*, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. iii. p. 9. On which Victorius observes, "Πάτρια fere omnes excusi, quemadmodum est in antiquis, habent: ut intelligat ritus patrios et institutiones illius sacræ familiæ, et augusta mysteria, ut inquit Cicero, ii. *De Legibus*." ‡ "Multa per altam scientiam theologicorum Ægyptiorum." § Τὰς ἱερείας [Δήμητρος] Μελίσσας ἐκάλουν οἱ ποιηταί.—SCHOL. EURIP. *Hippol.* Μελίσσας κυρίως τὰς τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερείας φησί.—SCHOL. PIND. *Pythion.* ‖ So the satyrist,

> "Paucæ adeo Cereris vittas contingere dignæ."—JUVENAL. *Sat.* vi.

female *Mystagogue*, as well as the male,* was devoted to a single life, so was the Cumæan Sibyl, whom he calls *Casta Sibylla*. Another reason why a Priestess is given to conduct him, is, because Proserpine presides in this whole affair. And the name of the Priestess in the *Eleusinian Mysteries* shews that she properly belonged to Proserpine, though she was also called the Priestess of Ceres. "The Ancients" (says Porphyrius) "called the Priestesses of Ceres Μέλισσαι, as being the ministers or Hierophants of the subterraneous goddess; and Proserpine herself, Μελιτώδης."† And Æneas addresses her in the language of the Aspirant, to the Hierophant:

"Potes namque omnia: nec te
Nequidquam lucis Hecate præfecit Avernis."

and she answers much in the style of those sacred Ministers,

"Quod si tantus amor, &c.
Et INSANO juvat indulgere labori;
Accipe quæ peragenda prius."

For *insanus* is the same as ὀργιαστικὸς, and this, as we are told by Strabo, was an inseparable circumstance in the celebration of the *Mysteries*.‡

The first instruction the Priestess gives Æneas, is to search for the GOLDEN BOUGH, sacred to Proserpine;

"Aureus et foliis et lento vimine ramus,
Junoni infernæ sacer."

Servius can make nothing of this circumstance. He supposes it might possibly allude to a tree in the middle of the sacred grove of Diana's temple in Greece; where, if a fugitive came for sanctuary, and could get off a branch from the tree, which was carefully guarded by the priests, he was to contend in single combat with one of them; and, if he overcame, was to take his place.§ Though nothing can be more foreign to the matter in question than this rambling account, yet the Abbé Banier is content to follow it, for want of a better.¶ But the truth is, under this *branch*, is figured the *wreath of myrtle*, with which the Initiated were crowned, at the celebration of the

* "Hierophanta apud Athenas eviratur virum, et æterna debilitate fit castus."—HIERON. *ad Geron. De Monogamia.* "Cereris sacerdotes, viventibus etiam viris, et consentientibus, amica separatione viduantur."—TERTUL. *De Monogamia*, sub finem. Καὶ τὸν ΙΕΡΟΦΑΝΤΗΝ καὶ τὰς ΙΕΡΟΦΑΝΤΙΔΑΣ, καὶ τὸν δᾳδοῦχον, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἱερείας μυρρίνης ἔχειν στέφανον· δι' ἃ καὶ τῇ Δήμητρι προσθέσθαι ταύτην φησί.—SCHOL. SOPHOCL. *Œdip. Col.* 674.—It was for this reason that these female Hierophants were called Μέλισσαι, as is well observed by the SCHOL. on PIND. in *Pyth.* the Bee being, among the ancients, the symbol of chastity:

"Quod nec concubitu indulgent, nec corpora segnes
In Venerem solvunt."

† Τὰς Δήμητρος ἱερείας, ὡς χθονίας θεᾶς μύστιδας, Μέλισσας οἱ πάλαιοι ἐκάλουν, αὐτήν τε τὴν Κόρην Μελιτώδη. - *De Antro Nymph.* ‡ Τῇ Δήμητρι νὴ Δία τὸ ΟΡΓΙΑΣΤΙΚΟΝ πᾶν, καὶ τὸ Βακχικὸν, καὶ τὸ χορικὸν, καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς μυστικόν.—Lib. x. p. 468, B, edit. Paris. 1620, fol. § See note Z, at the end of this book. ‖ *Explicat. Histor. des Fables*, vol. ii. p. 133, ed. 1715. ¶ See note AA, at the end of this book.

*Mysteries.** 1. The *golden bough* is said to be sacred to Proserpine, and so, we are told, was the *myrtle:* Proserpine only is mentioned all the way; partly, because the *Initiation* is described as an actual descent into hell; but principally, because, when the RITES of the *Mysteries* were performed, Ceres and Proserpine were equally invoked; but when the SHEWS were represented, as in the first part of this Episode, then Proserpine alone presided. 2. The quality of this *golden bough*, with its *lento vimine*, admirably describes the *tender branches of myrtle*. 3. The doves of Venus are made to direct Æneas to the tree:

"Tum maximus heros
Maternas agnoscit *aves.*"

They fly to it, and delight to rest upon it, as their mistress's favourite tree.

"*Sedibus optatis* gemina super arbore sidunt."

For the *myrtle*, as is known to every one, was consecrated to Venus. And there is a greater propriety and beauty in this disposition, than appears at first sight. For not only the *myrtle* was dedicated to Proserpine as well as Venus, but the *doves* likewise, as Porphyry informs us.†

But the reader may ask, why is this myrtle-branch represented to be of *gold?* not merely for the sake of the *marvellous*, he may be assured. A *golden bough* was literally part of the sacred equipage in the *shews*, a burthen which the *Ass, who carried the mysteries*, we may be sure, was chiefly proud of. This branch was sometimes wreathed into a crown, and worn on the head; at other times, it was carried in the hand. Clemens Alexandrinus tells us,‡ from Dionysius Thrax the grammarian, that it was an Egyptian custom to hold a branch in the act of adoration. And of what kind *these branches* were, Apuleius tells us, in his description of a procession of the Initiated in the *Mysteries* of Isis. "Ibat tertius, attollens PALMAM AURO SUBTILITER FOLIATAM, nec non mercurialem etiam CADUCEUM."§ The *Golden branch*, then, and the *Caduceus* were related. And accordingly Virgil makes the former do the usual office of the latter, in affording a free passage into the regions of the dead. Again, Apuleius, describing the fifth person in the procession, says, "Quintus aureum vannum AUREIS congestam RAMULIS."‖ So that a *golden bough*, we see, was an important implement, and of very complicated intention in the SHEWS of the *Mysteries*.

* Μυρσίνης στεφάνῳ ἐστεφανοῦντο οἱ μεμυημένοι.—SCHOL. ARISTOPH. *Ranis.*
† Τῆς δὲ Φερεφάττης, παρὰ τὸ φέρβειν τὴν φάτταν, φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ τοὔνομα τῶν θεολόγων. ἱερὸν γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡ φάττα.—PORPH. *De Abst.* lib. iv. § 16. ‡ —Παρὰ Αἰγυπτίων καὶ τὸ τῶν βαλλῶν τῶν διδομένων τοῖς προσκυνοῦσι.—*Strom.* lib. v. p. 568, p. 414, D, edit. Sylburg. § *Metam.* lib. xi. p. 383. ‖ *Ibid.*

Æneas having now possessed himself of the GOLDEN BOUGH, a passport as necessary to his *descent* as a *myrtle crown* to *initiation*,

> "(Sed non ante datur telluris operta subire,
> Auricomos quam quis decerpserit arbore fœtus,)"

carries it into the Sibyl's grot:

> "Et vatis portat sub tecta sibyllæ."

And this was to design initiation into the *lesser Mysteries*: for Dion Chrysostom* tells us, it was performed ἐν οἰκήματι μικρῷ, in a little narrow chapel, such a one as we must suppose the Sibyl's grot to be. The *Initiated* into these rites were called ΜΥΣΤΑΙ.

He is then led to the opening of the descent:

> "Spelunca *alta* fuit, *vastoque immanis hiatu*
> Scrupea, tuta lacu nigro nemorumque tenebris."

And his reception is thus described:

> "Sub pedibus mugire solum et juga cœpta moveri
> Sylvarum; visæque canes ululare per umbram,
> Adventante dea."

All this is exactly similar to the fine description of the poet Claudian, where he professedly, and without disguise, speaks of the tremendous entry into these mystic Rites:

> "Jam mihi cernuntur trepidis delubra moveri
> Sedibus, et claram dispergere fulmina lucem,
> Adventum testata Dei. Jam magnus ab imis
> Auditur fremitus terris, *templumque remugit*
> *Cecropium; sanctasque faces attollit* ELEUSIN;
> *Angues Triptolemi stridunt*, et squamea curvis
> Colla levant attrita jugis—
> Ecce procul ternas Hecate variata figuras
> Exoritur."†

Both these descriptions agree exactly with the relations of the ancient Greek writers on this subject. Dion Chrysostom, speaking of *initiation* into the *Mysteries*, gives us this general idea of it: "Just so it is, as when one leads a Greek or Barbarian to be initiated in a certain mystic dome, excelling in beauty and magnificence; where he sees many mystic sights, and hears in the same manner a multitude of voices; where darkness and light alternately affect his senses; and a thousand other uncommon things present themselves before him."‡

Our poet next relates the fanatic agitation of the *Mystagogue*, on this occasion:

> "Procul, o procul este, profani,
> Conclamat Vates, totoque absistite luco.
> Tantum effata furens antro se immisit aperto."

So again, Claudian, where he counterfeits the raptures and astonish-

* *Orat.* 12. † *De Raptu Proserp.* sub initio. ‡ Σχεδὸν οὖν ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ εἴτις ἄνδρα Ἕλληνα, ἢ Βάρβαρον μυεῖσθαι παραδιδοὺς εἰς μυστικόν τινα οἶκον, ὑπερφυῆ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει, πολλὰ μὲν ὁρῶντα μυστικὰ θεάματα, πολλῶν δὲ ἀκούοντα τοιούτων φωνῶν, σκότους τε καὶ φωτὸς ἐναλλὰξ αὐτῷ φαινομένων, ἄλλων τε μυρίων γινομένων.—*Orat.* 12.

ment of the *Initiated*, and throws himself, as it were, like the Sibyl, into the middle of the scene:

"Gressus removete, profani,
Jam furor humanos nostro de pectore sensus
Expulit."

The PROCUL, O PROCUL ESTE, PROFANI of the Sibyl, is a literal translation of the formula used by the Mystagogue, at the opening of the *Mysteries*:

ΕΚΑΣ, ΕΚΑΣ ΕΣΤΕ, ΒΕΒΗΛΟΙ.

But now the poet having determined to accompany his Hero through all the mysterious rites of his *initiation*, and conscious of the imputed impiety, in bringing them out to open day, stops short in his narration, and breaks out into this solemn apology:

"Dii, quibus imperium est animarum, umbræque silentes;
Et Chaos et Phlegethon loca nocte silentia late,
Sit mihi fas audita loqui: sit numine vestro
Pandere res alta terra et caligine mersas"—

And here let me observe, that this pretended apprehension of the Ancients, that they were doing an unlawful thing when they revealed the secrets of the *Realm of Dis*, arose from the custom of the Mysteries, where these sights were represented. For they had none of these scruples where they speak of the Habitations of the Celestial Gods. Claudian, who (as we have observed) professes openly to treat of the *Eleusinian* Mysteries, at a time when they were in little veneration, yet, in compliance to old custom, excuses his undertaking in the same manner:

"Dii, quibus in numerum, &c.
Vos mihi sacrarum penetralia pandite rerum,
Et vestri secreta poli, qua lampade Ditem
Flexit Amor, quo ducta ferox Proserpina raptu
Possedit dotale Chaos; quantasque per oras
Sollicito genetrix erraverit anxia cursu;
Unde datæ populis leges, et, glande relicta,
Cesserit inventis Dodonia quercus aristis."*

Had the revealing the *Mysteries* been as penal at Rome, as it was in Greece, Virgil had never ventured on this part of his poem. But yet it was esteemed impious;† and what is more, it was infamous.

—"vetabo qui Cereris sacrum
Vulgarit arcanæ, sub iisdem
Sit trabibus, fragilemque mecum
Solvat phaselum"— HOR.

He therefore does it covertly; and makes this apology to such as saw into his meaning.

* *De Raptu Proserpinæ*, lib. i. sub init. † "Athenis initiatus [Augustus] cum postea Romæ pro tribunali de privilegio sacerdotum Atticæ Cereris cognosceret, et quædam secretoria proponerentur, dimisso concilio et corona circumstantium, solus audiit disceptantes."—SUETON. lib. ii. *Octav. Aug.* cap. 93.

The Hero and his Guide now enter on their journey :

> " Ibant obscuri sola sub nocte per umbras :
> Perque domos Ditis vacuas, et inania regna.
> Quale per incertam lunam sub luce maligna
> Est iter in sylvis : ubi cœlum condidit umbra
> Jupiter, et rebus nox abstulit atra colorem."

This description will receive much light from a passage in Lucian's dialogue of *the Tyrant*. As a company made up of every condition of life are voyaging together to the other world, Micyllus breaks out and says ; " Bless us ! how dark it is ! What is become of the fair Megillus ? In this situation, who can tell, whether Simmiche or Phryne be the handsomer ? Every thing is alike, and of one colour ; there is no room for comparing Beauties. My old cloak, which but now presented to your eyes so irregular a figure, is become as honourable a wear as his Majesty's purple. They are, indeed, both vanished,* and retired together under the same cover. But my friend, the Cynic, where are You ! give me your hand : *you are initiated in the* ELEUSINIAN MYSTERIES. *Tell me now, do you not think this very like the blind march the good company make there ?* CY. *Oh, extremely : and see, here comes one of the Furies, as I guess by her equipage, her torch, and her terrible looks.*" †

The Sibyl, on their approach to the mouth of the cave, had advised Æneas to summon up all his courage, as being to undergo the severest trial :

> " Tuque invade viam, vaginaque eripe ferrum :
> Nunc animis opus, Ænea, nunc pectore firmo."

These trials were of two sorts : the encountering *real* labours and difficulties ; and the being exposed to *imaginary and false* terrors. This latter was objected to all the Initiated in general : the other was reserved for Chiefs and Leaders. On which account, Virgil describes them both, in their order ; as they were both to be undergone by his Hero. The real labours are figured under these words :

> " Vestibulum ante ipsum, primisque in faucibus Orci,
> Luctus et ultrices posuere cubilia Curæ :

* The original has a peculiar elegance. Ἀ Φ Α Ν Η γὰρ ἄμφω, &c. alludes to the ancient Greek notions concerning the *first matter*, which they called ἀφανὴς, *invisible*, as being without the qualities of *form* and *colour*. The investing Matter with these qualities, was the production of bodies, the τὰ φαινόμενα : and their dissolution, a return to a state of *invisibility*.—εἰς Ἀ Φ Α Ν Ε Σ χωρεῖ τὰ διαλυόμενα, as the pretended Merc. Trismeg. has it, cap. xi. *Matter*, in this state of invisibility, was, by the earlier Greeks, called Ἀ Δ Η Σ. Afterwards, the state itself was so called ; and at length it came to signify the abode of departed spirits.

† MI. Ἡράκλεις τοῦ ζόφου· ὡοῦ νῦν ὁ καλὸς Μέγιλλος, ἢ τῷ διαγνῷ τις ἐνταῦθα εἰ καλλίων Φρύνης Σιμμίχη ; πάντα γὰρ ἴσα, καὶ ὁμόχροα, καὶ οὐδὲν οὔτε καλὸν, οὔτε καλλίον· ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τὸ τριβώνιον, ὡρότερον τέως ἄμορφον εἶναι δοκοῦν, ἰσότιμον γίγνεται τῇ πορφυρίδι τοῦ βασιλέως· ἀφανῆ γὰρ ἄμφω, καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ αὐτῷ σκότῳ καταδεδυκότα. Κυνίσκε, σὺ δὲ ὡοῦ ὡότε ἄρα ἂν τυγχάνεις ;—ἔμβαλέ μοι τὴν δεξιάν· εἰπέ μοι, ἐτελέσθης γὰρ, ὦ Κυνίσκε, τὰ ΕΛΕΥΣΙΝΙΑ, οὐχ ΟΜΟΙΑ τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἐνθαδέ σοι δοκεῖ ; ΚΥΝ. Εὖ λέγεις· ἰδοὺ οὖν ὡροσέρχεται δαδουχοῦσά τις, φοβερόν τι, καὶ ἀπειλητικὸν ὡροσθλέπουσα· ἢ ἆρα ὡοῦ Ἐριννύς ἐστιν ;—LUCIANI *Cataplus*, tom. i. p. 643, edit. Reitzii, 4to, Amstel. 1743.

Pallentesque habitant Morbi,* tristisque Senectus,
Et Metus, et malesuada Fames, et turpis Egestas:
Terribiles visu formæ; Lethumque, Labosque:
Tum consanguineus Lethi Sopor, et mala mentis
Gaudia, mortiferumque adverso in limine Bellum,
Ferreique Eumenidum thalami, et Discordia demens"—

To understand the force of this description, it will be necessary to transcribe the account the ancients have left us of the probationary trials in the *Mysteries* of MITHRAS, whose participation was more particularly aspired to, by Chiefs and Leaders of armies; whence these Initiated were commonly called the SOLDIERS OF MITHRAS.† "No one," says Nonnus, "could be initiated into these *Mysteries*" [of Mithras] "till he had passed gradually through the probationary labours" [by which he was to acquire a certain *apathe* and sanctity]. "There were eighty degrees of these labours, from less to greater: and when the aspirant has gone through them all, he is initiated. These labours are—to pass through fire, to endure cold, hunger, and thirst, to undergo much journeyings; and, in a word, every toil of this nature." ‡

The second sort of trial were the *panic terrors*, of the *Mysteries*; and these, Virgil represents next. And to distinguish them from the figurative description of the *real labours* preceding, he separates the two accounts by that fine circumstance of the *tree of dreams*, which introduces the second sort:

"In medio ramos annosaque brachia pandit
Ulmus opaca, ingens: quam sedem somnia vulgo
Vana tenere ferunt, foliisque sub omnibus hærent.
Multaque præterea variarum monstra ferarum,
Centauri in foribus stabulant, Scyllæque biformes,
Et centum geminus Briareus, et bellua Lernæ
Horrendum stridens, flammisque armata Chimæra:
Gorgones, Harpyiæque, et forma tricorporis umbræ."

These *terribiles visu formæ* are the same which *Pletho*, in the place quoted above, calls ἀλλόκοτα τᾶς μορφᾶς φάσματα, as they were seen in the entrance of the *Mysteries*; and which Celsus tells us, were likewise presented in the Bacchic rites; τοῖς ἐν ταῖς Βακχικαῖς Τελεταῖς τὰ φάσματα καὶ δείματα προεισάγουσι.§

* Quint. is mistaken in supposing *pallentesque*, &c., a *metonymy*. Had this been the description of an *Hospital*, he had been right: For then, indeed, in these words, the *cause* would have been put for the *effect*.

† "Erubescite, Romani commilitones ejus, jam non ab ipso judicandi, sed ab aliquo MITHRÆ MILITE: qui cum initiatur in spelæo," &c.—TERTULL. *De Corona Militis*.

‡ Οὐ δύναται οὖν τις εἰς αὐτὸν τελεσθῆναι, εἰ μὴ πρότερον διὰ τῶν βαθμῶν τῶν κολάσεων παρέλθοι. βαθμοὶ δέ εἰσι κολάσεων τὸν μὲν ἀριθμὸν ὀγδοήκοντα, ἔχοντες δὲ ὑπόβασιν καὶ ἀνάβασιν· κολάζονται γὰρ πρῶτον τὰς ἐλαφροτέρας, εἶτα τὰς δραστικωτέρας. καὶ εἶθ' οὕτω μετὰ τὸ παρελθεῖν διὰ πασῶν τῶν κολάσεων, τότε τελεῖται ὁ τελούμενος· αἱ δὲ κολάσεις εἰσὶ τὸ διὰ πυρὸς παρελθεῖν, τὲ διὰ κρύους, διὰ πείνης καὶ δίψης, διὰ ὁδοιπορίας πολλῆς, καὶ ἁπλῶς διὰ πασῶν τῶν τοιούτων.—NONNUS *in Secundam Nazianz. Steleteuticam*. And again he says, Οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται τελεῖσθαι τὰς τοῦ Μίθρου τελετὰς, εἰ μὴ διὰ πασῶν τῶν κολάσεων παρέλθοι, καὶ δείξοι ἑαυτὸν ἀπαθῆ τίνα καὶ ὅσιον, &c.

§ ORIGEN. *Contra Cels.* lib. iv. p. 167.

But it is reasonable to suppose, that though these things had the use here assigned to them, it was some circumstance in the recondite physiology of the East, which preferred them to this station. We are to consider then this dark entrance into the *Mysteries*, as a representation of the CHAOS, thus described:

> "Ibant obscuri sola sub nocte per umbram,
> Perque domos Ditis *vacuas* et *inania* regna."

And amongst the several Powers invoked by the Poet, at his entrance on this scene, CHAOS is one:

> "Dî, quibus imperium est animorum, umbræque silentes:
> Et CHAOS et Phlegethon, *loca nocte tacentia late*."

Now a fragment of Berosus, preserved by George Syncellus, describes the ancient CHAOS, according to the physiology of the Chaldeans, in this manner,—"There was a time, they say, when all was water and darkness. And these gave birth and habitation to MONSTROUS ANIMALS OF MIXED FORMS AND SPECIES. For there were men with two wings, others with four, and some again with double faces. Some had the horns of goats, some their legs, and some the legs of horses; others had the hind-parts of horses, and the fore-parts of men, like the hippocentaurs. There were bulls with human heads, dogs with four bodies ending in fishes, horses with dogs' heads; *and men, and other creatures with the heads and bodies of horses, and with the tails of fishes.* And a number of animals, whose bodies were a MONSTROUS COMPOUND of the dissimilar parts of beasts of various kinds. Together with these, were fishes, reptiles, serpents, and other creatures, which, by a reciprocal translation of the parts to one another, became all portentously deformed: the pictures and representations of which were hung up in the temple of Belus. A woman ruled over the whole, whose name was Omoroca, in the Chaldee tongue Thalath, which, in Greek, signifies the Sea; and (on account of their powerful connexion) the Moon." * This account seems to have been exactly copied in the *Mysteries*, as appears from the description of the poet:

* Γενέσθαι φησὶ χρόνον, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πᾶν, σκότος καὶ ὕδωρ εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ζῶα τερατώδη, καὶ εἰδιφυεῖς τὰς ἰδέας ἔχοντα ζωογονεῖσθαι. Ἀνθρώπους γὰρ διπτέρους γενηθῆναι, ἐνίους δὲ καὶ τετραπτέρους, καὶ διπροσώπους.—Τοὺς μὲν αἰγῶν σκέλη καὶ κέρατα ἔχοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἱππόποδας, τοὺς δὲ τὰ ὀπίσω μὲν μέρη ἵππων, τὰ δὲ ἔμπροσθεν ἀνθρώπων, οὓς ἱπποκενταύρους τὴν ἰδέαν εἶναι. Ζωογονηθῆναι δὲ καὶ ταύρους, ἀνθρώπων κεφαλὰς ἔχοντας· καὶ κύνας τετρασωμάτους οὐρὰς ἰχθύος ἐκ τῶν ὄπισθεν μερῶν ἔχοντας, καὶ ἵππους κυνοκεφάλους, καὶ ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἕτερα ζῶα, κεφαλὰς μὲν καὶ σώματα ἵππων ἔχοντα, οὐρὰς δὲ ἰχθύων, καὶ ἄλλα δὲ ζῶα παντοδαπῶν θηρίων μορφὰς ἔχοντα. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἰχθύας, καὶ ἑρπετὰ, καὶ ὄφεις, καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα πλείονα θαυμαστὰ καὶ παρηλλαγμένα τὰς ὄψεις ἀλλήλων ἔχοντα, ὧν καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἐν τῷ τοῦ Βήλου ναῷ ἀνάκειται. Ἄρχειν δὲ τούτων πάντων γυναῖκα, ᾗ ὄνομα Ὁμορωκὰ. Εἶναι δὲ τοῦτο Χαλδαϊστὶ μὲν Θαλὰθ, Ἑλληνιστὶ δὲ μεθερμηνεύεται θάλασσα, κατὰ δὲ ἰσόψηφον Σελήνην.—GEORG. SYNCEL. *Chronogr.*

"Multaque præterea variarum monstra ferarum,
Centauri in foribus stabulant, Scyllæque biformes,
Et centum geminus Briareus, et bellua Lernæ
Horrendum stridens, flammisque armata Chimæra:
Gorgones, Harpyiæque, et forma TRICORPORIS umbræ."

The CANINE figures have a considerable station in this region of monsters: And he tells us,

—"Visæque CANES ululare per umbram:"

which Pletho explains in his scholia on the magic oracles of Zoroaster. "It is the custom, in the celebration of the *Mysteries*, to present before many of the Initiated, phantasms of a CANINE figure, and other monstrous shapes and appearances." *

The woman, whose name *Thalath* coincides with that of the *Moon*, was the *Hecate* of the Greeks, who is invoked by Æneas on this occasion:

"Voce vocans HECATEN *cæloque Erebo*que potentem."

Hence terrifying visions were called *Hecatea*.† The reason why Hecate, or the Moon, came to be one of the Governesses in these rites, was, because some had placed Elysium in the Moon; the Elysian fields being from thence called the *fields of Hecate*. The ancients called Hecate, *Diva* TRIFORMIS. And Scaliger observes that this word *Thalath*, which Syncellus, or Berosus, says, was equivalent to the Moon, signifies TRIA.

And now we soon find the Hero in a fright;

"Corripit hic subita trepidus formidine ferrum
Æneas, strictamque aciem venientibus offert."

With these affections the Ancients represent the *Initiated* as possessed on his first entrance into these holy Rites. "Entering now into the mystic dome" (says Themistius) "he is filled with horror and amazement. He is seized with solicitude, and a total perplexity: he is unable to move a step forward, and at a loss to find the entrance to that road which is to lead him to the place he aspires to. Till the Prophet" [the *vates*] "or Conductor, laying open the vestibule of the temple" ‡—To the same purpose Proclus:—"As in the most holy *Mysteries*, before the scene of the mystic visions, there is a terror infused over the minds of the Initiated, so," &c.§

The adventurers come now to the banks of Cocytus. Æneas is surprised at the crowd of ghosts which hover round it, and appear impatient for a passage. His Guide tells him they are those who

* Εἴωθε τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν τελουμένων φαίνεσθαι κατὰ τὰς τελετὰς κυνώδη τινὰ, καὶ ἄλλως ἀλλόκοτα τὰς μορφὰς φάσματα. † SCHOL. APOLLON. *Argon.* lib. iii. 859.
‡ Ὁ μὲν ἄρτι προσιὼν τοῖς ἀδύτοις, φρίκης τε ἀνεπίμπλατο καὶ ἰλίγγου· ἀδημονίᾳ τε εἶχετο καὶ ἀπορίᾳ συμπάσῃ, οὐδὲ ἴχνους λαθέσθαι οἷός τε ὢν, οὔτε ἀρχῆς ἡστινοσοῦν ἐπιδράξασθαι εἴσω φερούσης, ὁπότε δὲ ὁ προφήτης ἐκεῖνος ἀναπετάσας τὰ προπύλαια τοῦ νεὼ.—*Orat. in Patrem.* § Ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀγιωτάταις τελεταῖς πρὸ τῶν μυστικῶν θεαμάτων ἔκπληξις τῶν μυουμένων, οὕτω.—*In Plat. Theol.* lib. iii. cap. 18.

have not had the rites of sepulture performed to their manes, and so are doomed to wander up and down for a hundred years, before they be permitted to cross the river :

> " Nec ripas datur horrendas, nec rauca fluenta
> Transportare prius, quam sedibus ossa quierunt.
> Centum errant annos, volitantque hæc litora circum.
> Tum demum admissi stagna exoptata revisunt."

We are not to think this old notion took its rise from the vulgar superstition. It was one of the wisest contrivances of ancient politics ; and came originally from Egypt, the fountain-head of legislation. Those profound masters of wisdom, in projecting for the common good, found nothing would more contribute to the safety of their fellow citizens than the public and solemn interment of the dead ; as without this provision, private murders might be easily and securely committed. They therefore introduced the custom of pompous funeral rites : and, as Herodotus and Diodorus tell us, were of all people the most circumstantially ceremonious in the observance of them. To secure these by the force of Religion, as well as civil custom, they taught, that the deceased could not retire to a place of rest, till these rites were performed. The notion spread so wide, and fixed its roots so deep, that the substance of the superstition remains, even to this day, in most civilized countries. By so effectual a method did the Legislature gain its end, the security of the citizen. There is a circumstance in classical antiquity which will sufficiently inform us of how great moment these rites were esteemed. Homer, Sophocles, and Euripides, are confessed to be the greatest masters of their art, and to have given us the best models of it. Yet, in the judgement of modern critics, the funeral rites for Patroclus, in the Iliad, and for Ajax and Polynices, in the Ajax and the Phœnicians, are a vicious continuation of the story, which violates the *unity of the action*. But they did not consider, that funeral rites were anciently deemed an inseparable part of the Hero's story : And therefore those great masters of design could not understand the action to be complete, till that important office to the dead was dispatched.* Nay so dreadful was the apprehension of the want of *funeral Rites*, that the Historians tell us, it was one of the principal causes of the Spartan bashfulness, in that War in which *Tyrtæus* was employed to restore them to their ancient Spirit. Who when he had dissipated this superstitious terror by the magic of his martial numbers, they rushed on to the charge with a resolution to conquer or to die.

* Προστεθῆναι δὲ ἔτι τούτῳ τῷ νόμῳ τόνδε, τὸν διδόντα τὸ χρέος, καὶ ἀπάσης κρατέειν τῆς τοῦ λαμβάνοντος θήκης· τῷ δὲ ὑποτιθέντι τοῦτο τὸ ἐνέχυρον τήνδε ἐπεῖναι ζημίην, καὶ μὴ βουλομένῳ ἀποδοῦναι τὸ χρέος, μηδὲ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ τελευτήσαντι εἶναι ταφῆς κυρῆσαι μήτ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ πατρῴῳ τάφῳ, μήτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενί, μήτ' ἄλλον μηδένα τὸν ἑωῦτοῦ ἀπογενόμενον θάψαι.—Herod. lib. ii. cap. 136, edit. Gale, p. 142, lin. 8.

But the Egyptian Sage found, afterwards, another use in this opinion; and by artfully turning it to a punishment on insolvent debtors, strengthened public credit, to the great advantage of commerce, and consequently of civil community. For, instead of that general custom of modern barbarians to bury insolvents alive, this polite and humane people had a law of greater efficacy, which denied burial to them when dead. And here the learned Marsham seems to be mistaken, when he supposes, that the Grecian opinion of the wandering of unburied ghosts arose from this interdiction of sepulchral rites.* On the contrary it appears, that the law was founded on the opinion, originally Egyptian, and not the opinion on the law; for the law had no other sanction than the opinion.

In a word, had not our poet conceived it a matter of much importance, he had hardly dwelt so long upon it, or returned again to it,† or laid so much stress on it, or made his hero so attentively consider it:

> "Constitit Anchisa satus, et vestigia pressit,
> MULTA PUTANS."

But having added,

> —"Sortemque animo miseratus *iniquam*;"

and Servius commented, "Iniqua enim sors est puniri propter alterius negligentiam: nec enim quis culpa sua caret sepulchro;" Mr. Bayle cries out,‡ "What injustice is this! was it the fault of these souls, that their bodies were not interred?" But neither of them knowing the origin of this opinion, nor seeing its use, the latter ascribes *that* to the blindness of Religion, which was the issue of wise Policy. Virgil, by his *sors iniqua*, means no more than that in this, as well as in several other civil institutions, *a public benefit was often a private injury*.

The next thing observable is the ferry-man, Charon; and he, the learned well know, was a man of this world, an Egyptian of a well-known Character. This People, like the rest of mankind, in their descriptions of the other world, used to copy from something they were well acquainted with in this. In their funeral rites, which, as we observed, was a matter of greater moment with them than with any other people, they used to carry their dead over the Nile, and through the marsh of Acherusia, and there put them into subterraneous caverns; the ferry-man employed in this business being, in their language, called Charon. Now in their *Mysteries*, the description of the passage into the other world was borrowed, as was

* "Ab interdictæ apud Ægyptios sepulturæ pœnâ, inolevit apud Græcos opinio insepultorum corporum animas a Charonte non esse admissas."—*Canon Chronicus*, seculum xi. sect. 3. † Ver. 373, et seq. ‡ *Respons. aux Quest. d'un Provincial*, p. iii. cap. 22.

natural, from the circumstances of their funeral rites. So that the Charon *below* might very well refuse to charge his Boat with those whom his namesake *above* had not admitted. And it might be easily proved, if there was occasion, that the Egyptians themselves transferred these realities into the ΜΥΘΟΣ, and not the Greeks, as later writers generally imagine.

Charon is appeased at the sight of the *golden bough*:

> "Ille admirans venerabile donum
> Fatalis virgæ, LONGO POST TEMPORE visum."

But it is represented as the passport of all the ancient Heroes who had descended into hell; how then could it be said to be *longo post tempore visum*, Æneas being so near the times of those Heroes? To explain this, we must have in mind what hath been said above of a perfect Lawgiver's being held out in Æneas, and of Augustus's being delineated in the Trojan chief. So that here Virgil is pointing to his Master; and what he would insinuate, is, that the Roman emperor, initiated in the Eleusinian rites, should, in a later age, rival the fame of the first Grecian Lawgivers.

But Æneas hath now crossed the river, and is come into the proper regions of the dead. The first Apparition that occurs is the dog Cerberus:

> "Hæc ingens latratu regna trifauci
> Personat, adverso recubans immanis in antro."

This is plainly one of the phantoms of the *Mysteries*, which, Pletho tells us above, was in the shape of a dog, κυνώδη τινά. And in the fable of Hercules's descent into hell, which, we have shewn, signified no more than his Initiation into the *Mysteries*, it is said to have been, amongst other things, for fetching up the dog Cerberus.

The Prophetess, to appease his rage, gives him a medicated cake, which casts him into a slumber:

> "Cui vates, horrere videns jam colla colubris,
> *Melle soporatam et medicatis frugibus offam*
> Objicit."

In the *Mysteries* of Trophonius (who was said to be nursed by Ceres,* that is, as I understand it, to derive his rites from the Eleusinian) the Initiated carried the same sort of medicated Cakes to appease the serpents he met with in his passage.† Tertullian, who gives all *Mysteries* to the devil; and very equitably, as the good man makes *him* the author of all that is done there, mentions the offering up of these cakes, *celebrat et panis oblationem.*‡ This in question was of *poppy-seed*, made up with honey; and so I understand

* Δήμητρι—τοῦ Τροφωνίου εἶναι τροφόν.—PAUSAN. *Bœot.* cap. xxxix. p. 790, edit. Kuhnii, fol. Lips. 1696. † Μελιττοῦντας ἐπάγοντες ἐν ταῖν χεροῖν, μειλίγματα ἑρπετῶν.—PHILOS. *Vit. Apoll.* lib. viii. cap. 15. ‡ *De Præscr. adver. Hæret.*

medicatis frugibus, here, on the authority of the poet himself, who, in the fourth book, makes the priestess of Venus prepare the same treat for the *dragon* who guarded the Hesperian fruit:

"Spargens humida mella soporiferumque papaver."

Honey, as we have shewn above, was sacred to Proserpine, who on that account was called Μελιτώδης; and the *poppy* was consecrated to Ceres: "Cereale Papaver," says Virgil; on which words Servius thus comments: "Vel quod est usui, sicut frumentum, vel quo Ceres usa est ad oblivionem doloris; nam ob raptum Proserpinæ vigiliis defatigata, gustato eo acta est in soporem." *

But, without doubt, the images, which the spissated juice of poppy presents to the fancy, was one reason why this drug had a place in the ceremonial of the SHEWS: not improbably, it might be given to some at least of the *Initiated,* to aid the impression of those mystic visions which passed before them. For that something like this was done, that is, giving medicated drugs to the Aspirants, we are informed by Plutarch; who speaks of a shrub called Leucophyllus used in the celebration of the *Mysteries* of *Hecate,* which drives men into a kind of frenzy, and makes them confess all the wickedness they had done or intended. And *confession* was one necessary preparative for initiation.

The regions, according to Virgil's Topography, are divided into three parts: 1. PURGATORY. 2. TARTARUS. 3. ELYSIUM. For Deiphobus (in the first) says,

"Discedam, EXPLEBO numerum, reddarque tenebris." †

And, in the second, it is said of Theseus,

"Sedet, ÆTERNUMque sedebit
Infelix Theseus." —

The *Mysteries* divided them in the same manner. So Plato, in the passage ‡ quoted above (where he speaks of what was taught in the *Mysteries)* talks of souls sticking fast in mire and filth, and remaining in darkness, till a long series of years had purged and purified them; and Celsus, in *Origen,* § says, that the *Mysteries* taught the doctrine of eternal punishments.

Of all the three States this of Tartarus only was *eternal.* There was, indeed, another, in the ancient pagan theology, which had the same relation to Elysium, that Tartarus had to Purgatory, the extreme of reward, as Tartarus of punishment. But then this state was not in the infernal regions, but in Heaven. Neither was it the lot of common Men, but reserved for *heroes* and *dæmons;* Beings of a superior

* Ad lib. i. *Georg.* ver. 212. † But the nature and end of this purgatory the poet describes at large, from ver. 736, to ver. 745. ‡ See note (§), p. 222.
§ See note (*), p. 230.

order, such as Hercules, Bacchus, &c. who became Gods on their admission into Heaven, where *eternity* was the consequence of their deification.

Cicero distinguishes the two orders of souls, according to the vulgar Theology, in this manner: "Quòd autem ex hominum genere consecratos, sicut Herculem et cæteros, coli lex jubet, indicat *omnium* quidem *animos immortales* esse, FORTIUM BONORUMQUE DIVINOS." *

And here it is to our purpose to observe, that the Virtues and Vices, which stock these three Divisions with inhabitants, are such as more immediately affect Society. A plain proof that the poet followed the views of the Legislator, the institutor of the *Mysteries*.

PURGATORY, the first division, is inhabited by suicides, extravagant lovers, and ambitious warriors: And, in a word, by all those who had indulged the violence of their passions; which made them rather wretched than wicked. It is remarkable that amongst these we find one of the *Initiated*:

"Cererique sacrum Polybœten."

This was agreeable to the public doctrine of the *Mysteries*, which taught, that initiation with virtue procured men great advantages over others, in a future state; but that without virtue, it was of no avail.

Of all these disorders, the poet hath more distinctly marked out the misery of SUICIDE:

"Proxima deinde tenent mœsti loca, qui sibi lethum
Insontes peperere manu, lucemque perosi
Projecere animas. Quam vellent æthere in alto
Nunc et pauperiem et duros perferre labores!"

Here he keeps close to the mysteries; which not only forbad *suicide*, but taught on what account it was criminal. "That which is said in the MYSTERIES" (says Plato) "concerning these matters of man's being placed in a certain watch or station, which it is unlawful to fly from, or forsake, is a profound doctrine, and not easily fathomed." † *Insontes*, says the Poet, to distinguish Suicides (properly so called) from those whom the Laws condemned to be their own Executioners: for this inhuman treatment was amongst the capital inflictions, in the Criminal Code of the Ancients.

Hitherto all goes well. But what must we say to the poet's putting *new-born infants*, and *men falsely condemned*, into his purgatory? For though the *faith and inquisition* of modern Rome send many of both sorts into a place of punishment, yet the genius of ancient paganism had a gentler aspect. It is, indeed, difficult to tell what

* *De Legibus*, lib. ii. cap. 12. † Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΟΙΣ λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν, οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μεγάς τε τις μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διϊδεῖν.—*Phæd.* p. 62, Ser. ed. tom. i. See note BB, at the end of this book.

these inmates have to do here. Let us consider the case of the *infants*; and if we find it can only be cleared up by the general view of things here given, this will be considered as another argument for the truth of our interpretation of the DESCENT:

> "Continuo *auditæ voces, vagitus et ingens,*
> Infantumque animæ flentes in limine primo:
> Quos dulcis vitæ exortes, et ab ubere raptos
> Abstulit atra dies, et *funere* mersit *acerbo.*"

These appear to have been the *cries and lamentings* that, Proclus tells us, were heard in the Mysteries.* So that we only want to know the original of so extraordinary a circumstance. Which I take to have been just such another provision of the Lawgiver for the security of INFANCY, as that about *funeral rites* was for the ADULT. For nothing could more engage Parents in the care and preservation of their young, than so terrible a doctrine. Nor are we to imagine, that their natural fondness needed no inforcement, or support: for that most degenerate and horrid practice among the ancients, of EXPOSING INFANTS, was universal;† and had almost erased *morality* from the minds of the best instructed, and *instinct* from the breasts of the most tenderly affected.‡ St. Paul seems to have had this in his eye, when he accused the pagan world of being WITHOUT NATURAL AFFECTION.§ It needed therefore the strongest and severest check: and I am well persuaded it occasioned this counter-plot of the Magistrate, in order to give instinct fair play, and call back banished nature. Nothing, indeed, could be more worthy of his care: for the destruction of children, as Pericles finely observed of youth, is *like cutting off the spring from the year.* Accordingly we are told by Diodorus, that the Egyptians had a law‖ against this unnatural practice, which law he numbers amongst the singularities of that highly policied nation. "They are obliged" (says he) "to bring up all their children, in order to render the country populous; this being esteemed the best means of making states flourishing and happy."¶ And Tacitus speaks of the prohibition as no less singular amongst the Jews: "Augendæ multitudini consulitur. Nam et NECARE QUEMQUAM EX GNATIS, NEFAS."**

Here again Mr. Bayle is much scandalized: "The first thing which we meet on the entrance into the other world, is the station assigned to INFANTS, who cried and lamented without ceasing; and next to that, the station of men unjustly condemned to death. Now what could be more shocking or scandalous than the punishment of

* Καὶ τοῖς μυστηρίοις τοὺς μυστικοὺς ΘΡΗΝΟΣ μυστικῶς παρειλήφαμεν.—In *Comment. in Platonis Remp.* lib. x. † See note CC, at the end of this book. ‡ See what has been further said on this subject, book i. sect. 4. § Rom. i. 31. ‖ See note DD, at the end of this book. ¶ Καὶ τὰ γεννώμενα πάντα τρέφουσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕνεκα τῆς πολυανθρωπίας ὡς ταύτης μέγιστα συμβαλλομένης πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν χώρας τε καὶ πόλεων.—Lib. i. *Histor.* ** TACIT. *Hist.* lib. v.

those little creatures, who had yet committed no sin, or of those persons whose innocence had been oppressed by calumny?"* The first difficulty is already cleared up: the second shall be considered by and by. But it is no wonder Mr. Bayle could not digest this doctrine of the *infants*; for I am much mistaken, if it did not stick with Plato himself; who, relating the *Vision of Erus, the Pamphilian*, concerning the distribution of rewards and punishments in another life, when he comes to the condition of infants, passes it over in these words: —"But of children who died in their infancy, he reported certain other things NOT WORTHY TO BE REMEMBERED."† Erus's account of what he saw in another world, was a summary of what the Egyptians taught in their *Mysteries* concerning that matter. And I make no doubt but the thing *not worthy to be remembered*, was the doctrine of *infants in purgatory*: which appears to have given Plato much scandal, who did not, at that time at least, reflect upon its original and use. But here let us take notice, for the honour of HUMANITY, that while Pagans both old and new could be shocked at this punishment, modern papists, to the eternal disgrace of SUPERSTITION, can condemn unbaptised Infants, without remorse, to infinitely greater.

But now, as to the FALSELY CONDEMNED, we must seek another solution:

> "Hos juxta, falso damnati crimine mortis;
> Nec vero hæ sine sorte datæ, sine judice sedes.
> Quæsitor Minos urnam movet: ille silentum
> Consiliumque vocat, vitasque et crimina discit."

This designment appears both iniquitous and absurd. The *falsely accused* ‡ are not only in a place of punishment, but, being first delivered under this single predicament, they are afterwards distinguished into two sorts; some as blameable, others as innocent. To clear up this confusion, it will be necessary to transcribe an old story, told by Plato, in his *Gorgias*:—"This law, concerning mortals, was enacted in the time of Saturn, and is yet, and ever will be, in force amongst the Gods; that he who had lived a just and pious life, shall, at his death, be carried into the islands of the blessed, and there possess all kinds of happiness, untainted with the evils of mortality: but that he who had lived unjustly and impiously, shall be thrust into a place of punishment, the prison of divine justice, called Tartarus.

* "La premiere chose que l'on rencontroit à l'entrée des Enfers, étoit la station des petits enfans, qui ne cessoient de pleurer, et puis celle des personnes injustement condamnées à la mort. Quoi de plus choquant, de plus scandaleux, que la peine de ces petites creatures, qui n'avoient encore commis nul péche; ou que la peine de ceux, dont l'innocence avoit été opprimée par la calomnie?"—*Respons. aux Quest. d'un Prov.* p. iii. cap. 22. † Τῶν δὲ εὐθὺς γενομένων καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιούντων περὶ ἄλλα ἔλεγεν ΟΥΚ ΑΞΙΑ ΜΝΗΜΗΣ.—*De Rep.* lib. x. p. 615, Serr. edit. ‡ Servius, on the place, characterizes them in this manner—"qui sibi per simplicitatem adesse nequiverunt."

Now the judges, with whom the execution of this law was intrusted, were, in the time of Saturn, and under the infancy of Jove's government, *living men, sitting in judgment on the living;* and passing sentence on them, upon the day of their decease. This gave occasion to unjust judgments: on which account, Pluto, and those to whom the care of the happy islands was committed, went to Jupiter, and told him, that men came to them *wrongfully judged, both when acquitted, and when condemned.* To which the Father of the Gods thus replied: I will put a stop to this evil. These wrong judgments are partly occasioned by the corporeal covering of the persons judged; for they are tried while living: now many have their corrupt minds hid under a fair outside, adorned with birth and riches; and, when they come to their trial, have witnesses at hand, to testify for their good life and conversation; this perverts the process, and blinds the eyes of justice. Besides, the judges themselves are encumbered with the same corporeal covering: and eyes and ears, and an impenetrable tegument of flesh, hinder the mind from a free exertion of its faculties. All these (as well their own covering, as the covering of those they judge) are bars and obstacles to right judgment. In the first place then, says he, we are to provide that the foreknowledge which they now have of the day of death, be taken away; and this shall be given in charge to Prometheus; and then provide, that they who come to judgment, be quite naked; * for from henceforth they shall not be tried, till they come into the other world. And as they are to be thus stripped, it is but fit their judges should await them there in the same condition; that, at the arrival of every new inhabitant, soul may look on soul, and all family relation, and every worldly ornament being dropt and left behind, RIGHTEOUS JUDGEMENT may at length take place. I, therefore, who foresaw all these things before you felt them, have taken care to constitute my own sons to be the judges: two of them, Minos and Rhadamanthus, are Asiatics; the third, Æacus, an European. These, when they die, shall have their tribunal erected in the shades, *just in that* part of the highway, where the two roads divide, the one leading to the happy islands, the other to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge the Asiatics, and Æacus the Europeans; but to Minos I give the superior authority of hearing appeals, when any thing obscure or difficult shall perplex the others' judgments; that every one may have his abode assigned him with the utmost equity." †

* This evidently refers to the old Egyptian custom, when the judges beheld and examined their kings naked; Οὕτω καὶ ὁ Ἄρχων δικαστὴς ὢν ἐν τοῖς παλαιοτέροις χρόνοις, γυμνὸν ἐθεώρει τὸν βασιλέα.—HORAPOLLINIS *Hierogl.* lib. i. cap. 40.

† Ἦν οὖν νόμος ὅδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐστὶν ἐν θεοῖς· τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα, οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν· τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὁ δὲ τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἰέναι. Τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου. καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος, ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, ἐκείνῃ ἡμέρᾳ

The matter now begins to clear up; and we see plainly, that the circumstance of the *falsely condemned* alludes to this old fable: so that by *falso damnati crimine mortis* (if it be the true reading) VIRGIL did not mean, as one would suppose, *innocentes addicti morti ob injustam calumniam*, but *homines indigne et perperam adjudicati;* not *men falsely condemned*, but *wrongfully judged*, whether to acquittal or conviction; but condemnation being oftenest the sentence of justice, the greater part is put figuratively for the whole.

He who thinks this too licentious a figure, will perhaps be inclined to believe, that the poet might write,

"Hos juxta, falso damnati TEMPORE mortis:"

which not only points up to the fable, but hints at the original of it; and besides, agrees best with the context. But as the words *tempore mortis* are only to be explained by this passage of Plato, a transcriber might be easily tempted to change them to something more intelligible.

One difficulty only remains; and that, to confess the truth, hath arisen rather from a mistake of Virgil, than of his reader. We find these people yet unjudged, already fixed, with other criminals, in the assigned district of purgatory. But they are misplaced, through an oversight of the poet; which, had he lived to perfect the Æneis, he would probably have corrected: for the fable tells us they should be stationed on the borders of the three divisions, in that part of the high road, which dividing itself in two, leads, the one to Tartarus, the other to Elysium, thus described by the poet:

"Hic locus est, partes ubi se via findit in ambas,
Dextera, quæ Ditis magni sub mœnia tendit:
Hic iter Elysium nobis; at læva malorum
Exercet pœnas, et ad impia Tartara mittit."

δικάζοντες ἢ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν· κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο. Ὅτε οὖν Πλούτων καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἴοντες, ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία, ὅτι φοιτῷεν σφὶν ἄνθρωποι ἑκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι, εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεύς, Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ (ἔφη) παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι δικάζονται· ἀμπεχόμενοι γὰρ (ἔφη) οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. Πολλοὶ οὖν ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες, ἠμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ, καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους· καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ᾖ. ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσαντες ὡς δικαίως βεβιώκασιν. Οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα πρόκεκαλυμμένοι· ταῦτα δὲ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀμφιέσματα, καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν (ἔφη) παυστέον ἐστὶ προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν θάνατον· νῦν γὰρ προῖσασι· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ, ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτῶν· ἔπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον ἁπάντων τούτων. Τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι· καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα, ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος ἑκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν· καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρίσις ᾖ. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς, ἐποιησάμην δικαστὰς υἱεῖς ἐμαυτοῦ· δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω τε καὶ Ῥαδαμάνθυν· ἕνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν. Οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ, ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὰ ὁδὼ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς τάρταρον· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδαμάνθυς κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός. Μίνω δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω, ἐπιδιακρίνειν, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀπόρρητόν τι τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτη ἡ κρίσις ᾖ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.—Tom. i. p. 523, Serr. edit.

It only remains to consider the origin or moral of the fable; which, I think, was this: it was an Egyptian custom, as we are told by *Diodorus Siculus*, for judges to sit on every man's life, at the time of his interment; to examine his past actions, and to condemn and acquit according to the evidence before them. These judges were of the priesthood; and so, it is probable, taught, like the priests of the church of Rome, that their decrees were ratified in the other world. Partiality and corruption would, in time, pervert their decrees; and spite and favour prevail over justice: As this might scandalize the people, it would be found necessary to teach, that the sentence which was to influence every one's final doom, was reserved for a future judicature. However, the Priest took care that all should not go out of his hands; and when he could sit no longer *Judge*, he contrived to find his account in turning *Evidence:* as may be seen by the singular cast of this ancient inscription: "Ego Sextus Anicius Pontifex TESTOR honeste hunc vixisse: manes ejus inveniant quietem." *

How much this whole matter needed explaining, we may see by what a fine writer makes of it, in a discourse written to illustrate Æneas's descent into hell: "There are three kinds of persons" (says he) "described as being situated on the BORDERS; and I can give no reason for their being stationed there in so particular a manner, but because none of them seem to have had a proper right to a place among the dead, as not having run out the thread of their days, and finished the term of life that had been allotted them upon earth. The first of these are the souls of infants, who are snatched away by untimely ends; the second are of those who are put to death wrongfully and by an unjust sentence; and the third, of those who grew weary of their lives, and laid violent hands upon themselves." †

After this, follow the episodes of Dido and Deïphobus, in imitation of Homer; where we find nothing explanatory of the true nature of this episode, but the strange description of Deïphobus; whose mangled phantom is drawn according to the philosophy of Plato; which teaches that the dead not only retain all the passions of the mind, but all the marks, and blemishes of the body.‡ A wild doctrine, which Lucian agreeably rallies in his *Menippus;* who is made to say, that he saw Socrates in the Shades, busied at his old trade of *Disputation:* but that his legs yet appeared swelled, from the effects of his last deadly potion.§

* FABIUS CELSUS, *Inscript. Antiq.* lib. iii. † MR. ADDISON'S "Works," vol. ii. p. 300, quarto edit. 1721. ‡ Μαστιγίας αὖ εἴτις ἦν, καὶ ἴχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι, ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον· κατεαγότα εἴτου ἦν μέρη, ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ τεθνεῶτος ταῦτα ἔνδηλα· ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἦν πάντα, ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπί τινα χρόνον.—*Gorg.* p. 524. § Ἔτι μέντοι ἐπεφύσητο αὐτῷ καὶ διῳδήκει ἐκ τῆς φαρμακοποσίας τὰ σκέλη.—Tom. i. p. 481, edit. Reitzii, 4to, Amstel. 1743.

Æneas, having passed this first division, comes now on the confines of TARTARUS; and is instructed in what relates to the crimes and punishments of the inhabitants.

His guide here more openly declares her office of HIEROPHANT, or interpreter of the *Mysteries:*

"Dux inclyte Teucrûm,
Nulli fas casto sceleratum insistere limen:
Sed ME *cum lucis* HECATE PRÆFECIT *Avernis,*
Ipsa Deûm pœnas DOCUIT, *perque omnia* DUXIT"—

It is remarkable, that Æneas is led through the regions of Purgatory and Elysium; but he only sees the sights of Tartarus at a distance, and this could not well be otherwise in the shews of the *Mysteries,* for very obvious reasons.

The criminals destined to eternal punishment, in this division, are,

1. Those who had *sinned so secretly as to escape the animadversion of the Magistrate:*

"Gnossius hæc Rhadamanthus habet durissima regna:
Castigatque auditque dolos, SUBIGITQUE FATERI
Quæ quis apud superos, FURTO lætatus inani,
Distulit in seram commissa piacula mortem."

And it was principally on account of such crimes that the Lawgiver inforced the doctrine of a future state of punishment. But it is worth while to observe, that, according to the teaching of the *Mysteries,* the RACK TO EXTORT CONFESSION, came originally from THE PLACE OF THE DAMNED, where only it could be equitably applied.

2. Those whose principles dissolve the first bonds of association, and society, the ATHEISTS and *despisers of God and religion:*

"Hic genus antiquum terræ, Titania pubes."

This was agreeable to the laws of Charondas, who says: "Be the contempt of the Gods put in the number of the most flagitious crimes." * The poet dwells particularly on that species of impiety which affects divine honours:

"Vidi et crudeles dantem Salmonea pœnas,
Dum flammas Jovis et sonitus imitatur Olympi."

And this without doubt, was an oblique castigation of the APOTHEOSIS, then beginning to be paid and received at Rome.

3. The *infringers of the duties of* IMPERFECT *obligation, which civil laws cannot reach:* such as those without natural affection to brothers, duty to parents, protection to clients, or charity to the poor:

"Hic quibus invisi fratres, dum vita manebat;
Pulsatusve parens; et fraus innexa clienti; †

* Ἔστω δὲ μέγιστα ἀδικήματα θεῶν καταφρόνησις.—Apud STOBÆI *Serm.* xlii. p. 290, lin. 34. Tiguri, fol. 1559. † So the law of the Twelve Tables: "PATRONUS SI CLIENTI FRAUDEM FECERIT, SACER ESTO."

Aut qui divitiis soli incubuere repertis,
Nec partem posuere suis; quæ maxima turba est."

4. Those pests of public and private peace, the TRAYTOR and the ADULTERER; with all their various spawn, of *perjury* and *incest*:

"Quique ob adulterium cæsi, quique arma secuti
Impia, nec veriti dominorum fallere dextras—
Vendidit hic auro patriam, dominumque potentem
Imposuit; fixit leges pretio, atque refixit.
Hic thalamum invasit natæ, vetitosque hymenæos."

It is observable, he does not say, simply, *adulteri*, but *ob adulterium cæsi*; as implying, that the greatest civil punishment pleads for no mitigation of this crime at the bar of divine justice.

5. The INVADERS AND VIOLATERS OF THE HOLY MYSTERIES, held out in the person of Theseus, make the fifth and last class of offenders:

"Sedet, æternumque sedebit
Infelix Theseus; Phlegyasque * miserrimus omnes
Admonet, et magna testatur voce per umbras:
DISCITE JUSTITIAM MONITI, ET NON TEMNERE DIVOS."

The fable says, that Theseus and his friend Pirithous formed a design to steal Proserpine from hell; but being taken in the fact, Pirithous was thrown to the dog Cerberus, and Theseus kept in chains,† till he was delivered by Hercules: which without doubt means the death of one, and the imprisonment of the other, for their clandestine intrusion into the *Mysteries*. We have already offered several reasons, to shew that the descent of Theseus into hell, was a *violation of the Mysteries*: to which we may add what the ancients tell us of the duration of his imprisonment, which was four years; the interim between the celebrations of the greater *Mysteries*. So Seneca the tragedian makes him say:

"Tandem profugi noctis æternæ plagam,
Vastoque manes carcere umbrantem polum.
Ut vix cupitum sufferunt oculi diem!
Jam QUARTA *Eleusis* dona Triptolemi secat,
Paremque toties Libra composuit diem;
Ambiguus ut me sortis ignaræ labor
Detinuit inter mortis et vitæ mala." ‡

This may reconcile the contradictory accounts of the fable concerning Theseus; some of which say he was delivered from hell; others, that he was eternally detained there. The *first* relates to the liberty given him by the president of the *Mysteries* at the ensuing celebration: the

* The Phlegyæ here mentioned, I take to be those people of Bœotia spoken of by Pausanias, who attempting to plunder the temple of Apollo at Delphi, were destroyed by lightning, earthquakes, and pestilence; hence Phlegyæ, I suppose, signified impious, sacrilegious persons in general; and is so to be understood in this place.

† Κατασχεθέντων δὲ αὐτῶν, Πειρίθοος μὲν ἐβρώθη
Τῷ τρικερβέρῳ τῷ κυνὶ, Θησεὺς δ' εἱρκτῇ κρατεῖται.—JO. TZETZES, C. ii. cap. 51.

‡ HIPPOLYTUS.

other, to what the *Mysteries* taught he and all would suffer in the other world for *violating* them. This leads us to a circumstance which will much confirm the general interpretation of this famous Episode. In Æneas's speech to the Sibyl, Theseus is put amongst those heroes who went to, and returned from, hell :

"Quid Thesea magnum,
Quid memorem Alciden ?"—

But in the place before us he is represented as confined there eternally. Julius Hyginus, in his *Commentaries on Virgil*,* thinks this a gross contradiction ; which Virgil would have corrected, had he lived to finish the poem. But can it be supposed, the poet was not aware of this, in two passages so near one another, in the same book ? In truth, his employing these differing circumstances, confirms the general interpretation ; and the general interpretation helps to reconcile the difference. Æneas wanted to be initiated ; and when he speaks to the Sibyl, or *Mystagogue*, he enumerates those heroes who had been initiated before him ; that is, such who had seen the *shews* of the *Mysteries*, of which number was Theseus, though he had intruded violently. But when Virgil comes to describe these *Shews*, which were supposed to be a true representation of what was done and suffered in Tartarus, Theseus is put among the *damned*, that being his station in the other world.

This will remind the learned reader of a story told by Livy. "The Athenians" (says he) "drew upon themselves a war with Philip, on a very slight occasion ; and at a time when nothing remained of their ancient fortune, but their high spirit. Two young Acarnanians, during the days of INITIATION, themselves *uninitiated*, and ignorant of all that related to that secret worship, entered the temple of CERES along with the crowd. Their discourse soon betrayed them ; by making some absurd enquiries into the meaning of what they saw : so being brought before the President of the *Mysteries*, although it was evident they had entered ignorantly and without design, they were put to death, as guilty of a most abominable crime." †

The office Theseus is put upon, of admonishing his hearers against IMPIETY, could not, sure, be discharged in these *shews* by any one so well, as by him who represented the Violator of them. But the critics, unconscious of any such design, considered the task the poet

* A. GELLII *Noctes Atticæ*, lib. x. cap. 16. † "Contraxerant autem cum Philippo bellum Athenienses haudquaquam digna causa, dum ex vetere fortuna nihil præter animos servant. Acarnanes duo juvenes per initiorum dies, non initiati, templum Cereris, imprudentes religionis, cum cetera turba ingressi sunt. Facile eos sermo prodidit, absurde quædam percunctantes ; deductique ad antistites templi, cum palam esset per errorem ingressos, tanquam ob infandum scelus, interfecti sunt."—*Hist.* lib. xxxi.

has imposed on Theseus, of perpetually sounding in the ears of the damned, this admonition :

DISCITE JUSTITIAM MONITI, ET NON TEMNERE DIVOS,

as a very impertinent employment. For though it was a sentence of great truth and dignity, it was preached to very little purpose amongst those who were never to hope for pardon or remission.

Even the ridiculous Scarron hath not neglected to put it in this absurd light ; * and it must be owned, that, according to the common ideas of Æneas's descent into hell, it can hardly be seen in any other.

But, suppose Virgil to be here relating the admonitory maxims delivered during the celebration of these MYSTIC SHEWS, and nothing could be more just or useful : for then the discourse was addressed to the *vast multitude of living spectators*. Nor is it a mere supposition that such discourses made part of these representations. Aristides expressly says,† that in no place were more astonishing words pronounced or sung, than in these *Mysteries*. The reason, he tells us, was, that the *sounds* and the *sights* might mutually assist each other in making an impression on the minds of the Initiated. But, from a passage in Pindar, I conclude, that in these shews (from whence men took their ideas of the infernal regions) it was customary for each offender, as he passed by, in machinery, to make an admonition against his own crime. "It is reported" (says Pindar) "that Ixion, by the decrees of the Gods, while he is incessantly turning round his rapid wheel, calls out upon MORTALS to this effect, That they should be always at hand to repay a benefactor for the services he had done them." ‡ Where the word ΒΡΟΤΟΙ, *living men*, seems plainly to shew that the speech was at first made before men in this world.

The poet closes his catalogue of the damned with these words :

"Ausi omnes immane nefas, AUSOQUE POTITI."

For the antients thought that an action was sanctified by the success ; which they esteemed a mark of the favour and approbation of the Gods :

"Victrix Causa Diis PLACUIT, sed victa Catoni."

As this was a very pernicious doctrine, it was necessary to teach, that the imperial villain who trampled on his country, and the baffled

* "Cette sentence est bonne et belle,
Mais en Enfer de quoi sert-elle ?"

† Τίνι δ' ἄλλῳ χωρίων, ἢ μύθων φῆμαι θαυμαστότερα ἐφύμνησαν, ἢ τὰ δρώμενα μείζω ἔσχε τὴν ἔκπληξιν, ἢ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐφαμίλλον κατέστη ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τὰ ὁρώμενα ;—*Eleus.*

‡ Θεῶν δ' ἐφετμαῖσιν
Ἰξίονα φαντὶ ταῦτα
Βροτοῖς λέγειν, ἐν πτερόεντι τροχῷ
Παντὰ κυλινδόμενον,
Τὸν εὐεργέταν ἀγαναῖς ἀμοιβαῖς
Ἐποιχομένους τίνεσθαι.—*Pythia*, ii. 39.

plotter who expired on a gibbet, were equally the objects of divine vengeance.

Æneas has now passed *Tartarus;* and here end the LESSER MYSTERIES. Their original explains why this sort of *shews* was exhibited in them. We are told, they were instituted for the sake of Hercules, when about to perform his eleventh labour, of fetching Cerberus from hell,* and were under the presidency of *Proserpine.*†

The Hero advances to the borders of ELYSIUM, and here he undergoes the *lustration:*

> "Occupat Æneas aditum, *corpusque recenti*
> *Spargit aqua*, ramumque adverso in limine figit."

"Being now about to undergo the lustrations" (says Sopater) "which immediately precede initiation into the *greater Mysteries*, they called me happy." ‡

Accordingly, Æneas now enters on the GREATER MYSTERIES, and comes to the abodes of the blessed:

> "Devenere locos lætos, et amœna vireta
> Fortunatorum nemorum, sedesque beatas:
> Largior hic campos æther, et lumine vestit
> Purpureo: solemque suum, sua sidera norunt."

These two so different scenes of Tartarus and Elysium explain what Aristides meant, when he called the shews of *Eleusinian Mysteries, that most shocking, and, at the same time, most ravishing representation.*§

The Initiated, who till now only bore the name of Μύσται, are called ΕΠΟΠΤΑΙ, and this new vision, ΑΥΤΟΨΙΑ. "The Αὐτοψία or the seeing with their own eyes" (says Psellus) "is when he who is initiated beholds the divine lights." ‖

In these very circumstances Themistius describes the Initiated, when just entered upon this scene. "It being thoroughly purified, he now discloses to the Initiated, a region ¶ all over illuminated, and

* Οἱ Ἐλευσίνιοι ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὰ μικρὰ ἐποιήσαντο μυστήρια—Ἐμνήθη ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι τὰ δι' αὐτὸν [Ἡρακλέα] λεγόμενα ΜΙΚΡΑ μυστήρια.—TZETZ. *in Lycoph.* † Τὰ δὲ μικρὰ Περσεφόνης.—SCHOL. ARISTOPH. *ad Plut. secund.* ‡ Μέλλων δὲ τοῖς καθαρσίοις, τοῖς πρὸ τῆς τελετῆς, ἐντυγχάνειν, ἐκάλουν εὐδαίμονα ἐμαυτόν. *In Divis. Quæst.* § Τοῦτον φρικαλέστατόν τε καὶ φαιδρότατον.—*Eleus.* ‖ Αὐτοψία ἐστὶν, ὅταν αὐτὸς ὁ τελούμενος τὰ θεῖα φῶτα ὁρᾷ.—*In Schol. in Orac. Zoroast.* ¶ This which was *all over illuminated*, and which the priest had *thoroughly purified*, was ἄγαλμα, an image. The reason of transferring what is said of the illumination of the *image*, to the illumination of the region, is, because this image represented the appearances of the divine Being, in one large, uniform, extensive light. Thus JAMBLICHUS *De Mysteriis:* Μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα τῶν αὐτοφανῶν ΑΓΑΛΜΑΤΩΝ λόγους ἀφορισόμεθα· οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ΑΥΤΟΨΙΑΙΣ, ἐνεργέστερα καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ὁρᾶται τὰ θεάματα, ἀκριβῶς τε διαλάμπει, καὶ διηρθρωμένα λαμπρῶς ἐκφαίνεται.—And again, Ὡσαύτως τοίνυν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ΦΩΤΟΣ· τὰ μὲν τῶν θεῶν ΑΓΑΛΜΑΤΑ φωτὸς πλέον ἀστράπτει—τὸ μὲν τῶν θεῶν πῦρ, ἄτομον, ἀφθεγκτὸν ἐκλάμπει· καὶ πληροῖ τὰ ὅλα βάθη τοῦ κόσμου πυρίως, αλλ' οὐ περικοσμίως.—§. ii. cap. 4. He says, too, that it was *without figure*, ψυχῆς δὲ τῆς μὲν ὅλης, καὶ ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος

shining with a divine splendor. The cloud and thick darkness are dispersed ; * and the mind emerges, as it were, into day, full of light and chearfulness ; as before, of disconsolate obscurity." †

Let me observe, that the lines,

> "Largior hic campos æther, et lumine vestit
> *Purpureo :* SOLEMque suum, sua sidera norunt,"

are in the very language of those, who profess to tell us what they saw at their *initiation into the greater Mysteries.* "Nocte media vidi SOLEM *candido* coruscantem lumine," ‡ says Apuleius on that occasion : for *candido* and *purpureo lumine* signify the very same thing.

Here Virgil, by leaving his Master, and copying the amiable paintings of Elysium as they were represented in the *Mysteries*, hath artfully avoided a fault, too justly objected to Homer, of giving so dark and joyless a landscape of the *fortunata nemora*, as could raise no desire or appetite for them : his favourite Hero himself, who inhabited them, telling Ulysses, that he had rather be a day-labourer above, than command in the regions of the dead. Such a representation defeats the very intent of the Lawgiver, in propagating the doctrine of a future state. Nay, to mortify every excitement to noble actions, the Greek poet makes reputation, fame, and glory, the great spur to virtue in the pagan system, to be visionary and impertinent. On the contrary, Virgil, whose aim, in this poem, was the service of Society, makes the love of glory so strong a passion in the other world, that the Sibyl's promise to Palinurus, that his NAME should be affixed to a promontory, rejoices his shade even in the regions of the unhappy :

> "*Æternumque* locus Palinuri *nomen* habebit :
> His dictis curæ emotæ, pulsusque parumper
> Corde dolor tristi ; GAUDET COGNOMINE TERRA."

εἶδει κατεχομένης πῶρ ὁρᾶται ἀνείδεον.—Cap. 7. To this image, the following lines in the Oracles of Zoroaster allude :

> Μὴ φύσεως καλέσῃς ΑΥΤΟΠΤΟΝ ΑΓΑΛΜΑ,
> Οὐ γὰρ χρὴ κείνους σε βλέπειν πρὶν σῶμα ΤΕΛΕΣΘΗι.

"Invoke not the self-conspicuous image of nature, for thou must not behold these things before thy body be purified by initiation." This αὔτοπτον ἄγαλμα was only a diffusive shining light, as the name partly declares, thus described presently after, in the same Oracles :

> Ἡνίκα βλέψῃς μορφῆς ἄτερ εὐτερον πῦρ,
> Λαμπόμενον σκιρτηδὸν ὅλου κατὰ βένθεα κόσμου,
> Κλῦθι πυρὸς φωνήν.

And the *sight* of this divine splendor was what the Mysteries called, ΑΥΤΟΨΙΑ.

* Pletho tells us with what these clouds were accompanied, viz. thunder and lightning, and other meteoric appearances. Τὰ δὲ τελουμένοις φαινόμενα, κεραυνοὶ, καὶ πῦρ, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο, σύμβολα ἄλλως ἐστὶν, οὐ θεοῦ τίς φύσις.—*In Schol. ad Orac. Mag. Zor.* He says they were symbols, but not of the nature of the deity : and this was true ; for the symbol of this Nature was the αὔτοπτον ἄγαλμα which followed. Hence, as we see above, it was *without figure.*

† —Ἀποσμήξας πανταχόθεν, ἐπεδείκνυ τῷ μυουμένῳ μαρμαρύσσον τε ἥδη, καὶ αὐγῇ καταλαμπόμενον θεσπεσίᾳ, ἥτε ὁμίχλη ἐκείνη, καὶ τὸ νέφος ἀθρόον ὑπερρήγνυτο· καὶ ἐξεφαίνετο ὁ νοῦς ἐκ τοῦ βάθους, φέγγους ἀνάπλεως καὶ ἀγλαΐας ἀντὶ τοῦ πρότερον σκότου.—*Orat. in Patrem.*

‡ *Met.* lib. xi.

They were the licentious stories of the Gods, and this ungracious description of Elysium (both so pernicious to society) which made Plato drive Homer out of his Republic.

But to return. The poet having described the climate of the happy regions, speaks next of the amusements of its inhabitants :

"Pars in gramineis exercent membra palæstris ;
Contendunt ludo, et fulva luctantur arena."

Besides the obvious allusion, in these lines, to the philosophy of Plato, concerning the duration of the passions, it seems to have a more secret one to what he had all the way in his eye, the *Eleusinian Mysteries ;* whose celebration was accompanied with the GRECIAN GAMES.* On which account too, perhaps, it was that, in the disposition of his work, his fifth book is employed in the *Games* as a prelude to the *Descent* in the sixth.

1. The first place, in these happy regions, is assigned to LEGISLATORS, *and the founders of Society, who brought men from a savage to a civil life.*

"Magnanimi Heroës, nati melioribus annis."

At the head of these is Orpheus, the most renowned of the European Lawgivers ; but better known under the character of Poet : for the first laws being written in measure, to allure men to learn them, and, when learnt, to retain them, the fable would have it, that by the force of harmony, he softened the savage inhabitants of Thrace :

"Threïcius longa cum veste sacerdos
Obloquitur numeris septem discrimina vocum."

But he has the first place ; because he was not only a Legislator, but the Introducer of the *Mysteries* into that part of Europe.

2. The next is allotted to PATRIOTS, *and those who died for the service of their country :*

"Hic manus, ob patriam pugnando vulnera passi."

3. The third to *virtuous and pious* PRIESTS :

"Quique sacerdotes casti, dum vita manebat :
Quique pii vates et Phœbo digna locuti."

For it was of principal use to Society, that religious men should lead holy lives ; and that they should teach nothing of the Gods but what was agreeable to the divine nature.

4. The last place is given to the INVENTORS OF ARTS *mechanical and liberal :*

"Inventas aut qui vitam excoluere per artes :
Quique sŭi memores alios fecere merendo."

* Ἐνδοξότατοι πάντων οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀγῶνες· καὶ μὴν τούτων πρεσβύτατος ὁ τῶν Παναθηναίων· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὁ τῶν Ἐλευσινίων.—ARISTIDES, *Panath.*—Μυηθῆναι δὲ ξένων πρώτους Ἡρακλέα, καὶ Διοσκούρους· ἀγῶνά τε γυμνικὸν γενέσθαι πρῶτοι Ἐλευσῖνι τῆς Ἀττικῆς.—Idem, *Eleusin.*

The order is exact and beautiful. The first class is of those who FOUNDED Society, heroes and lawgivers: the second, of those who SUPPORTED it, patriots and holy priests: and the third, of those who ADORNED it, the inventors of the arts of life, and the recorders of worthy actions.

Virgil has all along closely followed the doctrine of the *Mysteries*, which carefully taught that virtue only could entitle men to happiness; and that rites, ceremonies, lustrations, and sacrifices would not supply the want of it.

Nor has he been less studious in copying their *shews* and *representations;* in which the figures of those heroes and heroines, who were most celebrated in the writings of the ancient Greeks, passed in procession.*

But, notwithstanding this entire conformity between the poet's scenes and those represented in the *Mysteries*, something is still wanting to complete the proofs: and that is, the famous SECRET of the *Mysteries*, THE UNITY OF THE GODHEAD, of which so much hath been said above. Had Virgil neglected to give us this characteristic mark, though, even then, we could not but say, his intention was *to represent an Initiation;* yet we must have been forced to own he had done it but imperfectly. But he was too good a painter, to leave any thing ambiguous; and hath therefore concluded his hero's *Initiation*, as was the custom, with instructing him in the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ, or the doctrine of the UNITY. Till this was done, the *Initiated* was not arrived to the highest stage of perfection; nor, in the fullest sense, intitled to the appellation of ΕΠΟΠΤΗΣ.

Musæus, therefore, who had been *Hierophant* at Athens, takes the place of the Sibyl (as it was the custom to have different Guides in different parts of the celebration) and is made to conduct him to the recess, where his Father's shade opens to him *the doctrine of Truth*, in these sublime words:

> "Principio cœlum, ac terras, camposque liquentes,
> Lucentemque globum Lunæ, Titaniaque astra
> SPIRITUS INTUS ALIT, totamque infusa per artus
> MENS agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.
> Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum,
> Et quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus."

This was no other than the doctrine of the old Egyptians, as we are assured by Plato; who says they taught that Jupiter was the SPIRIT WHICH PERVADETH ALL THINGS.†

We shall shew how easily the Greek Philosophy corrupted this

*—"Οσα μὲν δὴ θέας ἐχόμενα εἶδον γενεαὶ παμπληθεῖς εὐδαιμόνων ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀῤῥήτοις φάσμασιν· ἃ δ' εἰς τὸ μέσον ποιηταὶ, καὶ λογοποιοὶ καὶ συγγραφεῖς πάντες ὑμνοῦσι.—ARISTID.

† Ἴδωμεν δὲ καὶ τὰ τούτων παλαίτατα· ἦν δὲ τὰ Αἰγύπτια· τὴν Ἶσιν φασὶ, &c.—καὶ Δία μὲν, τὸ ΔΙΑ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΧΩΡΟΥΝ ΠΝΕΥΜΑ.—In *Cratylo*.

principle into (what is now called) SPINOZISM.* Here Virgil has approved his judgement to great advantage. Nothing was more abhorrent from the *Mysteries*, than Spinozism, as it overturned† the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, which the *Mysteries* so carefully inculcated; and yet the principle itself, of which Spinozism was the abuse, was cherished there, as it was the consequence of the doctrine of the Unity, the grand secret of the *Mysteries*. Virgil, therefore, delivers the principle, with great caution, and pure and free of the abuse; though he understood the nature of Spinozism, and (by the following lines in his fourth *Georgic*, where he delivers it) appears to have been infected with it:

> —"Deum namque ire per omnes
> Terrasque tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum.
> Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
> Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.
> Scilicet HUC REDDI DENIQUE AC RESOLUTA REFERRI
> OMNIA"—

But the *Mysteries* did not teach the doctrine of the Unity for mere speculation; but, as we said before, to obviate certain mischiefs of polytheism, and to support the belief of a Providence. Now, as a *future* state of rewards and punishments did not quite remove the objections to its inequalities here, the *Mysteries* added to it the doctrine of the METEMPSYCHOSIS, or the belief of a prior state.‡ And this, likewise, our poet has been careful to record. For after having revealed the great secret of the Unity, he goes on to speak of the *Metempsychosis*, or transmigration, in this manner:

> "Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos,
> Lethæum ad fluvium Deus evocat agmine magno;
> Scilicet immemores supera ut convexa revisant,
> Rursus et incipiant in corpora velle reverti."

And thence takes occasion to explain the nature and use of a Popish PURGATORY, which, in his hero's passage through that region, had not been done: this affords him too an opportunity for that noble episode, the procession of the hero's posterity, which passes in review before him: And with this the scene closes. One might well allow Virgil the use of so important a digression, (considering whom it was he celebrated under the character of Æneas) though it had been foreign to the nature of the *Mysteries* he is describing. But indeed he was even here following their customs very closely. It was then, and had been for some time, the practice of the *Mysteries*, when communicated to any aspirant of distinguished quality, to exhibit to him, in their *shews* and *representations*, something ORACULAR, relating to his own fortune and affairs. Thus Himerius tells us, that Olympia, on her uprising, after the birth of Alexander, was initiated

* See book iii. sect. 4. † See book iii. sect. 3 & 4. ‡ Vid. PORPH. *De Abst.* lib. iv. sect. 16, & CIC. *Fragm. ex Lib. de Philosophia.*

into the Samothracian *Mysteries;* Where, in the *shews,* she saw her husband Philip, at that time in Potidæa.*

In attending the hero's progress through the three estates of the dead, I have shewn, at almost every step, from some ancient writer or other, the exact conformity of his adventures to those of the Initiated in the *Mysteries.* We shall now collect these scattered lights to a point; which will, I am persuaded, throw such a lustre on this interpretation, as to make the truth of it irresistible. To this purpose, I shall have nothing to do, but to transcribe a passage from an ancient writer, preserved by Stobæus; which professes to explain the exact conformity between DEATH, or a real descent to the infernal regions, and INITIATION, where the representation of those regions was exhibited. His words are these: "THE MIND IS AFFECTED AND AGITATED IN DEATH, JUST AS IT IS IN INITIATION INTO THE GRAND MYSTERIES. AND WORD ANSWERS TO WORD AS WELL AS THING TO THING: FOR ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΝ IS TO DIE; AND ΤΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ, TO BE INITIATED. THE FIRST STAGE IS NOTHING BUT ERRORS AND UNCERTAINTIES; LABORIOUS WANDERINGS; A RUDE AND FEARFUL MARCH THROUGH NIGHT AND DARKNESS. AND NOW ARRIVED ON THE VERGE OF DEATH AND INITIATION, EVERY THING WEARS A DREADFUL ASPECT: IT IS ALL HORROR, TREMBLING, SWEATING, AND AFFRIGHTMENT. BUT THIS SCENE ONCE OVER, A MIRACULOUS AND DIVINE LIGHT DISPLAYS ITSELF; AND SHINING PLAINS AND FLOWERY MEADOWS OPEN ON ALL HANDS BEFORE THEM. HERE THEY ARE ENTERTAINED WITH HYMNS, AND DANCES, WITH THE SUBLIME DOCTRINES OF SACRED KNOWLEDGE, AND WITH REVEREND AND HOLY VISIONS. AND NOW BECOME PERFECT AND INITIATED, THEY ARE FREE, AND NO LONGER UNDER RESTRAINTS; BUT CROWNED AND TRIUMPHANT, THEY WALK UP AND DOWN THE REGIONS OF THE BLESSED; CONVERSE WITH PURE AND HOLY MEN; AND CELEBRATE THE SACRED MYSTERIES AT PLEASURE."†

* Λέγεταί ποτε καὶ Ὀλυμπιάδα, τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς Ἀλεξάνδρου τόκοις εὐδαίμονα ὀργιάζουσαν τὰ Καβείρων ἐν Σαμοθράκῃ μυστήρια, ἰδεῖν κατὰ τὴν τελετὴν τὸν Φίλιππον. —In *Eclog. Declam.* apud PHOTIUM, Cod. 165, 243. † Τὸ δὲ πάσχειν πάθος, οἷον οἱ τελεταῖς μεγάλαις κατοργιαζόμενοι· διὸ καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα τῷ ῥήματι, καὶ τὸ ἔργον τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ τελευτᾶν καὶ τελεῖσθαι προσέοικε, πλάναι τὰ πρῶτα καὶ περιδρομαὶ κοπώδεις, καὶ διὰ σκότους τινὸς ὕποπτοι πορεῖαι καὶ ἀτέλεστοι· εἶτα πρὸ τοῦ τέλους αὐτοῦ τὰ δεινὰ πάντα, φρίκη, καὶ τρόμος, καὶ ἱδρὼς, καὶ θάμβος· ἐκ δὲ τούτου, φῶς τι θαυμάσιον ἀπηνίσεν, ἢ τόποι καθαροὶ, καὶ λειμῶνες ἐδέξαντο, φωνὰς καὶ χορείας καὶ σεμνότητας ἀκουσμάτων ἱερῶν, καὶ φαντασμάτων ἁγίων ἔχοντες· ἐν αἷς ὁ τανῦν τελὴς ἤδη καὶ μεμυημένος ἐλεύθερος γεγονὼς, καὶ ἄφετος περιΐων ἐστεφανωμένος ὀργιάζει· καὶ σύνεστιν ὁσίοις καὶ καθαροῖς ἀνδράσι.—*Sermo* CXIX. p. 605, lin. 33, Tiguri, fol. 1559. The Son of Sirach, who was full of Grecian ideas, and hath embellished his admirable work of ECCLESIASTICUS with a great deal of Gentile learning, hath plainly alluded, though in few words, to these circumstances of INITIATION, where encouraging men to seek after *wisdom,* he says:—"At first she will walk with him by CROOKED ways, and bring FEAR and DREAD upon him, and TORMENT HIM WITH HER DISCIPLINE, until she may TRUST his soul, and TRY him by her laws. Then will she

The progress finished, and every thing over, Æneas and his Guide are let out again to the upper regions, through the *ivory gate* of DREAMS. A circumstance borrowed from Homer, and very happily applied to this subject; for, as Euripides elegantly expresses it,

"ΥΠΝΟΣ τὰ ΜΙΚΡΑ τοῦ θανάτου ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΑ.

"A DREAM is the LESSER MYSTERIES of *death*."

But, besides this of *ivory*, there was another of *horn*. Through the first issued *false* visions; and through the latter, *true*.

"Sunt geminæ Somni portæ: quarum altera fertur
Cornea, qua *veris* facilis datur exitus umbris:
Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto;
Sed *falsa* ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes.
His ubi tum natum *Anchises*, unaque Sibyllam
Prosequitur dictis, *portaque emittit eburna*."

Servius, with the rank spirit of a grammarian, who seldom finds any thing to stop at but a solecism in expression, says very readily, "Vult autem intelligi, falsa esse omnia quæ dixit. He would have you understand by this, that all he has been saying is false and groundless." The following critics give the same solution. Ruæus, one of the best, may speak for them all: "Cum igitur Virgilius Æneam eburnea porta emittit, indicat profecto, quidquid a se de illo inferorum aditu dictum est, in fabulis esse numerandum." This interpretation is strengthened by Virgil's being an Epicurean; and making the same conclusion in his second *Georgic*:

"Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Atque metus omnes et inexorabile fatum
Subjecit pedibus, *strepitumque Acherontis avari!*"

But Virgil wrote, not for the amusement of women and children over a winter's fire, in the taste of the *Milesian fables;* but for the use of men and citizens; to instruct them in the duties of humanity and society. The purpose, therefore, of such a writer, when he treats of a FUTURE STATE, must be to make the doctrine interesting to his reader, and useful in civil life: Virgil hath done the first, by bringing his Hero to it through the most perilous atchievement; and the second, by appropriating the rewards and punishments of that state to *virtue* and to *vice* only. Now if we will believe these critics, when the poet had laboured through a whole book, and employed all his art and genius to compass this important end, he foolishly defeats his whole design with one wanton dash of his pen, which speaks to this effect: "I have laboured, countrymen, to draw you to virtue, and to

return the STRAIGHT way unto him, and COMFORT him, and shew him her SECRETS."—Διεστραμμένως πορεύεται μετ' αὐτοῦ ἐν πρώτοις· ΦΟΒΟΝ δε καὶ ΔΕΙΛΙΑΝ ἐπάξει ἐπ' αὐτὸν, καὶ ΒΑΣΑΝΙΣΕΙ ΑΥΤΟΝ ΕΝ ΠΑΙΔΙΑι ΑΥΤΗΣ, ἕως οὗ ΕΜΠΙΣΤΕΥΣΗι τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ΠΕΙΡΑΣΗι αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς δικαιώμασιν αὐτῆς. Καὶ πάλιν ἐπανήξει κατ' εὐθεῖαν πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ ΕΥΦΡΑΝΕΙ αὐτὸν, καὶ ΑΠΟΚΑΛΥΨΕΙ αὐτῷ τὰ ΚΡΥΠΤΑ αὐτῆς.—Chap. iv. ver. 17, 18.

deter you from vice, in order to make particulars and societies flourishing and happy. The truths inforced to this purpose, I have endeavoured to recommend by the example of your ancestor and founder, Æneas; of whom (to do you the more credit) I have made an accomplished hero; and have set him on the most arduous and illustrious undertaking, the establishment of a civil community: and to sanctify his character, and add reverence to his laws, I have sent him upon the errand you see here related. But, lest the business should do you any service, or my hero any honour, I must inform you, that all this talk of a *future state* is a childish tale, and Æneas's part in it, only a fairy adventure. In a word, all that you have heard, must pass for a lenten dream, from which you are to draw no consequences, but that the poet was in a capricious humour, and disposed to laugh at your superstitions." Thus is Virgil made to speak in the interpretation of ancient and modern critics.* And this the conclusion he was pleased to give to the master-piece of all his writings.

The truth is, the difficulty can never be gotten over, but by supposing THE DESCENT TO SIGNIFY AN INITIATION INTO THE MYSTERIES. This will unriddle the enigma, and restore the poet to himself. And if this was Virgil's purpose, it is to be presumed, he would give some private mark to ascertain his meaning: for which no place was so proper as the conclusion. He has, therefore, with a beauty of invention worthy of himself, made this fine improvement on Homer's story of the *two gates;* and by imagining that of horn for true visions, and that of ivory for false, insinuates, by the first, the *reality* of another state; and by the second, the *shadowy* representations of it in the shews of the *Mysteries:* so that, not the things themselves, but only the pictures of them, objected to Æneas, were false; as the Scene did not lye in HELL, but in the TEMPLE OF CERES. This representation being called ΜΥΘΟΣ, κατ' ἐξοχήν. And this we propose as the true meaning of,

> "Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto:
> Sed FALSA ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes."

For *falsa insomnia* do not signify *lying*, but *shadowy dreams*. Thus the Roman widow, in the famous sepulchral inscription,† begs the

* This absurdity did not escape the learned Dacier, who, in his note on "porta fugiens eburna," lib. iii. Od. xxvii. of Horace, says,—"Mais ce qu'il y a d'etonnant, c'est que Virgile fait sortir Anchise par la porte d'yvoire, qui est celle des faux songes; par la il detruit toutes les grandes choses qu'il a dites de Rome et d'Auguste."

† ITA PETO VOS MANES
SANCTISSIMI
COMMENDATVM HABEATIS
MEVM CONIVGEM ET VELLITIS
HVIC INDVLGENTISSIMI ESSE
HORIS NOCTVRNIS
VT EVM VIDEAM
ET ETIAM ME FATO SVADERE
VELLIT VT ET EGO POSSIM
DULCIVS ET CELERIVS
APVD EVM PERVENIRE.
Apud GRUT. p. 786.

Dii manes to be so indulgent to her husband's shade, that she may see him in her dreams; that is, seem to see him, as the shade of Hector was seen by Æneas,

> "In somnis ecce ante oculos mœstissimus Hector
> Visus adesse mihi"—

and this, in distinction to what the Roman Widow makes the other part of her prayer, to be *really* joined to him in the other world.

But though the visions which issued from the ivory gate were *unsubstantial*, as being only representative; yet I make no question, but the ivory gate itself was *real*. It appears, indeed, to be no other than the sumptuous door of the temple, through which the *Initiated* came out, when the *celebration* was over. This temple was of an immense bigness, as appears from the words of Apuleius: "Senex comissimus ducit me protinus ad ipsas fores ÆDIS AMPLISSIMÆ." * Strabo is more particular: "Next" (says he) "is Eleusis, in which is the temple of the Eleusinian Ceres, and the mystic cell built by Ictinus, CAPABLE OF HOLDING AS LARGE A NUMBER AS A THEATRE." † But Vitruvius's description of it is still more curious: "ELEUSINÆ Cereris et Proserpinæ cellam IMMANI MAGNITUDINE Ictinus Dorico more, sine exterioribus columnis *ad laxamentum usus sacrificiorum*, pertexit. Eam autem postea, cum Demetrius Phalereus Athenis rerum potiretur, Philon ante templum in fronte columnis constitutis Prostylon fecit. *Ita aucto vestibulo laxamentum initiantibus operisque summam adjecit autoritatem.*" ‡ And Aristides thought this the most extraordinary circumstance in the whole affair: "But the thing most wonderful and divine was, that of all the public assemblies of Greece, this was the only one which was contained within the walls of one edifice." § Here was room, we see, and so purposely contrived, for all their SHEWS and REPRESENTATIONS.

And now, having occasionally, and by parts only, said so much of these things, it will not be amiss, in conclusion, to give one general and concise idea of the whole. I suppose the substance of the celebration to be a kind of drama of the history of Ceres; as those under the patronage of the other Gods represented their History; so HERCULES and MYTHRAS, who protected the oppressed from the ravages of wild Beasts or more cruel Men, had their labours in *war* and *hunting* dramatically held out. The Story of Ceres afforded opportunity to represent the three particulars, about which the mysteries were principally concerned. 1. *The rise and establishment*

* *Metam.* lib. xi. p. 996, edit. Lugd. 8vo, 1587.

† Εἶτ' Ἐλευσὶν πόλις, ἐν ᾗ τὸ τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερὸν τῆς Ἐλευσινίας· καὶ ὁ μυστικὸς σηκὸς, ὃν κατεσκεύασεν. Ἰκτῖνος, ὄχλον θεάτρου δέξασθαι δυνάμενον.—Lib. ix. *Geog.* edit. Casaub. p. 272. lin. 30.

‡ *De Architect.* Præf. ad lib. vii.

§ Τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον καὶ θειότατον, μόνην γὰρ ταύτην πανηγύρεων εἷς οἶκος συλλαβὼν εἶχε.—*Eleusin. Orat.*

of civil society. 2. *The doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.* 3. *The error of polytheism, and the principle of the unity.* The Goddess's legislation in Sicily and Attica (at both which places she was said to civilize the savage manners of the inhabitants) gave birth to the *first.** Her search for her daughter Proserpine in hell, to the *second;* and her resentments against the Gods for their permission of, or connivance at, the rape, to the *third.*† My supposition, of the dramatic nature of the shews, is not made without good authority. Lucian, in his *Alexander,* where he gives a large account of the impostures of that false prophet, speaking of the *Mysteries* which he instituted, in honour of his new-found God, Glyco; says, they were celebrated (after the usual preparatory rites of torch-bearing, initiation, and public notice to the prophane to keep at a distance) by a three Days' festival: "On the first day was represented the labour of Latona and the Nativity of Apollo; the nuptials of Ceronis; and the birth of Æsculapius. On the second, the appearance of Glyco, and the generation of the god: and on the third, the marriage of Podalirius with the mother of Alexander." ‡ Every thing in these rites being performed, as the turn of the learned author's relation necessarily implies, in imitation of ancient usage. But here let it be observed, that the secrets of the *Mysteries* were unfolded both by *words* and *actions:* of which Aristides, quoted above, gives the reason; "That so the *sounds* and *sights* might mutually assist each other in making an impression on the minds of the *Initiated.*" The *error of polytheism* therefore was as well exposed by the *dark wanderings* in the subterraneous passages through which the Initiated began his course, as by the information received from the Hierophant: and the *unity* as strongly illustrated by the αὔτοπτον ἄγαλμα, the *self-seen image,*§ the diffusive *shining light,* as by the *hymn of Orpheus,*‖ or this *speech of Anchises.*

On the whole, if I be not much deceived, the view in which I place this famous episode, not only clears up a number of difficulties, inexplicable on any other scheme; but likewise heightens and ennobles the whole poem; for now the episode is seen to be an essential part of the main subject, which is THE ERECTION OF A CIVIL POLICY and A RELIGION; custom having made *initiation into the Mysteries* a necessary preparative for that arduous undertaking.

* "Teque, Ceres et Libera, quarum SACRA—a quibus initia vitæ, atque victus, legum, morum, mansuetudinis, humanitatis exempla hominibus et civitatibus data, ac dispertita esse dicuntur."—CICERO *in Verr.* v. cap. 72, edit. Ox. 4to, tom. iv. p. 478.

† This circumstance Apollodorus informs us of. His words are these:—Μαθοῦσα δὲ παρ' ἑρμηνέων, ὅτι Πλούτων αὐτὴν ἥρπασεν, ΟΡΓΙΖΟΜΕΝΗ ΘΕΟΙΣ ΑΠΕΛΙΠΕΝ ΟΥΡΑΝΟΝ· εἰκασθεῖσα δὲ γυναικὶ, ἦκεν εἰς Ἐλευσῖνα.

‡ Λητοῦς ἐγίγνετο λοχεία, καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος γοναὶ, καὶ Κορωνίδος γάμος, καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸς ἐτίκτετο· ἐν δὲ τῇ δευτέρᾳ Γλυκῶνος ἐπιφάνεια καὶ γένεσις τοῦ θεοῦ. Τρίτῃ δὲ ἡμέρᾳ, Ποδαλειρίου τε ἦν καὶ τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου γάμος, &c.—Tom. iii. p. 245, edit. Reitzii, Amstel. 1746, 4to.

§ See note (‡), pp. 273, 274.

‖ See p. 217

But there is no place in this admirable Poem, even to the SHIELD OF ÆNEAS, which will not instruct us how considerable a station the MYSTERIES held in public life; and how necessary they were supposed to be, to compleat the equipage of a Hero.

The ornaments on this shield represent two famous Histories of different periods, and very differently executed. The first, a loose sketch of the foundation and early fortunes of Rome; the second, a highly finished picture of the victory of Actium. These so dissimilar pieces seem to be as oddly connected; by a sudden jump unto the other world.

"Hinc procul addit
Tartareas etiam sedes, alta ostia Ditis;
Et scelerum pœnas, et te, Catilina, minaci
Pendentem scopulo, Furiarumque ora trementem;
Secretosque pios; his dantem jura Catonem." *

But there is more in this disposition than appears at first sight. The several parts make an uniform and connected System. The first of the two principal parts, we have observed, is a view of the foundation and first establishment of ancient Rome. Now Dionysius of Halicarnassus tells us, that this city was in nothing more excellent, or worthy of imitation, than in the genius of its national Religion; which was so constructed, as to be always ready to render service to the State. Hence, Virgil, when he has brought us to the time in which their CIVIL establishment was perfectly secured by the slaughter and dispersion of the Gauls,

("Scutis protecti corpora longis,")

goes on to the RELIGIOUS constitution:

"Hic exultantes Salios, nudosque Lupercos,
Lanigerosque apices, et lapsa ancilia cœlo
Excuderat: castæ ducebant sacra per urbem
Pilentis matres in mollibus"—

Now Strabo observes, that the ancient pagan religion consisted of two parts, the OPEN and the SECRET.† The *open*, Virgil hath given us in the Salian and Lupercal rites. What remained was the *secret*, and this he presents to us in an oblique description of the *Mysteries*; where (as we have shewn) the scenes of a future state were exhibited to the Initiated.

"Hinc procul addit
TARTAREAS etiam SEDES, alta ostia Ditis;
Et scelerum pœnas, et te, Catilina, minaci
Pendentem scopulo, Furiarumque ora trementem;
SECRETOSQUE PIOS; his dantem jura Catonem."

So that, as before, a particular INITIATION into the *Mysteries* was meant by Æneas's descent to the infernal regions; here, the general CELEBRATION of them is to be understood by this contracted view of Tartarus and Elysium.

* Lib. viii. † Lib. x. p. 467, C, edit. Paris, 1620, fol.

As this meaning seems necessary to give common propriety to the description of the shield, there is reason, I think, for receiving it. And if we allow, that the MYSTERIES are here represented under the idea of the *infernal regions*, we gain a new argument in favour of the interpretation of the sixth book.

If it be asked why Cato is put, as it were, in the place of Minos; and Catiline, of Tityus: the answer will let us into another beauty. It is a fine insinuation, that these foreign rites of Eleusis deserved to be naturalized at Rome. In which he only followed the opinion of Cicero.*

Here it may not be improper to take notice of a vulgar mistake, as old at least as Servius, that Cato the censor, and not Cato of Utica, is meant in this place; as if the Court-poet would not dare to celebrate the professed enemy of the Julian house. This made the critics seek out for a Cato of a distant age, to brave Catiline in Hell; when they might have seen it could be no other than his great contemporary, who had before withstood him in Rome. The last line,

"SECRETOSQUE pios; his dantem jura Catonem,"

was probably a compliment to Cato in his little senate of Utica.

All this considered, we see the reason, the great artist had to call his picture, his portraiture on the shield,

—"Clypei NON ENARRABILE textum;"

an ÆNIGMATICAL picture.

And now the nature and purpose of the *sixth* book being further supported by this collateral circumstance, it will enable us to discover and explain another beauty in the *seventh*; which depending on this principle, could not be seen till it was established.

If the recommendation of the *Mysteries* was of such importance in an epic poem of this *species*; and if, at the time of writing, many of the *Mysteries* were become abominably corrupt, we can hardly believe but that the poet, after he had so largely expatiated in praise of those that were holy and useful, would take care to stigmatize such as were become notoriously profligate: because this tended equally with the other, to vindicate, what he had in view, the honour of the institution. And what strengthens this conjecture, is the similar conduct of another great writer of antiquity upon the same subject, whom we are now coming to, APULEIUS of Madaura, whose *Metamorphosis* is written altogether in this view of *recommending the Pagan Mysteries*; in which, as we shall find, he hath been no less circumstantial in reprobating the corrupt *Mysteries* of the SYRIAN GODDESS than in extolling the pure rites of the EGYPTIAN ISIS. A conduct so much alike, that the two cases will serve mutually to support what is here said of either.

* See p. 223.

This then seemed a necessary part in the plan of Virgil's Poem. But it was no easy matter to execute it. Another allegory would have been without grace; nor was there any repose in the latter part of the action of the poem, as in the former, to admit a digression of such a length. On the other hand, to condemn all *corrupt Mysteries*, in the plain way of a judiciary sentence, did not suit the nature of his poem: nor, if it had suited, could it have been used, without hurting the uniform texture of the work: after the *pure rites* had been so covertly recommended under figures and fictions.

The poet, therefore, with admirable invention, hath contrived, in the next book, to render the most corrupt of the *Mysteries*, the secret rites of BACCHUS, very odious, by making them the instrument to traverse the designs of Providence, in the establishment of his Hero, and by putting a FURY on the office of exciting the *aspirants*, to the *celebration* of them. Amata, the mother of Lavinia, in order to violate the league and alliance between Æneas and Latinus, contrives, at the instigation of Alecto, to secrete her daughter; and to devote and consecrate her to Bacchus, in an *initiation* into one of his abominable rites:

"SIMULATO numine BACCHI
Majus adorta NEFAS, majoremque orsa furorem,
Evolat, et *natam* frondosis montibus ABDIT; *
Quo thalamum eripiat Teucris, tedasque moretur:
Evoë, Bacche! fremens, SOLUM TE VIRGINE DIGNUM *
Vociferans—
Fama volat: Furiisque accensas pectore *matres*,
Idem omnis simul ardor agit, nova quærere tecta
Deseruere domos—
Clamat: Io, matres—
Solvite crinales vittas, capite orgia mecum.
Talem inter sylvas, inter deserta ferarum
Reginam ALECTO STIMULIS AGIT UNDIQUE BACCHI." †

The Mysteries of Bacchus were well chosen for an example of corrupted Rites, and of the mischiefs they produced; for they were early and flagrantly corrupted. But his principal reason for this choice, I suppose, was a very extraordinary story he found in the Roman annals, of the horrors committed in that city, during the clandestine celebration of the *Bacchic rites;* which Livy has transcribed very circumstantially into the thirty-ninth book of his *History*.

Nor did the poet think he had done enough in representing the

* Livy, we have seen, in his account of these rites of Bacchus, says, "Raptos a Diis homines dici, quos machinæ illigatos ex conspectu in abditos specus abripiant."
† Lib. vii.—Plutarch describes these corrupt Mysteries, in the same manner; but adds, that they were not celebrated in honour of any of the Gods, but to prevent mischief from EVIL DEMONS, whom, by such sort of Rites, they would appease and render innocuous.—Ἑορτὰς δὲ καὶ θυσίας ὥσπερ ἡμέρας ἀποφράδας καὶ σκυθρωπὰς ἐν αἷς ὠμοφαγίαι καὶ διασπασμοί, νηστεῖαί τε καὶ κοπετοί, πολλαχοῦ δὲ πάλιν αἰσχρολογίαι πρὸς ἱεροῖς, μανίαι τε ἄλλαι ὀρινόμεναι ῥαψαύχενι σὺν κλόνῳ, θεῶν μὲν οὐδενί, ΔΑΙΜΟΝΩΝ δὲ ΦΑΥΛΩΝ, ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα φήσαιμ' ἂν τελεῖν μειλίχια καὶ παραμυθία.—Περὶ τῶν ἐκλελοιπότων Χρηστηρίων, edit. Francof. fol. 1599, tom. ii. p. 417, C.

corrupt Mysteries under these circumstances of discredit, without specifying the mischiefs they produced; nor that he had sufficiently distinguished them from the *pure*, without shewing those mischiefs to be such as the *pure* had taken care to obviate.

The next news, therefore, we hear of Amata, after her celebration of the rites of Bacchus, is her SUICIDE, and a suicide of the most ignominious kind:

> "Purpureos moritura manu discindit amictus,
> Et nodum *informis leti* trabe nectit ab alta."

This disaster, the poet makes Jupiter charge upon Juno; who, by the ministry of Alecto, excited Amata to an *initiation:*

> "Terris agitare vel undis
> Trojanos potuisti: infandum accendere bellum,
> DEFORMARE DOMUM, et luctu miscere hymenæos."

Suicide, as we learn by Plato,* the *holy mysteries* expressly forbad and condemned. On which account our poet, in his allegorical description of what was represented in the *Eleusinian*, has placed these criminals in a state of misery:

> "Proxima deinde tenent mœsti loca, qui sibi lethum"—

Thus nobly hath Virgil completed his design on the subject of the MYSTERIES. The hero of the poem is initiated into the most pure and holy of them; his capital Enemy, into the most impure and corrupt; and the schemes and intrigues of each party have a correspondent issue.

To conclude, the principles here assumed, in explaining this famous poetical fiction, are, I presume, such as give solidity, as well as light, to what is deduced from them; and are, perhaps, the only Principles from which any thing reasonable can be deduced in a piece of criticism of this nature. For, from what I had shewn was taught, and represented in the *Mysteries*, I infer that Æneas's DESCENT INTO HELL signifies an INITIATION; because of the exact conformity, in all circumstances, between what Virgil relates of his Hero's adventure, and what antiquity delivers concerning the SHEWS and DOCTRINES of those MYSTERIES, into which Heroes were wont to be initiated. On the contrary, had I gratuitously supposed, without any previous knowledge of what was practised in the *Mysteries*, that the *descent* was an *initiation*, merely because Augustus (who was shadowed under the person of Æneas) was initiated; and thence inferred, that the *Mysteries* did exhibit the same scenes which the Poet hath made *Hell* to exhibit to his Hero, my explanation had been as devoid of any solid inference, as of any rational principle. And yet, if authority could support so impertinent a conduct, one might

* See above, p. 263.

have ventured on it. A celebrated writer,* in a tract intitled *Reflections on the character of Iapis in Virgil*, goes altogether on this gratuitous kind of criticism. Without any previous knowledge of the life and fortunes of ANTONIUS MUSA, the physician of Augustus, he supposes that Virgil meant this person by IAPIS, merely because Augustus was meant by Æneas. And then, from what the poet tells us of Iapis's history, the critic concludes it must have made part of the history of Musa; and so, instead of explaining a fable by history, he would regulate history on a fable. Whereas the principles of true criticism should have directed him to inquire previously what Antiquity had left us, concerning the person of Antonius Musa: and if, on comparing what he found there, with what Virgil has delivered concerning Iapis, any strong resemblance was to be found; then, and not till then, his ingenious conjecture, that *Iapis* was *Musa*, would stand upon a reasonable bottom. It was not thus that an able critic † lately explained Virgil's noble allegory, in the beginning of the *third* GEORGIC; where, under the idea of a magnificent Temple, to be raised to the Divinity of Augustus; the poet promises the famous epic poem which he afterwards erected in his honour; or, as our Milton says,

—"built the lofty rhime."

But had the existence of such a poem never come to our knowledge, I am persuaded, this excellent writer had never troubled the world with so slender a conjecture that a Temple signified an epic poem; and therefore that Virgil executed, or at least intended, such a work. In truth, Critics should proceed in these enquiries about their author's secret meaning, with the same caution and sobriety which Courts of Justice employ in the detection of concealed criminals; who take care, in the first place to be well assured of the *corpus delicti*, before they venture to charge the fact upon any one.

Thus far concerning the *use* of the MYSTERIES to SOCIETY. How *essential* they were esteemed to RELIGION, we may understand by the METAMORPHOSIS OF APULEIUS; a book, indeed, which from its very first appearance hath passed for a trivial fable. Capitolinus, in the life of Clodius Albinus, where he speaks of that kind of tales which disconcert the gravity of philosophers, tells us that Severus could not bear with patience the honours the Senate had conferred on Albinus; especially their distinguishing him with the title of *learned*, who was grown old in the study of old-wives-fables, such as the Milesian-Punic tales of his countryman and favourite, Apuleius: "Major fuit" (says Severus, in his letter to the senate on this occa-

* Dr. Atterbury, Bishop of Rochester. [See his Epistolary Correspondence, 1783, vol. i. p. 329.] † See HOR. *Ep. ad Augustum*, with an English Commentary, and Notes, p. 36.

sion) "dolor quod illum pro *literato* laudandum plerique duxistis, quum ille næniis quibusdam anilibus occupatus *inter Milesias Punicas Apulei sui* et ludicra literaria consenesceret." That poor, modern-spirited critic Macrobius, talks too of Apuleius in the same strain.—"Nec omnibus fabulis Philosophia repugnat, nec omnibus acquiescit —Fabulæ, aut tantum conciliandæ auribus voluptatis aut adhortationis quoque in bonam frugem gratia repertæ sunt, auditum mulcent; velut comœdiæ; quales Menander ejusve imitatores agendas dederunt: vel argumenta fictis casibus amatorum referta; quibus vel multum se *Arbiter* exercuit, vel APULEIUM nonnunquam *lusisse* MIRAMUR. Hoc totum fabularum genus, *quod solas aurium delicias profitetur, e sacrario suo in nutricum cunas sapientiæ tractatus eliminat.*" *—However he seems to wonder that Apuleius should trifle so egregiously: and well he might. For the writer of the *Metamorphosis* was one of the gravest and most virtuous, as well as most learned, philosophers of his age. But Albinus appears to have gone further into the true character of this work, than his rival Severus. And if we may believe Marcus Aurelius, who calls Albinus "homo exercitatus, vita tristis, gravis moribus," † he was not a man to be taken with such trifling amusements as Milesian fables. His fondness therefore for the *Metamorphosis* of Apuleius shews, that he considered it in another light. And who so likely to be let into the author's true design, as Albinus, who lived very near his time, and was of Adrumetum in the neighbourhood of Carthage, where Apuleius sojourned and studied, and was honoured with public marks of distinction! The work is indeed of a different character from what some Ancients have represented it; and even from what modern Critics have pretended to discover of it. Those Ancients, who stuck in the outside, considered it, without refinement, as an idle fable: the Moderns, who could not reconcile a work of that nature to the gravity of the author's character, have supposed it a thing of more importance, and no less than a general satire on the vices of those times: "Tota porro hæc metamorphosis Apuleiana" (says Mr. Fleuri ‡) "et stylo et sententia, satyricon est perpetuum, ut recte observavit Barthius, Advers. lib. ii. cap. 11, in quo magica deliria, sacrificulorum scelera, adulterorum crimina, furum et latronum impunitæ factiones palam differuntur." But this is far short of the matter. The author's main purpose was not to satyrize the specific *vices of his age* (though, to enliven his fable, and for the better carrying on his story, he hath employed many circumstances of this kind) but to recommend PAGAN RELIGION as the only cure for *all vice whatsoever*.

To give what we have to say its proper force, we must consider the real character of the writer. Apuleius, of Madaura in Afric, was a

* Lib. i. cap. 2. † CAPITOLINUS *in Claud. Alb.* ‡ Ed. AP. in Us. Delph.

devoted Platonist; and, like the Platonists of that age, an inveterate enemy to Christianity. His zeal for the *honour of philosophy* is seen in that solemn affirmation, when convened before a court of justice, "Philosophiæ honorem qui mihi salute mea antiquior est, nusquam minui." * His superstitious attachment to the *Religion of his country*, is seen in his immoderate fondness for the MYSTERIES. He was initiated, as himself tells us, into almost all of them: and, in some, bore the most distinguished offices. In his Apology before the proconsul of Africa, he says, "Vin' dicam, cujusmodi illas res in sudario obvolutas, laribus Pontiani commendarim? Mos tibi geretur. *Sacrorum pleraque Initia in Græcia participavi.* Eorum quædam signa et monumenta tradita mihi a sacerdotibus sedulo conservo. Nihil insolitum, nihil incognitum dico: vel unius Liberi Patris Symmistæ, qui adestis, scitis, quid domi conditum celetis, et absque omnibus profanis tacite veneremini. *At ego, ut dixi, multijuga sacra et plurimos ritus, varias ceremonias,* STUDIO VERI *et officio erga Deos, didici.* Nec hoc ad tempus compono: sed abhinc ferme triennium est, cum primis diebus quibus Œam veneram, publice *disserens de* ÆSCULAPII MAJESTATE eadem ista præ me tuli, et quot sacra nossem percensui. Ea disputatio celebratissima est; vulgo legitur; in omnium manibus versatur; non tam facundia mea, quam mentione Æsculapii religiosis Œensibus commendata.—Etiamne cuiquam mirum videri potest, cui sit ulla memoria religionis, *hominem tot Mysteriis Deûm conscium* quædam sacrorum crepundia domi adservare?" † His attachment to the *open* worship of Paganism was not inferior to that of the *secret*, as appears by what follows from the same Apology:—"Morem mihi habeo, quoquò eam, simulacrum alicujus Dei inter libellos conditum gestare: eique diebus festis thure et mero et aliquando victimis supplicare." ‡ His great devotion to Paganism, therefore, must needs have been attended with an equal aversion to Christianity; and it is more than probable, that the oration he speaks of as made in honour of Æsculapius, was in the number of those INVECTIVES, at that time so well received by the enemies of our holy faith. For, not to insist on the success of his oration, which, he tells us, was in every body's hands, a thing common to discourses on subjects that engage the public attention, but rarely the fortune of such stale ware as panegyrics on a God long worn into an establishment; not, I say, to insist upon this, we may observe that Æsculapius was one of those ancient heroes,§ who were employed, by the defenders of Paganism, to oppose to JESUS; and the circumstances of Æsculapius's story made

* *Apologia*, p. 114, ed. Pricæi, Par. 1635, 4to, in fine. † *Ibid.* pp. 63, 64.
‡ *Ibid.* p. 72, lin. 5. § JUSTIN MARTYR, *Apol.* 2.—Ὅτε δὲ πάλιν ἔμαθον προφητευθέντα θεραπεύσειν αὐτὸν νόσον, καὶ νεκροὺς ἀνεγερεῖν, τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν πατήνεγκαν.—See CYRILL. *Cont. Julian.* lib. vi.

him the fittest of any in fabulous antiquity, for that purpose. Ovid, who lived before these times of danger to the pagan Gods, and indeed, before the coming of that Deliverer who gave occasion to so many impious comparisons, hath yet made Ochirröe, in contemplation of his future actions, prophesy of him in such strains as presented to his excellent Translator the image of the *true physician of mankind;* and thereby enabled him to give a sublime to his version, which is not borrowed from his original:

> "Ergo ubi vaticinos concepit mente furores,
> Incaluitque Deo, quem clausum pectore habebat;
> Aspicit infantem, Totique salutifer orbi
> Cresce puer, dixit: tibi se mortalia sæpe
> Corpora debebunt: animas tibi reddere ademptas
> Fas erit. Idque semel, dîs indignantibus, ausus,
> Posse dare hoc iterum flammâ prohibebere avitâ:
> Eque deo corpus fies exsangue; deusque,
> Qui modò corpus eras, et bis tua fata novabis."—OVID.

> "Once as the sacred infant she survey'd,
> The God was kindled in the raving maid,
> And thus she utter'd her prophetic tale:
> 'Hail, great physician of the world, all hail;
> Hail, mighty Infant, who in years to come,
> Shalt heal the nations and defraud the tomb;
> Swift be thy growth, thy triumphs unconfin'd,
> Make kingdoms thicker, and increase mankind.
> Thy daring art shall animate the dead,
> And draw the thunder on thy guilty head:
> Then shalt thou die.—But from the dark abode
> Rise up victorious, and be twice a God.'"—ADDISON.

But the Reformers of Paganism having lately resolved all the Popular Gods into the Attributes and Manifestations of the FIRST CAUSE, Æsculapius bore a very distinguished rank in this new Model. Pausanias tells us, that in Phocis there was a celebrated Temple dedicated to him, where he was worshipped as *the Author and original of all things.**

Having seen what there was in the common passion of his Sect, and in his own fond mode of superstition, to indispose Apuleius to *Christianity;* let us inquire what private provocation he might have to prejudice him against it; for, a private provocation, I am persuaded, he had; occasioned by a personal injury done him by one of THIS PROFESSION; which, I suppose, did not a little contribute to exasperate his bigotry. He had married a rich widow, against the good liking of her first husband's Relations; who endeavoured to set aside the marriage on pretence of his employing sorcery and enchantments to engage her affections. Of this, he was judicially accused by his wife's brother-in-law, Licinius Æmilianus, before the Proconsul of Africa. Now his Accuser, if I am not much mistaken, was a CHRISTIAN, though this interesting circumstance hath escaped the notice of his

* Σταδίοις δὲ ἀπωτέρω Τιθορέας ἑβδομήκοντα ναός ἐστιν Ἀσκληπιοῦ, καλεῖται δὲ Ἀρχαγέτας. Τιμὰς δὲ παρὰ αὐτῶν ἔχει Τιθορέων, καὶ ἐπίσης παρὰ Φωκέων τῶν ἄλλων. —Lib. x. cap. xxxii. p. 879, edit. Kuhnii, fol. Lips. 1696.

commentators. However, let us hear the character Apuleius himself gives of his Party.—"Atqui ego scio nonnullos, et cum primis *Æmilianum* istum, *facetiæ* sibi habere *res divinas deridere*. Nam, ut audio, percensentibus iis qui istum novere, NULLI DEO *ad hoc ævi supplicavit; nullum templum frequentavit.* Si fanum aliquod prætereat, NEFAS HABET ADORANDI GRATIA MANUM LABRIS ADMOVERE. Iste vero nec diis rurationis, qui eum pascunt ac vestiunt, segetis ullas aut vitis aut gregis primitias impartit; nullum in villa ejus delubrum situm, nec locus aut lucus consecratus. At quid ego de luco aut delubro loquor? *Negant vidisse se, qui fuere, unum saltem in finibus ejus aut lapidem unctum, aut ramum coronatum.* Igitur agnomenta ei duo indita: *Charon,* ob oris et animi *diritatem:* sed alterum, quod LIBENTIUS AUDIT, ob deorum contemptum, *Mezentius.*" * And now let us see how this agrees with what Arnobius tells us, the Pagans objected to his Sect—"In hac enim consuestis parte crimen nobis maximum *impietatis* affigere, quod neque *ædes sacras venerationis* ad Officia construamus, *nec Deorum alicujus simulacrum* constituamus, aut formam: non *altaria fabricemus,* non aras, non cæsorum sanguinem animantium demus, *non tura, non fruges salsas,* non denique vinum liquens paterarum effusionibus inferamus. Quæ quidem nos cessamus non ideo vel exædificare, vel facere *tanquam impias geramus et scelerosas mentes, aut aliquem sumpserimus temeraria in Deos desperatione* CONTEMPTUM: sed quod, &c." † Again, where Apuleius apostrophises his Adversary in another place, he says, agreeably to the Character before given of him—"SI QUID CREDIS, Æmiliane!" ‡ and again, after explaining a spiritual doctrine of Plato, he adds with a sneer—"attamen si audire VERUM velis, Æmiliane!" § But the repetition of this characteristic word with an ironical emphasis is his constant formula when he addresses Æmilianus, "longe a VERO aberrasse necesse habeat confiteri"||—"Immo si VERUM velis"¶—"plane quidem si VERUM velis."** 1. Now, irreligion and atheism, we know, were the names Christianity at that time went by, for having dared to renounce the whole family of the gentile Gods together. To this opprobrium, Origen alludes, when he retorts it on Polytheism, in this elegant manner—οἱ περὶ ἀγαλμάτων καὶ τῆς ΑΘΕΟΥ πολυθεότητος. Æmilianus we see had made such clear work, that there was not so much as an *anointed stone,* or a *tree adorned with consecrated garlands,* to be found throughout his whole Farm. That the Atheism of Æmilianus was of this sort, and no *courtly* or *philosophic* impiety, appears from his Character and Station. He was neither a fine Gentleman, nor a profound Inquirer into nature; characters indeed which are sometimes found to be

* *Apol.* pp. 64, 65. † ARNOBIUS *Adver. Gentes,* lib. vii. sub init. ‡ P. 26
§ P. 14. || P. 77. ¶ P. 98. ** P. 108.

above Religion; but a mere Rustic, in his life and manners. Now plain, unpolished men, in such a condition of life, are never without some Religion or other: When therefore, we find Æmilianus not of the *established*, we must needs conclude him to be a *Sectary* and a CHRISTIAN. 2. His neglect of his country Gods was not a mere negative affront of forgetfulness. He gloried in being their despiser; and took kindly to the name of MEZENTIUS, as a title of honour—*alterum, quod libentius audit, ob deorum contemptum, Mezentius*, which I would consider as a further mark of a *Christian, convict*. 3. He even held it an *abomination* so much as to put his hand to his lips, (according to the mode of adoration in those times) when he passed by an Heathen Temple; "nefas habet, adorandi gratia, manum labris admovere," the most characteristic mark of a *primitive Confessor*, by which he could never be mistaken; nor, one would think, so long overlooked.* 4. By the frequent and sarcastical repetition of the word *verum*, Apuleius seems to sneer at that general title which the Faithful gave their *Religion*, of THE TRUTH.

Æmilianus, it seems, had misrepresented a little image of *Mercury*, which Apuleius used to carry about with him, as a *squalid magical* figure. On which occasion the Accused, in great rage, deprecates his Accuser—"At tibi, Æmiliane, pro isto mendacio, duat Deus iste, Superum et Inferum commeator utrorumque Deorum, malam gratiam, semperque obvias species mortuorum, quidquid Umbrarum est usquam, quidquid Lemurum, quidquid Manium, quidquid Larvarum, oculis tuis oggerat: *Omnia noctium occursacula, omnia Bustorum formidamina, omnia sepulcrorum terriculamenta.*"—This was the common curse and supposed to be the common punishment of impiety and *Atheism*. But it has here a peculiar elegance as denounced against Æmilianus. The Busta, or Repository of dead bodies, so abhorred by the Pagans, were the very places in which the Christians assembled for nocturnal Worship.

The aversion, therefore, which Apuleius had contracted to his Christian accuser, (and we see, by what is here said, it was in no ordinary degree) would without doubt increase his prejudice to that Religion. I am persuaded he gave the Character of the Baker's wife, in his *Golden Ass*, for no other reason than to outrage our holy faith. Having drawn her stained with all the vices that could deform a Woman; to finish all, he makes her a Christian.—"Nec enim vel unum vitium nequissimæ illi feminæ deerat: sed omnia prorsus, ut in quandam cœnosam latrinam, in ejus animam flagitia confluxerant, sæva, viriosa, ebriosa, pervicax, in rapinis turpibus avara, in sumptibus fœdis profusa: inimica fidei, hostis pudicitiæ. *Tunc spretis atque calcatis divinis numinibus,* IN VICEM CERTÆ RELIGIONIS

* See note EE, at the end of this book.

MENTITA SACRILEGA PRÆSUMPTIONE DEI, QUEM PRÆDICARET UNICUM, CONFICTIS OBSERVATIONIBUS VACUIS, fallens omnes homines," &c.* So again in the fourth book, describing certain magnific Shows exhibited to the people by one Demochares; when he comes to speak of the criminals thrown to wild-beasts, he expresses himself in this manner:—"Alibi noxii, PERDITA SECURITATE, suis epulis bestiarum saginas instruentes" [p. 72.] The Oxf. MS. for *securitate* reads *severitate:* on which *Price* observes, *ego nec hoc nec illud intellectum habeo.* Apuleius by *noxii* apparently meant the *condemned Christians;* and *perdita securitate,* which is the true reading, censures either their reasonable hope of a happy immortality, or their false confidence that the beasts would not hurt them.

Let us see now how this would influence his writings. There was nothing the PHILOSOPHERS of that time had more at heart, especially the *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans,* than the support of sinking Paganism. This service, as hath been occasionally remarked, they performed in various ways and manners: some by *allegorizing their Theology;* some by *spiritualizing their Philosophy;* and some, as Jamblichus and Philostratus, by writing the *lives of their Heroes,* to oppose to that of CHRIST; others again, as Porphyry, with this view *collected their oracles;* or as Melanthius, Menander, Hicesius, and Sotades, *wrote descriptive encomiums on their* MYSTERIES. Which last, as we shall now shew, was the province undertaken by Apuleius; his *Metamorphosis* being nothing else but one continued RECOMMENDATION of them.

But to give what we have to say its proper force; let us, 1. enquire into the motives our Author might have for entering at all into the defence of Paganism: 2. His reasons for choosing this topic of defence, *the recommendation of the Mysteries.*

1. As to his defence of paganism in general, we may observe, 1. That works of this kind were very much in fashion, especially amongst the Philosophers of our author's Sect. 2. He was, as we have seen, most superstitiously devoted to pagan worship: and, 3. He bore a personal spite and prejudice to the Christian profession.

2. As to his making the defence of the *Mysteries* his choice, still stronger reasons may be assigned. 1. These were the Rites to which he was so peculiarly devoted, that he had contrived to be *initiated* into all the *Mysteries* of note, in the Roman world; and in several of them had borne the most distinguished offices. 2. The *Mysteries* being at this time become extremely corrupt, and consequently, in discredit, needed an able and zealous Apologist: both of which qualities met eminently in Apuleius. The corruptions were of two kinds, DEBAUCHERIES and MAGIC. The *Debaucheries* we have taken

* *Metamorph.* lib. ix. p. 186, edit. Pricæi.

notice of, above: their *Magic* will be considered hereafter. But, 3. Our author's close attachment to *Mysterious rites* was, without question, the very thing that occasioned all those suspicions and reports, which ended in an accusation of *Magic*: And, considering what hath been said of the corrupt state of the *Mysteries*, the reader will not wonder that it should.

Such then being the general character of the *Mysteries*, and of this their great Devotee, nothing was more natural than his projecting their defence; which, at the same time that it concurred to the support of Paganism in general, would vindicate his own credit, together with an Institution of which he was so immoderately fond. And the following considerations are sufficient to shew, that the *Metamorphosis* was written after his *Apology*: for, 1. His accusers never once mention the fable of the *Golden Ass* to support their charge of Magic, though they were in great want of proofs, and this lay so ready for their purpose. For, we are not to suppose that he alludes to the *Metamorphosis* in the following words of the Apology,—"Aggredior enim jam ad ipsum crimen *Magiæ*, quod ingenti tumultu, ad invidiam mei, accensum, frustrata expectatione omnium, per *nescio quas anileis fabulas* deflagravit." pp. 29, 30. The *idle tales* here hinted at, are the gossiping stories which went about of him, and which he afterwards exposes in the course of this defence. 2. He positively asserts before the tribunal of Maximus Claudius, that he had never given the least occasion to suspect him of *Magic*: "*Nusquam* passus sum *vel exiguam* suspicionem *magiæ* consistere." *

Now Antiquity considered INITIATION INTO THE MYSTERIES as *a delivery from a living death of vice, brutality, and misery; and the beginning of a new life of virtue, reason, and happiness.*† This, therefore, was the very circumstance which our Author chose for the subject of his recommendation.

And as in the *Mysteries*, their moral and divine truths were represented in *shews* and *allegories*, so, in order to comply with this method of instruction, and in imitation of the ancient Masters of wisdom,‡ who borrowed their manner of teaching from thence, he hath artfully insinuated his doctrine in an agreeable Fable; and the fittest, one could conceive for his purpose, as will be seen when we come to examine it.

The foundation of this Allegory was a *Milesian Fable*, a species of

* P. 100, lin. 11. † See what hath been said above, in the discourse of the Mysteries. ‡ STRABO acquaints us with the inducements which the ancients had to practise this method of Instruction.—"Οταν δὲ προσῇ καὶ τὸ θαυμαστὸν καὶ τὸ τερατῶδες, ἐπιτείνει τὴν ἡδονὴν, ἥπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ μανθάνειν φίλτρον. Καταρχὰς μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη τοιούτοις δελέασι χρῆσθαι· προϊούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων μάθησιν ἄγειν, ἤδη τῆς διανοίας ἐρρωμένης, καὶ μηκέτι δεομένης κολάκων. Καὶ ἰδιώτης δὲ πᾶς καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, τρόπον τινὰ παῖς ἐστι, φιλομυθεῖ τε ὡσαύτως.—GEOG. lib. i. p. 19. A, edit. Paris. fol. 1620.

polite trifling then much in vogue, and not unlike the modern *Arabian tales*. To allure his readers, therefore, with the promise of a *fashionable* work, he introduces his Metamorphosis in this manner: *At ego tibi sermone isto Milesio varias fabulas conseram*, AURESQUE TUAS *benevolas lepido susurro* PERMULCEAM; plainly intimating that there was something of more consequence at bottom. But the *fashionable* people took him at his word; and, from that day to this, never troubled their heads about a further meaning. The OUTSIDE engaged all their attention, and sufficiently delighted them; as we may gather from the early title it bore of ASINUS AUREUS. And, from the beginning of one of Pliny's epistles, I suspect that AUREÆ was the common title given to the *Milesian*, and such like tales as Strolers used to tell for a piece of money to the rabble in a circle. Pliny's words are these—"assem para, et accipe AUREAM fabulam." * Unless we will rather suppose it to have been bestowed by the few intelligent readers in the secret; for, in spite of the Author's repeated preparation, a secret it was, and so, all along continued.

Upon one of these popular Fables, he chose to ingraft his instruction; taking a celebrated Tale from the *collections* of one Lucius of Patræ; who relates his transformation into an Ass, and his adventures under that shape. Lucian has epitomised this story, as Apuleius seems to have paraphrased it: and the subject being a METAMORPHOSIS, it admirably fitted his purpose; as the METEMPSYCHOSIS, to which that superstition belongs, was one of the fundamental doctrines of the *Mysteries*. But from Photius's account of Lucius Patrensis one would be inclined to rank him amongst those who composed books of *Metamorphosis* [see B. iii. Sect. 3] according to the popular Theology, rather than a writer of Milesian fables. He entitles Lucius's work μεταμορφώσεως λόγοι διάφοροι. And after having said that Lucian borrowed his *Ass* from thence, to ridicule pagan religion, he goes on;† "but Lucius giving a more serious turn to his Metamorphosis, and treating as realities these changes of Men into one another, of Men into Beasts, and so on the contrary, hath weaved together these and many other of the trifles and absurdities of the Ancient Mythology, and committed them to writing for the entertainment of the Public." This will account for the oddness of Apuleius's expressions, with which he introduces his *Fable*—"Et figuras fortunasque hominum in alias imagines conversas et in se rursum MUTUO NEXU refectas, ut mireris, exordior,"—words by no means suiting with the single transformation, and story of the *golden*

* Lib. ii. Ep. 20. † Ὁ δὲ Λουκίος σπουδάζων τε, καὶ πιστὰς νομίζων τὰς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀλλήλους μεταμορφώσεις, τάς τε ἐξ ἀλόγων εἰς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν· καὶ τὸν ἄλλον τῶν ΠΑΛΑΙΩΝ ΜΥΘΩΝ ὕθλον καὶ φλήναφον γραφῇ παραδίδου ταῦτα, καὶ συνύφαινον.—*Bibl.* ed. Gen. p. 311.

ass, but very expressive of the nature of such a work as that of Lucius Patrensis, according to the idea which Photius gives us of it. From whence I conclude, that Apuleius might translate these very words from his original author.

The Fable opens with the representation of a young man, personated by himself, sensible of the advantages of *virtue* and *piety*, but immoderately fond of PLEASURE, and as curious of MAGIC. Apuleius takes care to keep up the first part of this character as he goes along, *familiaris* CURIOSITATIS *admonitus*, l. iii. *familiari* CURIOSITATE *attonitus*, l. ix. And *Curiosus* and *Magus* were used by the Antients as Synonymous. So Apuleius himself—*At ego* CURIOSUS *alioquin, ut primum* ARTIS MAGICÆ *semper optatum nomen audivi*, p. 24. Hence it is that he is represented as having been initiated in all the *corrupt Mysteries*, where Magic was professedly practised. *Fotis*, the inferior Priestess in the magic rites of the Inchantress, *Pamphile*, enjoining him silence, says, "*sacris pluribus initiatus*, profecto nôsti sanctam silentii fidem."* As to the second, we have his adventure with *Byrrhena* and *Pamphile*, which seems to be borrowed from Prodicus's fable of the contest between *Virtue* and *Pleasure* for the young *Hercules*. Byrrhena meets our adventurer, pretends to be his relation,† and tells him that she brought him up from his infancy: by which is intimated that virtue was most natural to him. She leads him home to her house, which is described as a magnificent palace: one of its principal ornaments is the history of Diana;‡ where the punishment of Actæon is not forgotten,§ as a seasonable lesson against *vicious curiosity*. And to keep him to herself, she promises to make him heir of all her fortunes. Then taking him apart, she warns him to beware of the mischievous practices of his hostess Pamphile. "Per hanc, inquit, Deam (Dianam) ô Luci carissime, ut anxie tibi metuo, et, utpote pignori meo, longe provisum cupio, cave tibi, sed *cave fortiter*, a malis artibus, et facinorosis illecebris Pamphiles illius,—MAGA primi nominis, et omnis carminis sepulcralis magistra creditur: quæ surculis et lapillis, et id genus frivolis inhalatis, omnem istam lucem mundi sideralis imis Tartari, et in vetustum chaos submergere novit. Nam cum quemquam conspexerit speciosæ formæ juvenem, venustate ejus sumitur: et illico," etc.

But Lucius makes a choice very different from that of Hercules. He had promised to observe *Byrrhena's* admonitions, and to return to her again: but a circumstance of immoderate mirth intervening, he

* P. 53. † "Ego te, O Luci, meis istis manibus educavi: quidni? parentis tuæ non modo sanguinis, verum alimoniarum etiam socia fui."—P. 23. ‡ "Ecce lapis Parius in Dianam factus tenet libratam totius loci medietatem, signum perfecte luculentum,—introeuntibus obvium, et majestate numinis venerabile," &c.—P. 22. § "Inter medias frondes lapidis Actæonis simulacrum, curioso obtutu in dorsum projectus," &c.—P. 23.

found in himself a more than ordinary aversion to keep his word. "Ad hæc ego formidans et procul perhorrescens etiam ipsam domum ejus," &c.* This is a fine circumstance, nothing being so great an enemy to modesty and chastity (figured in the person of Byrrhena) as immoderate mirth. He gives a loose to his vicious appetite for *Pleasure* and *Magic*: and the crimes and follies into which they lead him soon end in his transformation to a BRUTE.

This contrivance of the introductory part is artful; and finely insinuates the great moral of the piece, THAT BRUTALITY ATTENDS VICE AS IT'S PUNISHMENT: and punishment by actual transformation was keeping up to the popular opinion.† His making a passion for *Magic* contribute to this dreadful change is no less ingenious, as it cleared both *himself* and the *Mysteries* from that imputation; for it appeared that *Magic* was so far from being innocent, that in his opinion, it was attended with the severest punishment; so far from being encouraged by the *Mysteries*, that they only could relieve men from the distresses which this vicious curiosity brought upon it's votaries; as is shewn by the catastrophe of the Piece.

St. Austin permitted himself to doubt whether Apuleius's account of his change into an ASS was not a true relation.—*Sicut Apuleius, in libris quos Asini aurei titulo inscripsit, sibi ipsi accidisse, ut accepto veneno, humano animo permanente, asinus fieret,* AUT INDICAVIT *aut finxit.*‡ I shall say nothing to so extravagant a doubt, but only observe, that it appears from hence, that St. Austin esteemed Apuleius a profligate in his manners, and addicted to the superstitions of *Magic*. And yet it is by no means credible, that he who took so much pains, in a very serious and public way,§ to free himself from these imputations, should afterwards wantonly undo all he had so successfully performed in support of a doubtful reputation, by an unnecessary narrative of his own early debaucheries. But it may be said, that all this happened in his youth; and that his subsequent *Initiations* had purified his manners: But neither will his APOLOGY admit of this supposition; for there he expressly insists on the virtue of his youth. "De eloquentia vero, si qua mihi fuisset, neque mirum, neque invidiosum deberet videri, si *ab ineunte ævo* unis studiis litterarum ex summis viribus deditus, omnibus aliis spretis voluptatibus *ad hoc ævi*, haud sciam anne super omneis homines impenso labore, diuque noctuque, cum despectu et dispendio bonæ valetudinis, eam quæsissem—Quis enim me hoc quidem pacto eloquentior vivat? quippe qui nihil *unquam* cogitavi quod eloqui non auderem. Eundem me aio facundissimum; nam *omne peccatum* semper nefas habui. Eundem disertissimum; quod nullum meum factum vel dictum extet, de quo

* P. 51. † See book iii. sect. 3. ‡ *Civitas Dei*, lib. xviii. cap. 18.
§ His Apology.

dissercre publice non possim."* What have we then to conclude but that the representation of himself in this *Fable*, under a debauched character, is entirely feigned? Yet still it would be as absurd to imagine that a grave and moral Philosopher should chuse to exhibit himself to the public in the odious, and false light of a *Magician* and *Debauchee;* and take a pleasure in dwelling upon the horrors of so detestable a Character, for no other purpose than to amuse and entertain a set of dissolute readers. We must needs therefore go a step further, and conclude that he assumed it only for the sake of the GENERAL MORAL, and the better to carry on his Allegory; which was, to recommend the MYSTERIES as the certain cure for all the DISORDERS OF THE WILL.

This being his end, he was but too much encouraged by the example of the most moral of the ancient Satirists, to particularize the various maladies to which he was applying a remedy. Let this, and his copying only what he found in his original Author, stand for some kind of excuse in a wretched Pagan; and it is the best we have, for all the obscenities with which his Fable abounds.

But to proceed with his plan. Having now shewn himself thoroughly brutalized by his crimes; he goes on to represent at large the miseries of that condition, in a long detail of his misadventures; in the course of which he fell, by turns, under the dominion of every vicious passion; though the incidents are chiefly confined to the mischiefs of unlawful love: And this, with much judgment, as one of the principal ends of the *Mysteries* was to curb and subdue this inordinance, which brings more general and lasting misery upon Mankind than all the other. And as it was the great moral of his piece to shew *that pure religion* (such as a platonic Philosopher esteemed pure) *was the only remedy for human corruption;* so, to prevent the abuse or mistake of this capital Principle, he takes care to inform us, *that an attachment to superstitious and corrupt Religion does but plunge the wretched victim into still greater miseries.* This he finely illustrates, in the history of his adventures with the BEGGING PRIESTS OF CYBELE, whose enormities are related in the eighth and ninth books; and whose CORRUPT MYSTERIES are intended as a contrast to the PURE RITES OF ISIS: With which, in a very studied description and encomium, he concludes the *Fable.*

In the mean time, matters growing from bad to worse, and Lucius plunged deeper and deeper in the sink of vice, his affairs come to a crisis. For this is one great beauty in the conduct of the Fable, that every change of station, while he remains a brute, makes his condition still more wretched and deplorable. And being now (in the *ninth* book) about to perpetrate one of the most shocking enormities;

* P. 6, lin. 10.

NATURE, though so deeply brutalized, REVOLTS; he abhors the idea of his projected crime; he evades his keepers; he flies to the sea-shore; and, in this solitude, begins to reflect more seriously on his lost condition. This is finely imagined; for we often see men, even after a whole life of horrors, come suddenly to themselves on the hideous aspect of some Monster-vice too frightful even for an hardened Reprobate to bear. Nor is it with less judgment that the Author makes these beginnings of reformation confirmed by solitude; when the unhappy victim of PLEASURE hath broken loose from the companions and partakers of his follies.

And now, a more intimate acquaintance with his hopeless condition obliges him to fly to Heaven for relief. The MOON is in full splendour; and the awful silence of the night inspires him with sentiments of Religion.—"Video præmicantis Lunæ candore nimio completum orbem,—nactusque opacæ noctis silentiosa secreta, certus etiam SUMMATEM DEAM præcipua majestate pollere, resque prorsus humanas ipsius regi *providentia*," etc.* He then purifies himself in the manner prescribed by PYTHAGORAS;† the Philosopher most addicted to *Initiations* of all the early Sages, as Apuleius, of all the later; and so makes his prayer to the *Moon* or ISIS; invoking her by her several names of the *Eleusinian Ceres*, the *celestial Venus*, *Diana* and *Proserpine*: when betaking himself to repose, she appears to him in a dream.‡ This was not a circumstance of the Fabulist's mere invention. Pausanias tells us "that in Phocis there was a Chapel consecrated to Isis, of all the places of worship, which the Grecks erected to this Egyptian Goddess, by far the most holy: that to this sacred place it was not lawful for any to approach, but such whom the Goddess had invited, and appeared to, in a *Dream*, for that purpose."§ Here she appears under the SHINING IMAGE so much spoken of by the *Mystics*, as representing the divine nature in general.‖ "Necdum satis conniveram: et ecce pelago medio, venerandos Diis etiam vultus attollens, emergit *divina facies*, ac dehinc paulatim toto corpore PER LUCIDUM SIMULACRUM, excusso pelago, ante me constitisse visum est. Ejus mirandam speciem ad vos etiam referre

* P. 238. † —"Meque protinus, purificandi studio, marino lavacro trado: septiesque submerso fluctibus capite, quod eum numerum præcipue religioni aptissimum divinus ille Pythagoras prodidit."—P. 238. ‡ ARTEMIDORUS says, that for a man to dream that Ceres, Proserpine, or Bacchus appears to him, betokens some extraordinary good fortune to happen to him. Δημήτηρ καὶ Κόρη καὶ ὁ λεγόμενος Ἴακχος τοῖς μεμυημένοις ταῖς θεαῖς ἀγαθόν τι καὶ οὐ τὸ τύχον ἐσόμενον σημαίνουσι.—Lib. iv. cap. 44. The ancient ONIROCRITICS, as we have observed, book iv. sect. 4, were not founded on the arbitrary fancies of the impostors who professed that art, but on the customs and superstitions of the times, and with a principal reference to the Egyptian HIEROGLYPHICS and MYSTERIES. § Τοῦ δὲ Ἀσκληπιοῦ περὶ τεσσαράκοντα ἀπέχει σταδίους περίβολος, καὶ ἄδυτον ἱερὸν Ἴσιδος ἁγιώτατον ὁπόσα Ἕλληνες θεῷ τῇ Αἰγυπτίᾳ πεποίηνται. Οὔτε γὰρ περιοικεῖν ἐνταῦθα οἱ Τιθοραιεῖς νομίζουσιν, οὔτε ἔσοδος ἐς τὸ ἄδυτον ἄλλοις γε ἢ ἐκείνοις ἐστίν, οὓς ἂν αὐτὴ προτιμήσασα ἡ Ἴσις καλέσῃ σφᾶς δι' ἐνυπνίων.—Lib. x. cap. 32, p. 880, edit. Kuhnii, Lips. fol. 1696. ‖ See above, p. 273, note (¶).

connitar—Corona multiformis, variis floribus sublimem distinxerat verticem: cujus media quidem super fronte *plana rotunditas*, candidum lumen emicabat. Dextra lævaque sulcis *insurgentium riperarum* cohibita, *spicis* etiam *Cerealibus* desuper porrectis.—Et quæ longe longeque etiam meum confutabat obtutum, *palla* nigerrima, splendescens atro nitore; quæ circum circa remeans,—per intextam extremitatem, et in ipsa oræ planitie, *stellæ* dispersæ coruscabant: earumque media semestris Luna flammeos spirabat ignes.—Dextera quidem ferebat *æreum crepitaculum*: cujus per angustam laminam in modum balthei recurvatam, trajectæ mediæ paucæ virgulæ, crispante brachio tergeminos jactus, reddebant argutum sonitum."* These several symbolic Attributes, the *lucid Round*, the *snakes*, the *ears of corn*, and the *sistrum*, represent the tutelar Deities of the *Hecatæan*, *Bacchic*, *Eleusinian* and *Isiac* MYSTERIES. That is, MYSTIC RITES IN GENERAL; for whose sake the allegory was invented. As the black Palla in which she is wrapped, embroidered with a silver-moon, and stars, denotes the TIME, in which the Mysteries were celebrated, namely the dead of NIGHT; which was so constant and inseparable a circumstance, that the author calls *initiation*, NOCTIS SOCIETAS.

In her speech to Lucius she gives this extraordinary account of herself, "En assum, tuis commota Lucî precibus, RERUM NATURA PARENS, elementorum omnium Domina, sæculorum progenies initialis, Summa numinum, Regina manium, Prima cœlitum, Deorum Dearumque facies uniformis: quæ cœli luminosa culmina, maris salubria flamina, inferorum deplorata silentia nutibus meis dispenso. Cujus numen unicum, multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis—priscaque doctrina pollentes ÆGYPTII, ceremoniis me prorsus PROPRIIS percolentes, appellant vero nomine reginam ISIDEM."† This was exactly adapted to the design of the *Mysteries;* and preparatory to the communication of the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ. It had likewise this further use, to patch up and recommend the PAGAN RELIGIONS; by shewing that their *Polytheism* consisted in nothing else than in giving the SUPREME GOD various NAMES, merely expressive of his various ATTRIBUTES. This was the fashionable colouring, which, after the appearance of Christianity, the advocates of paganism employed to blanch their IDOLATRY. I will only observe further, that the words, *Ægyptii ceremoniis me prorsus propriis percolentes*, insinuate, what was true, that all MYSTERIOUS WORSHIP came first from ÆGYPT; this people having penetrated furthest into the nature of the Gods: As the calling HER, who represents the *Mysteries in general*, RERUM NATURA PARENS, shews plainly what were the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ of them all.

PARENT NATURE then reveals to Lucius the means of his reco-

* Pp. 239, 240. † P. 241.

very. Her festival was on the following day; when there was to be a Procession of her Votaries. The Priest who led it up (she told him) would have a chaplet of ROSES in his hand, which had the virtue to restore him to his former shape. But as breaking through a habit of vice is, of all things, the most difficult; she adds encouragements to her promises, "nec quidquam rerum mearum reformides, ut arduum. Nam hoc eodem momento, quo tibi venio, simul et ibi PRÆSENS, quæ sunt consequentia sacerdoti meo per quietem facienda præcipio."* Alluding to what was taught in the *Mysteries*, that the *assistance of Heaven* was always *present* to second the efforts of virtue. But in return for the favour of releasing him from his brutal shape, i. e. of reforming his manners by *Initiation*, she tells him she expected the service of his whole life; And this, the *Mysteries* required: Nor should her service (she said) go unrewarded, for he should have a place in ELYSIUM hereafter; And this, too, the *Mysteries* promised. "Plane memineris, et penita mente conditum semper tenebis, *mihi reliqua vitæ tuæ curricula*, ad usque terminos ultimi spiritus, *vadata*. Nec injurium, cujus beneficio redieris ad homines ei totum debere quod vives. Vives autem *beatus*, vives, in mea tutela, *gloriosus*: et cum spatium seculi tui permensus ad inferos demearis; ibi quoque in ipso subterraneo semirotundo, me, quam vides Acherontis tenebris interlucentem, stygiisque penetralibus regnantem, CAMPOS ELYSIOS *incolens ipse*, tibi propitiam frequens adorabis."†

Lucius is at length confirmed in his resolution of *aspiring* to a life of virtue. And on this change of his dispositions, and intire conquest of his passions, the Author finely represents all Nature as putting on a new face of chearfulness and gaiety. "Tanta hilaritudine præter peculiarem meam gestire mihi cuncta videbantur; ut pecua etiam cujuscemodi, et totas domos, et ipsum diem serena facie gaudere sentirem."‡ And to enjoy Nature, in these her best conditions, was the boasted privilege of the *Initiated*, as we may see from a Chorus in the *Frogs* of Aristophanes.§

And now the Procession, in honour of ISIS, begins. Where by the way, we must observe, that the *two first days* of the celebration of the *Eleusinian Mysteries* are plainly described: the one called ΑΓΥΡΜΟΣ, from the multitude assembled; the other ΑΛΑΔΕ ΜΥΣΤΑΙ, from the Procession made to the sea-shore. "Tunc influunt *Turbæ* sacris divinis initiatæ‖—jam *ripam maris* proximamus."¶ The Priest or Hierophant of the Rites leads up the train

* P. 242. † P. 242. ‡ P. 243.

§ Μόνοις γὰρ ἡμῖν ἥλιος,
Καὶ φέγγος ἱλαρόν ἐστιν,
Ὅσοι μεμνήμεθ'.—Act. i.

‖ P. 245. ¶ P. 249.

of the Initiated with a garland of Roses in his hand. Lucius approaches, devours the Roses, and, according the promise of the Goddess, is restored to his native Form: by which, as we have said, no more was meant than a change of Manners, from vice to virtue. And this the author plainly intimates by making the Goddess thus address him under his brutal Figure, "pessimæ mihique detestabilis jamdudum beluæ istius corio te protinus exue." * For an Ass was so far from being *detestable*, that it was employed in the celebration of her rites; and was ever found in the retinue of Osiris or Bacchus. The *garland* plainly represents that which the aspirants were crowned with at their *initiation:* just as the *virtue* of the Roses designs the *Mysteries*. At his transformation he had been told, that ROSES were to restore him to Humanity: so that, amid all his adventures, he had still this remedy in view. Particularly in a circumstance of great distress, he met with a species of them called *rosa laurea;* but on examining its properties, he found that, instead of a restorative, it was a deadly poison to all kind of cattle—"quarum cuncto pecori cibus lethalis est." Who can doubt then, but by this *rose-laurel* was meant all *debauched, magical, and corrupt Mysteries*, such as those of the SYRIAN GODDESS, whose Ministers he represents in so abominable a light;† in opposition to what he calls "sobriæ religionis observatio:" and in those Rites, *initiation* was so far from promoting a life of virtue, that it plunged the deluded Votary into still greater miseries. These *emblematic Roses* were not of our author's invention. For the ROSE, amongst the Ancients, was a symbol of SILENCE, the requisite quality of the *Initiated*. And therefore the statues of Isis or Diana Multimammea, (images consecrated to the use of the *Mysteries)* are crowned with chaplets of Roses; designing what we now mean, when we say, in proverbial speech, UNDER THE ROSE.

Our Author proceeds to tell us, that the people wondered at this instantaneous Metamorphosis. "Populi mirantur, *religiosi venerantur* tam evidentem maximi numinis potentiam—et *facilitatem reformationis.*"‡ For the *Mysteries* boasted the power of giving a sudden and entire change to the mind and affections: And the advocates of Paganism against Christianity used to oppose this boast to the real and miraculous efficacy of GRACE.

As soon as Lucius had recovered the integrity of his nature, by *initiation*, the Priest covers him, naked as he was, with a LINEN garment:§ A habit always bestowed upon the Aspirant, on his admis-

* P. 242. † Lib. viii. p. 174. ‡ Pp. 247, 248. § "Sed sacerdos, utcumque *divino monitu cognitis ab origine cunctis cladibus meis*, quamquam et ipse insigni permotus miraculo, nutu significato prius præcipit, tegendo mihi LINTEAM dari LACINIAM."—P. 248.

sion to the *Mysteries;* the *rationale* of which, Apuleius himself gives us in his Apology.*

When all was over, the Priest accosts his Penitent in the following manner. "Multis et variis exantlatis laboribus, magnisque Fortunæ tempestatibus, et maximis actis procellis, ad portum quietis et *aram Misericordiæ* tandem, Luci, venisti: nec tibi natales, ac ne dignitas quidem vel ipsa, qua flores, usquam doctrina profuit: sed lubrico virentis ætatulæ, *ad serviles delapsus voluptates*, CURIOSITATIS IMPROSPERÆ sinistrum præmium reportâsti. Sed utrinque Fortunæ cæcitas dum te pessimis periculis discrutiat, *ad religiosam istam habitudinem* improvida produxit malitia. Eat nunc, et summo furore sæviat, et crudelitati suæ materiam quærat aliam. Nam in eorum vitas, *quorum sibi servitium Deæ nostræ majestas vindicavit, non habet locum casus infestus.* Quid latrones, quid feræ, quid servitium, quid asperrimorum itinerum ambages reciprocæ, quid metus mortis quotidianæ nefariæ Fortunæ profuit? in tutelam jam receptus OS FORTUNÆ, *sed* VIDENTIS; *quæ* SUÆ LUCIS SPLENDORE *ceteros etiam deos illuminat.* Sume jam vultum lætiorem, *candido isto habitu tuo* congruentem; comitare pompam Deæ SOSPITATRICIS innovanti gradu; VIDEANT IRRELIGIOSI: VIDEANT, ET ERROREM SUUM RECOGNOSCANT. En ecce pristinis ærumnis absolutus, ISIDIS *magnæ* PROVIDENTIA *gaudens Lucius de sua fortuna triumphat.*" †

Here the MORAL OF THE FABLE is delivered in plain terms; and, in this *moral*, all we have advanced, concerning the purpose of the work, fully confirmed. It is expressly declared, that VICE and inordinate CURIOSITY were the causes of Lucius's disasters; from which the only relief was INITIATION into the MYSTERIES. Whereby the Author would insinuate, that nothing was more abhorrent from those holy rites than DEBAUCHERY and MAGIC; the two enormities they were then commonly suspected to encourage.

It hath been observed above, that by Lucius's return to his proper Form, was meant his *initiation;* and accordingly, that return is called (as *initiation* was) *the being born again*—"ut RENATUS quodammodo," and—"sua providentia quodammodo RENATOS;" but this was only to the LESSER, not the GREATER *mysteries.* The first was to *purify* the mind: hence it was called by the Ancients, Κακίας ἀφαίρεσιν, a *separation from evil:* the *second* was to *enlighten* it, when purified, and to bring it to the knowledge of divine secrets, as Hierocles speaks, ἔπειτα οὕτω ἐπιβάλλει τῇ τῶν θειοτέρων γνώσει. Hence they named the one ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ, and the other ΤΕΛΕΙΟΤΗΤΑ,

* "*Lana* segnissimi corporis excrementum, pecori detracta, jam inde Orphei et Pythagoræ scitis, profanus vestitus est. Sed enim mundissima LINI seges, inter optimas fruges terræ exorta non modo *indutui et amictui sanctissimis Ægyptiorum sacerdotibus*, sed opertui quoque in *rebus sacris* usurpatur."—*Apol.* p. 64, lin. 17. † Pp. 248, 249.

PURIFICATION and PERFECTION. The *first* is here represented in the incident of Lucius's being restored to humanity by the use of *roses:* The *second*, as the matter of chief importance, the Author treats more circumstantially.

He begins with making the Priest take occasion, from the benefit already received, to press Lucius to enter into the GREATER MYSTERIES of Isis. "Quo tibi tamen tutior sis, atque munitior; da nomen huic *sanctæ militiæ*, cujus olim sacramento etiam lætaberis; teque jam nunc obsequio religionis nostræ dedica, et ministerii jugum subi voluntarium. *Nam, cum cœperis Deæ servire, tunc magis senties fructum tuæ libertatis.*" * But at the same time makes him inform the Candidate, that nothing was to be precipitated: for that not only many previous Rites and Ceremonies, concerning religious diet, and abstinence from prophane food, were to be observed; but that the Aspirants to these *higher Mysteries* were to wait for A CALL. "Quippe cum aviditati contumaciæque summe cavere, et utramque culpam vitare, ac neque vocatus morari, nec non jussus festinare deberem. Nec tamen esse quemquam de suo numero tam perditæ mentis, vel immo destinatæ mortis, qui non sibi quoque seorsum, jubente Domina, temerarium atque sacrilegum audeat ministerium subire, noxamque letalem contrahere. Nam et inferûm claustra, et salutis tutelam in Deæ manu posita ipsamque traditionem ad instar voluntariæ mortis et præcariæ salutis celebrari." † Accordingly, he is initiated into the GREATER MYSTERIES. The ceremony is described at large; ‡ and we find it to agree exactly with what, we have shewn, other ancient writers more professedly deliver concerning it.

The Author, by the doubts and apprehensions which retarded his *initiation*, first gives us to understand, that the highest degree of sanctity was required of those who entered into the *Mysteries*.—"At ego, quamquam cupienti voluntate præditus, tamen religiosa formidine retinebar. Quod enim sedulo percontaveram, *difficile religionis obsequium, et castimoniorum abstinentiam satis arduam, cautoque circumspectu vitam, quæ multis casibus subjacet, esse muniendam.*" § These difficulties now surmounted, he is *initiated* with the accustomed Ceremonies. He then makes his Prayer, in which the grand ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ of the *Mysteries* is still || more plainly referred to. "Tu quidem sancta et humani generis SOSPITATRIX perpetua, semper fovendis mortalibus munifica, dulcem matris affectionem miserorum casibus tribuis.—TE SUPERI COLUNT; OBSERVANT INFERI; TU ROTAS ORBEM; LUMINAS SOLEM; REGIS MUNDUM; CALCAS TARTARUM;

* P. 249. † Pp. 253, 254. ‡ Pp. 255—257. § P. 252. || See the quotation above.—*Fortunæ Videntis, quæ suæ lucis splendore ceteros etiam Deos illuminat.*

TIBI RESPONDENT SIDERA;* GAUDENT LUMINA; REDEUNT TEMPORA; SERVIUNT ELEMENTA; TUO NUTU SPIRANT FLAMINA; NUTRIUNTUR NUBILA; GERMINANT SEMINA; CRESCUNT GERMINA; TUAM MAJESTATEM PERHORRESCUNT AVES COELO MEANTES; FERÆ MONTIBUS ERRANTES; SERPENTES SOLO LATENTES; BELUÆ PONTO NATANTES." †

The affair thus over, and the honour attendant on *initiation* into the *greater Mysteries* being marked out in the words—*cominabar sacrarium; totæ civitati notus ac conspicuus, digitis hominum nutibusque notabilis;* ‡ the Author, in the next place, takes occasion, agreeably to his real practice and opinions, to recommend a MULTIPLICITY OF INITIATIONS. He tells us how *Isis* counselled him to enter into the *Mysteries* of *Osiris:* how, after that, she invited him to a third *initiation:* and then rewarded him for his accumulated Piety with an abundance of temporal Blessings.

All this considered, we can no longer doubt but that the true design of his work was to recommend INITIATION INTO THE MYSTERIES, IN OPPOSITION TO THE NEW RELIGION. We see the Catastrophe of the piece, the whole Eleventh Book, entirely taken up with it; and composed with the greatest seriousness and superstition.

And, surely, nothing could be better conceived, to recommend the *Mysteries*, than the idea of such a plan; or better contrived than his execution of it. In which he omits no circumstance that might be plausibly opposed to CHRISTIANITY; or that might recommend the MYSTERIES with advantage to the Magistrate's protection: as where he tells us, that in these Rites, *they prayed for the prosperity of all Orders in the* STATE—"fausta vota præfatus principi magno, senatuique et equiti, totique populo Romano."

This interpretation will throw new light on *every part* of the GOLDEN ASS. But I have been so long upon the subject, that I have only time to give one instance; and this, chiefly because it reflects light back again on my general interpretation of the Fable.

In the fifth and sixth books is the long episode of CUPID and PSYCHE; visibly allegorical throughout; and entirely foreign to all the rest of the work, considered as a mere Milesian fable; but very applicable to the Writer's purpose, if he had that moral to inculcate which we have here assigned unto him.

There was no man, though he regarded the *golden Ass* as a thing of mere amusement, but saw that the story of CUPID and PSYCHE

* *Respondent sidera.* This, I suppose, relates to the *music of the spheres.* The image is noble and sublime. It is taken from the *consent* in the lyre, to answer to, and obey the hand of the Master who had put them into tune. † Pp. 257, 258. ‡ P. 249.

was a *philosophic allegory of the progress of the soul to perfection, in the possession of divine love and the reward of immortality.* The Amour of Cupid and Psyche was a subject which lay in common amongst the Platonic writers. And though originally founded on some obscure tradition of the *Fall of Man*, yet every one fashioned this agreeable fiction (as our Author has done here) according to the doctrines he had to convey under it. By this means it could not but become famous. The remaining monuments of ancient sculpture convince us that it was very famous; in which, nothing is so common as the figures of CUPID and PSYCHE in the various circumstances of their adventures. Now we have shewn at large, that the professed end of the *Mysteries*, in the later ages of their celebrity, was to restore the soul to it's ORIGINAL RECTITUDE, and, in every age, to encourage good men with the promises of *happiness in another life.* The fable, therefore, of *Cupid and Psyche*, in the fifth and sixth books, was the finest and most artful preparative for the subject of the eleventh, which treats professedly of the *Mysteries.*

But if we look more nearly into this beautiful Fable, we shall find that, besides its general purpose, it has one more particular.

We have observed that the *corrupt state* of the *Mysteries*, in the time of Apuleius, was one principal reason of his undertaking their apology. These corruptions were of two kinds, DEBAUCHERIES and MAGIC. Their *debaucheries* have been taken notice of above. Their MAGIC was of three sorts: 1. The Magic of invocation or NECROMANCY. 2. The Magic of transformation or METAMORPHOSIS. 3. And the Magic of divine communication under a visible appearance or THEÜRGY. The ORACULAR RESPONSES, introduced late into the *Mysteries*, seem to have given birth to the first: The Doctrine of the METEMPSYCHOSIS taught therein, to the second: and the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ concerning the DIVINE NATURE, to the third. The abomination of the two first sorts was seen by all, and frankly given up as criminal: but the fanatic Platonists and Pythagoreans of the latter ages, espousing the third, occasioned it to be held in esteem and reverence. So that, as Heliodorus tells us, the Egyptian priests (between whose fanaticism and that of the Platonists there was, at this time, a kind of coalition*) affected to distinguish between the MAGIC of *Necromancy* and the magic of *Theürgy*; accounting the first infamous and wicked; but the last very fair, and even commendable. For now both those philosophic Enthusiasts had their *mysterious Rites*, which consisted in the practice of this THEÜRGIC MAGIC. These were the *Mysteries*, to observe it by the way, of which the Emperor Julian was so fond, that he placed his principal

* See book iii. sect. 4, towards the end.

felicity in (what the Christians placed his principal crime) their celebration. But our Author, who had imbibed his Platonism, not at the muddy streams of those late Fanatics, but at the pure fountain head of the Academy itself, well understood how much this superstition, with all it's plausible pretences, had polluted the *Mysteries*; and, therefore, as in the course of the adventures of his *golden Ass*, he had stigmatized the two other kinds of *Magic*, he composed this celebrated tale (hitherto so little understood) to expose the Magic of THEURGY. It is, as we said, *a philosophic Allegory of the progress of the Soul to perfection, in the possession of Divine Love and the reward of immortality*, delivered in the adventures of PSYCHE, or the *Soul*: whose various labours and traverses in this *Progress*, are all represented as the effects of her indiscreet passion for that species of *magic* called THEURGY.

To understand this, we must observe, that the fanatic Platonists, in their pursuit of the SUPREME GOOD, the *Union with the Deity*, made the completion and perfection of it to consist in the *Theurgic* Vision of the Αὔτοπτον Ἄγαλμα or SELF-SEEN IMAGE, i. e. seen by the splendour of its own light. Now the story tells us, there were three Sisters, the youngest of whom was called PSYCHE; by which we are to understand, the *three peripatetic souls*, the *sensitive*, the *animal*, and the *rational*; or in other words, *sense*, *appetite*, and *reason*.

That the two elder Sisters, *Sense* and *Appetite*, were soon disposed of in marriage; but that the younger, PSYCHE or the *rational Soul*, was of so transcendent and divine a beauty, that though men forsook the altars of the Gods to follow and worship her,* having paid her their full homage of admiration, not so much as one aspired to a closer union with her: intimating the general preference given to temporal things above spiritual:

"Virtus laudatur et alget."

However, amidst this neglect, she is happily contracted to, and possesses, the *celestial Cupid*, or DIVINE LOVE, who cohabits with her INVISIBLY amidst a scene of paradisaical pleasures and enjoyments. But is warned by Cupid not to hearken to the pernicious counsel of her sisters, whose envy at her happiness, from their own choice of husbands diseased and avaricious,† the lot of those under the dominion of their appetites, would soon bring them to attempt her ruin, in persuading her to get a sight of her *invisible* spouse. Against which SACRILEGIOUS CURIOSITY, as what would deprive her of all

* APULEII *Met.* ed. Pricæi, p. 85. "Interea Psyche cum sua sibi præcipua pulchritudine nullum decoris sui fructum percipit. Spectatur ab omnibus; laudatur ab omnibus, nec quisquam—cupiens ejus nuptiarum petitor accedit." † P. 94.

her happiness,* and to which her sisters would endeavour to inflame her mind, he carefully warns her. By all which the Author would insinuate, that they are the irregular passions and the ungovernable appetites which stir up men's *curiosity* to this species of *magic*, the THEÜRGIC VISION. However, Psyche falls into the snare her sisters had laid for her, and against the express injunction of the God, sacrilegiously attempts this *forbidden* sight; though he assured her,† that if she kept the religious secret, the child to be born of them should be immortal; but if she prophaned it, the child would be mortal, intimating, that Theürgic Magic was so far from rendering the participants divine, that it loaded them with impiety. In a word, she indulges her inordinate appetite, and is undone: *Divine Love* forsakes her; the happy scenes of her abode vanish; and she finds herself forlorn and abandoned, surrounded with miseries, and pursued with the vengeance of heaven by its instrument the *Celestial Venus*.

In this distress she first comes to the temple of CERES for protection; by which is meant the custom of having recourse to the *Mysteries* against the evils and disasters of life, as is plainly intimated in the reason given for her application—"nec ullam vel dubiam SPEI MELIORIS viam volens omittere."‡ *Spes melior* being the common appellation for what was sought for in the *Mysteries*, and what they promised to the participants. With these sentiments she addresses *Ceres* in the following observation: "Per ego te frugiferam tuam dextram istam deprecor—per *tacita sacra cistarum*—per—per, et cetera *quæ silentio tegit Eleusinis Atticæ sacrarium*"—§ But Psyche is denied any protection both here and at the temple of *Juno*: for the purer *Mysteries* discouraged all kind of magic, even the most specious. However, she is pitied by both. The reason Ceres gives her for not complying with her request is remarkable. She had entered, she said, into an ancient league with Venus, which she could not violate.‖ By which is intimated, that all the *Mysteries* had one and the same end. And Psyche, she said, had reason to thank her that she did not seize on her and detain her prisoner;¶ alluding to the obligation that all were under to bring to punishment the violators of the *Mysteries*.

Juno excuses herself, from imparting any assistance, "out of reverence to the Laws, which forbid any one to entertain another's

* "Identidem monuit, ac sæpe terruit, ne quando sororum pernicioso consilio suasa, de *forma Mariti* quærat: neve se SACRILEGA CURIOSITATE de tanto fortunarum suggestu pessum dejiciat; nec suum postea contingat amplexum."—P. 92. † "Infantem —si texeris nostra secreta silentio, divinum; si profanaveris, mortalem."—P. 96. ‡ P. 112. § P. 111. ‖ —"Cum qua etiam antiquum foedus amicitiæ colo."—P. 111. ¶ "Quod a me retenta custoditaque non fueris optimi consule."—P. 112.

runaway servant."* For those who had violated the *Mysteries* of one God could not be admitted to those of another.

In this distress PSYCHE resolves at last to render herself to the offended Parties, and implore their pardon. Venus imposes on her a long and severe penance; in which the author seems to have shadowed out the trials and labours undergone by the aspirants to the *Mysteries*, and the more severe in proportion to the delinquencies of the aspirants, intimated in the words of Venus to her—"Sed jam nunc ego sedulo periclitabor an oppido forti animo, singularique prudentia sis prædita."†

During the course of these trials, PSYCHE falls once more into distress by her rash curiosity,‡ and would be undone but for the divine assistance, which all along supports and aids her in her difficulties. In which the Author hints at the promises made to the aspirants on these occasions:—"Nec Providentiæ bonæ graves oculos innocentis animæ latuit ærumna." In her greatest distress, in the repetition of her first capital fault, she is relieved by Cupid himself; intimating, that nothing but the divine aid can overcome human weakness; as appears from these words of Cupid to his spouse—"Et ecce, inquit, *rursum* perieras misella *simili curiositate*. Sed interim quidem tu provinciam, quæ tibi matris meæ precepto mandata est, exequere gnaviter: *cetera egomet videro*."§ When in these trials the aspirant had done his best, the Gods would help out the rest.

With this assistance, she performs her penance, is pardoned, and restored to favour: put again into possession of DIVINE LOVE, and rewarded with IMMORTALITY, the declared end of all the MYSTERIES.

There are many other circumstances in this fine Allegory equally serving to support the system here explained: as there are others which allude to divers beautiful Platonic notions, foreign to the present discourse. It is enough that we have pointed to its chief, and peculiar purpose; which it was impossible to see while the nature and design of the whole Fable lay undiscovered.

But now perhaps it may be said, "That all this is very well. An Allegory is here found for the GOLDEN ASS, which, it must be owned, fits the Fable. But still it may be asked, Was it indeed made for it? Did the Author write the tale for the moral; or did the Critic find the moral for the tale? For an Allegory may be drawn from almost any story: and they have been often made for Authors who never thought of them. Nay, when a rage of allegorizing happens to prevail, as it did a century or two ago, the Author himself will be either tempted or obliged, without the Commentator, to encourage this

* —"Tunc etiam Legibus, quæ servos alienos profugos, invitis Dominis, vetant suscipi, prohibeor."—P. 112. † P. 118. ‡ "Mente capitur TEMERARIA CURIOSITATE."—P. 123. § P. 123.

delusion. *Ariosto* and *Tasso*, writers of the highest reputation, one of whom wrote after the *Gothic* Romances, as the other after the *Classic* Fables, without ever concerning themselves about any other moral than what the natural circumstances of the story conveyed; yet, to secure the success of their poems, they submitted, in compliance to fashion and false taste, to the ridiculous drudgery of inventing a kind of posthumous Allegory, and sometimes more than one; that the reader himself might season their Fables to his own taste." As this has been the case, To shew that I neither impose upon myself nor others, I have reserved the Author's own declaration of his having an *Allegoric meaning*, for the last confirmation of my system. It is in these words,

> "At ego tibi sermone isto Milesio
> Varias Fabulas conseram, auresque tuas
> Benevolas lepido susurro permulceam;
> Modo si PAPYRUM ÆGYPTIAM ARGUTIA
> NILOTICI CALAMI INSCRIPTAM, non spreveris
> Inspicere *—

A direct insinuation of it's being replete with the profound *Ægyptian wisdom;* of which, that Nation, by the invention of the MYSTERIES, had conveyed so considerable a part to the *Greeks*.

Before I totally dismiss this matter it may not be improper to observe, that both VIRGIL and APULEIUS have represented the genuine MYSTERIES, as Rites of perfect sanctity and purity; and recommended only such to their Countrymen; while they expose impure and impious Rites to the public execration; for it was their purpose to stigmatize the reigning corruptions, and to recommend the ancient sanctity. On the other hand, a man attached by his office to the recommendation of the *Mysteries*, as then practised, was to do the best he could, when deprived of the benefit of this distinction; and was to endeavour to give fair colours to the foulest things. This was the case of JAMBLICHUS. His friend *Porphyry* had some scruples on this head. He doubts whether those Rites could come from the Gods, which admitted such a mixture of lewdness and impurity. Such a mixture *Jamblichus* confesses; but, at the same time, endeavours to account for their divine original, by shewing, that they are only the emblems of natural Truths; or a kind of moral purgation of the inordinate passions.† You will say, he might have given a better answer; That they were *modern* abuses and corruptions. He asks your pardon for that. Such a confession would have been condemning his own Platonic fanaticism; that very fanaticism which had brought in these abominations. He was reduced therefore to the necessity of admitting that they were no after-corruptions, but coeval with the Rites themselves. And this admission of so learned a Hie-

* *In init. Fab.* † *De Mysteriis*, sect. i. cap. 11.

rophant, is, as far as I am able to collect, the only support which any one can now have for saying, that *the Mysteries were impure and abominable, even from their first Institution.*

Hitherto we have considered the Legislator's care in perpetuating the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE. And if I have been longer than ordinary on this head, my excuse is, that the topic was new,* and the doctrine itself, which is the main subject of the present inquiry, much interested in it.

A very remarkable circumstance (for which we are indebted to the observation of modern travellers) may convince us, that Rulers and Governors cultivated the belief of this doctrine with a more than common assiduity. Many barbarous nations have been discovered in these later times, on the coasts of Africa, which, in the distractions of Government, and transmigrations of People, have, it is probable, fallen from a *civilized* to a *savage* state of life. These are found to have little or no knowledge of a God, or observance of Religion. And yet, which is a surprising paradox, they still retain the settled belief and expectation of a FUTURE STATE. A wonder to be accounted for no other way than by what hath been said above of the Legislator's principal concern for the support of this Doctrine; and of the deep root, which by it's agreeable nature, it takes in the Mind, wherever it has been once received. So that though, as it hath been observed, *no Religion ever existed without the doctrine of a Future State*, yet the doctrine of a Future State hath, it seems, sometimes existed without a Religion.

* A well-known writer, Mr. Jackson (not to speak at present of Others of a later date) who had long and scurrilously railed at the author of the Divine Legation, in a number of miserable pamphlets, hath at length thought fit in a Thing, called Chronological Antiquities, to borrow from this book, without any acknowledgment, all he had to give the public concerning the pagan MYSTERIES; and much, concerning the HIEROGLYPHICS and origin of idolatry. But this is the common practice of such sort of writers: and is only mentioned here to shew the reader to what class they belong. The treatment these volumes have met with from some of the most worthless of my Countrymen, made me think it expedient to contrast their behaviour with that of the most learned and respectable foreign Divines and Critics of France, Germany, and Holland, in their animadversions on this Work, occasionally inserted in the notes.

APPENDIX

TO

THE SECOND BOOK.

We have seen with what art, and care in contrivance, the Sages of the Gentile World endeavoured, by the intervention of the Mysteries, to prevent the memory of the first Cause of all things from being totally obliterated from the minds of men; while the perverse constitution of the National Idolatries prevented the true God's being received into any public Worship. To the Secret of the *Mysteries* it was, that these Pseudo-Evangelists invited their more capable Disciples, awfully admonishing them *to give heed unto it, as unto a light shining in a dark place.* For it was no more than such a glimmering, till the *rising of the day-star* of the Gospel, in the *hearts* of the Faithful.

But if the late noble Author of the first Philosophy deserves credit; all this care was as absurd as it was fruitless.

The Institutors of the *Mysteries* imparted this secret, as the true and only solid foundation of religion; for the first Cause was, in their ideas, a God whose essence indeed was incomprehensible, but his attributes, as well moral as natural, discoverable by human reason. Such a God was wanted for that foundation: for *unassisted* reason taught *them*, as, in its most *assisted* state, it had taught St. Paul, *That he who cometh to God, must believe that he is; and that he is a* rewarder *of them who diligently seek him.* Thus Plato, in his *Book of Laws*, speaking of Religion, and it's use to civil Society, says, "It is not of small consequence, that what we here reason about the Gods, should, by all means and methods, be made probable; as that they are, and that they are good." * Hence, though their mistaken *mode* of teaching, deprived the pagan world of the *fruit* of the Doctrine, the purpose however was laudable and rational.

But now comes a modern Sage †—Philosopher and Statesman like the Ancient, (in all things else how unlike!) who tells us "that they made the Basis of Religion far too wide; that men have no further concern with God than to believe that he is, which his *physical Attributes* make fully manifest; but, that he is *a rewarder of them who diligently seek him,* Religion doth not require us to believe, since this depends on God's moral attributes, of which we have no conception." In this manner, by the turn of a hand, hath our Noble Philosopher changed *Natural Religion* into

* Ὡς θεοί τ' εἰσι, καὶ ἀγαθοί. † Lord Bolingbroke.

NATURALISM; and made this care of the ancient Sages as ridiculously conceived as it was ineffectually prosecuted.

But to do justice to the weak endeavours of those Friends and Servants of mankind, who surely deserve a grateful memory with Posterity, I shall take the liberty to examine his Lordship's reasoning on this branch of his FIRST PHILOSOPHY; which casts so malignant a shade over the whole religious World.

He pretends to prove *That we have* NO ADEQUATE *ideas of God's moral attributes, his* GOODNESS *and* JUSTICE, *as we have of his natural, his Wisdom and Power.* Here let me observe, that his Lordship uses the words, *inadequate ideas*, and, *no ideas*, as terms of the same import. And I think, not improperly. I have therefore followed him in the indifferent use of either expression. For the reason of his calling our ideas of God's *moral attributes* INADEQUATE, is, because he denies, that goodness and justice in God, and goodness and justice amongst Men, are the same IN KIND. But if not the *same in kind*, we can have NO IDEA of them; because we have no idea of any *other kind* of goodness and justice.

He lays down these three propositions.

1. That, by METAPHYSICS, or by reasoning *à priori*, we can gain no knowledge of God at all;

2. That our knowledge of his *Attributes* is to be acquired only by a contemplation on his WORKS, or by the reasoning *à posteriori*.

3. That in *this* way, we can only arrive at the knowledge of his NATURAL Attributes, not of his MORAL.

"It is from the CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD ALONE" (says his Lordship) "and from the state of mankind in it, that we can *acquire any ideas* of the divine attributes, or a *right to affirm any thing about them.*" *

"The knowledge of the Creator is, on many accounts, necessary to such a creature as man: and therefore we are made able to arrive by a proper exercise of our mental faculties, *from a knowledge of God's works to a knowledge of his existence*, and of that infinite POWER and WISDOM which are demonstrated to us in them. OUR KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING GOD GOES NO FURTHER." †

"Artificial Theology connects by very problematical reasoning *à priori*, MORAL ATTRIBUTES, such as we conceive them, and such as they are relatively to us, with the *physical attributes* of God; though there be no sufficient foundation for this proceeding, nay, though *the phœnomena are in several cases repugnant.*" ‡

Having thus assured us that the ideas of God's *moral attributes* are to be got by no consequential reasoning at all, either *à priori* or *à posteriori*, the two only ways we have to knowledge; He rightly concludes, that if Man hath such ideas, they were not FOUND but INVENTED by him. And therefore, that nothing might be wanting to the full dilucidation of this curious point, he acquaints us who were the Authors of the FICTION, and how strangely the thing came about.

* Vol. v. p. 331. † Vol. iv. p. 86. ‡ Vol. v. p. 316.

"Some of the Philosophers" (says his Lordship) "having been led by a more full and accurate contemplation of Nature to the knowledge of a supreme self-existent Being of infinite *power and wisdom*, and the first Cause of all things, were not contented with this degree of knowledge. They MADE A SYSTEM of God's MORAL as well as *physical* ATTRIBUTES BY WHICH TO ACCOUNT FOR THE PROCEEDINGS OF HIS PROVIDENCE." *

These Philosophers then, it seems, invented the system of God's *moral attributes*, in order to account for the difficulties arising from the view of God's *moral government*. If the World till now had been so dull as to have no conception of these Attributes; his Lordship's Philosophers, we see, made amends; who were so quick-witted to conceive, and so sharp-sighted to find out, the obliquities of a *crooked* line before they had got any idea of a *straight* one. For just to this, neither more nor less, does his Lordship's observation amount, that—*they made a System of God's moral attributes, by which to account for the proceedings of his Providence*. 'Till now, none of us could conceive how any doubts concerning *moral Government* could arise but on the previous ideas of the *moral attributes* of the *Governor*. This invention of his Lordship's old Philosophers puts me in mind of an ingenious Modern, the curious SANCHO PANCHA; who, as his historian tells us, was very inquisitive to discover the author of that very useful invention we call SLEEP: for, with this worthy Magistrate, Sleep and good Cheer were the FIRST PHILOSOPHY. Now the things sought after by Sancho and his Lordship, were at no great distance; for if *Sleeping* began when men first shut their eyes, it is certain the *idea of God's Goodness* appeared as soon as ever they opened them.

Dr. Clarke's Demonstration of the *moral attributes à priori*, I shall leave, as his Lordship is pleased to do, in all it's force. If the Doctor's followers think their Master's honour concerned, where his arguments are not, they have a large field and a safe to shew their prowess. I rather choose to undertake the NOBLE PHILOSOPHER on his own terms, without any other arms than the arguments *à posteriori*. For he is such a Champion for the good Cause, that he not only appoints his Adversaries the Field, but prescribes to them the use of their weapons.

But his Lordship, like other great men, is not easily approached; and when he is, not always fit to be seen. You catch his FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as Butler's Hero did Aristotle's FIRST MATTER, *undressed, and without a rag of form;* however flaunting and fluttering in FRAGMENTS. To speak plainly, his Lordship's entire neglect or ignorance of Method betrays him into endless *repetitions:* and, in these, whether for want of precision in his ideas, propriety in his terms, or art in his composition, the question is perpetually changing; and rarely without being new-covered by an equivocal expression. If you add to this, the perpetual *contradictions* into which he falls, either by defect of memory, excess of passion, or distress of argument, you will allow it to be no easy matter to take him fairly, to know him fully, and to represent him to the best advantage: in none of which offices would I be willingly defective. Indeed, when you have done

* Vol. iv. p. 48.

this, the business is over; and his Lordship's reasoning generally confutes itself.

When I reflect upon what this hath cost me, the reading over two or three bulky volumes to get possession of a single argument; which now you think you hold, and then again you lose; which meets you full when you least expect it; and slips away from you the very moment it promises to do most: when, I say, I reflect upon all this, I cannot but lament the hard luck of the *English* CLERGY, who, though apparently least fit, as being made Parties; certainly the least concerned, as there is nothing that can impose on a Scholar, though a great deal that may mislead the People, are likely to be the men most engaged with his Lordship in this controversy. Time was, when if a Writer had a disposition to seek Objections against Religion, though he found them hardly, and urged them heavily, yet he would digest his thoughts, and methodize his reasoning. The Clergy had then nothing to do but to answer him, if they found themselves able. But since this slovenly custom (as Lord SHAFTESBURY calls it) has got amongst our Free-thinkers, of *taking their physic in public*, of throwing about their loose and crude indigestions under the name of FRAGMENTS, things which in their very name imply not so much the *want*, as the *exclusion* of all *form*, the Advocate of Religion has had a fine time of it: he must work them into consistence, he must mould them into shape, before he can safely lay hold of them himself, or present them handsomely to the Public. But these Gentlemen have provided that a Clergyman should never be idle. All, he had of old to attend, was the saving the souls of those committed to his care. He must now begin his work a great deal higher; he must first convince his flock that they have souls to be saved. And the spite of all is, that at the same time his kind masters have doubled his task, they appear very well disposed to lessen his wages.

We have observed, that the DENIAL of God's *moral attributes* is the great barrier against Religion in general: but it is more especially serviceable in his Lordship's idiosyncratic terrors, the terrors of a *future State*. To these we owe his famous book of FRAGMENTS, composed occasionally, and taken as an extemporaneous cordial, each stronger than the other, to support himself under his frequent paroxysms. For, set the *moral attributes* aside, and we can neither form any judgement of the *end* of man, nor of the *nature* of God's government. All our knowledge will be confined to our *present* state and condition.* It is by the *moral attributes*, we learn, that man was made for *happiness*: and that God's dispensation to us *here* is but *part* of a general system: This naturally extends our views to, and terminates our knowledge in, *Futurity*.

The fate of all Religion therefore being included in the question of God's *moral attributes*, I hold it of much importance to prove against his Lordship, that MEN MAY ACQUIRE ADEQUATE IDEAS OF THEM in the same way, and with equal certainty, in which they acquire the knowledge of God's

* One of his Lordship's Corollaries therefore from the Proposition of *no moral attributes*, is this, "Our Knowledge concerning God goes no further than for the necessary use of human life."—Vol. iv. p. 486.

natural attributes: And the knowledge of these latter his Lordship deduces from its original in the following words.

"All our knowledge of God" (says he) "is derived from his works. Every part of the immense Universe, and the order and harmony of the Whole, are not only conformable to our ideas or notions of WISDOM and POWER, but these ideas and notions were impressed originally and principally by them, on every attentive mind; and men were led to conclude, with the utmost certainty, that a Being of infinite *wisdom* and *power* made, preserved, and governed the system. As far as we can discover, we discern these in all his works; and where we cannot discern them, it is manifestly due to our imperfection, not to his. This now is real knowledge, or there is no such thing as knowledge. We acquire it immediately in the objects themselves, in God, and in Nature, the work of God. We know what *wisdom* and *power* are: we know both intuitively, and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the Work: and therefore we know demonstratively that such they are in the Worker." *

All this is mighty well: and on these very grounds I undertake to prove that men may get as clear and precise ideas of God's GOODNESS and JUSTICE.

But, to prevent, or, indeed, now things are gone thus far, rather to *redress* all ambiguity in the terms, and equivocation in the use of them; it will be proper to explain what TRUE PHILOSOPHY means by GOD'S WORKS, whether *physical* or *moral.*

Now, it means, if I am not much mistaken, that CONSTITUTION OF THINGS which God hath established, and directed to a plain and obvious end: no regard being had to those impediments or obstructions in it's course, which the Author of nature hath permitted to arise from any part of the *material,* or *intellectual* Creation.

Thus, when we consider his *physical* works, in order to make our estimate of his *wisdom* and *power,* we conceive them as they are in themselves; and in the perfection of their first constitution; though the greater portions of the *physical* system may, from the intractability of Matter, be subject to some *inconsiderable irregularities;* which, as the TRUE PHILOSOPHER † observes, *will be apt to increase till this System wants a reformation:* and though the smaller Portions of it, such as the bodies of animals, may, from various accidents in their conception and birth, often want that convenient form in the adaption of their parts, from the wonderful contrivance of which, in the various bodies of animals in general, arises so illustrious an evidence of the *wisdom* and *power* of the Creator.

Surely then, common sense guided by equitable measure requires us to estimate God's *moral Works* on the same standard; to consider what the *moral constitution is in itself:* and (when the question is of God's *goodness* and *justice*) to keep that consideration distinct; and not suffer it to be disturbed by the view of any interruptions occasioned by the perverse influence of the passion or action of material or immaterial Beings. For,

* Vol. v. p. 524. † Newton.

here, Both concur to violate the Constitution: In the *natural* system, man's *Free-will* hath no place: in the *moral*, the abuse of *Free-will* occasions the greatest of it's disorders.

In prosecuting this question, therefore, As, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of God's *wisdom* and *power*, we consider the *natural system* so far forth only as it's order and harmony is supported by the *general Laws* of matter and motion; so, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of his *goodness* and *justice*, we should regard the *moral system* so far forth only as it's order and harmony is supported by that GENERAL LAW, which annexes *happiness to virtue, and to vice, misery, and ruin.*

Thus much, and only thus much, is *God's Work* in either system: and it is from *God's Work*, he tells us, we are to demonstrate his *Attributes*. The rest (where disorders real or apparent obtrude themselves to obstruct our views in these discoveries) proceed from *Matter* and *Mind.*

And it is not to be forgotten, that the conclusion, Religionists draw from hence, in support of their *adequate* ideas of God's *moral* attributes, hath the greater strength upon his Lordship's own principles; who holds, that this Constitution arises *solely from the* WILL of God: For then we are sure that the WILL, which annexes happiness to virtue, and misery to vice, must arise from God's *moral* rather than from his *physical* nature.

Having premised thus much; no more, indeed, than necessary to obviate one continued SOPHISM, which runs through all his Lordship's reasonings, against the *moral attributes* (where, the *course and operation of that moral Constitution*, as it appears under the disturbances occasioned by man's free-will, is perpetually put for the *Constitution itself*) I now proceed to shew, that, from GOD'S WORKS, we have as precise ideas of his GOODNESS and JUSTICE as of his *power* and *wisdom.*

His Lordship observes, that *from every part of the immense Universe, and from the harmony of the Whole, men are led to conclude, with the utmost certainty, that a Being of infinite* WISDOM *and* POWER *made, preserved, and governed the System.* This, he observes in favour of the *natural* attributes. And what should hinder men from making the same observation in favour of the *moral;* viz. That the happiness and misery by the very constitution of nature, attendant on Virtue and on Vice, lead men to conclude, with equal certainty, that a Being of infinite GOODNESS and JUSTICE made, preserves, and governs the system?

The existence of this *moral Constitution* in the natural connexion between vice and misery, virtue and happiness, his Lordship amply acknowledges. Let us consider it, therefore, both as it respects BODIES of men, and INDIVIDUALS.

That *Communities* are always happy or miserable in proportion as their Manners are virtuous or vicious, his Lordship himself is, on all occasions, ready to demonstrate. If such a Constitution of things do not bespeak the Author of it, *good* and *just*, how is it possible to conclude any thing of the character of the Creator, from his WORKS? His Lordship thinks, "that from the marks of wisdom and power in the *physical system*, we learn with the utmost certainty that God is *wise* and *powerful;*" and he says, that "we

acquire this knowledge immediately, as it were, by our senses." Are there not the self-same marks of goodness and justice in this part at least of the *moral system* which respects Communities? And do not we come to know as immediately by our senses, and as certainly by our reason, that God is *good* and *just?*

If we consider the *moral Constitution*, as it respects *Particulars*, we see virtue and vice have the same influence on our happiness and misery. Here, indeed, we find more interruptions, in the *means* to the *end*, than in the other part. Our material and our intellectual Natures are here of more force, to disorder the harmony of the System. In *Communities*, it can rarely be disturbed, but by a Pestilence, or that other, moral, Plague, a Hero or a Conqueror. Amongst *Particulars*, indeed, physical evil and the abuse of free-will operate more strongly: But when once the demonstration of the *moral attributes* is clearly made from that part of the Constitution which regards *Communities*, it can never afterwards be shaken by the disorders in that other part which regards *Particulars*. The established truth is now a Principle for further discoveries; and all we can fairly deduce from these disorders is the CERTAINTY of a *future State*. But this by the way.

What I insist upon at present is, that, to decide the question concerning God's *Attributes*, we are to consider the Constitution of things, as it is in itself. This is, properly, *God's Work*. The disorders in it, occasioned by the abuse of man's *free-will*, is not his work, but man's. This, his Lordship too, upon another occasion, namely, when he combats the argument of a *future state*, from an unequal Providence, is perpetually repeating. So that these disorders must, even on his Lordship's own principles, be excluded from the account, when we estimate God's Nature and *Attributes*, from his *Works*.

"But we see not those disorders in the *natural* world, which we both see and feel in the *moral*." This would be some objection, did God in the *moral*, as in the *natural* system, direct immediately, or constitute things mechanically; or had Free-will the same influence on the *natural* as on the *moral* system.—Did God direct, immediately or mechanically in both Constitutions, or did he direct immediately and mechanically in neither, and that yet the *moral* remained more subject to disorder than the *natural*, it might indeed follow that we had not so clear ideas of God's *goodness* and *justice* as of his *wisdom* and *power:* But since he has thought fit to leave man, FREE; and hath been pleased to suffer the abuse of free-will to affect the *moral* system, and not the *natural;* as this, I say, is the case, the greater irregularities in the *one* do not take off from the equal clearness of the demonstration, which results from the nature of *both one and the other* Constitution. This difference is not to be ascribed to a contrary conduct in the Governor of the two Systems, but to the contrary natures of the Subjects. Passive matter being totally inert, it's resistance to the Laws impressed upon it, must be extremely weak: and consequently the disorders arising from that resistance, proportionably slow and unheeded: while that active self-moving principle, the Mind, flies out at once from the

centre of its direction, and can every moment deflect from the line of truth and equity. Hence moral disorders began early, became excessive, and have continued, through all ages, to disturb the harmony of the System.

What is here said will, I suppose, be sufficient to confute the following assertions; and to detect the mistake on which they arise.

"Every thing" (says his Lordship) "shews the *wisdom* and *power* of God conformably to our ideas of wisdom and power in the *physical* world and in the *moral*. *But every thing does not shew in like manner the* justice *and* goodness *conformably to our ideas of these attributes in either. The physical attributes are in their nature more glaring and less equivocal.*" *

And again; "There is *no sufficient foundation* in the phænomena of Nature to connect the moral attributes with the physical attributes of God. *Nay, the phænomena are in several cases repugnant.*" †

But since he goes so far as to talk of the *want of a foundation*, and even a *repugnancy*; Before I proceed with the main branch of my reasoning, I will just urge one single argument for the reality and full evidence of the *moral attributes*: and it shall be taken from his own concessions, and shall conclude on his own principles.

He tells us, that such as he, "who apply themselves to the *first Philosophy*, apply themselves to the noblest objects that can demand the attention of the mind—To the signification of GOD'S WILL, concerning the duties we owe to him, and to one another." ‡

And again, "It is sufficient to establish our *moral* obligations that we consider them relatively to our own system. From thence they arise: and since they arise from thence, it must be the WILL of that Being who made the system, that we should observe and practise them." §

Let me ask then, Whence it is that we collect this WILL from the objects which his Lordship allows us to contemplate, namely, his WORKS *in this system?* He will say from certain *qualities* in those objects—What are those qualities? He will reply, the *fitnesses* of means to ends.—Who was the Author of these fitnesses? He hath told us the *God of nature*—It was God's *will* then, that we should use the *means*, in order to obtain the *ends*. Now, in the moral System, the means are virtuous practice; the end, happiness. Virtue therefore must needs be pleasing to him; and Vice, as its contrary, displeasing. Well, but then, as to this approbation and dislike; it must be either capricious, or it must be regulated on the nature of things. *Wisdom*, which his Lordship condescends to give his Maker, will not allow us to suppose it capricious. It is regulated therefore on the nature of things: But if the *nature of things* be, as his Lordship holds it is, the *constitution of God*, and dependent on his *will*, then he who is pleased with virtue, and displeased with vice, must needs be himself *good* and *just*.

To proceed now with the principal branch of our reasoning. His Lordship goes on thus: *But men not only might collect God's natural attributes from the physical system, but in effect they did; and all men, at all times,*

* Vol. v. p. 524. † Vol. v. p. 316. ‡ Vol. v. p. 447. § Vol. v. p. 452.

had these notions so strongly impressed on them, that they were led to conclude with the utmost certainty for a Being of infinite power and wisdom.

I desire to know in what time or place it ever happened, before his Lordship philosophised at Battersea, *and could find no foundation in the phænomena of nature to connect the moral with the physical attributes of God,* that a Man, who believed God's infinite wisdom and power, did not with equal confidence believe his infinite goodness and justice? In truth, these two sets of ideas, the *physical* and *moral* attributes of the Deity, were equally extensive, they were equally steddy, and, till now, they were always inseparable.

He says, that *as far as we can discover, we discern infinite wisdom and power in all God's works: and where we cannot discern them, it is manifestly due to our imperfection, not to his.*

What his Lordship here says will deserve to be considered. A comparison is insinuated between our discovery of infinite power and wisdom from the *physical* works of God; and our discovery of infinite goodness and justice from his *moral* works; in which, the advantage is given to the former. Now, in order to come to a just decision in this point (omitting at present the notice of his general Sophism, which operates in this observation, as in the rest) we must distinguish between the *means of acquiring* the knowledge of God's Attributes, and that *knowledge when acquired.*

As to the first, (the *means of acquiring,*) there seems to be some advantage on the side of God's PHYSICAL works. For, as his Lordship rightly observes, *where we cannot discern wisdom and power in the physical works, it is due to our imperfection, not to his: for as men advance in the knowledge of nature, we see more and more of wisdom and power.* And he insinuates, we cannot say the same concerning the difficulties in the *moral* system. It is true, we cannot. But then let me tell him, neither can we say the contrary. The reason is, The physical system lies open to our enquiries; and by the right application of our senses to well-tried experiments, we are able to make considerable advances in the knowledge of Nature. It is not so in the *moral* system; all we know here are a few general principles concerning its Constitution; and further than this, human wit or industry is unable to penetrate. These general principles are, indeed, amply sufficient to deduce and establish the *moral attributes* from the *moral system;* but not sufficient to remove all difficulties that arise from what we see of the actual administration of that System. So that, tho' *we* cannot say, that *as we advance in the knowledge* of the moral system *we see more and more of goodness and justness;* So neither can *his Lordship* say (tho' his words seem to insinuate he could) that as we advance, we see *less and less.* Whereas the truth is, beyond those general principles, we cannot advance at all.

But then, as to the second part in the distinction (the *knowledge of the attributes, when acquired*) I hold the advantage, and a great one it is, lies altogether on the side of the MORAL. And thus I argue: Tho' the idea of God's *natural* attributes be as clear in the abstract, as that of his *moral,* yet

the idea of his moral attributes is, in the concrete, more adequate than that of his natural. The reason seems convincing. The moral relation in which we stand to God, as free agents, is just the same whether man exists alone, or whether he be but a link in the chain of innumerable orders of intelligences surrounding the whole Creation. Hence we must needs have a full knowledge of our duty to him, and of his disposition towards us: on which knowledge is founded the exactness of our conceptions of his moral attributes, his *justice* and *goodness*. But the natural relation in which we, or any of God's creatures, stand towards him, as material Beings, is not the same when considered simply, as when considered to be a portion of a dependent and connected Whole. Because, whenever such a Whole exists, the harmony and perfection of it must first of all be consulted. This harmony ariseth from the mutual subserviency and union of its parts. But this subserviency may require a ministration of government, with regard to certain portions of Matter thus allied, different from what might have followed had those portions stood alone, because that precise disposition, which might be fit in one case, might be unfit in the other. Hence we, who know there is a Whole, of which our material system is a Part; and yet are totally ignorant both of it's nature and extent, can have but a very confused idea of that physical relation in which we stand towards God: so that our conceptions of his *natural* attributes, his *power* and *wisdom*, which are founded on that idea, must in the concrete be proportionably vague and inadequate.

But it may be asked, perhaps, Whence arises this reciprocal advantage which the *moral* and the *natural* attributes have over one another, in the *means of acquiring* the knowledge of the *Attributes*, and the precision of *that knowledge when acquired?* I will tell the Reader in two words. Of *our own physical* system, we know many particulars (that is, we discover much of the *means*, but nothing of the *end*); and of the *universal* physical system we are entirely ignorant. On the other hand, we know but few particulars of *our own moral* system (that is, we discover only the *end*, and not the *means*); and of the *universal* moral system we understand the general principles.

His Lordship proceeds. *This now* [the knowledge of God's *natural* attributes] *is real knowledge; or there is no such thing as knowledge. We acquire it immediately in the objects themselves,* IN GOD, *and in nature the work of God.*

What his Lordship means by, *in God*, in distinction from the *work of God*, I confess I do not understand: Perhaps it may be intended to insinuate, in honour of the *natural attributes*, that they may be even proved *à priori*; for this is not the first time by many, when, after having heartily abused a thing or person, he has been reduced to support himself on the authority, or the reasoning they afford him. Or perhaps, it was only used to round the period, and set off his eloquence. However, I agree with him, that this is *real knowledge*. And so too, I think, is the knowledge of the *moral* attributes, so gained. Why truly, says his Lordship, *I do allow just so much goodness and justice in God as we see in that* CONSTITUTION, *which annexes happiness to virtue, and misery to vice. But this*, says he, *I think*,

had better be called WISDOM. I think so too; if by *so much*, he means no more than what concerns God's *natural Government:* and that he means no more is plain from his making the *natural* consequence of vice and virtue the only sanction of the moral Law. But I will venture to go further, and say, that, from what we see in this *Constitution*, we may collect PERFECT GOODNESS AND JUSTICE. *Matter* and man's *Free-will* disturb the System: But if the *constitution* be the effect of God's *Will*, as his Lordship holds it is; and the mark of his *Wisdom*, as all mankind hold with him; Does not that *Wisdom* require that his *Will* should not be defeated? Would it not be defeated, if the disorders occasioned by the perversity of his Creatures were not remedied and set right? And is not A REMEDY the clearest mark of *perfect goodness* and *justice?*

Take it in another light. Free-will crosses that *Constitution*, which God, by establishing, shews he intended should take place. This *present* disturbance could not have been prevented, because, according to my Lord and his ill-used Poet, it was necessary to the schemes of divine wisdom, that there should be such a creature as MAN:

> "For in the scale of reasoning life, 'tis plain,
> There must be, somewhere, such a rank as man."

The consequence is, that the disorder will be *hereafter* rectified.

Had Man indeed been made *unnecessarily;* and had this Man broke in upon God's general System, his Lordship might have had some pretence to say, as he does, that GOD MEANT THE SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE FURTHER PURSUED; that is, that the scheme which annexes happiness to virtue, and misery to vice, should remain in it's present condition of an incomplete Dispensation, to all eternity. But since Man is acknowledged to be a *necessary* part of a general System, complete in all it's members, it is nonsense to talk of *God's not meaning the particular System should be further pursued*, when that *further pursuit* is only to bring it to it's natural period; short of which, it would remain unfinished, nay, unformed.

He goes on. *We know what* WISDOM *and* POWER *are. We know both intuitively, and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the* WORK; *and therefore we know demonstratively that such they are in the* WORKER.

And do we not know what GOODNESS and JUSTICE are? And by the very same means? Do we not *intuitively*, and by the *help of our senses know*, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the WORK, namely, in that *constitution of things*, which, his Lordship tells us, annexes happiness to virtue, and misery to vice? And may we not *demonstratively* collect from thence that such they are in the WORKER? since this *Constitution*, his Lordship tells us again, is the effect of God's WILL. On his own principles, therefore, applied to his own state of the reasoning *à posteriori*, it appears, that God is of *infinite goodness* and *justice*, as well as of *infinite wisdom* and *power*.

But to give AUTHORITY to his partial reasoning, (the usual support of all partialities,) he makes *Anaxagoras* instruct us, what we are to think of this matter. "Should you ask *Anaxagoras*" (says he) "what *goodness* is, or *justice?* He might bid you, perhaps, turn your eyes inward, first;

then, survey mankind; observe the wants of individuals, the benefits of society, and, from these particulars, frame the general notions of *goodness* and *justice*. He might go a step further: and add, this is *human* goodness and *human* justice, such as we can comprehend, such as we can exercise, and such as the supreme mind has made it both our duty and interest to exercise, by the constitution of the human system, and by the relations which arise in it: from all which our notions of *goodness* and *justice* result, and are compounded."

We know then, according to our mock Anaxagoras, what *goodness* and *justice* are, as certainly as what *Wisdom* and *Power* are: Since this quaternion of Attributes are all known by the same means and by no other: *we know both intuitively and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the work.* For he bids us *turn our eyes inward;* then *survey mankind;* and lastly, observe how *reason*, from the *constitution of human nature*, confirms our *intuitive* knowledge, and that which we gain by the *help of our senses*.—But what does all this signify, if *Anaxagoras* or his Lordship be in an humour of concluding against their own premisses? Hear then how the speech ends—"Of *divine goodness* and divine justice, might this Philosopher conclude, I AM UNABLE TO FRAME ANY ADEQUATE NOTIONS."* What? Unable to *frame* those notions which God, by his *moral Constitution*, has put into our hands; and by the declaration of his WILL has taught us to *apply?* Yes, he bids us conclude, that we are *unable to frame any adequate notion of divine* GOODNESS *and* JUSTICE, and yet, on the force of the very same reasoning, to conclude as steddily, that we are *able to frame an adequate notion of divine* WISDOM *and* POWER. —This old *Philosopher*, I suppose, was not brought in to be laughed at, like his drunken Church-HELOTES;† yet, he plays the fool to admiration. —*We* DO KNOW, says Anaxagoras, *what* Goodness *and* Justice *are: we know both intuitively, and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the* WORK; *and* THEREFORE *we* DO NOT KNOW *that such they are in the* WORKER.

Might I be permitted to address myself to this Renegado Sophist, I would say,—Your brethren, the antient Philosophers, reasoned *à posteriori* in this manner, "Can you think there is *wisdom* and *power* in you, and none in your Maker?"—By no means. They reasoned well.—Let me ask you then, is there *goodness* and *justice* in you, and none in your Maker? His answer, I suppose, would be the same. But, prompted by his Lordship, into whose service he is now entered, he adds, That, from *human goodness* and *justice* we cannot come to the NATURE of the *divine*. What should hinder us, I pray you? Is it not from our *intuitive conception* of our own *wisdom* and *power* that we gain an adequate idea of God's? Are *wisdom* and *power* MORE PERFECT, as they are found in man, than *goodness* and *justice?* If therefore the IMPERFECTION of these attributes in Man hinder our acquiring an adequate idea of those in God, we can have no

* Vol. iv. pp. 116, 117. † —"Far be it from me to wish" (says his Lordship) "that the race of Metaphysicians and Casuists should increase. But since there will be such men, it is very reasonable to wish that they may serve to the same good purpose that the Helotes, the drunken slaves, did at Sparta," &c.— Vol. v p. 446.

adequate idea of his *wisdom* and *power:* If the IMPERFECTION does not hinder, then we may have an adequate idea of his *goodness* and *justice.*

But, the inference to God's *power* and *wisdom*, his Lordship says, is supported by what men see of the effects of them, in his Works; the order and harmony of the *physical* System. Do we not see likewise the effects of God's *goodness* and *justice*, in the order and harmony of the *moral*, in the happiness that naturally attends virtue, and the misery consequent on vice? And is not the *moral* System as much *God's Work*, as the *physical?*

Thus, we see, that by the very reasoning, his Lordship EMPLOYS to prove the *natural* attributes, and by the very method he PRESCRIBES to us for proving the *moral* attributes, we have demonstrated the *moral* with a precision and a certainty, at least equal to the *natural.* His Lordship seems to have been aware of the event; and therefore when he had set us at defiance, he tried to put the change upon us, under pretence of reminding us, that the *moral attributes* should be examined by, or *applied to,* THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD AND THE STATE OF MANKIND IN IT.* I had full as much reason to be aware of his Lordship. And therefore, in stating the question, at my entrance on the subject, I obviated this miserable Sophism. I call it by no better name, because it is not *the constitution of the world or the state of mankind in it*, but the CONSTITUTION OF THE MORAL SYSTEM, or the nature of Virtue and Vice as they naturally operate to produce happiness and misery, by which God's *moral attributes* are to be tried and ascertained. But this, which, by a steddy light, gives us an uniform view, he would have us turn from; to contemplate that obscure, disturbed, and shifting Scene, the actual state of vice and virtue, of misery and happiness, amongst men. That is, he would have us conclude concerning God's nature, not from his VOLUNTARY CONSTITUTION of things, but from the BREACHES in that Constitution made by the abuse of man's free-will: which yet, (when he is arguing *for an equal providence*) he again and again confesses ought not to be charged upon God; and declaims violently against the folly of those who impute the effects of that abuse to him. Though here, (in his various attempts to blot out *the idea of God's moral attributes*) he be full of the disorders of the moral System, considered as part of God's design.

But since I have mentioned his arguments for an *equal providence*, I should be unjust to my argument, if I concealed from the Reader, another of his contradictions.—He had Man's *future State* as well as *God's moral attributes* to throw out of the religious World; or, to speak more properly, he had RELIGION to overturn, by taking away its very ESSENCE: and as the *irregularities* in the present administration of God's moral Providence stood in the way of his first attempt; and the *consistency* of the *moral System itself* in the way of the other; when he argues against a FUTURE STATE, You would think there were no *irregularities;* and when he argues against the MORAL ATTRIBUTES, You would think there was no *consistency.*

We now come to his Lordship's particular objections against the *moral attributes.* One of them is that they are BOUNDED.

* Vol. v. p. 331.

"They [the Divines] go further. As God is perfect, and man very imperfect, they talk of his *infinite goodness* and *justice*, as of his infinite wisdom and power; though the latter may preserve their nature without any conceivable bounds, and the former must cease to be what they are, unless we conceive them BOUNDED. Their nature implies necessarily a limitation in the exercise of them. Thus then the *moral attributes*, according to this Theology, requires infinitely more of God to man than men are able, or would be obliged if they were able, to exercise to one another: greater profusion in bestowing benefits and rewards, greater rigour in punishing offences." *

You have here his Lordship's own words; and nothing less could induce any one to think so disadvantageously of this Philosopher of the first head, as they necessarily imply. Let us consider the *premisses*, and examine the *inferences* both *implied* and *expressed*.

He says, 1. That the *moral attributes are bounded;* 2. That the *natural are not bounded*. Let us see to what the first proposition amounts; and how much truth there is in the second.

1. The *moral attributes* are considered by us as relative to *intelligent* creatures: The *natural* are not so considered. Thus, the goodness and justice when relative to man, are greatly *bounded;* a certain low degree of reward suffices for his *good;* a certain low degree of punishment for his *evil* actions. Let God's goodness and justice respect a higher rank of intelligent Beings, and they will be then *less bounded;* for greater rewards and punishments will be required: and so on, to the highest rank of intelligent creatures. Yet as the highest is at infinite distance from the Creator, the exercise of the moral attributes, as they bear relation to his intelligent creatures, must be still *bounded*.

2. His second proposition is, that *the natural attributes are not bounded*. It is true, these cannot be considered as relative to God's *intelligent* creatures; yet since, in their exercise, they must be considered as relative to his Creation at large; and since Creation, however immense, is not infinite, the natural attributes so considered are not infinite: but if not infinite, they are *bounded*. There is no difference therefore, in *the exercise* of God's attributes, between the *moral* and the *natural*, save only in the degree.

But if we consider God's *moral* and *natural* attributes more abstractedly, not as they are *in the exercise*, and relative to intelligent Beings, and to actual Creation, but as they are in his nature, then they are both *unbounded*. Thus we see his Lordship's notable distinction is both imaginary and useless.

However, let us give him all he asks; and then see what he will be able to *infer* from it.

1. His first *inference* seems to be this: "As the moral attributes are bounded, and not infinite like the natural, our idea of them must be *obscure* and *inadequate*." What! because they are better adapted to human contemplation? as things *bounded* certainly are better adapted than things *infinite*. Our idea of such of God's attributes as bear relation to a Being, whose nature and properties we know, namely MAN, must needs be more

* Vol. v. p. 528.

adequate and better defined than the idea of such attributes as bear relation to Beings, whose nature and properties we know not, namely the gross of those which make up the UNIVERSE.

2. His other *inference*, is expressed in these words: *Thus then the moral attributes, according to this Theology, require infinitely more of God to man than men are able, or would be obliged if they were able, to exercise to one another.* To say, the moral attributes, according to Christian Theology, or, as he is pleased to call it, *artificial Theology*, requires INFINITELY *more*, is an extravagant hyperbole. To say, it *requires more*, is true. And for this plain reason: the relation between Creator and Creature is much more intimate than that, between Fellow-creatures; therefore the divine *goodness* is more abundant: The relation between Lord and Servant is more appropriate than that between Fellow-servants; therefore the divine *justice* is more severe. And had it not been deemed too presuming to refer his Lordship to Scripture for instruction (especially in a matter where the abuse of Scripture was chiefly intended) I might there have pointed to a *Parable* which would have set him right: and has always kept *artificial Theology*, whatever he might think, from going wrong. But *infinite*, when applied to the *exercise* of a moral attribute in reference to Man, is his Lordship's nonsense, with due reverence be it spoken, not the *nonsense of artificial Divines.* They were not ignorant, that the rule, *infirmiorem vel deteriorem partem sequitur consequentia*, held as well in *Morals* as in *Logic.* Though God be infinite, man is finite; and therefore, with respect to man, the exertion of a *moral* attribute is finite, not infinite. His Lordship himself saw something of this, as appears by his own words. *The nature of the moral attributes implies necessarily a limitation in the use of them.* And why would he suppose, Divines could not see as far into this matter as himself?

But if there be an error in *artificial Theology*, he is as sure, at one time or other, to espouse it; as he is ready at all times to calumniate the Divine who holds it. Men, in their ill-advised zeal to defend the Scripture doctrine of the Son's Divinity, were not always sufficiently careful in selecting their arguments. Amongst such as had perhaps been better let alone, they employed this; That as man's offence was against an infinite Being, it required an infinite satisfaction; which none but such a Being could give. Now his Lordship, we see, espouses this very principle to discredit God's moral attributes, and the *artificial Theology* of Jesus Christ; which speaks, indeed, of *infinite* rewards; but not as matter of *due*, but of *grace.*

As the being *bounded* is one of his Lordship's objections against the moral attributes, so the being merely HUMAN, is another.

"After Dr. CLARKE" (says he) "has repeated over and over, that all the *moral attributes* are the same in God as in our ideas; and that he, who denies them to be so, may as well deny the divine *physical attributes*, the Doctor insists only on two of the former, on those of *justice* and *goodness.* He was much in the right to contract the generality of his assertion. The absurdity of ascribing TEMPERANCE, for instance, or FORTITUDE, to God, would have been too gross, and too visible even to eyes that prejudice had blinded the most. But that, of ascribing *justice* and *goodness* to him,

according to our notions of them, might be better covered, and was enough for his purpose, THOUGH NOT LESS REALLY ABSURD."*

Which shall we most admire: His *Knowledge* or his *Ingenuity?* Or shall we follow the advice of his own Motto,† and *Wonder at nothing?*

When men contemplate what they call, moral virtue, or the attributes of Humanity, they divide them into two classes, perfectly distinct from one another. In the first are comprized those which belong to man under the idea of a free intelligent Being, such as *goodness* and *justice:* in the second, those which belong to him under the idea of a creature of his own frail species, such as *temperance* and *fortitude.* The first belong to all free intelligent Beings; the latter, only to such a Being as man: *Those* arise out of the nature of free intelligence, and so are common to all: *These*, from the imperfections of a very inferior creature, and so are peculiar to Humanity; for we easily conceive a higher Order of free created Intelligences, in which the moral virtues of the second class have no place. They are superior to the impressions of fear, and so have no room to exert *fortitude:* They are removed from the temptation of excess, and so have no need to exercise *temperance.* Now when CLARKE, after other Divines, had said that *the moral attributes are the same in God as in our ideas*, What Attributes could they possibly mean but those of the *first class;* those which belong to Beings under the idea of free Intelligences? STUPID as his Lordship is pleased to make Divines, they could never *blunder* at such a rate as to conceive, that those virtues or *moral attributes*, which proceed from the *imperfection* of the Creature, might belong in any manner to the Creator, whom they supposed to be *all perfect.* They held, with his Lordship, and they will hold without him, that the great God is *infinitely* wise and powerful. Were they then in any danger to give him *temperance*, which implied his being obnoxious to *folly;* or *fortitude*, which argued *impuissance?* Infinite wisdom, therefore, and infinite power, exclude from God the very ideas of *temperance* and *fortitude.* But do infinite wisdom and infinite power exclude from God the ideas of *goodness* and *justice?* On the contrary, his Lordship, as we shall see presently, is reduced to the poor shift of owning *goodness* and *justice* to be contained in infinite *wisdom* and *power;* after he had said, as here he does, *That the ascribing goodness and justice to God is* NO LESS REALLY ABSURD *than the ascribing temperance and fortitude to him.*

—But CLARKE *contracted the generality of the assertion to serve a purpose.* I think he did: and for one of the best *purposes* in the world, that of COMMON SENSE. Had his Lordship been pleased to *contract* himself on the same principle, he might have passed, perhaps, for a greater Philosopher; though he had certainly been a less Writer.

But then, if you ask, *What purpose* his Lordship had *to serve*, when he used the equivocal word ALL, (which may signify either *all* of one kind, or *all* of every kind) where he observes, Clarke holds, *that* ALL *the moral attributes are the same in God, &c.?* I answer, it was to give himself the poor pretence to say, that Clarke afterwards *contracted his generality*, or, in other words, that he contradicted himself.

* Vol. v. p. 311. † "Nil admirari."

A third objection against the *moral attributes* is, "That PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS mix with our goodness and justice; which therefore cannot be supposed to be *the same in kind* with GOD'S; though our wisdom and power, with which no passions or affections mix, must be the *same in kind* with his."

Were passion and affection *inseparable* from human goodness and justice, the objection might seem to have some force; indeed, not much even then. But how miserable must the objection appear to those who see, as all men may, that they are *separable?* Separable, I mean, in practice as well as speculation: (Of which we have at present* one great Example at least, in a high Tribunal where they shine the most.) So that the true idea even of human goodness and justice excludes all passion and affection. What hinders then our rising, from that idea, to Divine goodness and justice, any more than our rising, from the idea of human wisdom and power, to the Divine wisdom and power; and from perceiving, that as well the *moral*, as the *natural* attributes, are the same in kind, both in God and man?

But this is not all that may be fairly said in favour of our adequate idea of God's *moral attributes*, when compared with the *natural*. For though PASSION mixes not with the human attributes of wisdom and power, yet something else does, much more difficult to be separated than *passion*, from the human attributes of goodness and justice, I mean the INSTRUMENTALITY OF MATTER. We can conceive nothing of *human power* without the use of such an instrument: yet this, by his Lordship's own confession, does not hinder us from rising from the idea of our own wisdom and power, to the wisdom and power of God; nor from seeing that they are the same *in kind*. Why then should the other foreign combination hinder us from seeing that goodness and justice are the same *in kind?*

Still, further. The MANNER *of knowing* in God, on which depends his natural attribute of WISDOM, is confessedly different from what it is in man; and, at the same time, is a thing of which we have no conception: yet this, according to his Lordship's account, does not hinder our attaining to an adequate idea of *divine wisdom*, though it rises only from what we see of the *human*.

How happens it then, that, in both these cases, notwithstanding the foreign mixture of the *instrumentality of matter*, and the *manner of knowing*, we attain an adequate idea of God's wisdom and power? His Lordship will tell you, it is by separating what is foreign, from what is native to the ideas of wisdom and power. And shall not I have as much credit with my Reader, when I tell him, we acquire an adequate idea of God's goodness and justice, by separating from the idea of human goodness and justice the foreign mixture of *passion* and *affection?*

But his Lordship has a greater quarrel than all this, with the MORAL ATTRIBUTES. They give rise to embarrassed questions, dishonourable to God, and mischievous to Religion.

"As they [the Divines] modeled God's government on a human plan, so they conceived his perfections, *moral* as well as physical, by human ideas.—Thus God was said to be the FIRST GOOD: but then the general

* 1765.

notion or abstract idea of this *good* was not only taken from human goodness, but was considered too with little or no other relation than to man—A question arose therefore on these hypotheses, *How could evil come into a system of which God was the author?*—this question made a further hypothesis necessary; another first God, another coeternal and coequal principle, was introduced to solve it; *a first cause of all evil*, as the other was *of all good.*" *

The false representation of this fact I reserve for another occasion: the false inference from it is what I now propose to consider.

His Lordship supposes, that the notion of God's *moral attributes* gave birth to an insoluble question concerning *the origin of evil;* and that this occasioned the invention of the mischievous hypothesis of the *two Principles.* Who would have suspected all this evil to arise from the FIRST GOOD! Yet so it was: And therefore the notion of such a GOOD must be *false;* or at least, very *hurtful.*

I. As to the first, if his Lordship's inference be right, it will unsettle all useful knowledge; because there is no great principle, either in *physics*, or in *natural Theology*, but which, if we be not on our guard, and wise enough to stop at the extent of our ideas, will lead us into inextricable difficulties: As one might instance in a point that arises out of both the sciences, physics and morals together—*The agreement between free-will and prescience.* This is a well-known case: And as his Lordship pretends to untie this knot, which hath so long kept the learned world intangled, let us examine his great talents on what is worthy of them. "Our ideas" (says he) "of divine intelligence and wisdom may be neither *fantastical* nor *false*, and yet God's MANNER of knowing may be so different from ours, that fore-knowledge, as we call it *improperly in him*, may be consistent with the contingency of events; although that which we call *properly* fore-knowledge *in ourselves*, be not so." †

I have two or three remarks to make on these words.

1. Our ideas of God's moral attributes, his *goodness* and *justice*, he makes *fantastical* and *false*, on account of difficulties arising from them: yet God's natural attributes, his *intelligence* and *wisdom*, *may*, he says, *be neither fantastical nor false*, though a difficulty as great arises from them; namely, the apparent discordancy between free-will and prescience.

2. My second remark is, that his solution is more *fantastic* and *false* than the wildest chimera of School-metaphysics. The difficulty in reconciling God's prescience to man's free-will does not arise from our ignorance in God's MANNER OF KNOWING, but from God's ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.

3. My third remark is, that his Lordship, who is here so penetrating, that he can easily reconcile *prescience* and *free-will*, is yet, in another place, so cloudy, that he cannot see how an "*equal providence* and *free agency* may stand together." ‡

4. My last remark is (and it rises out of the fore-going) that where Religion is not concerned, his Lordship sees no difficulty in any part of the

* Vol. iv. p. 88. † Vol. v. p. 525. ‡ See my observations on this Proposed difficulty in the Appendix to the Fifth Book of the Divine Legation.

system of Creation: But as soon as ever Religion appears, then difficulties start up by dozens. Of this, take an instance from, as it will lead us back to, the case in hand. Our ideas of God's *moral attributes*, he says, must needs be false, because the conceiving of them by human goodness and justice raises up the question of the *origin of evil*, considered *morally*. Well. And does not the conceiving of God's *physical attributes*, by human wisdom and power, lead to the question of the *origin of evil*, considered *naturally?* Yet our ideas of the physical attributes are neither *false nor fantastical*. But to this, his Lordship replies, Evil, considered *naturally*, is not real, but apparent only. Why so? Because it contributes to the greater good of the whole. May not the same thing be said of Evil, considered *morally?* Nay, hath it not been actually said, and proved too, on the same principles? It follows then, that they are either both *real*, or both *fantastic*.

In a word, the truth is no more than this, Presumptuous man knows not where to stop: he would penetrate even to the Arcana of the Godhead:

"For Fools rush in, where Angels fear to tread."

And this impious humour it was which gave birth to the absurd hypothesis of TWO PRINCIPLES. But is the folly to be charged upon our idea of the *moral attributes?* Ridiculous! We see it's *cause* is in vanity and self-conceit: passions that operate alike on all Systems; and find materials to gratify their extravagance, equally in the *physical* as in the *moral* attributes of the Deity.

II. As to his Lordship's second inference, that *this* idea is at least productive of much *mischief*, and therefore it would be better to have none at all; Let me observe, that the idea of God's very existence is productive of much mischief, even all the mischiefs of Superstition. Is it therefore better to be without a God? Who besides his Lordship would say so? * Why then should we think it better to be without the idea of the *moral attributes*, even though the evils it produced were *necessary?* But that is not the case. They are *casual* only: the issue of pride and presumption; which the idea of the *moral attributes* does not at all influence.

III. HOWEVER, these, if not hurtful, are USELESS; and this is his next cavil. "Infinite *wisdom* and *power*" (says his Lordship) "have made things as they are: how *goodness* and *justice* required they should be made is neither *coram judice*, nor to any rational purpose to enquire." † To inquire how the *universe of things should be made*, which refers to God's *power* and *wisdom*, serves indeed to *no reasonable purpose*. But to inquire concerning our own state and condition in this Universe, which refers to God's *goodness* and *justice*, is either *coram judice*, or we were sent into the world to no purpose. His Lordship's sophistry seems to confound two things that plain sense hath always distinguished; viz. *our own business from other men's*. When the King holds a Session of justice, 'tis not for every Particular to inquire into all his measures; but every Particular, who is summoned to attend the Court, is much concerned to know how he

* He indeed says, *he had rather be an Atheist than acknowledge the Christian Theology;* and we may believe him. See vol. iv. p. 34. † Vol. v. p. 363.

himself shall be dealt with. His Lordship, indeed, is ready to say, We are not *summoned;* that is, we are not *accountable creatures.* But this is begging the question.

Again, to *inquire*, much more to prescribe, *how things should be made*, in any particular System, has all the folly, presumption, and impiety, which his Lordship charges upon it: Because the Parts having a relation to the Whole, an all-wise Architect makes them in conformity to that Whole, of which, we know nothing; and therefore our only conclusion should be, that the Part we do know, is constituted for the best. But it is another thing to say (which is all that Divines have said, how differently soever his Lordship is pleased to represent the matter) that God will act equitably with his rational Creation, by distributing good and evil to them according to their deserts: because this does not depend upon any Whole, of which we know nothing, but on his attributes of goodness and justice, of which, we know enough to determine with certainty concerning his final dealing with every rank of free and reasonable Beings. In this case to pass our judgment is so far from folly or impiety, that not to do it would be stupidity or hypocrisy. To call this proceeding, as his Lordship does, the patching or botching up one System with another, is a gross misrepresentation.

AT LENGTH, he ends just where he set out, That we have NO IDEAS of the moral attributes at all. "Upon the whole matter" (says he) "we may conclude safely from error, and in direct opposition to CLARKE, that *goodness and justice in God cannot be conceived, without manifest presumption and impiety, to be the same as in the ideas we frame of these perfections when we consider them in men, or when we reason about them abstractedly in themselves;* but that in the supreme Governor of the World they are something TRANSCENDENT, and of which we cannot make any true judgment, nor argue with any certainty about them."* It was for jargon like this that a famous Schoolman got the name of the TRANSCENDENT DOCTOR. Yet he assures us that he is justified by the authority of St. PAUL and Dr. BARROW. *These two great Divines* (says he) *are on my side.*† Two noble supporters, (it must be confessed) to his Lordship's Atchievements! One thing I have observed, which may be worth reflecting on—A strange propensity in FREE-THINKERS to mistake their enemies for their friends, and as strange a propensity in the CLERGY to mistake their friends for their enemies. This different turn is odd enough: and, at first view, seems a little mysterious; when, perhaps, there may be no more in it than this—Free-thinkers have invented the trick, to amuse the Clergy, in order to raise their suspicions, and excite their jealousy against their best Friends: And, unhappily, the Clergy have, now and then, fallen into the snare.

But, after all, who would expect that *the leather-dressing Pontiff*‡ of all men should have been thought worthy to support the *first Philosophy!* What has St. PAUL done at last to deserve this honour? Why, in answer

* Vol. v. p. 359. † Vol. v. p. 362. ‡ This is the title with which he dignifies SAINT PAUL, in his IVth vol. p. 423. What pity was it, his Lordship did not know that *Theodoret* had called him a downright COBBLER.

to the objections against God's dispensations in the religious World, the Apostle refers us, "for intire satisfaction to the incomprehensible wisdom of God, who frequently in the course of his providence ordereth things in methods transcending our abilities to discover or to trace." * This solution, which is here extolled for its great *modesty*, is referred to, in another place, for it's greater IMPUDENCE.†

But St. PAUL says, *we must have recourse to the incomprehensible wisdom of God.* In good time. But how does this prove that, in Paul's opinion, we have no adequate idea of the *moral attributes?* Unless the *quality* of an Agent, and his *action*, be one and the same thing.

Dr. BARROW, I presume, will stand his Lordship in no better stead than St. Paul. "As the dealings of every wise man" (says the Doctor) "are sometimes founded upon maxims, and admit justifications not obvious or penetrable by vulgar conceit; so may God act according to rules of wisdom and justice which it may be quite impossible by our faculties to apprehend, or with our means to descry. As there are natural modes of Being and operation, so there may be prudential and moral modes of proceeding, far above our reach, peculiar objects of divine wisdom not to be understood by any creature, especially by creatures who stand in the lowest form of intelligence; one remove from beasts. In fine, those rules of equity and experience which we in our transactions with one another do use, if they be applied to the dealings of God will be found very incongruous or deficient, the case being vastly altered from that infinite distance in nature and state between God and us, and from the immense difference which his relations towards us have from our relations to one another." ‡ What now has all this (which relates only to the *incomprehensible nature of God's providence*) to do with our *inadequate ideas of his moral attributes?* At least, if his Lordship will contend, that the man who thinks God's providence *incomprehensible*, must needs think our ideas of his moral attributes *inadequate*, he must go a step further, and confess, that Barrow supposed our ideas of the *natural* attributes to be *inadequate* likewise; for he puts both on the same footing. *As there are* NATURAL *modes of Being and operation* (says the Doctor), *so there may be prudential and* MORAL *modes of proceeding far above our reach.* But as this would be going too far; farther than the FIRST PHILOSOPHY will allow of, I suppose his Lordship would be content to give up this quotation from Barrow, as nothing to the purpose

AT LAST, and when you would least expect it, Common-sense and Common-sentiments return. And God's moral attributes, after much ado, are allowed to be in Nature. "Where Religions" (says his Lordship) "which pretend to be revealed, prevail, a new character of God's *goodness* arises—an *artificial goodness* which stands often in the place of the NATURAL." § And this, after he had so often told us, that we have no adequate idea of any goodness at all. Well, but as aukwardly as God's *natural goodness* comes (and, in every sense) *à posteriori*, yet it comes, and deserves to be made welcome. "All the knowledge" (says he) "that God has given us the means to acquire, and therefore all he designed we should have of his

* Vol. v. p. 360. † Vol. iii. p. 307. ‡ Vol. v. pp. 361, 362. § Vol. v. p. 431.

physical and MORAL nature and attributes, is derived from *his works*, and from the TENOUR OF THAT PROVIDENCE by which he governs them." * You will observe the words—*the tenour of that Providence*—I have detected the sophistry of them before, where I have stated the meaning of the terms, *God's works*. I bid you observe them now, to judge of the following climax (if I may so call it), or his walk down stairs. The *wisdom* " is not so often discernible by us [in God's works] as the power of God, nor the *goodness* as the wisdom." † As scanty and slender as the knowledge is of God's moral attributes, which his Lordship here allows us to collect from his works, yet it flatly contradicts what his System had obliged him over and over to maintain; particularly in the following words—*Of divine goodness and divine justice* (says his Lordship in the person of Anaxagoras) *I am unable to frame any adequate notions,‡ from God's works.*

This Mock-concession is again repeated, and as carefully guarded. " By natural Theology " (says his Lordship) " we are taught to acknowledge and adore the infinite *wisdom* and *power* of God, which he has manifested to us in some degree or other in every part, even the most minute, of his Creation. *By that too, we are taught to ascribe* GOODNESS *and* JUSTICE *to him, wherever he intended we should so ascribe them*, that is, wherever either his works, or the dispensations of his providence, do as NECESSARILY communicate these notions to our minds, as those of wisdom and power are communicated to us, in the whole extent of both." §

What his Lordship would have you infer from this is, that we are NO WHERE taught to ascribe *goodness* and *justice* to God; since the *dispensations of his providence* do NO WHERE, in his Lordship's opinion, NECESSARILY *communicate these notions*. But allow him his premisses, that neither God's Works nor Dispensations do NECESSARILY communicate to us the notions of God's goodness and justice; Would his conclusion follow, that therefore we are no where taught in these works and dispensations to ascribe those attributes unto him? Suppose these works and dispensations did only PROBABLY communicate these notions to our minds; will not this probability teach us to ascribe goodness and justice to him? God hath so framed the constitution of things, that man, throughout his whole conduct in life, should be necessarily induced to form his judgment on appearances and probable arguments. Why then not in this, as well as the rest? or rather, why not in this, above the rest? if so be God indeed had not (as I have shewn he hath) necessarily communicated these notions—But still, what is this to our *adequate* idea of the moral attributes, the point in question? God's not *necessarily communicating* affects only the *reality*, not the *precision* of the idea. All therefore we learn by the observation, which would thus put the change upon us, is, that his Lordship has a very strong inclination, that God should have neither *goodness* nor *justice;* so far as they carry with them any DISPOSITION to *reward* or *punish*. For as to the Attributes *themselves*, divested of their consequences; and undisturbed by our IMPIOUS IMITATION,|| he has little or no quarrel with them.

* Vol. v. pp. 523, 524. † Vol. v. p. 335. ‡ Vol. iv. pp. 116, 117. § Vol. v. p. 527. || OUR OBLIGATION TO IMITATE GOD IS A FALSE AND PROFANE DOCTRINE.—Vol. v. p. 65.

His Lordship certainly never intended to *teach* the common Reader more of the secrets of his Philosophy than what NECESSARILY arises from his *professions*. But to make God treat Mankind in this manner, to communicate to their minds the appearance of Attributes which he has not, is drawing an image of the Deity from his Lordship's own likeness; the very fault he so much censures in Divines. But if it must needs be, that God is to be represented either after Them, or after his Lordship, I should chuse to have the Clergy's God, though made out of no better stuff than ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY (because this gives him both *goodness* and *justice*), rather than his Lordship's God, which has neither; although composed of the more refined materials of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY. In the mean time, I will not deny but He may be right in what he says, That men conceive of the Deity, *more humano;* and that his Lordship's God and the Clergy's God are equally faithful copies of themselves.

In a word, if God *teaches*, whether clearly or obscurely, he certainly intended, we should *learn*. And what we get even by appearances, is real knowledge, upon his Lordship's own principles. For if TRUTH be, as he assures us it is, of so precarious a nature as to take it's Being from our own System, it must be *real* as far as it *appears*. "Our knowledge" (says this great Philosopher) "is so dependent on our own system, that a great part of it would not be *knowledge* perhaps, but *error* in any other." *

It is thus he involves himself in perpetual contradictions: And it will be always thus, when men dispute (for believe they cannot) † against common notices, and the most obvious truths; such as *liberty of will;* the *certainty of knowledge;* and this, which (I reckon) obtrudes itself upon us as forcibly as either, the MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY.

But the game is now on foot, let us follow it close. We have unravelled him through all his windings; and we may soon expect to see him take shelter in the thick cover of God's incomprehensible Nature; and rather than allow (more than in jest) the *moral attributes* of the Deity, ready to resolve all his Attributes, both *natural* and *moral*, into one INDEFINITE PERFECTION.

But soft. Not yet. We must come to it by degrees and regular advances. First, the *moral attributes* are to be *resolved* into the *natural*.

—"If they [the *natural* and *moral* attributes] may be considered separately, as we are apt to consider them; and if the LATTER, and every thing we ascribe to these, are not to be RESOLVED *rather into the former;* into his infinite intelligence, wisdom, and power." ‡—It is yet, we see, but a question; and that only, whether the *moral* attributes are not to be resolved into the *natural*. In the next passage the matter is determined. "I think" (and what he thinks, he holds it but reasonable we should all think) "that the *moral* attributes of the Supreme Being are *absorbed in his wisdom;* that we should consider them only as different modifications of this *physical* attribute." §

We are not yet near the top. However, before we go any higher, let us

* Vol. iii. p. 356. † Hear what he himself says of FREE-WILL. *The free-will of man no one can deny he has, without* LYING, *or renouncing his intuitive knowledge.*—Vol. v. p. 406. ‡ Vol. v. pp. 523, 524. § Vol. v. p. 335.

set together his INCONSISTENCIES, as they appear in this situation. Sometimes *the ideas of divine wisdom are better determined than those of divine goodness:* * Sometimes *we have no ideas at all of divine goodness:* † And sometimes again (as in the place before us) the *divine goodness is the same as wisdom*, and therefore, doubtless, (notwithstanding his Lordship) the idea of it as well defined. Now, of all these assertions, to which will he stick? To which, do you ask? To none of them, longer than they will stick to him: And straggling, undisciplined Principles, picked up at adventures, are not apt to stick long to any side: As soon as they begin to incline towards the enemy, he has done with them.—Come, if you will needs have it, you shall. The secret is this. The attributes are mere NAMES; and there is an end of them. All that remains, worth speaking of, is one undefined ETERNAL REASON: and so the Farce concludes.

"The moral ATTRIBUTES" (says he) "are *barely* NAMES that we give to various manifestations of the infinite wisdom of one *simple uncompounded being.*" ‡

"Of divine goodness and justice I am unable to frame any adequate notions; and instead of conceiving such distinct moral attributes in the supreme Being, *we ought, perhaps, to conceive nothing more than this*, that THERE ARE VARIOUS APPLICATIONS OF ONE ETERNAL REASON, WHICH IT BECOMES US LITTLE TO ANALYZE INTO ATTRIBUTES." §

To this miserable refuge is his Lordship reduced, to avoid DIVINE JUSTICE. But why, the Reader will say, did he not speak out at first, and end his quarrel with the *moral attributes* at once? Your humble servant for that. Barefaced NATURALISM has no such charms as may make her received when and wherever she appears. There is need of much preparation, and not a little disguise, before you can get her admitted even to what is called *good company.*—But then, you will say, after he had resolved to speak out, Why did he stop again in his career; and, when his premisses are general against *all* attributes, his conclusion became particular, against the *moral* only? Not without reason, I assure you. He had need of the *natural* attributes, to set up against the *moral;* and therefore had himself *analyzed* this *eternal reason* into the specific attributes of *wisdom* and *power.* But when he saw his Adversaries might, by the same way, *analyze* it into *goodness and justice*, he then thought fit to pick a quarrel with his own method: But it was to be done obliquely. And hence arises all this embarras and tergiversation. He would willingly, if his Readers would be so satisfied, analyze the *eternal reason* into *wisdom* and *power:* but there he would stop; and leave the other side of the *eternal reason*, unanalyzed: and if *goodness* and *justice* should chance to start out, he has a trick to *resolve* and *absorb* them into wisdom and power, as only *different modifications of the physical attributes.* But if this should revolt his Readers, and they expect equal measure; then, rather than give them back the *goodness* and *justice* which he has been at all this pains to proscribe, he will throw *wisdom* and *power* after them, and *resolve* all into the ONE ETERNAL REASON.

* Vol. v. pp. 341, 526. † Vol. iv. pp. 116, 117. ‡ Vol. v. p. 453.
§ Vol. iv. p. 117.

Bashful NATURALISM has now thrown aside her Veil; and is, we see, ready to face down and defy her Rival; whom till now she was content to counterfeit. Give me leave, therefore, to repress this last effort of her insolence and of his Lordship's superior Wisdom. He now tells us, "that these pretended attributes, as they are commonly specified, and distinguished into *natural* and *moral*, are a mere human fiction; invented, by aid of analogy from the actions, passions, and qualities observable in man: and that the simple nature of Deity is one uniform perfection; of which, Infinity being the base, we can have no distinct idea or conception."

To this I reply, that it is indeed true, that these specific attributes, from which we deduce all our knowledge of the nature and will of God, are formed on analogy, and bear relation to ourselves. But then we say such attributes are not on that account the less real or essential. The light of the SUN is not in the orb itself, what we see it in the RAINBOW. There it is one candid, uniform, perfect blaze of glory: here we separate it's Perfection into the various attributes of red, yellow, blue, purple, and what else the subtle optician so nicely distinguishes. But still the *solar* light is not less real in the Rainbow, where it's rays become thus untwisted, and each differing thread distinctly seen in its effect, than while they remained united and incorporated with one another in the Sun. Just so it is with the divine Nature: it is one simple individual Perfection in the Godhead himself: but when refracted and divaricated, in passing through the medium of the human mind, it becomes power, justice, mercy; which are all separately and ADEQUATELY represented to the understanding. But that his Lordship so frequently discards his own principles, I should hope he would submit to this illustration, since he owns *that we see the Deity in a reflected, not in a direct light.**

It is a true light then, and not a false: and the knowledge which it conveys is real, not fantastic: For mirrors are not wont to reflect the species of the mind's visions, but things exterior and substantial. To turn us, therefore, from God's *attributes*, (though the indirect, yet the well-defined Image of him) because they discover something to us we may not like, a HELL and a FUTURE JUDGMENT, to turn us, I say, from these, to the *undefined eternal reason*, is doing like certain French Philosophers, who, when they quarrelled with Newton's Theory of light and colours, contrived to break the Prism by which it was demonstrated.

And now, Reader, let me ask, Who is there that deserves the name of MAN, and will not own, that they are the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of the Deity which make him AMIABLE; just as the *natural attributes* make him *revered?*—What is his Lordship's quarrel with the God of MOSES and PAUL, but that he is made *unamiable*, and represented without *goodness* or *justice? Their God*, therefore, he expressly tells us, *shall not be his God.*† Well then: He has his God to make. And who would not expect to find him, when made by such a Workman, a God of infinite goodness and justice? No such matter: These qualities come not out of his Lordship's hands; so, cannot enter into the composition of his God: They are

* Vol. v. p. 524. † "Can any man presume to say, that the God of Moses or the God of Paul is the true God?" &c.—Vol. v. p. 567.

barely NAMES *that men give to various manifestations of the infinite wisdom of one simple uncompounded Being.* The pretended want of them in the God of the Jews afforded his Lordship a commodious cavil; for he had RELIGION to remove out of his way: But when he came to erect NATURALISM in it's stead, it had been very inconvenient to give them to his own Idol.

Honest Plutarch, though a Priest, was as warm an enemy to PRIESTCRAFT as his Lordship. He derives all the evils of Superstition from men's not acquiring the idea of a God *infinitely good and just.* And proposes this knowledge as the only cure for Superstition. This is consistent. But what would the ancient World have thought of their Philosopher, had his remedy, after hunting for it through a hundred volumes, been a God without any goodness and justice at all?

NATURE tells us, that the thing most desirable is the knowledge of a God whose goodness and justice gives to every man according to his works. His LORDSHIP tells us, that REASON or NATURAL RELIGION discovers to us no such God. Now, if both speak truth, How much are we indebted to REVELATION! Which, when *natural Religion* failed us, brings us to the knowledge of a God infinitely good and just; and gives us an adequate idea of those attributes! I say no more than his Lordship has confessed.—*Christianity*, says he, DISCOVERS *the love of God to man; his infinite* JUSTICE *and* GOODNESS.*

Is this a blessing to be rejected? His Lordship has no room to say so, since the discovery is made in that very way, in which, upon his own Principles, it only could be made. He pretends, "We have no other natural way of coming to the knowledge of God, but from his *works.* By these," *he says*, "we gain the idea of his *physical attributes;* and if there be any thing in his *works* which seems to contradict those attributes, 'tis only seeming: For as men advance in the knowledge of nature, the difficulties vanish. It is not so," he says, "with regard to the *moral attributes.* There are so many *phænomena* which contradict these, and occasion difficulties never to be cleared up, that they hinder us from acquiring an *adequate* idea of the *moral attributes.*" Now admitting all this to be true, (for generally, his Lordship's assertions are so extravagant, that they will not even admit a supposition of their truth, though it be only for argument's sake,) What does it effect but this, the giving *additional credit to Revelation?* The *physical difficulties* clear up as we advance in our knowledge of *Nature*, and we advance in proportion to our diligence and application. But the *moral difficulties* never clear up, because they rise out of the *Whole System* of God's moral dispensation; which is involved in clouds and darkness, impenetrable to mortal sight: and all the force of human wit alone will never be able to draw the veil. The assistance must come from another quarter. It must come, if it comes at all, from the Author of the Dispensation. Well; *Revelation* hath drawn this veil, and so, removed the darkness which obstructed our attaining an *adequate* idea of the *moral* attributes. Shall we yet stand out? And, when we are brought hither upon his Lordship's own principles, still with-hold our assent? Undoubtedly

* Vol. v. p. 532.

you must. Beware (says he) of a pretended Revelation. Why so? "Because the Religion of nature is perfect and absolute: and therefore Revelation can teach nothing but what Religion hath already taught." * Strange; Why, *Revelation* teaches those *moral* attributes! which you, my Lord, own, *natural Religion* does not teach—Here we stick.

> "Dic aliquem sodes, dic, Quintiliane, colorem:
> Hæremus—"

And here, we are like to stick. His Lordship leaves us in a Riddle. Will you have the solution? It is foolish enough; as the solution of such kind of things generally are. But if the Reader hath kept his good humour, which, I confess, is difficult amidst all these provocations of impiety, it is enough to make him laugh. I said before, that his Lordship borrowed all his reasoning against Revelation, from such as Tindal, Toland, Collins, Chubb, and Morgan. This solemn argument particularly, of the PERFECTION OF NATURAL RELIGION, and the superseded use of Revelation, he delivers to us just as he found it in Tindal. Now Tindal, who pretended to hold that natural Religion taught both the *moral attributes* and a *future state*, had some pretence for saying that *it was perfect and absolute*. But what pretence has his Lordship to say it after him, who holds that natural Religion taught neither one nor the other? The truth is, he refused no arms against REVELATION; and the too eager pursuit of this his old enemy through thick and thin has led him into many of these scrapes.

To see his Lordship use TINDAL'S ARGUMENTS *against Revelation, and for the perfection of Natural Religion*, along with his OWN PRINCIPLES of *no moral attributes* and *no future state*, must needs give the Reader a very uncommon idea of his abilities: for the first of these principles makes one entire absurdity of all he borrows from Tindal against Revelation; and the second takes away the very pretence for *perfection* in natural Religion.

His Lordship's friend, *Swift*, has somewhere or other observed, that no subject in all Literature but Religion could have advanced TOLAND and ASGILL into the class of reputable Authors. Another of his friends seems to think that no subject but Religion could have sunk his Lordship so far below it: IF EVER LORD BOLINGBROKE TRIFLES (says *Pope*), IT WILL BE WHEN HE WRITES ON DIVINITY.† But such is the fate of Authors, when they chuse to write upon subjects for which they were not qualified either by *nature* or *grace*. For it is with authors as with Men: Who can guess *which vessel was made for honour, and which for dishonour?* when sometimes, one and the same is made for both. Even this choice Piece of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, his Lordship's sacred pages, is ready to be put to very different uses, according to the different tempers in which they have found his few Admirers on the one side, and the Public on the other; like the china Utensil in the DUNCIAD, which one Hero used for a p—pot, and another carried home for his Head-piece.

* Vol. v. p. 544. † POPE'S "Works," vol. ix. lett. xiv.

CONTINUATION OF BOOK II.

SECTION V.

HITHERTO we have shewn the Magistrate's care in PROPAGATING the belief of a God—of his Providence over human affairs—and of the way in which that Providence is chiefly dispensed; namely, by rewards and punishments in a *future state*. These things make the essence of Religion, and compose the body of it.

His next care was for the SUPPORT of Religion, so propagated. And this was done by UNITING it to the State, taking it under the civil protection, and giving it the rights and privileges of an ESTABLISHMENT. Accordingly we find that all states and people, in the ancient world, had an ESTABLISHED RELIGION; which was under the more *immediate* protection of the civil Magistrate, in contradistinction to those which were only TOLERATED.

How close these two Interests were united in the Egyptian Policy, is well known to all acquainted with Antiquity. Nor were the politest Republics less solicitous for the common interests of the two Societies, than that sage and powerful Monarchy (the nurse of arts and virtue) as we shall see hereafter, in the conduct both of Rome and Athens, for the support and preservation of the *established* worship.

But an *established Religion* is the voice of Nature; and not confined to certain ages, people, or religions. That great voyager and sensible observer of men and manners, J. Baptiste Tavernier, speaking of the kingdom of Tonquin, thus delivers himself concerning this universal policy, as he saw it practised, in his time, both in the East and West: "I come now to the political description of this kingdom, under which I comprehend the religion, which is, *almost every where, in concert with the civil government, for the mutual support of one another.*" *

That the Magistrate *established* Religion, united it to the State, and took it into his immediate protection for the sake of civil Society, cannot be questioned; the advantages to Government being so apparent.

* "Je viens à la description politique de ce royaume, dans laquelle je comprens la religion, qui est *presque en tous lieux de concert avec le gouvernement civil pour l' appuy reciproque de l'un et de l'autre.*"—*Relation nouvelle du Royaume de Tunquin*, chap. x. à la fin.

But the necessity of this union for procuring those advantages, as likewise the number and extent of them, are not so easily understood. Nor indeed can they be understood without a perfect knowledge of the nature of an ESTABLISHED RELIGION, and of those principles of equity, on which it ariseth. But as this masterpiece of human policy hath been of late, though but of late, called in question, after having from the first institution of Society, even to the present age, been universally practised by the Magistrate, and as universally approved by philosophers and divines; and as our question is the conduct of Lawgivers, and legitimate Magistrates, whose institutions are to be defended on the rules of reason and equity; not of Tyrants, who set themselves above both; it will not be improper to examine this matter to the bottom; especially as the enquiry is so necessary to a perfect knowledge of the civil advantages, resulting from an *established religion.*

We must at present then lay aside our ideas of the ancient modes of civil and religious societies; and search what they are in themselves, by nature; and thence deduce the institution in question.

I shall do this in as few words as possible; and refer those, who desire a fuller account of this matter, to a separate discourse, intituled, THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE.

In the beginning of the first book, where we speak of the origin of civil Society, the reader may remember we have shewn the natural deficiency of its plan; and how the influence and sanction of *Religion* only can supply that defect.

Religion then being proved necessary to Society; that it should be so used and applied, and in the best way, and to most advantage, needs no proof. For it is as instinctive in our nature to improve, as to investigate and pursue Good: and with regard to the improvement of this in question, there is special reason why it should be studied. For the experience of every place and age informs us, that the coactivity of *civil Laws and Religion,* is little enough to keep men from running into disorder and mutual violence.

But this improvement is the effect of art and contrivance. For all natural Good, every thing constitutionally beneficial to man, needs man's industry to make it better. We receive it at the provident hand of Heaven, rather with a capacity of being applied to our use, than immediately fitted for our service. We receive it indeed, in full measure, but rude and unprepared.

Now, concerning this technical improvement of moral good, it is in *artificial* bodies as in *natural; two* may be so essentially constituted, as to be greatly able to adorn and strengthen one another: But then, as in this case, a mere juxta-position of the parts is not sufficient; so

neither is it in that: some union, some coalition, some artful insertion into each other will be necessary.

But then again, as in natural bodies the artist is unable to set about the proper operation, till he hath acquired a competent knowledge of the nature of those bodies, which are the subject of his skill; so neither can we know in what manner Religion may be best applied to the service of the State, till we have learned the real and essential natures both of a *State* and a *Religion*. The *obvious* qualities of both sufficiently shew, that they must needs have a good effect on each other, when properly applied; (as our artist, by his knowledge of the obvious qualities of two natural bodies, we suppose, may make the like conclusion) though we have not yet got sufficient acquaintance with them to make the proper application.

It behoves us therefore to gain a right knowledge of the nature both of a *civil* and of a *religious* Society.

I. To begin with *civil Society*: It was instituted either with the purpose of attaining all the good of every kind, it was even accidentally capable of producing; or only of some certain good, which the Institutors had in view, unconcerned with, and unattentive to any other. To suppose its end to be the vague purpose of acquiring all possible accidental good, is, in politics, a mere solecism; as hath been sufficiently shewn by the writers on this question.* And how untrue it is in fact, may be gathered from what hath been said in the beginning, of the origin of Society. Civil society then, I suppose, will be allowed to have been instituted for the attainment of some certain end or ends, exclusive of others: and this implies the necessity of distinguishing this end from others. Which distinction arises from the different properties of the things pretending. But again, amongst all those things, which are apt to obtrude, or have, in fact, obtruded upon men, as the ends of civil government, there is only this difference in their properties, as ends; *That, one of them is attainable by civil Society only, and all the rest are easily obtained without it.* The thing then with that property or quality must needs be the genuine end of *civil Society*. And this end is no other than SECURITY TO THE TEMPORAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY OF MAN. For this end (as we have shewn) civil Society was invented; and *this*, civil Society alone is able to procure. The great, but spurious rival of this end, the SALVATION OF SOULS, or the security of man's *future* happiness, belongs therefore to the other division. For *this* not depending on outward accidents, or on the will or power of another, as the

* See LOCKE's Defences of his Letters on Toleration. This appears to have been Aristotle's opinion—Φύσει μὲν οὖν διώρισται τὸ ἄῤῥην, καὶ τὸ θῆλυ, καὶ τὸ δοῦλον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον, οἷον χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν ποιηχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἓν πρὸς ἕν, &c. —*Polit.* lib. i. cap. 2.

body and goods do, may be as well attained in a state of nature, as in civil society; and therefore, on the principles here delivered, cannot be one of the causes of the institution of civil government; nor, consequently, one of the ends thereof. But if so, the promotion of it comes not within the proper province of the Magistrate.

II. *Secondly*, as to religious Society, or a Church. This being instituted to preserve purity of faith and worship, its ultimate end is the SALVATION OF SOULS: From whence it follows,

1. That *the religious Society must needs be* SOVEREIGN, and INDEPENDENT ON THE CIVIL. Natural dependency of one Society on another, arises either from the *law of nature*, or *of nations*. Dependency by the *law of nature*, is from *essence* or *generation*. Dependency from *essence* there can be none. For this kind of dependency being a mode of natural union and coalition; and coalition being only where there is an agreement *in eodem tertio;* and there being no such agreement between two Societies essentially different, as these are, there can possibly be no dependency. Dependency from *generation* is where one Society springs up from another; as corporations, colleges, companies, and chambers, in a city. These, as well by the conformity of their ends and means, as by their charters of incorporation, betray their original and dependency. But *religious Society*, by ends and means quite different, gives internal proof of its not arising from the State; and we have shewn by external evidence,* that it existed before the state had any being. Again, no dependency can arise from the *law of nations*, or the *civil law*. Dependency by this law is, where one and the same people composing two different Societies, the *imperium* of the one clashes with the *imperium* of the other. And, in such case, the lesser Society becomes, by that law, dependent on the greater; because the not being so, would make that absurdity in politics, called *imperium in imperio*. But now *civil* and *religious* Society, having ends and means entirely different; and the means of *civil* Society being *coercive* power, which power therefore the *religious* hath not; it follows, that the administration of each Society is exercised in so remote spheres, that they can never meet to clash: And those Societies which never clash, necessity of state cannot bring into dependency on one another.

2. It follows, *That this independent religious Society hath not, in and of itself, any coactive power of the civil kind:* Its inherent jurisdiction being, in its nature and use, entirely different from that of the State. For if, as hath been proved, *civil Society* was instituted for the attainment of one species of good (all other good, requisite to human happiness, being to be attained without it) and that *civil Society* attains the good, for which it was ordained, by the *sole* mean

* See book iii. sect. 6.

of coercive power; then it follows, that the good, which any other kind of Society seeks, may be attained without that power; consequently, *coercive* power is unnecessary to a *religious Society*. But that mean, which is *unnecessary* for the attainment of any end, is likewise *unfit;* in all cases, but in that, where such mean is rendered unnecessary by the use of other means of the same kind or species. But *religious society* attains its end by means of a different kind; therefore *coercive* power is not only unnecessary, but unfit. Again, Ends, in their nature different, can never be attained by one and the same mean. Thus in the case before us: *coercive* power can only influence as to outward practice; by outward practice only, is the good which *civil Society* aims at, immediately effected; therefore is *coercive* power peculiarly fit for *civil Society*. But the good, which *religious Society* aims at, cannot be effected by outward practice; therefore *coercive* power is altogether unfit for *this* Society.

Having thus by a diligent enquiry found,

I. First, *That the care of the civil Society extends only to the body, and its concerns; and the care of the religious Society only to the soul:* it necessarily follows, that the civil Magistrate, if he will improve this natural influence of Religion by human art and contrivance, must seek some UNION or ALLIANCE with the *Church*. For his office not extending to the *care of souls*, he hath not, in himself, power to enforce the influence of religion: and the *Church's* province not extending to the *body*, and consequently being without coactive power, she has not, in herself alone, a power of applying that influence to *civil* purposes. The conclusion is, that their joint powers must co-operate thus to apply and inforce the influence of *religion*. But they can never act conjointly but in *union* and *alliance*.

II. *Secondly*, having found *that each society is sovereign, and independent on the other*, it as necessarily follows, that such *union* can be produced only by FREE CONVENTION AND MUTUAL COMPACT: because, whatever is sovereign and independent, can be brought to no act without its own consent: but nothing can give birth to a *free convention*, but a sense of mutual wants, which may be supplied; or a view of mutual benefits, which may be gained by it.

Such then is the nature of that *Union* which produceth a RELIGION BY LAW ESTABLISHED: and which is, indeed, no other than *a public league and alliance for mutual support and defence*. For the *State* not having the *care of souls*, cannot inforce the influence of *religion;* and therefore seeks the concurring aid of the *Church:* and the *Church* having no *coercive power* (the consequence of its care's not extending to *bodies*) as naturally flies for protection to the *State:* this being of that kind of *Alliance* which Grotius calls FOEDUS INÆQUALE—"Inæquale fœdus" (says he) "hic intelligo quod ex ipsa vi

pactionis *manentem prælationem* quandam alteri donat: hoc est, ubi quis tenetur alterius imperium ac majestatem conservare, UT POTENTIORI PLUS HONORIS, INFIRMIORI PLUS AUXILII DEFERATUR."*

An *Alliance*, then, *by free convention*, being in its nature such that each party must have its motives for contracting; our next enquiry will be,

I. What those motives were, which the State had for *seeking*, and the Church for *accepting*, the offers of an union: And,

II. The *mutual benefits* and advantages thereby arising.

The motives the Magistrate had to seek this *alliance*, were these:

I. To preserve the essence and purity of religion.

II. To improve its usefulness, and apply its influence in the best manner.

III. To prevent the mischief which, in its natural independent state, it might occasion to civil society.

I. The Magistrate was induced to seek it, 1. *As the necessary means of preserving the being of religion.* For though (as hath been shewn in the treatise of *the Alliance*†) religion constitutes a Society; and though this Society will indeed, for some time, support the existence of religion, which, without it, would soon vanish from amongst men; yet, if we consider that religious Society is made up of the same individuals which compose the civil; and destitute likewise of all coercive power; we must needs see, that a Society, abandoned to its own fortune, without support or protection, would, in no long time, be swallowed up and lost. Of this opinion was a very able writer, whose knowledge of human nature will not be disputed: "Were it not," says he, "for that sense of virtue, which is principally preserved, so far as it is preserved, BY NATIONAL FORMS AND HABITS OF RELIGION, men would soon lose it all, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what else the worst of savages do." ‡

2. But of whatever use an *Alliance* may be thought, for preserving the *being* of religion, the necessity of it, for preserving its *purity*, is most evident: for if *truth*, and *public utility* coincide, the nearer any religion approacheth to the truth of things, the fitter that religion is for the service of the State. That they do coincide, that is, that truth is productive of utility, and utility indicative of truth, may be proved on any principles, but the atheistic; and therefore we think it needless, in this place, to draw out the argument in form: § Let us then consider the danger religion runs of deviating from truth, when left, in its natural state, to itself. In those circumstances, the men of highest credit, are such as are famed for greatest sanctity. This *sanc-*

* *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, lib. i. cap. iii. sect. 21. † Book i. chap. 5.
‡ WOLLASTON'S "Religion of Nature delineated," p. 124, quarto edit. 1725. § See book iii. sect. 6.

tity hath been generally understood to be then most perfect, when most estranged from the world, and all its habits and relations. But this being only to be acquired by secession and retirement from affairs; and that secession rendering man ignorant of civil Society, and of its rights and interests; in place of which will succeed, according to his natural temper, the destructive follies either of superstition or fanaticism, we must needs conclude, that religion, under such directors and reformers, (and God knows these are generally its lot) will deviate from truth; and consequently from a capacity, in proportion, of serving civil Society. I wish I could not say, we have too many examples to support this observation. The truth is, we have seen, and yet do see religious Societies, some grown up, and continuing unsupported by, and *ununited* with the State; others, that, when supported and *united*, have by strange arts brought the State into subjection, and become its tyrants and usurpers; and thereby defeated all the good which can arise from this *Alliance*; such Societies, I say, we have seen, whose religious doctrines are so little serviceable to civil Government, that they can prosper only on the ruin and destruction of it. Such are those which teach *the holiness of celibacy and asceticism, the sinfulness of defensive war, of capital punishments, and even of civil magistracy itself.*

On the other hand, when religion is in *Alliance* with the State, as it then comes under the Magistrate's direction, those holy leaders having now neither credit nor power to do mischief, its purity must needs be reasonably well supported and preserved; for truth and public utility coinciding, the civil Magistrate, as such, will see it for his interest to seek after, and promote truth in religion: and, by means of public utility, which his office enables him so well to understand, he will never be at a loss, where such truth is to be found: so that it is impossible, under this civil influence, for religion ever to deviate far from truth; always supposing (for on such supposition this whole theory proceeds) a LEGITIMATE Government, or civil policy, established on the principles of the natural rights and liberties of man: for an unequal and unjust Government, which seeks its own, not public utility, will always have occasion for error: and so, must corrupt religion both in principle and practice, to promote its own wrong interests.

II. Secondly, the Magistrate was induced to seek this Alliance, *as the necessary means to improve the usefulness, and to apply in the best manner the influence of religion for his service.* And this an *Alliance* does by several ways.

1. *By bestowing additional reverence and veneration on the person of the civil* MAGISTRATE, *and on the* LAWS *of the state.* For, in this alliance, where the religious Society is taken into the protection of

the State, the supreme Magistrate, as will be shewn hereafter, is acknowledged HEAD *of the religion.* Now nothing can be imagined of more efficacy for securing the obedience of the people. Those two great masters in politics, Aristotle and Machiavel, as we have seen, thought it of force enough to gain reverence and security to a tyrant. What then must we suppose its efficacy in a legitimate Magistrature? The same veneration will extend itself over the *Laws* likewise: For while some of them are employed by the State for the *support of the Church,* and others *lent* to the Church to be employed in the *service of the State,* and all of them enacted by a *legislature, in which churchmen have a* considerable *share* (all these things being amongst the conditions of *Alliance)* * laws under such direction, must needs be regarded with the greatest reverence.

2. *By lending to the* CHURCH *a coactive power.*—It may be remembered, that, in speaking of the innate defects of civil Society, we observed, that there were several sorts of duties which civil laws could not inforce; such as the duties of IMPERFECT OBLIGATION; which a religious Society, when endowed with *coercive power,* to invigorate the influence of religion, is capable of exacting: and SUCH likewise of the duties of PERFECT OBLIGATION; whose breach is owing to the intemperance of the sensual appetites; the severe prohibition of which threatens greater and more enormous evils: for while these unruly passions overflow, the stopping them in one place is causing them to break out with greater violence in another: as the rigorous punishment of fornication hath been generally seen to give birth to unnatural lusts. The effectual correction therefore of such evils must be begun by moderating and subduing the passions themselves. But *this,* civil laws are not understood to prescribe; † as punishing those passions only when they proceed to *act;* and not rewarding the attempts to *subdue* them: it must be a tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal, and good desires as meritorious, which can work this effect; and this can be no other than the tribunal of religion. When that is once done, a coactive power of the civil kind may be applied to good purpose; but not till then: And who so fit to apply it as that Society, which prepared the subject for its due application and reception? ‡ Again, it hath been observed, § that the State punishes deviations from the rule of right as *crimes* only; and not as *such deviations,* or as *sins;* and, on the idea of

* See "The Alliance between Church and State," book ii. chap. 3. † See note FF at the end of this book. ‡ A jurisdiction somewhat resembling this we find in the famous court of AREOPAGUS at Athens: which city was once the model of *civil prudence* as well as of *religion,* to the improved part of mankind. Isocrates speaking of this branch of jurisdiction in the Areopagus, says, "It was not exerted to PUNISH crimes, but to PREVENT them"—Οὐ τοῦτο ᾠρῶτον ἐσκόπουν, δι' ὧν κολάσουσι τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ἂν κατασκευάσουσι μηδὲν αὐτοὺς ἄξιον ζημίας βουλήσεσθαι ἁμαρτάνειν· ἡγοῦντο γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν αὑτῶν ἔργον εἶναι.—ΑΡΕΙΟΠ. ΛΟΓ. § See "The Alliance," book i. chap. 4.

crimes, proportions its punishments; by which means some very enormous deviations from the rule of right, which do not immediately affect society, and so are not considered as *crimes*, are overlooked by the civil tribunal: yet these, being, though *mediately*, very pernicious to the state, it is for its interests they should be brought before some capable tribunal. But, besides the civil, there is no other than the ecclesiastical, endowed with coactive power. *Hence may be deduced the true, and only, end and use of* SPIRITUAL COURTS. A church tribunal then, with coactive power, being necessary in all these cases; and a *religious* Society having, in itself, no such power, it must be borrowed from the State: but a State cannot lend it, without great danger to itself, *but* on the terms of an *Alliance;* a State therefore will be induced to seek this Alliance, in order to improve the natural efficacy of religion.

3. *By conferring on the State the* application *of the efficacy of religion, and by putting it under the Magistrate's direction.*—There are certain junctures when the influence of religion is more than ordinarily serviceable to the State: and these, the civil Magistrate only knows. Now while a Church is in its natural state of independency, it is not in his power to improve those conjunctures to the advantage of the State, by a proper application of religion: but when the *Alliance* is made, and consequently the Church under his direction, he hath then authority to prescribe such public exercises of religion, and at such times, and in such manner, as he finds the exigencies of State require.

4. *By engaging the Church to apply its utmost endeavours in the service of the State.* For an *Alliance* laying an obligation on the State to protect and defend the Church, and to provide a settled maintenance for its ministers, such benefits must needs produce the highest love and esteem for the benefactor: which will be returned, out of motives both of gratitude and interest, in the most zealous labours for the service of civil government.

III. Lastly, *the State was induced to seek this Alliance, as the only means of preventing the mischiefs, which the Church, in its natural independent condition, might occasion to civil Society.* For, in this state the Church having, of itself, a power of assembling for religious worship, factious men may commodiously, under that cover, hatch and carry on designs against the peace of civil government: and the influence which popular and leading men gain over the consciences of such assemblies, by the frequency of occasional harangues, may easily ripen these contrivances into act, when strengthened with the specious pretext of religion: all which evils are effectually remedied by this *Alliance*. For then, the civil Magistrate being become protector of the Church, and, consequently, supreme HEAD and director of it, the

ministry is mostly in his power; that mutual dependency, between the clergy and people, being, by means of a settled revenue, quite broken and destroyed. He admits and excludes to the *exercise* of their function, as he sees fit; and grants it to none, but such as give a previous security for their allegiance to him: by which means, all that influence, which the ministers and leaders in a Church had over it before the Alliance, *as the protectors of religion*, is now drawn off from them, and placed solely in the civil Magistrate.

Another mischief there is in this *unallied* condition of the Church, still as certain and fatal, whenever more than one religion is found in a State. For in these latter ages, every sect thinking itself the only *true* church, or, at least, the *most perfect*, is naturally pushed on to advance its own scheme upon the ruins of the rest: and where argument fails, civil power is brought in, as soon as ever a party can be formed in the *public administration*: and we find, they have been but too successful in persuading the Magistrate that his interests are concerned in their religious differences. Now the most effectual remedy to the dangerous and strong convulsions, into which States are so frequently thrown by these struggles, is an *Alliance*, which establishes *one church*, and gives *a full toleration to the rest*; only keeping sectaries out of *the public administration*: From a heedless admission into which, these disorders have arisen.

Having now shewn the principal motives which engaged the State to *seek* an *alliance* with the Church;

I come, in the next place, to consider the motives which the Church had to *accept* of it. For this being, as is observed, a FREE CONVENTION, unless the Church, as well as State, had its proper views, no *Alliance* could have been formed. To discover these motives, we must recollect what hath been said of the nature and end of a *religious Society*: for the benefits adapted to that nature and end, must be her legitimate motive: but if so, this benefit can be no other than SECURITY FROM ALL EXTERNAL VIOLENCE. The State indeed could not justly offer it, had no Alliance been made: but this is no reason why the Church should not think it for its interest to secure its natural right by *compact*; any more than that one State should not stipulate with another not to do it violence, though *that other* was under prior obligations, by the law of nature and nations, to forbear.

But by this *Alliance* between the two Societies, the State does more: it not only promises not to injure the *Church* confederated, but to serve it; that is, to protect it from the injuries of other religious Societies, which then exist, or may afterwards arise in the State. How one religious Society may be injuriously affected by another, hath been shewn just before; how great those injuries may

prove, will be shewn hereafter. It must needs then be the first care of a Church, and a reasonable care, to preserve itself, by all lawful ways, from outward violence. A State then, as hath been said, in order to induce the Church's acceptance of this offer, must propose some benefit by it: and because this is the only *legitimate* benefit the Church can receive, it must propose *this:* which, therefore, being considerable, will be the Church's *motive for Alliance.*

There are only two other considerations that can be esteemed *motives:* the one, *to engage the State to propagate the established religion by force:* and the other, *to bestow honours, riches, and powers upon it.* Now, on recurring to the nature and end of the two Societies, the *first* motive will be found *unjust;* and the *second, impertinent.* It is *unjust* in the Church to require the engagement; because the performing it would be violating the natural right every man hath of worshipping God according to his own conscience. It is *unjust* in the State to engage in it; because, as we have shewn, its jurisdiction extendeth not to opinions.

It is *impertinent* in a Church to aim at riches, honours, and powers, because these are things which, as a Church, she can neither use nor profit by; for they have no natural tendency to promote the *ultimate* end of this Society, *salvation of souls;* nor the *immediate* end, *purity of worship.* "Nihil ecclesia sibi nisi fidem possidet,"* says St. Ambrose. We conclude, therefore, that the only legitimate motive she could have, was *security and protection from outward violence.*

On these mutual motives was formed this FREE ALLIANCE; which gave birth to a CHURCH BY LAW ESTABLISHED.

Now as from the nature of the two Societies is discovered what kind of union only they could enter into; so from that consideration, together with the motives they had in uniting, may be deduced, by necessary inference, the reciprocal TERMS and conditions of that union.

From the mutual motives inducing thereunto, it appears, that the great *preliminary and fundamental article* of *Alliance* is this, THAT THE CHURCH SHALL APPLY ITS UTMOST INFLUENCE IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE; AND THAT THE STATE SHALL SUPPORT AND PROTECT THE CHURCH.

But in order to the performance of this agreement, there must be a *mutual communication of their respective powers:* for the province of each Society being naturally distinct and different, each can have to do in the other's, but by mutual concession.

But again, these Societies being likewise as naturally independent one on the other, a mutual concession cannot be safely made, without

* *Epist. contra Symmachum.*

one of them, at the same time, giving up its INDEPENDENCY: from whence arises what Grotius, we see, called MANENS PRÆLATIO: which, in his *Fœdus inæquale*, the more powerful Society hath over the less.

Now from these two conclusions, which spring necessarily from *the great fundamental article of union*, we deduce all the terms, conditions, mutual grants, and concessions, which complete this *Alliance*.

For, from this obligation on the Church *to apply its influence in the service of the State*, arise a SETTLED MAINTENANCE FOR THE MINISTERS OF RELIGION; and an ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION with *coactive* power: which things introduce again, on the other side, the DEPENDENCY OF THE CLERGY ON THE STATE. And from the State's obligation *to support and protect the Church*, ariseth the ECCLESIASTICAL SUPREMACY OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE; which again introduceth, on the other hand, the right of CHURCHMEN to PARTAKE OF THE LEGISLATURE.

Thus are all these Rights and Privileges closely interwoven and mutually connected by a necessary dependence on each other.

But to be more particular in the grounds and reasons of each grant and privilege, we will now, in a different and more commodious order for this purpose, examine,

I. What the CHURCH RECEIVES from the State.

II. What the Church GIVES to it.

Which will present us with *a new view of the two Societies, as they appear under an Establishment;* and leave nothing wanting to enable us to form a perfect judgment of their natures.

I. What the Church *receives* from the state by this *Alliance*, is,

1. First, *A public and settled endowment for its ministers.* The reasons of it are, 1. To render the religious Society, whose assistance the State so much wants, more firm and durable. 2. To invite and encourage the clergy's best service to the State, in rendering those committed to their care, virtuous. But, 3, and principally, in order to destroy that mutual dependency between the clergy and people, which arises from the former's being maintained by the voluntary contributions of the latter; the only maintenance the clergy could have, before the two Societies were allied; and which dependence, we have shewn to be productive of great mischiefs to the State. Add to all this, that as the clergy are now under the Magistrate's direction, and consequently become a public Order in the State, it is but fit and decent, that the State should provide them with a public maintenance.

2. The second privilege the Church receives from this Alliance is, *a place for her representatives in the Legislature.* For, as it necessarily follows, from that *fundamental article of Alliance* of the *State's supporting and protecting the Church*, that the Church must, in

return, *give up its independency to the State*, whereby the State becomes empowered to determine in all church-matters, so far as the Church is considered under the idea of a Society; as this, I say, necessarily follows, the Church must needs have its representatives in the Legislature, to prevent that power, which the State receives in return for the protection it affords, from being perverted to the Church's hurt: for the giving up its independency, without reserving a right of representation in the legislature, would be making itself, instead of a *subject*, a *slave* to the State. Besides, without these Representatives no laws could be reasonably made concerning the Church: because no free man, or body, can be bound by laws, to which they have not given their consent, either in person, or by representative. So that, as the Church when she entered into alliance, cannot *justly*, we may presume she did not *willingly*, give up her independency without the reservation of some such prerogative.

3. The third and last privilege is, *a jurisdiction, inforced by civil coactive power*, FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS. It is one of the *preliminary* articles of this *Alliance*, that *the Church should apply its best influence in the service of the State*. But there is no way in which it can be so effectually inforced as by a jurisdiction of this kind. It hath been shewn above, that there are a numerous set of duties both of *imperfect obligation*, which civil laws could not reach; and several of *perfect obligation*, which, by reason of the intemperance of the sensual passions, from whence the breach of those duties proceeds, civil laws could not effectually inforce; as their violence yielded only to the influence of Religion; both which, however, the good of the Community requires should be inforced; and which an ecclesiastical tribunal, intrusted with coactive power, is only able to inforce. And, indeed, the sense of those wants and defects, which these courts do supply, was the principal motive of the State's seeking this *Alliance*. On the other hand, the Church having now given up her supremacy, she would without the accession of this authority, be left naked and defenceless, and reduced to a condition unbecoming her dignity, and dangerous to her safety.

II. Let us now see, what the Church *gives* to the State. It is, in a word, this: *The resigning up her independency; and making the civil Magistrate her* SUPREME HEAD, *without whose approbation and allowance she can administer, transact, or decree nothing in quality of a political Society*. For as the State, by this *Alliance*, hath undertaken the protection of the *Church;* and as no Society can safely afford protection to another over which it hath no power, it necessarily follows that the *civil Magistrate must be supreme*. Besides, when the State, by this convention, covenanted to afford protection to the Church, that contract was made to a particular Church of one

denomination, and of such determined doctrine and discipline. But now, that protection, which might be advantageous to the State in union with such a Church, might be disadvantageous to it, in union with one of a different doctrine and discipline: therefore, when protection is given to a Church, it must be at the same time provided, that no alteration be made in it, without the State's approbation and allowance. Farther, the State having *endowed its clergy*, and bestowed upon them a *jurisdiction with coactive power*, these privileges might create an *imperium in imperio*, had not the civil Magistrate, in return, the *supremacy of the Church*. The necessity of the thing, therefore, invests him with this right and title.

Thus have we shewn the mutual privileges *given* and *received* by Church and State, in entering into this famous *convention:* the aim of the State being, agreeably to its nature, UTILITY; and the aim of the Church, agreeably to its nature, TRUTH. From whence we may observe, that as these privileges all took their rise, by necessary inference, from the fundamental article of the convention, which was, *that the Church should serve the State; and the State protect the Church;* so they receive all possible addition of strength from their mutual connection with, and dependency on, one another. This we have cause to desire may be received as a certain mark that our *plan of Alliance* is no precarious arbitrary hypothesis, but a *theory*, founded in reason, and the invariable nature of things. For having, from the real essence of the two Societies, collected the *necessity* of allying, and the *freedom* of the compact; we have, from the *necessity*, fairly introduced it; and from its *freedom*, consequentially established every mutual term and condition of it. So that now if the reader should ask, *where this charter or treaty of convention for the union of the two Societies, on the terms here delivered, is to be met with;* we are enabled to answer him. We say, it may be found in the same archive with the famous ORIGINAL COMPACT between magistrate and people, so much insisted on in the vindication of the *common rights of subjects*. Now, when a sight of this *compact* is required of the defenders of civil liberty, they hold it sufficient to say, that it is enough for all the purposes of fact and right, that such *original compact* is the only legitimate foundation of civil Society: that if there were no such thing *formally* executed, there was *virtually:* that all differences between magistrate and people, ought to be regulated on the supposition of such a *compact;* and all Government reduced to the principles therein laid down: for, that the happiness, of which civil Society is productive, can only be attained, when formed on those principles. Now something like this we say of our ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE.

Hitherto we have considered this *Alliance* as it produceth an

establishment, under its most simple form; *i. e.* where there is but *one* Religion in the State: but it may so happen, that, either at the time of convention, or afterwards, there may be *more than one*.

1. If there be *more than one at the time of convention*, the State allies itself with the *largest* of the religious Societies. It is *fit* the State should do so, because the larger the religious Society is (where there is an equality in other points) the better enabled it will be to answer the ends of an *Alliance*; as having the greatest number under its influence. It is *scarce possible* it should do otherwise; because the two Societies being composed of the same individuals, the greatly prevailing religion must have a majority of its members in the assemblies of State; who will naturally prefer their own religion to any other. With *this* Religion is the *alliance* made; and a full TOLERATION given to all the rest; yet under the restriction of a TEST-LAW, to keep them from hurting that which is *established*.

2. If these different religions spring up *after* the Alliance hath been formed; then, whenever they become considerable, a *test-law* is necessary, for the security of the *established church*. For amongst diversities of sects, where every one thinks itself the *only true*, or at least the *most pure*, every one aims at rising on the ruins of the rest; which it calls, *bringing into conformity* with itself. The means of doing this, when reason fails, which is rarely at hand, and more rarely heard when it is, will be by getting into the public administration, and applying the civil power to the work. But when one of these Religions is the *established*, and the rest under a *toleration*; then envy, at the advantages of an *establishment*, will join the *tolerated churches* in confederacy against it, and unite them in one common attack to disturb its quiet. In this imminent danger, the *allied church* calls upon the State, for the performance of its contract; which thereupon gives her a TEST-LAW for her security: whereby, the entrance into the Administration of public affairs (the only way, the threatened mischief is effected) is shut to all but members of the *established church*.

Thus a TEST-LAW took its birth, whether *at* or *after* the time of *Alliance*. That the State is under the highest obligations to provide the Church with this security, we shall shew,

1. By the *Alliance*, the State promised to protect the Church, and to secure it from the injuries and insults of its enemies. An attempt in the members of any other church to get into the administration, in order to deprive the *established church* of the covenanted rights which it enjoys, either by sharing those advantages with it, or by drawing them from it to itself, is highly injurious. And we have shewn, that where there are diversities of religions, this attempt will be always making. The State then must defeat the attempt: but there is no

other way of defeating it, than by hindering its enemies from entering into the Administration: and they can be hindered only by a *test-law*.

2. Again, this promise of protection is of such a nature as may, on no pretence, be dispensed with. For protection was not simply a condition of *Alliance*, but, on the Church's part, the only condition of it. We have shewn, that all other benefits and advantages are foreign to a Church, as such, and improper for it. Now, not performing the *only condition* of a contract, virtually breaks and dissolves it: especially if we consider that this only condition is both *necessary* and *just*. *Necessary*, as a free convention must have *mutual* conditions; and, but for this condition, one side would be without any: *Just*, as the convention itself is founded on the laws of nature and nations; and *this* the only condition which suits the nature of a Church to claim. If it be pretended that debarring good subjects from *places of honour and profit*, in the disposal of the Magistrate, is *unjust*; I reply, that the assertion, though every where taken for granted, is false; it being founded on the principle, that *reward is one of the sanctions of civil laws*, which I have shewn to be a mistake; * and that all, a member of Society can *claim*, for the discharge of his duty, is *protection*. So that, farther reward than this, no subject having a *right* to, all *places of honour and profit* are free donations, and in the absolute disposal of the Magistrate.

3. But again, the Church, in order to enable the State to perform this *sole condition* of protection, consented to the giving up its supremacy and independency, to the civil Sovereign: whence it follows, that, whenever the enemies of the *established* Church get into the magistrature, to which, as we have said, the supremacy of the Church is transferred by the *Alliance*, she becomes a prey, and lies entirely at their mercy; being now, by the loss of her supremacy, in no condition of defence, as she was in her natural state, unprotected and independent; so that the not securing her by a *test-law*, is betraying, and giving her up bound to her enemies.

4. But lastly, had no promise of protection been made, yet the State would have lain under an indispensable necessity of providing a *test-law*, for its own peace and security. It hath been observed, that wherever there are diversities of religion, each sect, believing its own the true, strives to advance itself on the ruins of the rest. If this doth not succeed by dint of argument, these partisans are apt to have recourse to the coercive power of the State: which is done by introducing a party into the public administration. And they have always had art enough to make the State believe that its interests were much concerned in the success of their religious quarrels. What persecutions, rebellions, revolutions, loss of civil and religious liberty, these

* See book i. sect. 2.

intestine struggles between sects have occasioned, is well known to such as are acquainted with the history of mankind. To prevent these mischiefs was, as hath been shewn, one great motive for the State's seeking *Alliance* with the Church: for the obvious remedy was the *establishing one church*, and giving a *free toleration to the rest*. But if, in administring this cure, the State should stop short, and not proceed to exclude the *tolerated* religions from entering into the public administration, such imperfect application of the remedy would infinitely heighten the distemper: for, before the *Alliance*, it was only a mistaken aim in propagating truth, which occasioned these disorders: but now, the zeal for opinions would be out of measure inflamed by envy and emulation; which the temporal advantages, enjoyed by the established church, exclusive of the rest, will always occasion: And what mischiefs this would produce, had every sect a free entry into the administration, the reader may easily conceive. If it be said, that would men content themselves, as in reason they ought, with enjoying their own opinions, without obtruding them upon others, these evils, which require the remedy of a *test-law*, would never happen. This is very true: and so, would men but observe the rule of justice in general, there would be no need to have recourse to civil Society, to rectify the violations of it.

In a word, an ESTABLISHED RELIGION WITH A TEST-LAW is the universal voice of Nature. The most savage nations have employed it to civilize their manners; and the politest knew no other way to prevent their return to barbarity and violence.

Thus the city of ATHENS, so humane and free, exacted an oath of all their youth for the security of the established religion: for, Athens being a democracy, every citizen had a constant share in the administration. A copy of this oath, the strongest of all *tests*, is preserved by Stobæus, who transcribed it from the writings of the Pythagoreans, the great school of ancient politics. It is conceived in these words: "I will not dishonour the *sacred arms*,* nor desert my comrade in battle: I will DEFEND AND PROTECT MY COUNTRY AND MY RELIGION, whether alone or in conjunction with others: I will not leave the public in a worse condition than I found it, but in a better: I will be always ready to obey the supreme magistrate, with prudence; and to submit to the established laws, and to all such as shall be hereafter established by full consent of the people: and I will never connive at any other who shall presume to despise or disobey them; but will revenge all such attempts on the sanctity of the republic, either alone or in conjunction with the people: and lastly, I

* Ὅπλα τὰ ἱερὰ, the *sacred arms*, by what follows, seems to mean those which the lovers presented to their favourite youths. Concerning this institution, see what is said in the explanation of Virgil's episode of Nisus and Euryalus, in sect. iv. of this book.

WILL CONFORM TO THE NATIONAL RELIGION. So help me those gods who are the avengers of perjury." *

Here we see, that after each man had sworn, *to defend and protect the religion of his country*, in consequence of the obligation the State lies under to protect the *established worship*, he concludes, *I will conform to it;* the directest and strongest of all *tests*.

But a test of conformity to the established worship, was not only required of those who bore a share in the civil administration, but of those too who were chosen to preside in their religious rites. Demosthenes hath recorded the oath which the priestesses of Bacchus, called Γεραιραὶ, took on entering into their Office. "I observe a religious chastity, and am clean and pure from all other defilements, and from conversation with man: AND I CELEBRATE THE THEOINIA AND IOBACCHEIA TO BACCHUS, ACCORDING TO THE ESTABLISHED RITES, AND AT THE PROPER SEASONS." †

Nor were the ROMANS less watchful for the support of the *established* religion, as may be seen by a speech of the consul Posthumius in Livy, occasioned by some horrid abuses committed, through the clandestine exercise of foreign worship. "How often," says he, "in the times of our fathers and forefathers, hath this affair been recommended to the Magistrates; to prohibit all foreign worship; to drive the priests and sacrifices from the cirque, the forum, and the city; to search up, and burn books of prophecies; and to abolish all modes of sacrificing, differing from the Roman discipline? For those sage and prudent men, instructed in all kind of divine and human laws, rightly judged that nothing tended so much to overthrow religion, as when men celebrated the sacred rites, not after their own, but foreign customs." ‡

But when I say all regular policied states had an *established religion*, I mean no more than *he* would do, who, deducing Society from its true original, should, in order to persuade men of the benefits it produceth, affirm that all nations had a civil policy. For, as this writer could not be supposed to mean that every one constituted a free State,

* Οὐ καταισχυνῶ ὅπλα τὰ ἱερὰ, οὐδ' ἐγκαταλείψω τὸν παραστάτην ὅτῳ ἂν στοιχήσω· ΑΜΥΝΩ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΥΠΕΡ ΙΕΡΩΝ, καὶ ὑπὲρ ὁσίων, καὶ μόνος καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν· τὴν πατρίδα δὲ οὐκ ἐλάσσω παραδώσω, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀρείω. ὥσην ἂν παραδέξομαι· καὶ εὐηκοήσω τῶν ἀεὶ κρινόντων ἐμφρόνως, καὶ τοῖς θεσμοῖς τοῖς ἱδρυμένοις πείσομαι, καὶ οὕς τινας ἂν ἄλλους τὸ πλῆθος ἱδρύσηται ὁμοφρόνως· καὶ ἄν τις ἀναιρῇ τοὺς θεσμοὺς ἢ μὴ πείθηται, οὐκ ὑποτρέψω, ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ μόνος. καὶ μετὰ πάντων· καὶ ΙΕΡΑ ΤΑ ΠΑΤΡΙΑ ΤΙΜΗΣΩ· ἵστορες Θεοὶ τούτων.—JOAN. STOBÆI *De Rep. Serm. xli.* p. 243, Lugd. ed. 1608.

† Ἁγιστεύω, καὶ εἰμὶ καθαρὰ, καὶ ἀγνὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ καθαρευόντων. καὶ ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς συνουσίας, καὶ τὰ Θεοίνια καὶ Ἰοβακχεῖα γεραίρω τῷ Διονύσῳ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΑ ΠΑΤΡΙΑ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις.—*Orat. contra Neæram.*

‡ "Quoties hoc patrum avorumque ætate negotium est magistratibus datum, ut sacra externa fieri vetarent; sacrificulos, vatesque foro, circo, urbe prohiberent; vaticinos libros conquirerent, comburerentque; omnem disciplinam sacrificandi, præterquam more Romano, abolerent? Judicabant enim prudentissimi viri omnis divini humanique juris, nihil æque dissolvendæ religionis esse, quam ubi non patrio, sed externo ritu sacrificaretur."—*Historia*, lib. xxxix.

on the principles of public liberty (which yet was the only Society he proposed to prove was founded on truth, and productive of public good) because it is notorious, that the far greater part of civil policies are founded on different principles, and abused to different ends; so neither would I be understood to mean, when I say all nations concurred in making this UNION, that they all exactly *discriminated the natures*, and fairly *adjusted the rights* of BOTH SOCIETIES, on the principles here laid down; though an ESTABLISHMENT resulting from this discrimination and adjustment, be the only one I would be supposed to recommend. On the contrary, I know this *union* hath been generally made on mistaken principles; or, if not so, hath degenerated by length of time. And, as it was sufficient for that writer's purpose, that those Societies, good or bad, proved the sense, all men had of the benefits resulting from civil policy in general, though they were oft mistaken in the application; so it is sufficient for *ours*, that this universal *concurrence* in the TWO SOCIETIES TO UNITE, shews the sense of mankind concerning the *utility* of such union. And lastly, as that writer's principles are not the less true on account of the general deviation from them in forming civil Societies; so may not ours, though so few states have suffered themselves to be directed by them in *practice*, nor any man, before, delivered them in *speculation*.

Such then is the *Theory* here offered to the world; of which, whoever would see a full account, and the several parts cleared from objections, may consult the treatise mentioned before, intituled, *The Alliance between Church and State*; in which we pretend to have discovered a plain and simple truth, of the highest concernment to civil Society, long lost and hid under the learned obscurity arising from the collision of contrary false principles.

BUT it is now time to proceed with our main subject. We have here given a short account of the true nature of the *Alliance between Church and State*; both to justify the conduct of the ancient Lawgivers in establishing religion; and to shew the infinite service of this institution to civil Society. Another use of it may be the gaining an exacter knowledge of the *nature* of the established religions in the *pagan world*: for, having the true *theory* of an Establishment, it serves as a straight line to discover all the obliquities to which it is applied.

I shall therefore consider the *causes*, which facilitated the *establishment of religion* in the ancient world: and likewise *those* causes which prevented the *establishment* from receiving its due form.

I. Ancient pagan religion consisted in the worship of local tutelary Deities; which, generally speaking, were supposed to be the authors of their civil Institutes. The consequence of this was, that the *State*, as

well as *particulars*, was the SUBJECT of religion. So that this religion could not but be *national and established;* that is, protected and encouraged by the civil Power. For how could that religion, which had the *national God* for its *object;* and the *State*, as an artificial man, for its *subject*, be other than *national* and *established?*

II. But then these very things, which so much promoted an *established religion*, prevented the union's being made upon a just and equitable footing. 1. By giving a wrong *idea* of *civil Society*. 2. By not giving a right *form* to the *religious*.

1. It is nothing strange, that the ancients should have a wrong idea of *civil Society;* and should suppose it ordained for the cognizance of *religious*, as well as of *civil* matters, while they believed in a local tutelary Deity, by whose direction they were formed into Community; and while they held that Society, as such, was the *subject* of religion, contrary to what has been shewn above, that the *civil* Society's offer of a voluntary alliance with the *religious*, proceeded from its having no power in itself to inforce the influence of religion to the service of the State.

2. If their *religion* constituted a proper Society, it was yet a Society dependent on the State, and therefore not *sovereign*. Now it appears that no voluntary alliance can be made, but between two independent sovereign Societies. But, in reality, Pagan religion did not constitute any Society at all. For it is to be observed, that the unity of the object of faith, and conformity to a formula of dogmatic theology, as the terms of communion, are the great foundation and bond of a religious Society.* Now these things were wanting in the several national religions of Paganism: in which there was only a conformity in public Ceremonies. The *national Pagan* religion therefore did not properly compose a *Society;* nor do we find by Antiquity, that it was ever considered under that idea; but only as *part of the State;* and in that view, indeed, had its particular Societies and Companies, such as the colleges of Priests and Prophets.

These were such errors and defects as destroyed much of the utility, which results from *religious Establishments*, placed upon a right bottom. But yet *religious Establishments* they were; and, notwithstanding all their imperfections, served for many good purposes: such as *preserving the being of Religion:—bestowing additional veneration on the person of the Magistrate, and on the laws of the State:—giving the Magistrate the right of applying the civil efficacy of religion:—and giving Religion a coactive power for the reformation of manners.* And thus much for ESTABLISHMENTS.

* See "The Alliance between Church and State," book i. chap. 5.

SECTION VI.

THE last instance to be assigned of the Magistrate's care of religion, shall be that universal practice, in the ancient world, of religious TOLERATION; or the permitting the free exercise of all religions, how different soever from the *National* and *Established*. For though the very nature and terms of an *Established* religion implied the Magistrate's peculiar favour and protection; and though in fact, they had their *Test-laws* for its support, wherever there was diversity of worship; yet it was ancient policy to allow a large and full TOLERATION. And even in the *extent* of this allowance they seem generally to have had juster notions than certain of our modern Advocates for religious Liberty. They had no conception that any one should be indulged in his presumption of extending it to *Religious Rites and practices hurtful to Society, or dishonourable to Humanity*. There are many examples in Antiquity of this sage restriction. I shall only mention the universal concurrence in punishing *Magical Rites*, by which the health and safety of particulars were supposed to be injuriously affected. And Suetonius's burning the sacred grove in Anglesea,* in which human sacrifices were offered up by the Druids, was but the beginning of what those modern Advocates, above mentioned, would call a *Persecution* against the Order itself, whose obstinate perseverance in this infernal practice could not be overcome but by their total extirpation.

Two principal causes induced the *ancient Lawgivers* to the sage and reasonable conduct of a large and full toleration.

I. They considered that Religion seldom or never makes *a real impression* on the minds of those who are *forced* into a profession of it: and yet, that all the service Religion can do to the State, is by working that *real impression*.† They concluded, therefore, that the profession of Religion should be FREE.

Hence may be understood the strange blindness of those *modern Politicians*, who expect to benefit the State by forcing men to outward conformity; which only making hypocrites and atheists, destroys the sole means religion hath of serving the State. But here, by a common fate of Politicians, they fell from one blunder into another. For having first, in a tyrannical adherence to their own scheme of

* "Præsidium posthac impositum victis,. excisique Luci, SÆVIS superstitionibus sacri. Nam cruore captivo adolere aras, et hominum fibris consulere deos fas habebant." —TACITI *Annales*, lib. xiv. cap. 30.—*Superstition* amongst the Greeks and Romans had its free course. But the *sævæ superstitiones*, the *savage and cruel Rites*, injurious and dishonourable to human nature and civil Society, were rigorously forbidden.

† "In specie autem fictæ simulationis, sicut reliquæ virtutes, ita PIETAS inesse non potest; cum qua simul et sanctitatem et religionem tolli necesse est: quibus sublatis, perturbatio vitæ sequitur et magna confusio. Atque haud scio, an PIETATE adversus deos sublata fides etiam, et societas humani generis, et una excellentissima virtus, justitia, tollatur."—CICERO *De Nat. Deor.* lib. i. cap. 2.

Policy, or superstitious fondness for the established System of Worship, infringed upon religious Liberty; and then beginning to find, that diversity of Sects was hurtful to the State, as it always will be, while the rights of Religion are violated; instead of repairing the mistake, and restoring religious Liberty, which would have stifled this pullulating evil in the seed, by affording it no further nourishment, they took the other course; and endeavoured, by a thorough discipline of *Conformity*, violently to rend it away: and with it they rooted up and destroyed all that good to Society, which so naturally springs from Religion, when it hath once taken fast hold of the human mind.

II. This was the most legitimate principle they went upon, and had the most lasting effect. They had another, which, though less ingenuous, was of more immediate influence; and this was the keeping up the warmth and vigour of religious impressions, by the introduction and toleration of new Religions and foreign Worship. For they supposed that "piety and virtue then chiefly influence the mind, while men are busied in the performance of religious Rites and Ceremonies;" * as Tully observes, in the words of Pythagoras, the most celebrated of the pagan Lawgivers. Nor does this at all contradict the Roman maxim, as delivered by Posthumius in Livy [see p. 356.] For *that* maxim relates to *public Religion*, or the Religion of the State; *this* concerns *private Religion*, or the Religion of Particulars. Now vulgar Paganism being not only false, but highly absurd, as having its foundation solely in the fancy and the passions; variety of Worships was necessary to suit every one's taste and humour. The genius of it disposing its followers to be inconstant, capricious, and fond of novelties; weary of long-worn Ceremonies, and immoderately fond of new. And in effect we see amongst the same people, notwithstanding the universal notion of tutelary Deities, that, in *this* age, one God or mode of worship, in *that*, another mode had the vogue. And every new God, or new ceremony, rekindled the languid fire of Superstition: just as in modern Rome, every last Saint draws the Multitude to his shrine.

For, here it is to be observed, that in the Pagan world, a *tolerated Religion* did not imply *dissention* from the *established*, according to our modern ideas of *toleration*. Nor indeed could it, according to the general nature and genius of ancient Idolatry. *Tolerated* Religions there are rather subservient to the *established*, or supernumeraries of it, than in opposition to it. But then they were far from being on a footing with the *established*, or partakers of its privileges.

* "Siquidem et illud bene dictum est a Pythagora, doctissimo viro, tum maxime et pietatem et religionem versari in animis, cum rebus divinis operam daremus."—*De Legibus*, lib. ii. cap. 11.

But men going into Antiquity under the impression of modern ideas, must needs form very inaccurate judgements of what they find. So, in this case, because few *tolerated Religions* are to be met with in Paganism, according to our sense of *toleration*, which is the allowance of a Religion OPPOSED to the *national*; and consequently, because no one is watched with that vigilance which ours demand, but all used with more indulgence than a Religion, reprobating the *established*, can pretend to; on this account, I say, a false opinion hath prevailed, that, *in the Pagan world, all kinds of Religion were upon an equal footing, with regard to the State.* Hence, we hear a noble writer perpetually applauding * *wise* Antiquity, for the full and free liberty it granted in matters of Religion, so agreeable to the principles of truth and public utility; and perpetually arraigning the UNSOCIABLE HUMOUR OF CHRISTIANITY for the contrary practice; which, therefore, he would insinuate, was built on contrary principles.

On this account, it will not be improper to consider, a little, the genius of Paganism, as it is opposed to, what we call, *true Religion*: Which will shew us how easily the civil Magistrate brought about that Toleration, which he had such great *reasons of State* to promote; and at the same time, teach these objectors to know, that the good effect of this general tolerance, as far as the genius of Religion was concerned in its promotion, was owing to the egregious falshood and absurdity of Paganism: and that, on the other hand, the evil effects of intolerance under the Christian religion, proceeded from its truth and perfection; not the natural consequence, as these men would insinuate, of a *false* Principle, but the abuse of a *true* one.

Ancient Paganism was an aggregate of several distinct Religions, derived from so many pretended revelations. Why it abounded in these, proceeded, in part, from the great number of Gods of human invention. As these Religions were not laid on the foundation, so neither were they raised on the destruction of one another. *They were not laid on the foundation of one another;* because, having given to their Gods, as local tutelary Deities,† contrary natures and dispositions, and distinct and separate interests, each God set up, on his own bottom, and held little in common with the rest.‡ *They were not raised on the destruction of one another;* because, as hath been observed, the several Religions of Paganism did not consist in matters of belief, and dogmatic theology, in which, where there is a contrariety, Religions destroy one another; but in matters of practice, in Rites and Ceremonies; and in these, a contrariety did no harm: For having given their Gods different natures and interests, where was the wonder if they clashed in their commanded Rites;

* See the "Characteristics," *passim.*
† See note GG at the end of this book.
‡ See note HH at the end of this book.

or if their worshippers should think this no mark of their false pretensions?

These were horrible defects in the very essence of Pagan theology: and yet from these would necessarily arise *an universal toleration:* for each Religion admitting the other's pretensions, there must needs be a perfect harmony and INTERCOMMUNITY amongst them. Julian makes this the distinguishing character of the pagan Religion. For the imperial Sophist writing to the people of Alexandria, and upbraiding them for having forsaken the religion of their country, in order to aggravate the charge, insinuates them to be guilty of ingratitude, as having forgotten those happy times when *all Egypt worshipped the Gods* IN COMMON,—καὶ οὐκ εἰσέρχεται μνήμη τῆς παλαιᾶς ὑμᾶς ἐκείνης εὐδαιμονίας, ἡνίκα ἦν ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ μὲν πρὸς Θεοὺς Αἰγύπτῳ τῇ πάσῃ, πολλῶν δὲ ἀπελαύομεν ἀγαθῶν. And, in his book against the Christian Religion, he says, there were but two commands in the Decalogue, that were peculiar to the Jews, and which the Pagans would not own to be reasonable, namely, the observation of the Sabbath, and the *having no other Gods but the Creator of all things.* Ποῖον ἔθνος ἐστὶ (says he) πρὸς τῶν Θεῶν ἔξω τοῦ, Οὐ προσκυνήσεις Θεοῖς ἑτέροις, καὶ τοῦ, Μνήσθητι τῶν σαββάτων, ὃ μὴ τὰς ἄλλας οἴεται χρῆναι φυλάττειν ἐντολάς;* The First Cause of all things, we see, was acknowledged by the Gentile Sages: what stuck with them was the not worshipping other Gods IN COMMON.—For according to the genius of Paganism, as here explained, no room was left for any other disputes, but whose God was most powerful; except where, by accident, it became a question, between two nations inhabiting the same country, who was truly the TUTELAR Deity of the place. As once we are told happened in Egypt, and broke out into a religious war:

> "Inde furor vulgo, quod numina vicinorum
> Odit uterque locus, cum SOLOS CREDIT HABENDOS
> Esse deos, quos ipse colit."†

Here the question was not, which of the two worshipped a Phantom, and which a God, but whose God was the *tutelar* God of the place. Yet to insult the *tutelar* Gods of the place was a thing so rare, and deemed so prodigious, that Herodotus thinks it a clear proof of Cambyses's incurable madness that he outraged the Religion of Egypt, by stabbing their God Apis and turning their monkey Deities into ridicule.‡ Notwithstanding a late noble writer, from this account of Juvenal, would persuade us,§ that *intolerance* was of the very nature and genius of the Egyptian theology, from whence all

* *Apud* S. CYRIL. *Contra Julian.* lib. v. † JUVENALIS *Sat.* xv. ‡ Καμβύσης δὲ, ὡς λέγουσι Αἰγύπτιοι, διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἀδίκημα αὐτίκα ἐμάνη, ἐὼν οὐδὲ πρότερον φρενήρης.—*Thalia*, cap. 30. *in initio.* § "Characteristics," vol. iii. Miscel. 2.

Paganism arose. "The common heathen religion" (says he) "was supported chiefly from that sort of enthusiasm, which is raised from the external objects of grandeur, majesty, and what we call august. On the other hand, the Egyptian OR SYRIAN religions, which lay most in mystery and concealed rights, *having less dependence on the Magistrate*, and less of that decorum of art, politeness, and magnificence, ran into a more pusillanimous, frivolous, and mean kind of superstition; the observance of days, the forbearance of meats, and the contention about traditions, seniority of laws, and priority of godships.

——— 'Summus utrimque
Inde furor vulgo,' &c."*

Well might he say, he suspected "that it would be urged against him, that he talked at random and *without book*."† For the very contrary of every thing he here says, is the truth. And his supposing the Egyptian and Syrian religions had less dependence on the Magistrate than the Roman; and that the Egyptian, and *Syrian* (as he is pleased to call the *Jewish)* were the same, or of a like genius, is such an instance of his knowledge or ingenuity, as is not easily to be equalled. However, since the noble writer hath made such use of the Satirist's relation, as to insinuate that the Ombites and Tentyrites acted in the common spirit and genius of the Egyptian theology, and became the model of *intolerance* to the Jewish and Christian world, it may not be amiss to explain the true original of these religious squabbles, as Antiquity itself hath told the story: whereby it will appear, they had their birth from a very particular and occasional fetch of civil policy, which had no dependence on the general Superstition of the Pagan world.

The instance stands almost single in Antiquity. This would incline one to think that it arose from no common principle: and if we enquire into the *nature* of the Egyptian theology, it will appear impossible to come from *that*. For the common notion of local and tutelary deities, which prevents all *intolerance*, was originally, and peculiarly, Egyptian, as will be seen hereafter. It may then be asked how this mischief came about? I believe a passage in Diodorus Siculus, as quoted by Eusebius, will inform us. A certain king of Egypt, finding some cities in his dominions apt to plot and cabal against him, contrived to introduce the distinct worship of a different animal into each city; as knowing that a reverence for their own, and a neglect of all others, would soon proceed to an EXCLUSION; and so bring on such a mutual aversion, as would never suffer them to unite in one common design. Thus, was there at first as little of a *religious war on the principles of intolerance* in this affair of the Ombites and

* Vol. iii. p. 41. † Page 82.

Tentyrites, as in a drunken squabble between two trading Companies in the church of Rome about their patron saints. But Diodorus deserves to be heard in his own words: who, when he had delivered the fabulous accounts of the original of brute-worship, subjoins that which he supposed to be the true. "But some give another original of the worship of brute animals: for the several cities being formerly prone to rebellion, and to enter into conspiracies against Monarchical government, one of their Kings contrived to introduce into each city the worship of a different animal: so that while every one reverenced the Deity which itself held sacred, and despised what another had consecrated; they could hardly be brought to join cordially together in one common design, to the disturbance of the Government." *

But to return: such then was the root and foundation of this SOCIABILITY of Religion in the ancient world, so much envied by modern Pagans. The effect of their absurdities, as *Religions*; and of their imperfections, as *Societies*. Yet had universal custom made this principle of INTERCOMMUNITY, so essential to Paganism, that when their Philosophers and men of learning, on the spreading of Christianity, were become ashamed of the grossness of Polytheism, and had so refined it by allegorical interpretations of their Mythology, as to make the several Pagan deities but the various attributes of the one only God; they still adhered to their darling principle (for Paganism still continued to be without a dogmatic theology, or formulary of faith) and contended, that this diversity was harmony, a musical discord, well pleasing to the God of heaven and earth. "It is but reasonable for us" (says Symmachus) † "to suppose, that it is one and the same BEING whom all mankind adores. We behold the same

* Αἰτίας δὲ καὶ ἄλλας φασί τινες τῆς τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων τιμῆς· τοῦ γὰρ πλήθους τὸ παλαιὸν ἀφισταμένου τῶν βασιλέων, καὶ συμφρονοῦντος εἰς τὸ μηκέτι βασιλεύεσθαι, ἐπινοῆσαί τινα διάφορα σεβάσματα αὐτοῖς τῶν ζώων παρασχεῖν, ὅπως ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενον σεβωμένων, τοῦ δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀφιερωμένου καταφρονούντων, μηδέποτε ὁμονοῆσαι δύνωνται πάντες οἱ κατ' Αἴγυπτον.—EUSEBII *Præp. Evang.* p. 32, ed. Rob. Steph. Plutarch gives us an account of another of these squabbles (if indeed it was not the same with Juvenal's) which happened much about the same time, between the Oxyrynchitæ and the Cynopolitæ; and confirms what is here said of the original of this mutual hatred.—Ἄλλοι δὲ τῶνδε τῶν δεινῶν τινα καὶ πανούργων βασιλέων ἱστοροῦσι, τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους καταμαθόντα τῇ μὲν φύσει κούφους καὶ πρὸς μεταβολὴν καὶ νεωτερισμὸν ὀξυῤῥόπους ὄντας, ἄμαχον δὲ καὶ δυσκάθεκτον ὑπὸ πλήθους δύναμιν ἐν τῷ σωφρονεῖν καὶ κοινοπραγεῖν ἔχοντας, ἀΐδιον αὐτοῖς ἐν κατασπορᾷ δείξαντα δεισιδαιμονίαν διαφορᾶς ἀπαύστου πρόφασιν· τῶν γὰρ θηρίων ἃ προσέταξεν ἄλλοις ἄλλα τιμᾶν καὶ σέβεσθαι δυσμενῶς καὶ πολεμικῶς ἀλλήλοις προσφερομένων, καὶ τροφὴν ἑτέραν ἑτέρους προσίεσθαι πεφυκότας, ἀμύνοντας, ἀεὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἕκαστοι καὶ χαλεπῶς ἀδικούμενοι φέροντες, ἐλάνθανον τὴν τῶν θηρίων ἔχθραις συνελκόμενοι καὶ συνεκπολεμούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· μόνοι γὰρ ἔτι νῦν Αἰγυπτίων Λυκοπολῖται πρόβατον ἐσθίουσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ λύκος, ὃν θεὸν νομίζουσιν· οἱ δὲ Ὀξυρυγχῖται καθ' ἡμᾶς τῶν Κυνοπολιτῶν τὸν ὀξύρυγχον ἰχθὺν ἐσθιόντων, κύνας συλλαβόντες καὶ θύσαντες, ὡς ἱερεῖον κατέφαγον· ἐκ δὲ τούτου καταστάντες εἰς πόλεμον, ἀλλήλους τε διέθηκαν κακῶς, καὶ ὕστερον ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων κολαζόμενοι διετέθησαν.—Περὶ ΙΣ. καὶ ΟΣ. pp. 676, 677, Steph. ed. † "Æquum est, quicquid omnes colunt unum putari; eadem spectamus astra; commune cœlum est; idem nos mundus involvit: *Quid interest quâ quisque prudentiâ verum requirat?* UNO *itinere non potest perveniri ad tam* GRANDE SECRETUM.—*Ad Valent. Theod. et Arcad. Augg.* lib. x. ep. 61.

stars; we live under the influence of one common heaven; we are encompassed by the same universe. What matters it, what device each man uses in his search after truth? ONE road is plainly too narrow to lead us into the initiation of SO GRAND A MYSTERY." Elegantly alluding to the *secret* of the *greater Mysteries*, where, after the History of the Popular theogony had been delivered to the Initiated, the orphic Hymn, revealing the doctrine of the *Unity*, concluded the entertainment. "The great lord and governor of the earth" (says Themistius) "seems to be delighted with these diversities of Religions. It is his Will that the Syrians worship him one way, the Greeks another, and the Egyptians yet another."* The reader sees that the foundation of this way of thinking, was the old principle of *intercommunity* in the worship of local tutelary Deities. But, what is remarkable, it appears even to this day, to be essential to Paganism. Bernier tells us, that the Gentiles of Hindoustan defended their religion against him in this manner: "They gave me" (says he) "this pleasant answer; that they did not at all pretend that their Law was universal—that they did not in the least suspect that *ours* was false: it might, for what they knew, be a good Law for us, and that GOD MAY HAVE MADE MANY DIFFERENT ROADS TO LEAD TO HEAVEN; but they would by no means hear that *ours* was general for the whole world, and *theirs* a mere fable and invention."† Bernier indeed speaks of this as a peculiar whimsy, which had entered the head of his Brachman. But had he been as conversant in history and Antiquity, as he was in modern philosophy, he would have known that this was a principle which accompanied Paganism through all its stages.

Let us now see the nature and genius of those Religions which were founded, as we say, in TRUE REVELATION. The first is the JEWISH; in which was taught the belief of one God, the Maker and Governor of all things, in contradistinction to all the false gods of the Gentiles: This necessarily introduced a DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. So that the followers of this Religion, if they believed it true, in the sense it was delivered to them, must needs believe all others to be false. But it being instituted only for themselves, they had, *directly*, no further to do with that falshood, than to guard themselves against the contagion of it, by holding no fellowship or communion with the Gentiles.

Yet so strong was this general prejudice of INTERCOMMUNITY, that all the provisions of the Law could not keep this brutal people from running into the idolatries of the Nations: For their frequent

* Ταύτῃ νόμιζε γάννυσθαι τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τὸν τοῦ παντὸς Ἀρχηγέτην· ἄλλως Σύρους ἐθέλει θρησκεύειν, ἄλλως Ἕλληνας, ἄλλως Αἰγυπτίους.—*Orat.* xii. † See note II at the end of this book.

defections, till after the Babylonian Captivity, were no other than the joining foreign Worship to the Worship of the God of Israel.

After this Religion, comes the CHRISTIAN, which taught the belief of the same God, the supreme Cause of all things: and being a Revelation, like the other, from Heaven, must needs be built upon that *other*; or at least on the supposition of its truth. And, as this latter was not national, like the other, but given to all mankind, for that reason, but especially for some others, which will be fully considered in their place, it had a MORE COMPLETE system of dogmatic theology. The consequence of this was, that its followers must not only think Paganism false, and Judaism abolished, and so refuse all fellowship and communion with both; but must endeavour to propagate their Religion throughout the world, on the destruction of all the rest. And their dogmatic theology teaching them that TRUTH (and not UTILITY,* as the Pagans, who had only public Rites and Ceremonies, supposed) was the end of Religion; it was no wonder, their aversion to *falshood* should be proportionably increased. And so far all was right. But this aversion, cherished by piety, unhappily produced a blind, ungovernable zeal; which, when arguments failed, hurried them on to all the unlawful use of force and compulsion. Hence the evils of PERSECUTION, and the violation of the laws of humanity, in a fond passion for propagating the Law of GOD.†

This is a true representation of the state of things, both in the Pagan, and in the Believing world. To give it the utmost evidence, we will next consider the reception true Religion met with amongst idolaters.

The Pagan world having early imbibed this inveterate prejudice concerning *intercommunity of worship*, men were but too much accustomed to new Revelations, when the JEWISH appeared, not to acknowledge its superior pretences. Accordingly we find by the history of this People, that it was esteemed a *true one* by its neighbours. And therefore they proceeded, in their usual way, to join it, on occasion, to their own: as those did, whom the king of Assyria sent into the cities of Israel in the place of the ten Tribes. Whereby it happened (so great was the influence of this Principle) that in the same time and country, the Jews of Jerusalem added the Pagan idolatries to their Religion; while the Pagans of Samaria added the Jewish religion to their idolatries.

But when this people of God, in consequence of having their *dogmatic Theology* more carefully inculcated to them after their return from the Captivity, became rigid in pretending not only that their

. * For this the reader may see Dion. Halicarnasseus's discourse of the religion which Romulus introduced in his republic; and for his reason, see books iii. and iv. † See note KK at the end of this book.

Religion was true, but the only true one; then it was, that they began to be treated by their Neighbours, and afterwards by the Greeks and Romans, with the utmost hatred and contempt for this THEIR INHUMANITY AND UNSOCIABLE TEMPER. To this cause alone we are to ascribe all that spleen and rancour which appears in the histories of these latter Nations, concerning them. Celsus fairly reveals what lay at bottom, and speaks out, for them all: "If the Jews, on these accounts, adhere to their own Law, it is not for *that* they are to blame: I rather blame those who forsake their own country religion to embrace the Jewish. But if these People give themselves airs of sublimer wisdom than the rest of the world, and on that score refuse all COMMUNION with it, as not equally pure;—I must tell them that it is not to be believed that they are more dear, or agreeable to God, than other nations."* Hence, amongst the Pagans, the Hebrew People came to be distinguished from all others by the name of GENUS HOMINUM INVISUM DEIS,† and with good reason.‡

This was the reception the Jews met with in the world: but not pretending to obtrude their Religion on the rest of mankind, as it was given properly to the Posterity of Abraham, they yet, for the most part, escaped persecution.

When CHRISTIANITY arose, though on the foundation of Judaism, it was at first received with great complacency by the Pagan world. For they were such utter strangers to the idea of one Religion's being built, or dependent on another, that it was a long time before they knew this connection between them. Even Celsus himself, with all his sufficiency, saw so little how this matter stood, that he was not satisfied whether the Jews and Christians worshipped the same God;—was sometimes inclined to think they did not. This ignorance, which the propagators of our Religion were not too forward to remove,§ for fear of hindering the progress of the Gospel, prevented the prejudice which the Pagans had to Judaism, from indisposing them to Christianity. So that the Gospel was favourably heard. And the superior evidence, with which it was inforced, inclined men, long habituated to pretended Revelations, to receive it into the number of the Established. Accordingly we find one Roman emperor introducing it amongst his closet Religions;‖ and another proposing to the Senate,¶ to give it a more public entertainment.** But when it was found to

* Εἰ μὲν δὴ κατὰ ταῦτα περιστέλλοιεν Ἰουδαῖοι τὸν ἴδιον νόμον, οὐ μεμπτὰ αὐτῶν· ἐκείνων δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν καταλιπόντων τὰ σφέτερα, καὶ τὰ Ἰουδαίων προσποιουμένων· εἰ δ' ὥς τι σοφώτερον εἰδότες σεμνύνονταί τε, καὶ τὴν ἄλλων κοινωνίαν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου καθαρῶν ἀποστρέφονται—οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εὐδοκιμεῖν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ καὶ στέργεσθαι διαφόρως τι τῶν ἄλλων τούτους εἰκός.—ORIG. *Contra Celsum*, lib. v. p. 259. † TACIT. *Hist.* lib. v.

‡ See note RR, at the end of this book. § See note LL, at the end of this book.

‖ Alexander Severus.—LAMPRIDII cap. 29. ¶ "Tiberius retulit ad senatum nt INTER CETERA SACRA reciperetur."—HIER. See note MM, at the end of this book. ** See note NN, at the end of this book.

carry its pretensions higher,* and to claim, like the Jewish, the title of the ONLY TRUE ONE, then it was that it began to incur the same hatred and contempt with the Jewish. But when it went still further, and urged a necessity for all men to forsake their national Religions, and embrace the Gospel, this so shocked † the Pagans, that it soon brought upon itself the bloody storms which followed. Thus you have the true origin of *persecution for Religion:* (though not of the *intolerant principle*, as we shall see before we come to the end of this section). A persecution not committed, but undergone, by the Christian Church.

Hence we see how it happened, that such good Emperors as Trajan and M. Antonine came to be found in the first rank of persecutors. A difficulty that hath very much embarrassed the enquirers into ecclesiastical antiquity; and given a handle to the Deists, who empoison every thing, of pretending to suspect that there must be something very much amiss in primitive Christianity, while such wise magistrates could become its persecutors. But now the reason is manifest: ‡ the Christian pretences overthrew a fundamental principle of Paganism, which they thought founded in nature; namely, *the friendly intercommunity of worship*. And thus the famous passage of Pliny the younger becomes intelligible. "For I did not in the least hesitate, but that whatever should appear on confession, to be their faith, yet that their frowardness and *inflexible obstinacy* would certainly deserve punishment." § What was this *inflexible obstinacy?* It could not consist in professing a *new Religion:* that was a thing common enough. It was the refusing all communion with Paganism; refusing to throw a grain of incense on their altars. For we must not think, as is commonly imagined, that this was at first enforced by the Magistrate to make them renounce their Religion: but only to give a *test* of its *social and hospitable* temper. It was indeed, and rightly, understood by the Christians to be a renouncing of their Religion; and so, accordingly, abstained from. The misfortune was, that the Pagans did not consider this *inflexibility* as a mere *error*, but as an *immorality* likewise. The *unsociable, uncommunicable* temper, in matters of religious worship, was esteemed by the best of them, as *a hatred and aversion to mankind*. Tacitus, speaking of the burning of Rome: "Haud perinde in crimine incendii quam ODIO HUMANI GENERIS convicti sunt || [Christiani]." *Convicted*, he says, *of hate to all mankind*. But how? The confession of the Pagans themselves, concerning the purity of the Christian morals, shews this could be no other than a *conviction* of their rejecting all *intercommunity of Wor-*

* See note OO, at the end of this book. † See note PP, at the end of this book.
‡ See note QQ, at the end of this book. § "Neque enim dubitabam, *qualecunque esset* quod fatcrentur, certe, pertinaciam et *inflexibilem obstinationem* debere puniri."—Lib. x. ep. 97. || *Annalium* lib. xv. sect. 44.

ship; which, so great was their prejudice, they thought could proceed from nothing but *hate to mankind*. The like character the same historian gives of the Jews: "Apud ipsos FIDES OBSTINATA, sed adversus omnes alios HOSTILE ODIUM." * *Now the Jews and Christians* had nothing in common but this *unsociable and uncommunicable temper* in religious matters, this *obstinata fides* which gave so much offence to Paganism. We are not to imagine, these excellent Pagan moralists so blind as not to see all the merit of *a firm and fixed resolution of keeping a good conscience*. They did see and own it, as appears by the famous "Justum et tenacem propositi virum," &c. of one of their moral poets. But, unluckily for truth, they did not see the *pervicacia et inflexibilis obstinatio* of the Christians in that light. Though it was nothing more than such a *fixed resolution*, as one who most severely censured them for it, the good emperor Marcus Antoninus, fairly confesses. In his book of *Meditations*, speaking of a wise man's readiness to die, he says, "He should be so prepared, that his readiness may be seen to be the effect of a well-weighed judgment, not of MERE OBSTINACY, like that of the Christians." † This is a very heavy charge on the primitive Martyrs. But he himself removes it in his Constitution to the *Community of Asia*, given us by Eusebius. "I know," says he, "the Gods are watchful to discover such sort of men. For it is much more fit that they themselves should punish those WHO REFUSE TO WORSHIP THEM, than that we should interfere in it." ‡ Why then was it called *mere obstinacy?* The reason is seen above: universal prejudice had made men regard a refusal of this *intercommunity* as the most brutal of all dissociability. And the emperor Julian, who understood this matter the best of any, fairly owns, that the Jews and Christians brought the execration of the world upon them by their aversion to the Gods of Paganism, and their refusal of all communication with them.§

On this occasion, it may not be improper, once for all, to expose the ignorance and malice of those, whom the French call PHILOSOPHERS, and we English, FREE-THINKERS; who, with no more knowledge of Antiquity, than what the *modern sense* of a few Latin and Greek words could afford them, have this *odium humani generis* perpetually in their mouths, to disgrace the chosen People of God, or rather the Author of their Religion. Their favourite author, Tacitus himself, by extending the abuse, discountenances it. He makes this *odium humani generis* the characteristic *both of Jews and Christians;*

* See note RR, at the end of this book. † See note SS, at the end of this book.

‡ Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιμελές ἐστι μὴ λανθάνειν τοὺς τοιούτους· πολὺ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνοι κολάσαιεν ἂν τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους αὐτοὺς προσκυνεῖν ἢ ἡμεῖς.—EUSEBII *Eccl. Hist.* lib. iv. cap. 13.

§ Ἀλλὰ τὸ, οὐ προσκυνήσεις θεοῖς ἑτέροις· ὃ δὴ μέγα τῆς περὶ τὸν Θεὸν φησι διαβολῆς. Θεὸς γὰρ ζηλωτής φησι.—ἄφετε τοῦτον τὸν λῆρον, καὶ μὴ τηλικαύτην ἐφ' ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἕλκετε βλασφημίαν.—Apud CYRILLUM *Contra Julian.* lib. v.

and by so doing, shews us, in what it consisted. Nor do the Ancients in general, by affixing it as the common brand to these two *inhospitable* Religions, contribute to this calumny, any otherwise than by the incapacity of our *Philosophers* to understand them. Diodorus Siculus, speaking * of Antiochus's profanation of the *Jewish Temple*, and his contemptuous destruction of the *Sacred Books* applauds the Tyrant's exploits, as those Books contained τὰ μισόξενα νόμιμα, *Laws, which bore hate and enmity to all the rest of mankind.* This pretended *odium humani generis*, we find then, was not any thing in the personal temper of the Jews, but in the nature and genius of their LAW. These Laws are extant and lie now before us; and we see, the only *hate* they contain is the *hate of Idols.* With regard to the *race of Mankind*, nothing can be more endearing than the Mosaic account of their *common original;* nothing more benign or salutary than the legal directions to the Jews concerning their treatment of all, *out of the* COVENANT. Whatever there might be of this *odious temper* fairly ascribed to the Jews, by our *Philosophers*, it received no countenance from the LAW, and is expresly condemned by the Almighty Author of it, when it betrayed itself amongst certain corrupt and apostate members of that Nation. These, indeed, the Prophet Isaiah describes, as saying to all others,—*Stand by thyself, come not near me; for I am holier than thou.*† And lest this should be mistaken for the fruits of *the unhospitable genius of the Law*, he takes care to inform us that these men were the rankest and most abandoned Apostates.—*A rebellious People who sacrifice in gardens, and burn incense upon Altars of Brick—who remain amongst the graves, and lodge in the monuments, which eat swine's flesh,*‡ &c. that is, a People thoroughly paganized.

Thus have I endeavoured to explain the true origin of that universal TOLERATION (as far as Religion influenced it) under *Paganism;* and the accidental causes of its violation under *Christianity.* The account will be further useful to many considerable purposes, as will be seen hereafter. At present I shall only take notice how well it obviates one specious objection against Christianity. "If this Religion," say the Deists, "were accompanied with such illustrious and extraordinary marks of truth, as is pretended; how happened it, that its truth was not seen by more of the best and wisest of those times? And if it were seen (as it certainly was), how could they continue Pagans?" The answer is easy. The conviction of the truth of a *new* Religion was not deemed a sufficient reason, by men, overrun with the general prejudice of INTERCOMMUNITY, to quit their *old* ones.

The case indeed was different in a Jew, who held none of this *intercommunity.* If such a one owned the truth of Christianity, he

* *Eclog.* I. ex DIOD. SIC. lib. 31. † Isai. lxv. 5. ‡ Verses 2—4.

must needs embrace it. We conclude, therefore, that the passage of Josephus (who was as much a Jew as the Religion of Moses could make him) which acknowledges *Jesus to be* THE CHRIST,* is a rank forgery, and a very stupid one too.† But it hath been said, that Josephus was a *Jewish Convert*. If so, it must be *to* Judaism, and not *from* it. For where he affirms, against Apion, that *there ought to be but one Temple for one God*,‡ he speaks the very spirit of the LAW.

We have now seen the motives the civil Magistrate had to *tolerate*:—Of what nature that *toleration* was:—And how easily it was brought about.

But then, lest the People should abuse this right of worshipping according to their own will, to the detriment of the State, in private and clandestine conventicles (which right the Magistrate supported for the civil benefit of it), he took care that such worship should have the public approbation and allowance, before it was received on the footing of a *tolerated Religion*. So, by the laws of ATHENS, no *strange God*, nor *foreign Worship* was permitted, till approved and licensed by the Court of AREOPAGUS. This is the reason why St. Paul, who was regarded as the bringer in of *foreign Gods*, ΞΕΝΩΝ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΩΝ, was had up to that Tribunal. Not as a criminal,§ but rather as a public benefactor, who had a *new Worship* to propose to a people, *religious above all others*, ΩΣ ΔΕΙΣΙΔΑΙΜΟΝΕΣΤΕΡΟΙ; most addicted, as Strabo tells us, to the recognition of *foreign Worship*;‖ and "of all the Greeks," as Julian observes, "most devoted to Religion, and most hospitable to strangers."¶ Tully** makes Solon the founder of this Court. But the Arundel marbles, and Plutarch in his life of that Lawgiver,†† contradict this opinion; and the latter, in support of his own, quotes a law of Solon's, which makes mention of the Areopagus as already existing. The difficulty is how to reconcile these accounts. I imagine this might be the case: Solon, we know, was employed by the Athenians to new-model their Commonwealth, by reforming the ill Constitutions, and supplying such as were defective. So that in the number of his regulations, this might be one; The adding, to the Court of Areopagus, the peculiar jurisdiction in question; as of great moment to public utility. And having thus enlarged and ennobled its Jurisdiction, he was after-

* Ἰησοῦς σοφὸς ἀνήρ· εἴγε ἄνδρα αὐτὸν λέγειν χρή· ἦν γὰρ παραδόξων ἔργων ποιητής. Διδάσκαλος ἀνθρώπων, τῶν ἡδονῇ τἀληθῆ δεχομένων.—Ο ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ ΗΝ.—Ἐφάνη γὰρ αὐτοῖς τρίτην ἔχων ἡμέραν πάλιν ζῶν· τῶν θείων προφητῶν ταῦτα, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία θαυμάσια περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰρηκότων.—*Antiq.* lib. xviii. cap. iii. § 3. † See a further proof of it, book v. sect. 4. ‡ Lib. ii. § See note TT, at the end of this book. ‖ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ ὥσπερ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα φιλοξενοῦντες διατέλουσιν, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοὺς θεούς· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ξενίκων ἱερων παρεδέξαντο.—*Geogr.* lib. x. ¶ Ὡς καὶ φιλόθεοι μάλιστα πάντων εἰσὶ, καὶ δέξιοι πρὸς τοὺς ξένους.—*Misopog.* ** *De Officiis*, lib. i. cap. 22. †† *Vitæ Parall.* vol. i. p. 194, edit. Bryan.

wards regarded as its founder. A passage in Æschylus seems, at first sight indeed, not to favour this opinion; but to insinuate, that this Jurisdiction was coëval with the Court. In the fifth act of his *Eumenides*, he makes the worship of the *Furies*, or the *venerable Goddesses*, as they were called, to be received and recognized in Athens, by a decree of Minerva, as head of the college of Areopagus, which the poet feigns she had just then instituted. But this plainly appears to have been contrived only for the sake of a poetical embellishment: and Æschylus seems to employ one circumstance in this scene, designedly to inform us of the order of time, in which the Court received its two different jurisdictions. It is, where he makes the *criminal* cause of Orestes, the first which was judged at that Tribunal; and the *religious* one, of the reception of the Eumenides, but the second. However this be, the Areopagus was, by far, the most formidable judicature in the republic. And it is observable, that Aristophanes, who spares neither the fleets, the armies, the Courts of justice, the person of the supreme Magistrate, the Assemblies of the people, or the Temples of the gods themselves, does not dare to hazard the least injurious reflection on that venerable body.

The ROMANS had a law to the same purpose; which, as often as it was violated, was publicly vindicated by the authority of the State: as appears from the words of Posthumius in Livy, quoted in the last section: "Quoties hoc patrum avorumque ætate negotium est magistratibus datum, ut sacra externa fieri vetarent, sacrificulos vatesque foro, circo, urbe prohiberent, vaticinos libros conquirerent?" * &c. Which shews their care to have all *tolerated* religions under the Magistrate's inspection. And, if I am not much mistaken, Tully, in his *Book of Laws*, the substance of which is taken from the *Twelve tables*, gives us that very law; whereby, as we said, all foreign and clandestine worship, unauthorized by the civil magistrate, was forbid. SEPARATIM NEMO HABESSIT DEOS: NEVE NOVOS, NEVE ADVENAS, NISI PUBLICE ADSCITOS, PRIVATIM COLUNTO.† "No man shall worship the Gods clandestinely, or have them separately to himself: nor shall any new or foreign God be worshipped by particulars, till such God hath been legally approved of, and tolerated by the magistrate." The comment, as concise, and consequently as obscure as the text, follows in these words: SUOSQUE DEOS, AUT NOVOS, AUT ALIENIGENAS COLI, CONFUSIONEM HABET RELIGIONUM, ET IGNOTAS CEREMONIAS: NON A SACERDOTIBUS, NON A PATRIBUS ACCEPTOS DEOS, ITA PLACERET COLI, SI HUIC LEGI PARUERANT IPSI.‡ "For each man to have his Gods in peculiar, whether *new* or *stranger* Gods, without public allowance, tends to defeat and confound

* *Hist.* lib. xxxix. † See note UU, at the end of this book. ‡ See note XX, at the end of this book.

all religion, and introduce clandestine worship: and had the priests and our forefathers had a due regard to this law, we should never have approved of that kind of worship which we now pay to the Gods they introduced amongst us."

But notwithstanding all this, Mr. Bayle, from the words above quoted from the speech of Posthumius in Livy, would persuade us,* that the Romans did not admit or tolerate foreign worship; and that the care of the Magistrate there taken notice of by the Consul, was to prohibit all religions, but the *established*: an opinion which the whole Roman history discredits; where we find the Magistrate, from time to time, *tolerated* all foreign religions with the utmost facility. The care then, which Posthumius meant, was surely that of preventing all clandestine worship, unlicensed by the Magistrate: This appears even from that other passage brought by Mr. B. from Livy to support his assertion: "Nec corpora modo affecta tabo, sed animos quoque multiplex religio et pleraque externa invasit, novos ritus sacrificando, vaticinando *inferentibus in domos, quibus quæstui* sunt capti superstitione animi:" † But more particularly from the very affair, Posthumius was here engaged in. At this juncture, the State was above measure exasperated by the monstrous enormities committed in the clandestine rites of Bacchus: yet it is observable, that in the edict passed in the very height of their resentment, the right of *toleration* was preserved inviolate: the Decree of the Senate forbidding "any celebration of the *Bacchanals* either in Rome or Italy. But that if any one should be possessed with a belief that this sort of rite was due by custom, and necessary; and that he could not omit the celebration of it without irreligion and impiety, he should lay his case before the city Pretor; the Pretor should consult the Senate, when there was not less than an hundred in council, to know if they approved of it. These cautions observed, the rites might be celebrated, provided that not more than five assisted at the sacrifice, that they had no *common purse*, no *priest*, nor a *master of the solemnities*." ‡

As here, the Magistrate's care, in expelling foreign religions, was to prevent clandestine worship amongst the *tolerated*; so at other times, the same care was employed in preventing those foreign religions from mixing with the *established*, as we are informed by Valerius Maximus.§ But neither in that case, nor in this, was the liberty of

* *Pensées Diverses*, cap. 221. † *Hist.* lib. iv. ‡ "Ne qua Bacchanalia Romæ, neve in Italia essent. Si quis tale sacrum solenne et necessarium duceret, nec sine religione et piaculo se id omittere posse, apud Prætorem urbanum profiteretur; Prætor senatum consuleret, si ei permissum esset, quum in senatu centum non minus essent: ita id sacrum faceret, dum ne plus quinque sacrificio interessent, neu qua pecunia communis, neu quis magister sacrorum, aut sacerdos esset."—Lib. xxxix. § Lib. i. cap. 3.

particulars, to worship as they thought fit, at all infringed or impaired.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus plainly distinguishes between their *established* and *tolerated* religions. The passage is curious; and will not only serve to confute Mr. B.'s notion, but will afford us an opportunity of explaining what is further necessary to clear up this embarrassed subject. The words of this diligent enquirer into the Roman Constitution are these: "What, above all things, raised my admiration was, that, notwithstanding the vast multitudes which throng from all parts to Rome, who must there, consequently, worship their own country Gods, according to their country rites; yet the city never adopted any of these foreign worships into the PUBLIC religion; as hath been the custom for many other states to do." * Whence it appears, 1. That all strangers might freely worship in Rome according to their own way; the being debarred of that liberty, was not deemed, by him, a conceivable case: That such *particulars* as were so disposed, might join with them; and that, besides these *tolerated* religions, there was one *public*, and *established*, which admitted of no foreign mixtures. 2. We are not to understand the author as if his wonder was caused by the Romans having an *established* religion distinct from the *tolerated;* but, for that they mixed, or introduced into the *established* few or no foreign rites; which was the custom in the cities of Greece: for these are the *other states*, which the historian hints at. But modern writers not adverting to this, when they read of the Roman practice of admitting no *foreign* worship into their *public* religion, concluded wrongly, that they allowed no *toleration:* and when they read of the Greek practice of naturalizing *foreign* religions, by adopting them into their public worship, concluded, as wrongly, that they had no *establishments*. 3. The words Η ΠΟΛΙΣ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΑ, are remarkable: He does not say, the city rejected foreign worship, but, that it admitted not of it PUBLICLY; that is, did not bring it into the *public* religion of the State. For, as we observed before, Paganism had two parts, the one public, the other private: the *State*, as such, was the subject of the one; and *Particulars*, as such, of the other. But they admitted of foreign rites *privately;* that is, allowed *particulars* to use them, after the Magistrate's licence had been obtained for that purpose. So that the *established* religion, every where, related to the *public* part of Paganism; and the *tolerated*, to the *private* part. 4. The historian observes, that, in this conduct, Rome differed from many other cities, meaning the Grecian. And indeed, it was less a wonder than he seems to make it: For Rome,

* Καὶ ὐ πάντων μάλιστα ἔγωγε τεθαύμακα, καίπερ μυρίων ὅσων εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐπεληλυθότων ἐθνῶν, οἷς πολλὴ ἀνάγκη σέβειν τοὺς πατρίους θεοὺς τοῖς οἴκοθεν νομίμοις, οὐδενὸς εἰς ζῆλον ἐλήλυθε τῶν ξενικῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἡ πόλις δημοσίᾳ. ὐ πολλοῖς ἤδη συνέβη παθεῖν.—*Antiq.* lib. ii.

rising on her own foundation, independent on, and unrelated to any other State, and early possessed with the high enthusiam of distinction and empire, would naturally esteem her tutelary Gods as her own peculiar; and therefore would reject all foreign mixtures. On the contrary, the Grecian States, related to, and dependent on one another, would more easily admit of an association and combination amongst their national Deities.

Such was the nature of TOLERATION in the Pagan world; and this the wise provision of ancient Policy, while Civil liberty could keep its own. But when now Government began to degenerate, and ALL, preposterously to submit to the will of ONE; when the Magistrate came to have a good, distinct from that of the People; and civil peace was estimated, not by the blessings it produced, but by the degree of subjection it was able to inflict; then the fashionable scheme of Politics began to turn solely on the maintenance of a Tyrant's power: and He having observed, that, though the *toleration* of religion, under the regulations above described, was evidently for the advantage of Society; yet, as those regulations were too apt to be neglected, he thought it best, by an absolute *intolerance*, and a thorough *uniformity*, to cut off all occasions and opportunities of mischief to himself, from private conventicles and conventions.

Agreeably to this system of power, we find Mæcenas, in Dion Cassius,* dissuading Augustus from allowing any *toleration* of religion at all: as, an indulgence in this matter, would indispose men towards the Magistrate, and make them less fond of the civil and religious Constitutions of their country; from whence factions, and confederacies against the State, would unavoidably arise. He concludes his advice against *toleration* in these remarkable words: ΑΠΕΡ ΗΚΙΣΤΑ ΜΟΝΑΡΧΙΑ ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙ; "as a thing by no means agreeing with arbitrary power." And Tacitus informs us,† the usurper followed it. Thus, we see, that the famous declaration of ONE KING AND ONE RELIGION, is not a new maxim, for which we are indebted to French Politics.

So noble an original had the principle of INTOLERANCE: and so iniquitous are the adversaries of our holy religion, to throw it upon the *Christian Faith;* when it appears to have been the pure offspring of *civil Tyranny;* how well soever it may have been afterwards nursed and fondled by some Fathers of the Church.

Thus have I attempted to give a plain account of the general methods used by ancient Policy to inculcate and support Religion.

* *Hist.* lib. lii. † "Actum et de sacris Ægyptiis Judaicisque pellendis: factumque patrum consultum, ut quatuor millia libertini generis ea superstitione infecta, quis idonea ætas, in insulam Sardiniam veherentur, coercendis illic latrociniis, et si ob gravitatem cœli interissent, vile damnum: ceteri cederent Italia, nisi certam ante diem profanos ritus exuissent."—TACITI *Annales,* lib. ii. cap. 85.

Were I to speak, as I once intended, of *those* which particular Lawgivers and Magistrates employed for the use of their proper Societies, I should have it in my power to throw great light upon the argument. But this, though the most curious part of all, must be omitted at present, by reason of its length. In the mean time, I presume, more than enough hath been said, even in those places which only shew the Legislator's care for religion in general, to prove the truth of the proposition, *That, in the opinion of ancient policy, the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was indispensably useful to civil Society:* For having shewn that the doctrine of a future state was an inseparable part of Pagan religion, and indeed the sole support of it, the proving their care for religion in general, proves their care for this doctrine in particular. Where, it is worth observing, that, though the ancient Lawgivers deviated from truth, and differed from one another, even in the most important points, concerning *property, marriage, dominion, &c.* yet they unanimously agreed in owning the use, and propagating the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments: And what stronger proof would any one desire of the *necessity* of that doctrine to RELIGION and SOCIETY?

We now see the close connexion between *Civil government* and *Religion.* The following observation will still further explain the necessity of this union.

That benevolent spirit of Antiquity, described above, which set their Heroes upon polishing the barbarous manners of their fellow-creatures, and imparting to them the blessings of CIVIL LIFE, as divine as it appears, hath yet been far exceeded by the charity of these later ages, which sends MISSIONARIES into the furthest regions of the east and west, with the inestimable blessing of *the glad tidings of the Gospel.* But nothing is matter of more grief to serious men, than the constant ill success of so charitable an undertaking. Something sure must have been greatly amiss, to defeat a design which all nature conspires to advance. This would be accounted for. *Catholic* (as they call themselves) and *Protestant* Missionaries go promiscuously to either India. The *Catholics* have laboured most in countries civilized; but, giving a commentitious system for the Gospel of Christ, it is no wonder the Pagans should not be greatly disposed to change *old* fables for *new.* And though the *protestant* Missionaries carry the *genuine Gospel* with them into America, yet they preach it to Savages, with no better success. The reason seems to be, because they are *Savages,* without Government or Laws; and consequently of very rude, uncultivated minds. Now Christianity, plain and simple as it is, and fitted in its nature for what it was designed by its Author, requires an intellect above that of a mere Savage to understand.*

* See note YY, at the end of this book.

Something then must be previous to it. And what is that something but CIVIL SOCIETY? This is not at all to its dishonour. And if it hath sometimes happened, through the indefatigable labours of these Missionaries, both of the one and the other Communion, that numbers of savage converts have been made, they could never long preserve, or propagate amongst their tribes, the Christianity they had been taught: but their successors have always found the work was to begin anew, and in a little time, nothing left of the other's labours to advance upon. And if what we have said in this book be true, *That religion cannot long subsist without the aid of civil government*, we are not to wonder at it: for, from hence, we conclude, they began at the wrong end; and that to make our holy religion rightly understood, much more to propagate and perpetuate it, they should first have taught these Savages the arts of life: from whence (besides the benefit of that previous knowledge above-mentioned) would have resulted this further advantage, that men so sensibly obliged, would have given a more favourable attention to their benefactors. As it is, I am afraid, these Savages observing in the Missionaries (and they have sense enough to observe that the Europeans keep many things from them which it would be useful for them to know) a total disregard of their temporal concerns, would be hardly brought to think the matters pressed upon them of much importance, or the teachers greatly in earnest. The civilizing a barbarous people is in itself a work of such exalted charity, that to see it neglected when a far nobler end than the arts of life may be procured by it, is matter of the utmost astonishment.* But it is partly owing to this, that many of both missions have had too much of that *fanaticism* in their temper, which disposes men to an utter contempt of worldly things: they are therefore so far from preaching up the advantages of Society, and recommending civil Manners, that they are more disposed to throw aside their own; and have recourse to the dried skins and parched corn of the Savages. While others of them, of a colder turn, and lower form of *superstition*, having taken it into their heads, that the vices of improved life would more *indispose* the Indians to the *precepts* of the Gospel, than their present brutality *incapacitates* them from comprehending the *doctrines* of it, have concluded it best, upon the whole, to keep their eyes shut to the advantages of civil life.† But without doubt so fatal a conduct arises chiefly from the false and inhumane policy of the European Colonies, a policy common to every sect and profession, which makes them do all in their power to keep the natives in a savage state; as suspecting that the neighbourhood of a civilized people would be too unfriendly to their private

* See note ZZ, at the end of this book.

† See note AAA, at the end of this book.

interests. However, this policy, as bad as it is, has yet something less diabolical in it than that other part of COLONY-RELIGION, which robs the opposite Continent of so many thousands of our species, for a yearly sacrifice to their great idol, Mammon, THE GOD OF GAIN. These Colonists, indeed, pretend to observe a kind of aversion in the savages to a civilized State. And it is no wonder if they should not be very forward to imitate the manners of their oppressors. But this is not the natural condition of things. Barbarians are never backward to partake of those advantages of civil life which they understand; except where ill usage has given them an abhorrence for their Instructors. The Goths and Vandals in Europe, together with the other benefits of their Conquests, joyfully embraced the Christian Faith: And the Turks in Asia, and other clans of Tartars in China, readily received Religion and Civility from the conquered nations. On the whole, however, I dare venture to foretell, that no great good will ever come of these Missions, till the two projects of *civilizing* and *saving* be joined in one.

As the matter stands at present, the forests of North and South America are good for little but to be made nurseries for PHILOSOPHERS and FREE-THINKERS. The inhabitants, by following simple nature, are already in possession of that blessing, which these illustrious Instructors so vainly wished for at home; namely, the removal of all RELIGIOUS PREJUDICES from the education of their children. A learned voyager, who has been lately on a mathematical mission to the Equator, describes this happy and envied condition in very emphatic terms; which the reader may find below.* What crops of *Free-thinking* may not be expected from so happy a climate! But our *Philosophers* perhaps, on reflection, may think their favourite maxim here pushed a little too far. However, this freedom from religious prejudices, in the purity of its state here, may be of use, in disposing our *Philosophers* to review their favourite *maxim;* and to consider whether they be well founded, in recommending it in that extent in which it is here practised. It is true, a superstitious educa-

* "J'ai cru reconnoître dans tous [les Indiens Américains, quoique différentes en langues, mœurs, et coûtumes] un même fonds de charactère. L'insensibilité en fait le base. Je laisse à décider si on la doit honorer du nom d'apathie; ou l'avilir par celui de stupidité. Elle naît sans doute du petit nombre de leurs idées, qui ne s'étend pas au delà de leurs besoins. Gloutons jusqu' à la voracité, quand ils ont de quoi se satisfaire; sobres, quand la necessité les y oblige, jusqu' à se passer de tout, sans paroître rien desirer; pusillanimes et poltrons à l'excès, si l'ivresse ne les transporte pas; ennemis du travail, indifférens à tout motif de gloire, d'honneur, ou de reconnoissance; uniquement occupés de l'objet présent, et toujours déterminés par lui; sans inquiétude pour l'avenir; incapables de prévoyance et de réflexion; se livrant, quand rien ne les gêne, à une joie puerile qu'ils manifestent par des sauts et des éclats de rire immodérés, sans objet et sans dessein; ils passent leur vie sans penser, et ils vieillissent sans sortir de l'enfance, dont ils conservent tous les défauts—on ne peut voir sans humiliation combien l'homme abandonné à la simple nature, privé d'éducation et de societé, differe peu de la bête.—*Relation d'un Voyage dans l'Amerique meridionale, par M. de la Condamine,* p. 51, et seq.

tion is productive of great evils. But what then? If, through these prejudices, the *Omaguas* of the southern continent think it piety, at the birth of their children, to flatten their heads, like a cheese, between two boards, that their faces may resemble their Deity, the *full moon;* Should the ridicule of this custom make it thought absurd in us, to bring up our children in the love of justice, of purity, and benevolence, that they may resemble the God of the Christians, whom we adore? Our *Philosophers* will say, So far they are not unwilling to go. What they would have is, that the infant-mind be kept free from the deformed impressions of POSITIVE RELIGION. But they must pardon us if we think, that in such minds, precepts are best enforced by *example;* and that the best example is that of the Deity in his dispensations to mankind, as delivered by *positive religion.*

Was the full definition of *man*, a GOOD PHILOSOPHER, and his only business, speculative truth, something might be said in favour of preserving his mind a *rasa tabula*, till he was himself able to judge what was fit to be written on it. But as he was sent into the world to make a GOOD CITIZEN, in the observance of all the relations of civil, social, and domestic life; as he was born for practice and not for speculation; I should think that virtues, so necessary for the discharge of those relations, could not be insinuated too soon, or impressed too frequently; even though the consequence might happen to be, the acquiring an obstinate and unconquerable prejudice in favour of RELIGION.

On the whole, then, we see, that the ancient Lawgivers were as much superior to the modern Missionaries in the *execution*, as These are, to Them in the *design*. Those Sages saw plainly that religion and civil policy were inseparable; and therefore they always taught them together. The experience of all ages justified their conduct; and the *truth*, on which they acted, gives us the most transcendent idea of Divine goodness, which hath so closely united our *temporal* to our *spiritual* happiness. The sum of all is this, that whoever would secure CIVIL GOVERNMENT, must support it by the means of RELIGION; and whoever would propagate RELIGION, must perpetuate it by the means of CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

NOTES

ON

THE SECOND BOOK.

P. 171. A. *Valla* explains the word *ἀνθρωποφυέας* by *ex hominibus ortos;* and, I think, rightly. But our learned *Stanley*, in his notes to the *Persians* of *Æschylus*, understands it otherwise: and that it rather signifies *humana forma præditos.* I suppose it appeared harsh to him, that any one could imagine the Gods had *human natures;* but the meaning is explained above. Yet the ingenious writer of the *Letters concerning Mythology*, p. 217, sides with our country-man, and understands *ἀνθρωποφυὴς* to signify,—*made like a man*—or, *of the shape and figure of a man.* But if we regard the literal meaning of the two simples which make up this compound, we cannot avoid understanding it to signify, *being of man's nature.* How then does this learned writer support his criticism? By a passage from Hecatæus; who, on pretty much the same occasion, uses (as he supposes) *ἀνθρωπόμορφος*, in the place of *ἀνθρωποφυὴς*; and *ἀνθρωπόμορφος*, he thinks, all will agree, must signify, *of the shape and figure of a man.* No, not if his own method of interpretation be right: for, if *ἀνθρωποφυὴς* (transferred from the literal, to the figurative sense) must signify of man's *form*, then *ἀνθρωπόμορφος*, so transferred, must signify *of man's nature.* But it is not true, that Hecatæus uses *ἀνθρωπόμορφος* in the place of *ἀνθρωποφυὴς.* The propositions of Herodotus and Hecatæus are different, and therefore we may well suppose these two words, in the predicate of each, to be different. Herodotus, speaking of the PERSIANS, says, they had no statues of their Gods, because they did not believe, with the Greeks, that the Gods had *human natures* [*ἀνθρωποφυέας*]. And Hecatæus, speaking of MOSES, says, he permitted no images of the Gods, because he did not hold, with the Gentiles, that God had a *human form* [*ἀνθρωπόμορφον*]. And their use of different words, as we shall now see, was with accuracy and discernment; for they were asserting different things. The question between the *Persians* and the *Greeks* (who worshipped many gods in common) was, whether these Gods were *partakers of human nature*, *ἀνθρωποφυέας*; that is, whether they were dead men deified. But the question between *Moses* and the Gentiles, was, whether the God of the universe had a *human form*, *ἀνθρωπόμορφος*; not whether *the gods had human natures;* for these Gods, the Jews had nothing to do with; they worshipped only the one God: and several of the Gentiles, who had some knowledge of this one God, imagined he might have a *human form.* So that we see, the use of these two terms, on the *same* occasion, is so far from shewing their signification to be the *same*, as the learned writer supposes, that the occasion demonstrably shews their signification to be *different.* Let me only observe, it appeared so evident to Eusebius, that the custom of making the statues of the Gods in *human form* was an indication of their original from mortality, that he says,

ὅ γέ τοι ἀληθὴς λόγος βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγε, μονονουχὶ φωνὴν ἀφιεὶς, ζητοὺς ἄνδρας μαρτυρῶν γεγονέναι τοὺς δηλουμένους. Ευαγγ. προπαρ. β. γ.

P. 186, B. This we are told by *Jamblichus:* his words are, λέγεται τοίνυν ὡς φωνῇ χρῆσθαι τῇ πατρῴᾳ ἑκάστοις παρήγγελλον, Vit. Pythag. 194, Kust. ed.—Dr. Bentley understands them to signify, that *every one should use his own mother-tongue.* And, indeed, without reading the context, one could scarce avoid giving this sense to the passage. Vizzanius,—*that every one should use the mother-tongue of Crotona;* which was *the Doric. Of these,* the learned Critic says, *which is the true, perhaps all competent readers will not be of one mind,* p. 386. But I believe there will no great difference of opinions amongst those who weigh the following reasons:—1. Jamblichus adds, τὸ γὰρ ξενίζειν οὐκ ἐδοκίμαζον; by which I understand him to mean, that *the* Pythagoric *sect did not approve of a foreign or stranger dialect.* For if he meant, not the sect in general, but the particulars of which it was composed, the several provincial *Greeks* who entered into it, no *dialect* could be called *foreign* to one or other of them: if he meant the Sect, which we may suppose had a *dialect* peculiar and consecrated to the Community, all but that was *foreign* to it; and the expression becomes proper and pertinent. 2. *Jamblichus,* in the same place, tells us, that Pythagoras valued the *Doric* above the other Greek Dialects, as most agreeable to the laws of harmony, Τὴν δὲ Δώριαν διάλεκτον ἐναρμονίαν εἶναι: Now having made the essence of the soul to be harmony, it was no wonder he should choose a dialect, which he supposed approached nearest to its nature; that the mind and tongue might go together. 3. Pythagoras seems here to have imitated his master Orpheus, from whom, as we shall see hereafter, he borrowed much of his philosophy; for Jamblichus tells us, that the old writings that went under the name of Orpheus, were composed in *Doric.* 4. But, lastly, a passage in Porphyry's *Life of Pythagoras* seems alone sufficient to determine this matter: Porphyry giving the causes of the decay of the Pythagoric philosophy, assigns this for one, that *their commentaries were written in* Doric. Ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα Δωρίδι γεγράφθαι, p. 49. Kust. ed. This is the clearest comment on the words in question, and determines them to the sense contended for. One would wonder, indeed, that so learned a Critic could take them in any other. But the secret was this, Dr. Bentley having pretended to discover, that Ocellus Lucanus did not write his book in the common dialect, as it is now extant, but in *Doric; (Dissert. upon Phalaris,* &c. p. 47,) his adversaries *(Dissert. examined,* p. 54) charge him with having stolen this discovery from *Vizzanius.* This, Dr. Bentley flatly denies; *(Dissert. defended,* p. 384.) But the only proof he gives of his innocence, is, that the Greek passage, quoted above from Jamblichus, on which both he and *Vizzanius* had founded their discoveries, is differently translated by them. "The thing, as I said it" (says the Dr.) "is thus; the *Pythagoreans* enjoined all the *Greeks* that entered themselves into the society, to use every man his mother-tongue (φωνῇ χρῆσθαι τῇ πατρῴᾳ.) *Ocellus,* therefore, being a *Dorian* of *Lucania,* must have writ in the *Doric.* This I *took* to be Jamblichus's meaning. But *Vizzanius* has represented it thus: that they enjoined all that came to them to use the mother-tongue of Crotona, which was the *Doric.*—Whether *Vizzanius* or I have hit upon the true meaning of Jamblichus, perhaps all competent readers will not be of a mind." The diffidence of this conclusion would make one suspect the Doctor was now convinced, that *Vizzanius's* was the right meaning. Yet, I will venture to say, that the words of Jamblichus, as quoted by

Vizzanius without the context, would have been understood by every man, skilled, as Dr. Bentley was, in Greek, in the different sense he has given to them. From whence I conclude, that, when Dr. Bentley wrote his *Dissertation on Phalaris*, he had seen the words of Jamblichus no where but in *Vizzanius*.

P. 190. C. Some have affected not to understand, where it is, in the foregoing passage, that Zaleucus inculcates this doctrine. The place, methinks, was not hard to find: it is, where *wicked men* are bid *to set before themselves the dreadful hour of death.* For how should a picture of this scene allure men to virtue, or deter them from vice, but as it opens to them a view of those rewards and punishments they are just going to receive? Hence, too, we learn what those *hopes and fears* were, which Plutarch, in the passage p. 179, says the *ancient lawgivers* impressed upon the minds of the people, to keep up the awe and reverence of religion: for Plato assures us it was their general practice, to inculcate the distinction between soul and body; and to teach, that, at their separation, the soul survived the body; and this, says he, we should believe upon their word, unless we would be thought to be out of our senses.—*πιστεύειν δ' αὖ καὶ τοῖς* ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΟΥΣΙ *ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν, ἅπερ μὴ πανταπάσιν ἄφρονες φαίνωνται. De Legg.* lib. xi. But, in his next book, he informs us, more at large, why the ancient Lawgivers inculcated that *distinction.* It was, in order to build upon it the belief of *a future state of rewards and punishments:* for he says, the Lawgivers were to be believed, when they teach the total difference between soul and body, that the former is immortal, and that when it is on the point of departing for the regions of immortality (where it must give an account of its conduct in the body) the good man will meet death with courage and constancy, and the evil man with affright and terrour. And then takes occasion to mention the punishments reserved for the latter: *πείθεσθαι δ' ἐστὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ χρεὼν τάτε ἄλλα, καὶ λέγοντι ψυχὴν σώματος εἶναι τὸ πᾶν διαφέρουσαν.—τὸν δὲ ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὄντως ἀθάνατον εἶναι, ψυχὴν ἐπονομαζόμενον, παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους ἀπιέναι δώσοντα λόγον, καθάπερ ὁ νόμος ὁ πάτριος λέγει, τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ θαῤῥαλέον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ μάλα φοβερὸν—ἀτιμώρητος ἂν κακῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἐγίγνετο τὸν μετὰ τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον. De Legg.* lib. xii. tom. ii. p. 959, A, B, C, edit. H. Steph. fol. And here let me observe, that Plato, in the words *τῷ ἀγαθῷ θαῤῥαλέον, &c.* seems to have had the very passage of Zaleucus in his eye, *τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀμμάτων τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον, &c.*—But this cavil had been obviated, sect. i. of this second book, p. 165.

P. 208. D. *Paul Ernest Jablonski*, a learned German Divine, in his book called *Pantheon Ægyptiorum, sive de Diis eorum Commentarius*, having taken it into his head, for some reason or other, to contend that the Ægyptian Gods were not *dead men deified*, thought rightly that this account of the *Mysteries* stood in his way. "Inter omnia argumenta" (says he) "quibus utuntur viri docti, ad probandum, Ægyptios coluisse homines, post mortem divinis honoribus donatos, illud sine dubio primum meretur locum, quod ex Mysteriis Græcorum et ipsorum quoque Ægyptiorum petitum est. Observavit nempe Theologus Anglus præstantissimus, omnique doctrinæ genere cultus, in Mysteriis Græcorum, hanc etiam initiatis doctrinam tradi consuevisse, Deos illos, quos vulgo adorarent omnes, re ipsa mortales extitisse homines, idque testimoniis quibusdam e Cicerone perquam opportune allatis demonstrasse, et extra omnem dubitationis aleam posuisse videtur." He then quotes this passage of the *Tusculan questions*, and the following from the first book, *of the nature of the Gods:* and thus proceeds—"Cui quidem loco ex priori, lux est accendenda. Jubebantur ergo

omnes, initiati Græcorum Mysteriis, credere Deos quos Græcia coleret cunctos, in lucem hanc aliquando editos fuisse, inter homines vixisse et tandem mortem quoque oppetiisse." All this is said with the candour of a true scholar. How unlike to that miserable chicane lately published at home on this question! Where things are denied no less incontestible than that two and two make four. However the learned Doctor *Jablonski* must not desert his System. His first evasion therefore of the force arising from my account of the *Mysteries* is this—I had represented them as the invention of Legislators; and had shewn that it was the practice of ancient Lawgivers and Philosophers to teach one doctrine openly and another secretly. Having got me at this advantage, Who knows then, says he, Whether these Institutors of the *Mysteries* believed what they taught? But hear him in his own words—"At quæri non immerito potest, fuerintne Legislatores et Conditores Mysteriorum, de eo, quod credere volebant alios, ipsi certo persuasi. Docere nos voluit ingeniosus ille Auctor, qui arcana Mysteriorum Eleusiniorum nobis non sine successu explicare conatus est, Legislatores et Philosophos veteres permulta suis inculcasse, et vehementer commendasse, quæ credebant hominibus fore utilia, etiamsi ea reipsa judicarent esse falsa. *Quid vetat nos credere* ex illorum numero fuisse etiam doctrinam in *Mysteriis* traditam de mortalibus ad honores divinos evectis"—*Prolegom.* Sect. xii.—Nay I know of nothing that *hinders us from believing*, but common sense: Which assures us, that if these Men practised the method of the *double doctrine*, one set of opinions taught publicly to all, and another secretly to a few select Auditors, in whom they could particularly confide, the opinions *believed* by them were certainly the latter. But he has another evasion, in support of his System. Though the *Grecian Mysteries* taught the human nature of the National Gods, how does it appears that the *Egyptian Mysteries* taught the same? I answer, From the *Grecian Mysteries* being borrowed from the *Egyptian*, and from a thousand testimonies besides; particularly from the famous transaction between Alexander the Great and Leo the Egyptian priest. This the learned Writer considers as a fable, a very ready way of getting rid of difficulties which obstruct our Systems.—He endeavours to prove, that in the accounts which *Minutius Felix* and *Athenagoras* give of this matter, there were some circumstances inconsistent with the avowed history of Alexander: and from thence he concludes—"Ita ad constituendam illam Fabellam, mendaciis merisque figmentis opus erat." Sect. xv. But if this be sufficient to convict the adventure of imposture, the best attested facts of Antiquity will be in danger; such, for instance, as the defeat of Julian's impious purpose to rebuild the Temple of Jerusalem; to the true circumstances of which defeat, the Relators of it have added many very fabulous and absurd. However he acknowleges, that if Alexander did write such a Letter to his mother, the Fact will admit no further controversy. But the Letter, he says, was a forgery of some indiscreet Christian Writers, who being notorious Tricksters, and at the same time got into the general Opinion that the *national Gods of the Pagans were dead men*—what then?—"Estne igitur mirum Tenebrionem *nescio quem*, in eorum gratiam talem Alexandri Epistolam confinxisse, eamque postea certatim alios in usum suum convertisse?" Sect. xvi. Falsarys, of whatever time or profession, I suppose never forge but to supply some imaginary or real want. Thus these Christian Falsarys (as this learned writer observes) forged some *Sibylline Oracles* and books of *Hermes Trismegistus*. But why did they so? Because they foolishly imagined the Faith wanted some support from the Prophecies and doctrines of the Pagans themselves. But with regard to

the Opinion that *their Gods were dead men deified*, the Prophane Writings of best Authority were now full. Nothing therefore can be less founded than this suspicion. His next argument against the authenticity of the EPISTLES is indeed a pleasant one. If, says he, the ancient Philosophers had known any thing of this *Epistle*, their eternal disputations concerning the essence, nature and origin of the *Egyptian Gods* must have been at an end. "Si Epistola illa, quam Patres laudant, genuina esset, tum quæstio de essentia, natura, et origine Deorum Ægyptiorum quæ veteres Philosophos tantopere exercuit, sic decisa et penitus finita fuisset, ut nemini amplius dubium superesse potuerit." Sect. xvi. Did not the ancient Philosophers dispute full as much concerning the essence, nature and origin of the *Grecian Gods?* And yet this learned Writer confesses that the Grecian Mysteries taught that they were *dead men deified*. He must know little of the temper of the ancient Philosophers, who supposes that even an ORACLE, whether without or within the walls of the *Mysteries* (for oracular responses were given there as well as at Delphi), could stop them in the career of Disputation. Cicero (we know), who is the Representative of them all, did not suffer his knowledge of what the *Eleusinian Mysteries* taught, to debar him from advancing a hundred different tenets and conjectures concerning the essence, nature and origin both of the *Egyptian* and *Grecian* GODS.

But, continues the learned Doctor, "none of the prophane Writers, Greek or Roman, ever mention this Epistle." "Non certe videmus unquam aliquem ad hoc oraculum confugere, aut ejus vel levissimam mentionem facere; non Varronem—non Ciceronem—non Diodorum Siculum—non Plutarchum"—Sect. xvi. Nothing indeed is more common, yet nothing is more sophistical, than to argue against a fact recorded by one single Ancient, or by one set of Ancients, because we cannot find it in any other. As if we had all Antiquity before us, and did not know that a few fragments only of that rich Cargo remain, of the Wreck of Barbarous Times. Beside, the silence (on this head) in those fragments we have gathered up, may be naturally accounted for. What the *Mysteries* every where taught, was so well known to the Learned, from numerous and authentic testimonies, concerning the *Eleusinian* and others, that it was nothing strange that neither Varro, Cicero, nor Diodorus Siculus should take any particular notice of this EPISTLE. I do not put *Plutarch* into the number of the silent, because the learned Dr. himself is forced to confess that, in the opinion of some learned men, this Ancient hath alluded to the Epistle in question. The words of Plutarch quoted above run thus, *Alexander in his Epistle to his mother says, that there were certain Oracular Mysteries imparted to him, which, on his return, he would communicate to her under the same seal of Secrecy.* Our learned Dr. thinks otherwise: and that what is said, in the *Epistle* quoted by Plutarch, means the response of a *Common Oracle;* while the *Epistle* mentioned by the Christian Writers refers to what Alexander learnt in the *Mysteries.* "Verum an dices, obsecro, hanc esse Epistolam illam, quam Patres laudant? Sed in hac agebatur de *doctrinis Mysticis Theologiæ Ægyptiorum*, ante non auditis, in illa, Sermo tantum est de *divinationibus et prædictionibus sibi divinitus factis*," &c. Sect. xvi. This slender reasoning, is spun out of his ignorance, that the words, μαντείας ἀποῤῥήτους, here used by Plutarch, can only signify *Oracles delivered in the celebration of the Mysteries.* The case was this, The Hierophants of the Mysteries had by this time, to invite custom, erected *their* Oracles also, like to those at the other public Shrines of the Gods: Of which, an account is given elsewhere.

P. 208. E. The words that follow, are, "Quibus explicatis, ad rationemque revocatis, rerum magis natura cognoscitur, quam Deorum." Which M. Pluche, in his *Histoire du Ciel*, brings to prove, that the purpose of the *Mysteries* was not to explain the nature of the Gods; and translates thus, "Quand ces mysteres sont expliqués et ramenés à leur vrai sens, il se trouve que c'est moins la nature des Dieux, qu'on nous y apprend, que la nature des choses mêmes, ou des vérités dont nous avons besoin." P. 401. *Hist. du Ciel*, seconde edit. But had he attended to the dispute carried on in the dialogue, from whence these words of Cicero are quoted, he could hardly have thus grosly mistaken the sense of his author. The reader has now the whole passage before him; in which it is said, that Euhemerus taught the nature of the Gods; that they were dead men deified: and in which, it is clearly enough intimated, that the *Eleusinian* and *Samothracian Mysteries* taught the same doctrine. Yet, according to this translator, Tully immediately adds, that, "when these *Mysteries* are explained and brought back to their true sense, it is found, that not so much the nature of the Gods is taught in them, as the nature of things, or those truths which our wants require us to be instructed in." That is, the Mysteries *did*, and they *did not* teach the nature of the Gods. But it is not for such kind of prate that Cicero has been so long admired. The words, *quibus explicatis, ad rationemque revocatis, &c.* have a quite different meaning. Velleius, the Epicurean, had undertaken to explain the nature of the Gods. Cotta, the Academic, shews, in his answer, that, under pretence of teaching the nature of the Gods, he, Velleius, took away all Religion; just as those did, who said, the notion of the Gods was invented by Politicians, for the use of Society; just as Prodicus Chius did, who said, men made Gods of every thing they found beneficial to them; just as Euhemerus did, who said, they were dead men deified: I forbear (says Cotta) to speak of what is taught in the *Mysteries:* and then follow the words in question: "Quibus explicatis, ad rationemque revocatis, rerum magis natura cognoscitur quam deorum." That is, "If you will weigh" (says Cotta) "and consider all these opinions, so like your own, they will lead you to the knowledge, not of the nature of the Gods, which you, Velleius, proposed to discourse of, but to the nature of things, which is quite another consideration." Or, in clearer terms, it was, he tells us, Velleius's drift to bring men from *Religion* to *Naturalism*. This observation is to the purpose; and shews that Velleius had deviated from his argument. But what M. Pluche makes him say, is to nobody's purpose but his own. In a word, *quibus explicatis, &c.* relates to all that Cotta had said of the Epicureans—of those who made religion the invention of Statesmen—of Prodicus Chius—of Euhemerus, and of the *Mysteries*. But M. Pluche makes it relate only to the *Mysteries*. It had hardly been worth while to mention this M. Pluche, had it not been evident, that his purpose in this interpretation of Cicero was to disguise the liberty he took of transcribing the general explanation of the MYSTERIES, as delivered in the first edition of this volume, printed in 1738, into the *second* edition (for when he published the *first*, he knew nothing of the matter) of his book, called *Histoire du Ciel*, printed 1741, without the least notice or acknowledgment. But for a further account of this piece of plagiarism, I refer the reader to a discourse, intitled *Observations sur l'explication que M. l'Abbé Pluche donne des mysteres et de la mythologie des payens dans son Histoire du Ciel*, written with much judgment and solidity, by M. de Silhouette: who has intirely subverted M. Pluche's fanciful system, as well as proved, that he took his idea of the *Mysteries* from the *Divine Legation*. It is in the fifth dissertation of a

work, intitled *Dissertations sur l'union de la religion, de la morale, et de la politique.*

P. 211. F. *Eusebius* says, Scripture tells us this, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ οἱ ἱεροὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς διδάσκουσι λόγοι. And so indeed it does even in the general tenor of its history. But I am persuaded this learned writer had his eye on some particular passage; probably on the xlvth chapter of *Isaiah*, where the prophet, foretelling the conquests of *Cyrus*, and the exaltation of his Empire, apostrophizes the God of *Israel* in this manner, *Verily thou art a God* THAT HIDEST THYSELF, *O God of* Israel, *the Saviour*, ver. 15. This was said with great propriety of the Creator of all things, the subject of the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ, or *Secret*, in all the *Mysteries* throughout the *Gentile* World; and particularly of those of *Mithras*, in that country which was the scene of the prophecy. That this is the true sense of this obscure passage, appears from the following words of the same chapter, where God himself addresseth the Jewish people: *I have not spoken* IN SECRET, IN A DARK PLACE *of the earth: I said not unto the seed of* Jacob, *Seek ye me* IN VAIN, ver. 19. This was said, to shew that he was taught amongst them in a different way from that participation of his Nature to a *few select Gentiles*, in their *Mysteries;* celebrated *in secret, and in dark* subterraneous *places;* which not being done in order to give him glory, by promoting his public and general worship, was done *in vain*. These were the two places (explained by one another) which, I presume, furnished *Eusebius* with his observation, *That for the* Hebrew *people alone was reserved the honour of being initiated into the knowledge of God the Creator of all Things, and of being instructed in the practice of true piety towards him.*—This naturally leads us to the explanation of those oracles of *Apollo*, quoted by *Eusebius* (*Præp. Evang.* lib. ix. cap. x.) from *Porphyry;* the sense of which neither those ancient writers, nor our Sir *John Marsham*, seem rightly to have understood. The first is in these Words,

> Αἰπεινὴ γὰρ ὁδὸς μακάρων, τρηχεῖά τε πολλὴν,
> Χαλκοδέτοις τὰ πρῶτα διοιγομένη πυλεῶσιν.
> Ἀτραπιτοὶ δὲ ἔασσιν ἀθέσφατοι ἐγγεγαυῖαι,
> Ἃς πρῶτοι μερόπων ἐπ' ἀπείρονα πρῆξιν ἔφυσαν
> Οἱ τὸ καλὸν πίνοντες ὕδωρ Νειλώτιδος αἴης.

The Way to the Knowledge of the Divine Nature is extremely rugged, and of difficult Ascent. The Entrance is secured by brazen gates, opening to the adventurer; and the winding roads, to be passed through, impossible to be described. These, to the vast benefit of mankind, were first marked out by the EGYPTIANS.

The second is as follows:

> Μοῦνοι Χαλδαῖοι σοφίαν λάχον ἠδ' ἄρ' Ἑβραῖοι,
> Αὐτογένεθλον ἄνακτα σεβαζόμενοι Θεὸν ἁγνῶς.

True wisdom was the lot only of the CHALDEANS *and* HEBREWS, *who worship the Governor of the world, the self-existent Deity, with pure and holy rites.*

Marsham, supposing after *Eusebius*, that the SAME THING was spoken of in both the Oracles, says, *Certe nulla est controversia quin* περὶ μοναρχίας, *de unius regimine sive de unico Deo, verecus fuerit et rectissima Ebræorum, non item recta Egyptiorum existimatio.* And again,—*Verum Apollo parum sibi constans* (*Canon. Chron.* pp. 255, 256. edit. *Fr.*), because in the one Oracle, the *Egyptians* are said to be the *first;* and in the other, the *Chaldeans* and *Hebrews* the *only* People who knew the true God. But they are very consistent; they treat of DIFFERENT THINGS: The first, of the *Knowledge* of the true God; and the second, of his *public Worship*. This

appears by the different terms in which the Oracles are delivered: The *Hebrews*, whom the Oracle calls *Chaldeans*, were well known to be the *only* people who *publicly worshipped* the true God. But the *knowledge* of him being likewise taught, though to *few*, all over the *Gentile* world, and only in the *Mysteries*, and the *Mysteries* coming, as we have shewn, originally from *Egypt*, the Oracle says, that the *Egyptians first taught men the knowledge of the divine Natures*. But that it was in *this way*, his words plainly intimate:

Ἀτραπιτοὶ δὲ ἔασσιν ἀθέσφατοι ἐγγεγαυῖαι,

which exactly describe the embarrassed and perplexed condition of the *Initiated* before they came to the participation of this knowledge. But when the same Oracle speaks of the *Hebrews*' knowledge of God, he uses a very different language,

σεβαζόμενοι Θεὸν ἁγνῶς,

evidently respecting the calm and settled state of public worship. I will only observe, that the frights and terrors to which the initiated were exposed, gave birth to all those metaphorical terms of *Difficulty* and *Danger* so constantly employed by the *Greek* writers, whenever they speak of the Communication of the true God.

P. 212. G. What hath been said will give light to a strange story told by Thucydides, Plutarch, Cornelius Nepos, Justin, and others, of a debauch and night-ramble of Alcibiades, just before his expedition to Syracuse. In which, they say, he revealed to, and acted over with, his companions, the *Mysteries of Ceres:* that he assumed the office of *Hierophant*, and called some of those he initiated Μύσται, and others, Ἐπόπται: and that, lastly, they broke all the statues of Hermes. These are mentioned by the Historians as distinct actions, and unconnected with one another. But now we see their relation, and how one arose from the other: for Alcibiades having revealed the origin of Polytheism and the doctrine of the Unity to his companions, nothing was more natural than for men, heated with wine, to run forth, in a kind of religious fury, and break the statues of their idols. For, what he acted over, was the celebration of the *greater Mysteries*, as appears from Plutarch's calling them the *Mysteries of Ceres*, she presiding in the *greater*, as Proserpine presided in the *lesser;* and from Alcibiades's calling some Ἐπόπται, the name of those who participated of the *greater Mysteries*.

P. 217. H. A criticism of that very knowing and sagacious writer, Father Simon of the Oratory, will shew the reader how groundless the suspicions of learned men are concerning the genuineness of this Fragment. Father Simon imagines that Porphyry forged the history of Sanchoniatho, under the name of a translation by Philo Byblius; and conjectures that his purpose in so doing was to support Paganism; by taking from it, its *Mythology* and *Allegories*, which the Christian writers perpetually objected to it. "Il se peut faire—pour repondre aux objections qu'on leur faisoit de toutes parts, sur ce, que leur Theologie etoit une pure Mythologie—ils remonterent jusques aux tems qui avoient precedé les allegories et les fictions des sacrificateurs." *Bib. Crit.* vol. i. p. 140. But this learned man totally mistakes the matter. The Christians objected to vulgar Paganism, that the stories told of their Gods, were *immoral*. To this their Priests and Philosophers replied, that these stories were only *mythologic Allegories*, which veiled all the great truths of *Theology*, *Ethics*, and *Physics*. The Christians said, this could not be; for that the stories of the Gods had a *substantial foundation in fact*, these Gods being only dead men deified, who,

in life, had like passions and infirmities with other mortals. For the truth of which they appealed to such writers as Sanchoniatho, who had given the History both of their mortal and immortal stations and conditions. How then could so acute an adversary as Porphyry, deeply engaged in this controversy, so far mistake the state of the question, and grounds of his defence, as to forge a book in support of his cause, which totally overthrew it?

P. 220. I. Some modern Critics think, with *Theophilus*, that Euhemerus was rightly charged with ATHEISM; some think, with *Clemens Alex.* that he was not. There is a circumstance in the case, which seems to me decisive, and would incline one to conclude, concerning him, with the generality of the Ancients: It is this, that the earlier policy of the *Mysteries* and the later of the *Philosophers* concurring to think it expedient for the sake of Religion to keep that truth a secret which Euhemerus divulged, He who, by divulging it, overthrew Paganism, and never troubled himself to substitute any other scheme of Public Worship in its room, might fairly be supposed to intend the destruction of Religion in general.

P. 222. K. The celebrated French Poet, in a late work intituled, *La Philosophie de l'Histoire*, cap. 37. *Des Misteres de Ceres Eleusine*, hath done me the honour of giving his Reader an exact abridgement of all that is here said on the subject of the Mysteries: not as collected from the *Divine Legation*, but as the result of his own researches in Antiquity; save that when he speaks of the Sixth Book of Virgil, he says: "De tres savants hommes ont prouvé que le sixiéme livre de l'Enéide n'est que la peinture de ce qui se pratiquait dans ces spectacles [des Misteres de Ceres Eleus.] si secrets et si renommés:" and when he speaks of the unity of the Godhead revealed in these Mysteries he says, "Le savant Eveque Warburton, quoique *tres injuste dans plusieurs de ses decisions audacieuses*, donne beaucoup de force à tout ce que *je viens de dire* de la necessité de cacher le dogme de l'unité, &c."

My *audacious decisions*, I suppose, are nothing else than my unmasking the ignorance and ill faith of those moderns, which he and his Colleague D'Alembert constantly call THE PHILOSOPHERS, meaning thereby all kind of Unbelievers whatsoever.

P. 223. L. The common reading, in which all the MSS. agree, is, *Quid mihi displiceat*, INNOCENTES *poetæ indicant comici*. Victorius conjectured, that, instead of *innocentes*, Tully wrote IN NOCTURNIS, which is certainly right. By the *poetæ comici*, I suppose, Cicero meant the writers of the NEW COMEDY. The abuses he hints at, as perpetrated in the *Mysteries*, were of a libidinous kind: which occasioned an intrigue proper for the new comedy. And we may see by Fabricius's *Notitia comicorum deperditorum*, *Bibl. Græc.* lib. ii. cap. 22. how frequently the writers of the new comedy laid the scene of their plots in a religious festival or *Mystery*. Plautus, who copied from them, opens the subject of his *Aulularia* in these words,

——"Senex
Is adolescentis illius est avunculus,
Qui eam stupravit noctu Cereris vigiliis."

P. 223. M. By *ille* is here meant P. Clodius, the mortal enemy of Cicero. So that his reasoning seems to stand thus—"I allow an exception for the Eleusinian mysteries, on account of their great use to civil life. But yet their celebration in the night is attended with strange inconveniencies, as appears from the comic poets. And had this liberty of celebrating nocturnal rites by men and women promiscuously, as in the Eleu-

sinian *Mysteries*, been practised in Rome, what enormities must we believe such a one as Clodius would have committed, who contrived to violate the nocturnal rites of the GOOD GODDESS, to which only women were admitted?" For that the Grecian *Mysteries* were thus promiscuously celebrated, appears from what Dionysius Halicarnassensis observes of the purity of the early Roman worship; where no nocturnal vigil (says he) was kept promiscuously by men and women, in the celebration of their *Mysteries.—οὐ διαπαννυχιασμοὺς ἐν ἱεροῖς θεῶν, ἀνδρῶν σὺν γυναιξὶν—.*

P. 228. N. After I had thus distinguished, as here, and elsewhere (in my discourse on the Sixth Æneis and on the Golden Ass of Apuleius) the PURE from the CORRUPT *Mysteries*, the reader will be surprized at the following passage of the very learned and candid Chancellor *Mosheim*—"Pererudite non ita pridem, quanquam non tam semper feliciter quam ingeniose, de MYSTERIIS disputavit Wilhelmus Warburtonus libro celeberrimo, 'The Divine Legation of Moses demonstrated.' Censet vir eruditissimus, ad humanarum mentium immortalitatem docendam omnia instituta fuisse MYSTERIA. Dederim, in *nonnullis* religionis illius, quam recta ratio tradit, præcepta inculcata, et publicarum religionum vanitatem patefactam fuisse: *omnium vero hanc rationem fuisse, nunquam sibi persuadebit, qui vel* BACCHI MYSTERIA *cogitaverit, quæ teste* LIVIO Romani ferre nolebant." *De rebus Christianorum ante Constantinum M. Commentarii.* Cap. i. Sect. 13. note (***). But as to the pure and uncorrupt *Mysteries* of Bacchus, authorized by the magistrate, the learned Writer might have seen, p. 195, note (†), that Celsus expresly affirms, even these taught a future state; which truth his adversary Origen confesses.

P. 228. O. This short historical deduction of the rise and fall of the *Mysteries* will afford much light to the following passage of St. Paul, speaking of the *leaders* and *instructors* of the Gentile world,—"So that they are without excuse: because that *when they knew God, they glorified him not as God*, neither were thankful; but became *vain in their imaginations*, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools: and *changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds and four-footed beasts, and creeping things.* Wherefore God gave them up to *uncleanness*, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves. Who changed the *truth of God into a lie*, and worshipped and *served the creature more than the Creator*, who is blessed for ever, amen. For this cause God gave them up *unto vile affections*," *&c. Rom.* i. 20, *et seq.* In these words, the holy apostle evidently condemns the foolish policy of the Gentile sages, who, *when they knew God* (that is, discovered God, as Paul intimates, by the light of nature) yet *glorified him not as God*, by preaching him up to the people; but, carried away, in the *vanity of their imagination*, by a mistaken principle of politics, that a vulgar knowledge of him would be injurious to society, shut up his *glory* in their MYSTERIES, and gave the people, in exchange for an *uncorruptible God, an image made like to corruptible man and birds, &c.* Wherefore God, in punishment for their thus *turning his truth into a lie*, suffered even their *Mysteries*, which they erected (though on these wrong principles) for a school of virtue, to degenerate into an odious sink of vice and immorality; *giving them up unto all uncleanness and vile affections.* That this was the apostle's meaning, appears not only from the general tenor of the passage, but from several particular expressions; as where he speaks of *changing the glory of God to birds, beasts, and creeping things:* for this was the peculiar superstition of Egypt: and Egypt we have shewn to be the first inventress of the *Myste-*

ries. Again, he says, *they worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator*, παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα. This was strictly true with regard to the MYSTERIES: the CREATOR was there acknowledged by a small and select number of the Participants; but the general and solemn worship even in these celebrations was to their national idols. In the OPEN worship of paganism, either *public* or *particular*, it was not at all true, for there the CREATURE was the sole object of adoration.

P. 229. P. What hath been said above, shews that M. Le Clerc hath gone into the other extreme of party prejudice, when he contends (*Bibl. Univ.* tom. vi. p. 73.) that the *Mysteries* were not corrupted at all. I can conceive no reason for so violent a paradox, but as it favoured an accusation against the *Fathers*, who have much insisted on the corruption of them.—"Les peres ont dit qu'on commettoit toute sorte d'ordures dans ces ceremonies: mais quoi qu'ils disent, il n'est pas croiable que toute la Grece, quelque corrompuë qu'elle ait été, ait jamais consenti que les filles et les femmes se prostituassent dans les mysteres—Mais quelques auteurs chrétiens n'ont fait aucune difficulté de dire mille choses peu conformes à la verité, pour diffamer le paganisme: de peur qu'il n'y eût que les payens à qui on pût reprocher leur calomnies." Bibl. Univ. tom. vi. p. 120.

P. 230. Q. The reader will not be displeased to find here an exact account of this whole matter, extracted from a very curious dissertation of Is. Casaubon, a great and unexceptionable writer, in his Sixteenth Exercitation on the Annals of Baronius.—"Pii patres quum intelligerent, quo facilius ad veritatis amorem corruptas superstitione mentes traducerent; et verba sacrorum illorum quamplurima in suos usus transtulerunt; et cum doctrinæ veræ capita aliquot sic tractarunt, tum ritus etiam nonnullos ejusmodi instituerunt; ut videantur cum Paulo dicere gentibus voluisse, ἃ ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, ταῦτα καταγγέλλομεν ὑμῖν. Hinc igitur est, quod sacramenta patres appellarunt *mysteria*, μυήσεις, τελετὰς, τελειώσεις, ἐποπτείας, sive ἐποψείας, τελεστήρια; interdum etiam ὄργια, sed rarius: peculiariter vero eucharistiam τελετῶν τελετήν. Dicitur etiam antonomastice τὸ μυστήριον, aut numero multitudinis τὰ μυστήρια. Apud patres passim de sacra communione leges φρικτὰ μυστήρια vel τὸ ἀπόῤῥητον μυστήριον; Gregorio Magno, *magnum et pavendum mysterium*. Μυεῖσθαι in veterum monumentis sæpe leges pro cœnæ dominicæ fieri particeps; μύησιν pro ipsa actione; μύστης est sacerdos, qui etiam dicitur ὁ μυσταγωγῶν et ὁ ἱεροτελεστής. In liturgiis Græcis et alibi etiam ἡ ἱερὰ τελετὴ, et ἡ κρυφία καὶ ἐπίφοβος τελετὴ, est eucharistia. Quemadmodum autem gradus quidam in mysteriis paganicis servati sunt, sic Dionysius universam τῶν τελετῶν τὴν ἱερουργίαν, traditionem sacramentorum distinguit in tres actiones, quæ et ritibus et temporibus erant divisæ: prima est κάθαρσις, *purgatio;* altera μύησις, *initiatio;* tertia, τελείωσις, *consummatio;* quam et ἐποψίαν sæpe nominat. Spem meliorem morientibus attulisse mysteria Attica dicebat paulo ante M. Tullius. Patres contra, certam salutem et vitam æternam Christi mysteria digne percipientibus afferre, confirmabant: qui illa contemnerent, servari non posse: finem vero et fructum ultimum sacramentorum θέωσιν, *deificationem*, dicere non dubitarunt, quum scirent vanarum superstitionum auctores suis *epoptis* eum honorem audere spondere. Passim igitur legas apud Patres, τῆς ἱερᾶς μυσταγωγίας τέλος εἶναι θέωσιν, finem sacramentorum esse, ut qui vera fide illa perciperent, in futura vita dii evadant. Athanasius verbo θεοποιεῖσθαι in eam rem est usus; quod mox ab eodem explicatur, *participatione spiritus conjungimur deitati.* De symbolis sacramentorum, per quæ divinæ illæ ceremoniæ celebrantur, nihil attinet hoc loco dicere; illud vero, quod est et appellatur fidei symbolum, diversi est generis, et

fidelibus tesseræ usum præstat, per quam se mutuo agnoscunt, qui pietati sacramento dixerunt ; cujusmodi tesseras fuisse etiam in paganorum mysteriis ostendimus. Formulæ illi in mysteriis peragendis usurpatæ, *Procul este profani*, respondet in liturgia hæc per diaconos pronuntiari solita ; ὅσοι κατηχούμενοι πρόέλθετε ; vel, ἔξω περιπατεῖτε ὅσοι ἐνεργούμενοι, ὅσοι ἀμύητοι ; *omnes catechumeni, foras discedite, omnes possessi, omnes non initiati.* Noctu ritus multi in mysteriis peragebantur ; noctu etiam initiatio Christianorum inchoabatur : Gaudentio nominatur *splendidissima nox vigiliarum.* Quod autem dicebamus de silentio in sacris opertaneis servari a paganis solito, id institutum veteres christiani sic probarunt, ut religiosa ejus observatione mystas omnes longe superarint. Quemadmodum igitur dicit Seneca, sanctiora sacrorum solis initiatis fuisse nota, et Jamblichus de Philosophia Pythagoreorum in τὰ ἀπόῤῥητα, quæ efferri non poterant, et τὰ ἔκφορα, quæ foras efferre jus erat ; ita universam doctrinam christianam veteres distinguebant in τὰ ἔκφορα, id est, ea quæ enuntiari apud omnes poterant, et τὰ ἀπόῤῥητα, arcana temere non vulganda ; τὰ δόγματα, inquit Basilius, σιωπᾶται· τὰ δὲ κηρύγματα δημωσιεύεται, *dogmata silentio premuntur ; præconia publicantur.* Chrysostomus, de iis qui baptizantur pro mortuis : *Capio quidem perspicue rem dicere ; sed propter non initiatos non audeo : hi interpretationem reddunt nobis difficiliorem ; dum nos cogunt, aut perspicue non dicere, aut arcana, quæ taceri debent, apud ipsos efferre.* Atque ut ἐξορχεῖσθαι τὰ μυστήρια dixerunt pagani, de iis qui arcana mysteriorum evulgabant ; ita dixit Dionysius, *Vide ne enunties, aut parum reverenter habeas sancta sanctorum.* Passim apud Augustinum leges, *Sacramentum quod norunt fideles.* In Johannem tract. xi. autem sic ; *Omnes catechumeni jam credunt in nomine Christi,* Sed Jesus non se credit eis. Mox *Interrogemus catechumenum, Manducas carnem filii hominis? nescit quid dicimus.* Iterum, *Nesciunt catechumeni quid accipiant christiani : erubescant ergo quia nesciunt.*" But the worst part of the story is still behind, which the concluding words of the quotation will not suffer me to pass over in silence. These Fathers used so strange a language, in speaking of the *last Supper*, that it gave occasion to a corrupt and barbarous Church, in after-times, to ingraft upon it a doctrine more stupendously absurd and blasphemous than ever issued from the mouth of a Pagan Priest. What is further to be lamented in the affair is this, that the Fathers, who so complaisantly suffered themselves to be misled by these *Mysteries*, in their representation of the Christian Faith, would not suffer the *Mysteries* to set them right in the meaning of a term frequently found in the New Testament, and borrowed from those Rites, namely the very word itself, Mystery : which, amongst the men from whom it was taken, did not signify the revealing of a thing incomprehensible to human reason ; but the revealing of a thing kept hid, and secreted, which yet, in its nature, was very plain and intelligible.

P. 231. R. Mr. Le Clerc owns, that Plutarch, Diodorus, and Theodoret, have all said this ; yet the better to support his scheme in the interpretation of the history of Ceres, he has thought fit to contradict them ; but his reason is very singular :—" C'étoit la coûtume des payens de dire que des divinitez étoient les mêmes, lors qu'ils avoient remarqué quelque legere ressemblance entre elles, *dans la fausse pensée où ils etoient que les plus grands de leurs dieux s'étoient fait connoître dans toute la terre :* au lieu qu'il n'y en avoit aucun qui ne fut topique, c'est à dire particulier à un lieu—On en trouvera divers exemples dans le petit traité *De la deese de Syrie.*" *Bibl. univ.* tom. vi. p. 121. It is very true, that the Gods of the Pagans were local deities ; but to think the Ancients could be ignorant of

this, when it is from the nature and genius of Paganism, as delivered by them, that we come to know it, is a very extraordinary conceit. Indeed the Moderns, possessed with their own ideas, were and are generally unattentive to this truth; and so have committed many errors in their reasonings on the subject. But that principle of the *inter-community of worship* in ancient paganism (explained in another place) would have the same effect in spreading the worship, as if their Gods were universal and not local; which shews the Ancients not mistaken in the point in question. Yet Mr. Le Clerc, in another place, could see that Astartè was certainly Isis, as Adonis was Osiris; and this, merely from the similitude, or rather, identity of their ceremonies.

P. 231. S. There is a remarkable passage in Syncellus relating to this subject, which hath been little understood. This Writer speaking, from Africanus, of the very early Egyptian King, Suphis, says, οὗτος δὲ καὶ ΠΕΡΙΟΠΤΗΣ ἐις Ζεοὺς ἐγένετο καὶ τὴν ἱερὰν συνέγραψε βίβλον, *This King was a Contemplator of the Gods, and wrote a sacred Book.* The Reader may see, by what Sir J. Marsham hath said on this passage [Can. Chron. p. 53] how much it wants explaining. What increases the difficulty is the contrary account which Eusebius, in Syncellus, gives of this matter. He says that *this King was a Contemner of the Gods, and that on his repentance he wrote a sacred book;* ὃς καὶ ΥΠΕΡΟΠΤΗΣ ἐις Ζεοὺς γέγονεν, ὡς μετανοήσαντα αὐτὸν τὴν ἱερὰν συγγράψαι βίβλον. These obscure and inconsistent tracts of History can be only explained and reconciled by what is here delivered concerning the *Mysteries* (originally Egyptian) which had for their grand *secrets* or ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ the detection of Polytheism, and the doctrine of the first Cause. I regard therefore this passage of Africanus, as a remarkable piece of history, which conveys to us the memory of the first Institutor of the ΑΠΟΡΡΗΤΑ of the *Mysteries*. The term περιόπτης peculiar to these Rites, and the ἱερὰ βίβλος, the name of that book which was read to the Initiated, very much support this interpretation. To which let me add this further circumstance:—Suphis, according to Marsham, died about forty years after Abraham. The Patriarch without question instructed the idolatrous Egyptians in the knowledge of the true God. Suphis therefore might take advantage of that knowledge (which he found amongst the priests, with whom Abraham, as Damascenus in Eusebius informs us, had many disputes and conferences about Religion) and apply it to this purpose: And then Eusebius's account that Suphis was *a contemner of the Gods* will be so far from giving us any trouble to reconcile it to Africanus's, who calls this same Suphis a *Contemplator* of them, that they jointly tend to elucidate the general subject. For if Suphis instituted ἀπόῤῥητα in his *Mysteries*, which exposed and disgraced Polytheism, he certainly would be esteemed, by all those who had heard it, as an ATHEIST or *Contemner of the Gods;* the character given to all who opposed Polytheism both in the earlier and later times of Paganism. Now Eusebius finding this charged upon Suphis, by the same authority which says he *wrote a sacred Book*, not apprehending to what the thing referred, and not conceiving how a *prophane* man should be disposed to *write a sacred Book* or a Ritual of Worship, he tried to reconcile matters, by supposing that the Monarch repented of his *impiety* before he wrote his *book*. Lastly, to confirm all that hath been here said, we may observe, that the mode of speech here used concerning Suphis, is the very same which the Egyptian Chroniclers employ when they speak more plainly of the INITIATIONS of their succeeding Kings. Josephus from Manetho, speaking of Amenophis, hath a remarkable passage to this purpose. Φησὶ τοῦτον ἐπιθυμῆσαι Θεῶν

γενέσθαι ΘΕΑΤΗΝ, ὥσπερ Ὧρος εἷς τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ βεβασιλευκότων· ἀνενεγκεῖν δὲ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ὁμωνύμῳ μὲν αὐτῷ Ἀμενώφει, πατρὸς δὲ Πάπιος ὄντι, θείως δὲ δοκοῦντι μετεσχηκέναι φύσεως, κατά τε σοφίαν καὶ προγνωσιν τῶν ἐσομένων· εἰπεῖν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτον τὸν ὁμώνυμον, ὅτι δυνήσεται Θεοὺς ΙΔΕΙΝ, εἰ καθαρὰν ἀπό τε λεπρῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μικρῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν χώραν ἅπασαν ποιήσειεν. [*Cont. Apion.* l. i. c. 26.] "He says, that Amenophis *desired to be made a Contemplator* of the Gods, as was Orus one of his Predecessors in the Kingdom: and that he communicated this desire to his namesake Amenophis, the son of Papis, who, by his wisdom and prescience of futurity, was understood to have *participated of the Divine Nature*. His namesake hereupon told him that he might have the Privilege of *seeing the Gods*, if he would *purge* the whole country from leprous and *unclean* persons." We see plainly that what was here desired by Amenophis, of his namesake, was an INITIATION. This son of Papis appears to have been the HIEROPHANT of the *Mysteries*, and under that character celebrated for his skill in *divining*. The request is enforced by the favour granted to his Predecessor, Orus, as Æneas's request to the Sibyl, that he might visit the infernal Regions, by the example of Orpheus, Hercules, &c.

"Si potuit Manis arcessere conjugis Orpheus, &c."

The proposed adventures are related in the high terms of *seeing the Gods* and *visiting the infernal Regions*, agreeably to what has been, and will presently be further explained concerning this sublime phraseology, arising partly from the high veneration paid to *initiation* into the *Mysteries*, and partly from the amazement occasioned by the *Shews* and the *Machinery* exhibited in the celebration of them. The *Aspirant* is required by his namesake the *Hierophant*, to purify the land from the *unclean*, in conformity to those previous ceremonies of lustration which we have shewn were to be performed before admission to the *Mysteries*. And now we see of how little avail, to the service of infidelity, that *Parallel* is, which Sir J. Marsham has drawn between all these passages from Africanus and Manetho, and Moses's *Visions of God* at the *Bush* and in the *Mount*.

P. 237. T. Ulysses, in Homer, mentions both these sorts in the following lines,

Ζεῦ πάτερ, εἴ μ'—
Φήμην τίς μοι φάσθω ἐγειρομένων ἀνθρώπων
Ἔνδοθεν, ἔκτοσθεν δὲ Διὸς τέρας ἄλλο φανήτω.

The word *omen* in its proper sense signifies *futuræ rei signum, quod ex sermone loquentis capitur*. Tully says, lib. i. *Divin.* "Pythagorei non solum voces deorum observarunt, sed etiam hominum, quæ vocant omina." This sort of omen was supposed to depend much upon the will of the person concerned in the event. Hence the phrases *accepit omen, arripuit omen*. This, as we say, was its first and proper signification. It was afterwards applied to *things*, as well as *words*. So Paterculus, speaking of the head of Sulpicius on the rostrum, says it was *velut omen imminentis proscriptionis*. And Suetonius of Augustus: "Auspicia quædam et omina pro certissimis observabat. Si mane sibi calceus perperam, ac sinister pro dextero induceretur, ut dirum." It was used still in a larger sense to signify an *augury*, as by Tully, *De Div.* lib. i.

"Sic aquilæ clarum firmavit Jupiter *omen*."

And lastly, in the most general sense of all, for a portent or *prodigy* in general, as in the place before us.

P. 243. U. The Etrusci seem to have had the same custom, in which the public reposed its last confidence. Livy tells us, that in the 444th year of Rome, when the affairs of this people were grown desperate by the repeated

defeats of their armies, they had recourse to the *lex sacra*, as their last refuge. Of which the historian gives this succinct and obscure account,—"ad Vadimonis lacum Etrusci *lege sacrata* coacto exercitu, quum *vir virum legisset*, quantis nunquam alias ante simul copiis, simul *animis* dimicarunt," &c., lib. ix. The commentators are at a loss for the meaning of this *sacred law*, in raising an army where every soldier was to chuse his fellow. I certainly think it to be the Institution in question: the Etrusci were descended from the Pelasgi, and had afterwards civilized and polished themselves by Grecian customs, as one may well suppose from the character Livy gives of them in this book—"Cære educatus apud hospites, Etruscis inde literis eruditus erat:—habet autores, vulgo tum Romanos pueros, sicut nunc Græcis, ita *Etruscis literis* erudiri solitos." But, in general, the giving a traditive original even to the most characteristic customs, is very fallacious. MAHOMET, who certainly did not BORROW from the ancient Grecian practices, yet established the same kind of Fraternity amongst his followers, in the first year of the Hegira. See Abul-feda *De vita Mahommedis*, cap. 26. init. *De Fraternitate instituta inter Moslemos.* And, what is still more extraordinary, the Missionaries assure us, that it is one of the most sacred Institutions amongst the warrior-nations of the free people in North America. Which, because it so exactly resembles the Grecian in all its circumstances, I shall give, as I find it described by one of their best writers. "Chacun parmi eux a un ami à peu pres de son age, auquel il s'attache, et qui s'attache à lui par des liens indissolubles. Deux hommes ainsi unis pour leur intérêt commun, doivent tout faire et tout risquer pour s'entr'aider, et se secourir mutuellement: *la mort même, à ce qu'ils croyent, ne les separe que pour un tems: ils comptent bien de se rejoindre dans l'autre monde pour ne se plus quitter*, persuadés qu'ils y auront encore besoin l'un de l'autre.—On ajoute, que ces amis, quand ils se trouvent eloignés les uns des autres, s'invoquent reciproquement dans les périls, où ils se rencontrent; ce qu'il faut sans doute entendre de leurs genies tutélaires. *Les* PRESENS *sont les nœuds de ces associations*, l'intérêt et le besoin les fortifient; c'est un secours sur lequel on peut presque toujours compter. *Quelques uns pretendent qu'ils s'y glisse du desordre;* mais j'ai sujet de croire qu'au moins cela n'est pas general." Journal d'un Voyage dans l'Amerique Septentrionale par le P. de Charlevoix, tome vi. p. 14.

P. 244. X. One can hardly account for that strange mistake of the Abbé Velly in his elegant History of France, where speaking of these *fraternities in arms* amongst the *Northern* Nations (for nature dictates the same practice to all, in the same circumstances), he says—"On n'en trouve AUCUN VESTIGE chez ces fieres Republiques qui s'etoient attribué l'esprit et la politesse à l'exclusion de tout autre Peuple: mais elles sont de toute ancienneté chez les Nations Septentrionales, que la Grece et l'Italie plutôt civilisées ont jugé àpropos de nommer Sauvages et Barbares." Tom. v. p. 58.

P. 246. Y. Hence the reader will be able to judge of the delicacy of taste, and accuracy of discernment, in a late Writer; who, in a book called *Elements of Criticism*, corrects Virgil's want of judgement in this part of the *Æneis*, after having given instances of defects full as notorious, in the *Georgics*. "An episode in a narrative Poem" (says this Man of Taste) "being, in effect, an Accessory, demands not that strict union with the principal subject, which is requisite betwixt a whole and its constituent parts. The relation, however, of *Principal* and *Accessory* being pretty intimate, an Episode LOOSELY connected with the principal subject will never be graceful. I GIVE FOR AN EXAMPLE *the descent of Æneas into Hell*, which employs the Sixth Book of the Æneid. The Reader IS NOT PREPARED for this important event. NO CAUSE IS ASSIGNED that can make it

appear NECESSARY, or even natural, to suspend, for so long a time, the principal action," &c. &c. vol. i. p. 38.—The Critic having told us that *a strict union is not required between the Principal and Accessory*, finds fault with the *Accessory*, that no cause is given to make it appear, that it is NECESSARY to the *Principal*. However, I ought not to be too severe on this great Critic, since the Observation was certainly made on purpose to recommend my interpretation of this *descent into Hell;* which shews, if not the *necessity*, yet the infinite grace and beauty of this noble *Accessory*, and the close and *natural* connexion it has with its *Principal*.

P. 251. Z. But Servius, in his explanation of the *branch*, went upon the absurd supposition that Æneas's descent into hell was the same with that of Ulysses, in Homer, *a necromantic incantation* by sacrifice, to call up the shadows of the dead. "Ramus enim necesse erat, ut et unius causa esset interitus, unde et statim mortem subjungit Miseni: et ad sacra Proserpinæ accedere, nisi sublato ramo non poterat. Inferos autem subire, hoc dicit sacra celebrare Proserpinæ." And again, ad ver. 149, *Præterea jacet exanimum tibi corpus amici*. Ac si diceret; Est et alia opportunitas descendendi ad inferos, id est, Proserpinæ sacra peragendi. Duo enim horum sacrorum genera fuisse dicuntur; unum NECYOMANTLÆ, quod Lucanus exsequitur; et aliud SCIOMANTLÆ, id est, divinationis per umbras; σκία enim umbra est, et μαντεία, vaticinium, quod in *Homero, quem Virgilius sequitur*, lectum est."

P. 251. AA. The learned Selden, in his comment on the ninth book of *Poly-olbion*, seems to approve the absurd conjecture of P. Crinitus, that the *golden-bough* signifies *misletoe:* and would confirm it by that very reason, which absolutely overthrows it; viz. that Virgil COMPARES it to the *misletoe:* for it is contrary to all the rules of good writing, whether simply figurative, or allegoric, to make the *comparison to the cover, the contents of the cover;* a COMPARISON necessarily implying, that the thing, to which another is compared, should be different from that other.

P. 263. BB. The very learned Mr. Dacier translates ἐν ἀπορρήτοις, *dans les Mysteres;* and this agreeably to his knowledge of antiquity. For ἀπόρρητα was used by the ancients, to signify not only the grand secret taught in the *Mysteries*, but the *Mysteries* themselves; as appears from innumerable places in their writings. Yet the celebrated French translator of Puffendorf's *Law of Nature and Nations*, lib. ii. cap. 4, § 19, note (1), accuses him of not understanding his author: "Mr. Dacier fait dire à Platon que *l'on tenoit tous les jours ces discours au peuple dans les ceremonies et dans les Mysteres.* Il seroit à souhaiter qu'il eût allégué quelque autorité pour etablir un fait si remarquable. Mais il s'agit ici manifestement des instructions secrétes que les Pythagoriciens donnoient à leurs initiez, et dans lesquelles ils decouvroient les raisons les plus abstruses et les plus particuliers des dogmes de leur philosophie. Ces instructions cachées s'appelloient ἀπόρρητα—Ce que Platon dit un peu auparavant de Philolaus, philosophe Pythagoricien, ne permit pas de douter que la raison, qu'il rapporte ici comme trop abstruse et difficile à comprendre, ne soit celle que donnoient les Pythagoriciens." He says, *it were to be wished Dacier had some authority for so remarkable a fact.* He hath this very passage, which is sufficient; for the word ἀπόρρητα can mean no other than the *Mysteries.* But those who want further authority, may have enough of it, in the nature and end of the *Mysteries*, as explained above.—He says, "It is evident, Plato is here talking of the secret instructions which the Pythagoreans gave to their Initiated, in which they discovered their most abstruse and particular doctrines. This cannot be so, for a very plain reason. The philosophy of the Pythagoreans, like that of the other sects, was divided into

the *exoteric* and *esoteric;* the *open*, taught to all; and the *secret*, taught to a select number. But the *impiety of suicide* was in the first class, as a doctrine serviceable to society: "Vetatque Pythagoras injussu imperatoris, id est, Dei, de præsidio et statione vitæ decedere," says Tully, in his book *Of old age;* who, in his *Dream of Scipio*, written in the *exoteric* way, condemns *suicide* for the very same reason; but in an epistle to a particular friend, which certainly was of the *esoteric* kind, he approves of it; "Ceteri quidem, Pompeius, Lentulus tuus, Scipio, Afranius, fœde perierunt. At Cato PRÆCLARE. Jam istuc quidem, cum volemus, licebit." Lib. ix. ep. 18. It could not be, therefore, that the impiety of *suicide* should be reckoned amonst the ἀπόῤῥητα of philosophy, since it was one of their *popular* doctrines. But this will be fuller seen, when we come to speak of the philosophers, in the next book. Mr. Barbeyrac concludes, that, "as Plato had spoken of Philolaus a little before, it cannot be doubted but that he speaks of the reason against *suicide*, as a doctrine of the Pythagorean philosophy." What has been said above, utterly excludes this interpretation. But though it did not, there is nothing in the context which shews, Plato thought of Philolaus in this place. It is allowed, this was a doctrine of the Pythagoric school, though not of the *esoteric* kind. The *Mysteries*, and that School, held a number of things in common; this has been shewn, in part, already: and when we come to speak of Pythagoras, it will be seen how it happened.

P. 264. CC. We may well judge it to be so, when we find it amongst the CHINESE (see *M. Polo*, lib. ii. cap. 28.) and the ARABIANS, the two people least corrupted by foreign manners, and the vicious customs of more civilized nations. The Arabians, particularly, living much in a state of nature, where men's wants are few, and consequently where there is small temptation to this unnatural crime, yet were become so prone to it, that their lawgiver Mahomet found it necessary to exact an oath of the Arabian women, not to destroy their children. The form of this oath is given us by Gagnier, in his notes on Abel-feda's *Life of Mahomet*, and it is in these words;—"Ne deo rem ullam associent; ne furentur; ne fornicentur; NE LIBEROS SUOS OCCIDANT [metu paupertatis uti habetur, *Sur* vi. v. 151.] neque inobedientes sint Apostolo Dei, in eo quod justum est." p. 41. n. (a).

P. 264. DD. The Egyptian laws were said to have been of Isis's own appointment. This will shew us with what judgment and address Ovid has told the tale of Lidgus the Cretan, in his *Metamorphosis;* (of the nature and art of which work more will be observed hereafter.) Lidgus (in the ixth book, fab. 12.) is represented as commanding his pregnant wife, Telethusa, to destroy the expected infant, if it proved a female. Yet is this Cretan thus characterized,

> "vita fidesque
> Inculpata fuit"—

in a word, just such another as Terence's man of universal benevolence, (mentioned above) the Author of the famous maxim, *homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto*, and of the very same command of infanticide to his Wife; who for not obeying it is reckoned by him, amongst those, *qui neque jus neque bonum atque æquum sciunt.* Telethusa, however, as common as such a command was, and as indifferent as it was esteemed, is much alarmed with the apprehension of falling into the cruel situation of being obliged to execute it. In this distress Isis appears to her in a dream, promises her assistance, and orders her to deceive her husband, and bring up whatever the Gods should send:

" Pone graves curas, mandataque falle mariti ;
Nec dubita, cum te partu Lucina levârit,
Tollere quicquid erit"—

Ovid's moral of his tale is this, "That Egypt had opposed very wise and humane laws to the horrid practice of INFANTICIDE, now become general, and continuing unchecked by all other civil institutions."

P. 309. EE. On what is here said concerning the Character of Æmilianus the most learned Chancellor Mosheim observes as follows : "Platonicis Christianam Religionem astu subvertere studentibus, APULEIUM non ita pridem addidit vir ingenio æque magnus atque doctrina, *Guil. Warburtonus* in *Demonstratione divinæ Legationis Mosis*. Hunc enim in notissima illa de aureo Asino fabula seu *Metamorphosi* id egisse putat, ut *Mysteria* Deorum summa virtute ad sanandas et purgandas hominum mentes esse prædita, sacrisque Christianis idcirco longe anteferenda, demonstraret, hominem nempe imprimis superstitiosum, Christianisque et publico Sectæ, quam probabat, et privato nomine inimicum. Observavit Vir egregius, qua est sagacitate, rerumque veterum peritia, in Apuleio nonnulla nemini ante ipsum observata : in quibus id placet maxime, quod LICINIUM ÆMILIANUM, qui APULEIUM apud Africæ Proconsulem *Magiæ* accusaverat, CHRISTIANUM fuisse ex *Apologia*, quæ extat, accusati, non sine magna veri specie suspicatur. De consilio vero *Fabulæ de Asino*, quod commentationem *Mysteriorum* et Christianæ Religionis contemtionem vir doctissimus esse conjicit, dubitare mihi liceat, quum nihil afferri videam ex ea, quod difficulter in aliam partem accipi possit." *De rebus Christ. ante Constant. M. Commentarii* Seculum tert. Sect. 21. not. (***) The English of which conclusion amounts to this, "That another interpretation might be given of the *Golden Ass*." I believe so. It might be shewn to contain a process for the discovery of the *Philosopher's Stone*. And a certain German Chymist, if I be not mistaken, has extracted this secret out of the *Fable*.

P. 346. FF. These were the considerations, doubtless, which induced the excellent author *De l'esprit des loix* to say, "Il est aisé de regler par des loix ce qu'on doit aux autres ; il est difficile d'y comprendre tout ce qu'on se doit à soi-meme." Vol. I. p. 167. 4to.

P. 361. GG. See Book IV.—Nay, so fond were they of this notion of local tutelary Deities, that they degraded even JUPITER himself, their *Father of gods and men*, into one of them, as appears by his several appellations of *Jupiter Ammon*, *Olympicus*, *Capitolinus*, etc. This deceived Dr. Bentley, who finding *Jupiter*, in the popular theology, to be a local Deity, concluded him not to be *one* but *many*. So that in the last edition of his excellent *Remarks* on that foolish book, called *A discourse of free-thinking*, he reproves the translator of Lucan for calling Jupiter Ammon, *this greatest of the Gods, this mighty chief:*—"A Roman would never have said that *Juppiter Ammon* was as great as *Juppiter Capitolinus ;* though the translator took it for granted *that all Juppiters must needs be the same.* But a known passage in Suetonius may correct his notion of the heathen theology.—Augustus had built a temple to *Juppiter Tonans*, within the area of the capitol : whereupon he had a dream, that *Capitolinus Juppiter* complained his worshippers were drawn away : Augustus, in his dream, answered, that he had dedicated *Tonans* there, only as the other's porter : and accordingly, when he waked, he hung (as a porter's badge) that temple round with bells.—Now if *Capitolinus* would not bear the very *Thunderer* by him, but in quality of his porter ; much less would he have suffered poor beggarly *Ammon* (for all he was his name-sake) to be styled the *mighty chief*." p. 281. Here he had *one* poet to contradict ; who "thought" (he says) "all Jupiters the same." When he wrote his notes on Milton

he had *another* on his hands, who, it seems, did not think them to be the same, and he chuses to contradict him, likewise.

> " Ammonian Jove, or Capitoline, was seen,
> He with Olympias, this with her who bore
> Scipio "— Par. Lost, Book ix. 508.

On which, the Critic observes with some contempt—" Then he brings more stories—and (something strange) TWO Jupiters." However in his former humour he will have it, that *according to the popular theology*, " all Jupiters were not the same." This will deserve to be considered. The PEOPLE of Antiquity, in excess of folly and flattery, were sometimes wont to worship their good kings and benefactors under the name of *Jupiter, the Father of gods and men*, who, by thus lending his titles, received, in a little time, from posterity, all that worship which was first paid to the borrowers of his name ; all their particular benefactors being swallowed up in him. And this was one principal reason of Jupiter's being a *tutelary deity*. But their PHILOSOPHERS, searching into the original of the Pagan theology, found out this lost secret, That their kings had given occasion to the worship of this local tutelary Jupiter ; whom, therefore, they regarded, as different Jupiters ; that is, as so many kings who had assumed his name. Hence Varro in Tertullian reckons up no less than three hundred. The result of all this was, that in the *popular theology* there was but ONE Jupiter ; in the *philosophic theogony* there were MANY. Just as, on the contrary, in the *popular mythology* there were *many* Gods ; in the *philosophic physiology*, but *one*.

What shall we say then to the story from Suetonius, which is brought to prove that, according to the popular theology, *all Jupiters were not the same?* For surely the Romans regarded the Capitoline Jupiter and the Thunderer as the same person : If it be asked, Why then, had they different names? Suetonius will inform us : who relates that Augustus consecrated this temple to Jupiter Tonans, on his being preserved from a dreadful flash of lightning, in his Cantabrian expedition. And so Minucius Felix understood the matter, where he thus addresses the Pagan idolators —" Quid ipse JUPITER vester ! modo imberbis statuitur, modo barbatus locatur : et cum HAMMON DICITUR, habet cornua ; et cum CAPITOLINUS, tunc gerit fulmina." Cap. 21. And Eusebius, who was perfectly well acquainted with the pagan theology, says expresly, that Ammon was one of the *Surnames* of Jupiter—ἔτι δὲ Διὰ τὸν ὑπό τινων ΑΜΜΩΝΑ προσαγορευόμενον. *Præp. Evang.* l. iii. c. 3. And Cicero in his book of *the nature of the Gods* makes Cotta take it for granted, that the Capitoline and the Ammonian Jupiter were one and the same ; for, speaking of the form and figure of the Gods against Velleius, he says, *Et quidem alia* [species] *nobis Capitolini, alia Afris Ammonis Jovis*. Where all the weight of the observation consists in the supposition, that the *Capitoline* and *Ammonian* Jupiter were one and the same God. However, this must be confessed, that Capitolinus and Tonans appear to Augustus in a *dream*, as two different persons, and are so considered by him when *awake*. The true solution of the difficulty is this : The Pagans worshipped their Gods under a material visible image. And their Statues, when consecrated, were supposed to be informed by an Intelligence, which the God, to whose worship they were erected, sent into them, as his Vicegerent. This general notion furnished Lucian with a pleasant incident in his *Jupiter Tragicus*, who, calling a grand synod of the Gods, is made to summon all those of gold, silver, ivory, stone, and copper. Now, in Augustus's dream, it was the *Intelligence*, or Vicegerent, in the statue of Jupiter Capitolinus, who complained of his new brother, in that of Tonans, as getting all the

custom from him. This being the whole of the mystery, Jupiter's popular unity remains unshaken.

But what shall we say to the Critic? He censures Rowe, for not saying what Milton had said; and afterwards censures Milton for not saying what Rowe had said: and is yet so unlucky as to be doubly mistaken. The case is this, Where Milton speaks of two Jupiters, he is delivering the sense of the *Philosophers;* where Rowe says there was but one, he is delivering the sense of the *people;* and both were right. But the Critic, being in a contradicting humour, will have both to be in the wrong.

P. 361. HH. "Denique et antequam commerciis orbis pateret, et antequam gentes ritus suos moresque miscerent, unaquæque natio conditorem suum, aut ducem inclytum, aut reginam pudicam sexu suo fortiorem, aut alicujus muneris vel artis repertorem venerabatur, ut civem bonæ memoriæ. Sic et defunctis præmium, et futuris dabatur exemplum." *Minuc. Fel.* c. xx. Hence may be seen the falshood, both in *fact* and *right*, of the foundation principle of the book called—*The grounds and reasons of the Christian Religion;* that "it was a *common* and *necessary* method for new Revelations to be built and grounded on precedent Revelations." Chap. iv. p. 20, 26. See this position confuted more at large in the Divine Legation, Book vi. sect. vi.

P. 365. II. "Ils me donnoient cette response assez plaisante; qu'ils ne pretendoient pas que leur Loi fût universelle—qu'ils ne pretendoient point que la nôtre fût fausse;—qu'il se pouvoit faire qu'elle fût bonne pour nous, et que DIEU POUVOIT AVOIR FAIT PLUSIEURS CHEMINS DIFFERENS POUR ALLER AU CIEL; mais ils ne veulent pas entendre que la nôtre étant generale pour toute la terre, la leur ne peut être que fable et que pure invention." *Voyages de Fr. Bernier*, tom. ii. p. 138. Friar William de Rubruquis, a French Minorite, who travelled into Tartary in the year 1253, tells us, c. xliii. that Mangu Chan, Emperor of Tartary, talking to him of religion, said, "As God hath given unto the hand divers fingers, so he hath *given many ways to men to come unto him;* he hath given the Scriptures unto you; but he hath given unto us soothsayers, and we do that which they bid us, and we live in peace." The Jesuit Tachard tells us, that the king of Siam made much the same answer to the French embassador, who moved him, in his master's name, to embrace the Christian religion—"Je m'etonne que le roy de France mon bon ami s'intresse si fort dans une affaire qui regarde Dieu, où il semble que Dieu même ne prenne aucune interest, et qu'il a entiérement laissé à nôtre discretion. Car ce vray Dieu, qui a créé le ciel et la terre et toutes les creatures qu'on y voit, et qui leur a donné des natures et des inclinations si differentes, ne pouvoit-il pas, s'il eût voulu, en donnant aux hommes des corps et des ames semblables, leur inspirer les mêmes sentimens pour la religion qu'il falloit suivre, et pour le culte qui luy étoit le plus agreable, et faire naître toutes les nations dans une même loy? Cet ordre parmi les hommes et cette unité de religion dependant absolument de la Providence divine, qui pouvoit aussi aisement introduire dans le monde que la diversité des sectes qui s'y sont etablies de tout tems; ne doit on pas croire que *le vray Dieu prend autant de plaisir à estre honoré par des cultes et des ceremonies differentes*, qu'à estre glorifié par une prodigieuse quantité de creatures qui le loüent chacune à sa maniere? Cette beauté et cette varieté que nous admirons dans l'ordre naturelle, seroient elles moins admirables dans l'ordre surnaturel, ou moins dignes de la sagesse de Dieu?" *Voyage de Siam*, l. v. p. 231, 232. Amst. ed. 1688. The Abbé de Choisi, a coadjutor in this embassy, tells us, that the people were in the same way of thinking with their king.—"Jusques ici ils [les missionnaires] n'ont pas fait grand chose

dans le royaume de Siam. Les Siamois sont des esprits doux, qui n'aiment pas à disputer, et qui *croyent que la plûpart de toutes les religions sont bonnes.*" *Journal du Voyage de Siam*, p. 200. ed. Amst. 1688.

P. 366. KK. M. Voltaire, in his *Le Siécle de Louis* XIV, having spoken of this persecuting spirit amongst the followers of Christ, and observed that it was unknown to Paganism, says very gravely, that "after having *long searched* for the cause of this difference between the two religions, both of which abounded with dogmatists and fanatics, he at length found it in the REPUBLICAN SPIRIT of the latter."—This was only mistaking the *effect* for the *cause;* and was no great matter in a writer, who in the same place can tell us, not as problematical, but as a known and acknowledged truth, that the JEWS as well as Gentiles offered HUMAN sacrifices.—"Cette fureur fut inconnuë au Paganisme. Il couvrit la terre de ténébres, mais il ne l'arrosa guerres que du sang des animaux; et si quelquefois CHEZ LES JUIFS et chez les Païens on *devoua des victimes humaines*, ces devouemens, tout horribles qu'ils étaient, ne causérent point de guerres civiles.—J'AI RECHERCHE LONGTEMS comment et pourquoi cet esprit dogmatique, qui divisa les ecoles de l'antiquité payenne sans causer le moindre trouble, en a produit parmi nous de si horribles.—Ne pourrait-on pas trouver peut-être l'origine de cette nouvelle peste qui a ravagé la terre, DANS L'ESPRIT REPUBLICAIN qui anima les premieres églises?" Tom. ii. chap. 32. *Du Calvinisme*, p. 23. Strange! that he should mistake thus, when he had the true cause almost in view, as he had when he made the following observation: "La religion des Païens ne consistait que dans la morale et dans des fetes." And again, in his *Abregé de l'Histoire Universelle*—"la raison en est, que les Payens dans leurs erreurs grossières *n'avoient point de dogmes*," p. 63. The first question is, How he came by his observation? That it was no deduction of his own appears from his not seeing the consequence of the fact contained in it, which was great *indifference* in Religion: for he goes on with that old encomium on Paganism, which our Free-thinkers (who did not see from whence the *indifference* arose) are always ready to give unto it. See p. 164. vol. I. of the Abregé. The second question is, How the Christians came by their *republican spirit?* And this only is worth an answer. Without doubt it was the SPIRIT OF THEIR RELIGION which gave it to them, when the followers of Paganism had it not. Christianity consists in the belief of certain propositions necessary to salvation; which *peculiarity* virtually condemns all other religions. So that these other having the civil power on their side, would endeavour to suppress so inhospitable a Novelty. And this directly violating conscience, produced the *Republican spirit*, or the spirit of resistance; whose natural aim goes no further than *Liberty;* not to *Dominion*. Agreeably hereto, as is observed above, the first persecution for Religion was *borne*, not *inflicted*, by the Christian Church.

P. 367. LL. To this old Pagan blindness, some modern Christians seem to have succeeded. They pretend, that what is said in Scripture of the dependency and foundation of Christianity on Judaism, is said by way of ACCOMMODATION to the prejudices of the Jews; but that when the preachers of the Gospel applied themselves to the Gentiles, they preached up Jesus simply, as a divine Messenger, omitting the Jewish characters of the Messiah. Now, though nothing can be more false, or extravagant; yet the method employed by the first Preachers of the Gospel, to introduce Christianity amongst the Gentiles, gives this foolish Doctrine the little countenance it hath.

P. 367. MM. This, the Father says on the authority of Tertullian and Eusebius. M. Le Clerc, in his *Hist. Eccl. ann.* xxix. rejects the whole

story, though it be as strongly supported as a civil fact can well be. What he urges against it is fully obviated by the principles here delivered. Indeed the chief force of his objection arises from several *false additions* to the fact: A circumstance, which may be found in, and hath been brought to the discredit of, the best attested facts of antiquity; such as the defeat of Julian's attempt to rebuild the Temple of Jerusalem. See my discourse on that subject.

P. 367. NN. The not attending to the genius of Paganism, hath misled some of the best Critics into a very lame judgement on the first Apologists; who, they pretend, have unskilfully managed, in employing all their pains to evince what was so easy to be done, the falshood of Paganism, rather than to prove the truth of their own Religion. For, say these critics, were Paganism proved false, it did not follow that Christianity was true; but were the Christian Religion proved true, it followed that the Pagan was false. But the matter, we see, was just otherwise; and the Apologists acted with much good judgment. The truth of Christianity was acknowledged by the Pagans; they only wanted to have the compliment returned. As this could not be done, there was a necessity to assign the reasons of their refusal. And this gave birth to so many confutations of idolatrous Worship. It is true, when their adversaries found them persist in their *unsociable* pretences, they paid this harsh treatment in kind; and accused Christianity, in its turn, of falshood: but this was not till afterwards, and then faintly, and only by way of acquit. For want of due reflection on these things, both FABRICIUS and L'ENFANT have been betrayed into this wrong judgment.—"Facilius subscribo" (says the first) "judicio viri celeberrimi atque eruditissimi Jacobi L'enfant, in Diario Londiniensi," *Hist. of the works of the Learned, A.* 1709. p. 284. "Il y a long tems, qu'on a eu lieu de remarquer, que la religion Chrétienne est une bonne cause, qui de tout tems a été sujette à être aussi mal defenduë, que mal attaquée. Ses PREMIERS APOLOGISTES la soûtinrent mieux par leur zèle, par leur pieté, et par leurs souffrances, que par les Apologies, qu'ils nous en ont laissées." —*Delectus argum. et syllabus script. qui relig. Christ. asser.* p. 209.

P. 368. OO. This was not understood immediately by the Pagans, as appears from a remarkable passage of Lampridius in his life of Alexander Severus—"Christo templum facere voluit [Alex. Severus] eumque inter deos recipere—Sed prohibitus est ab iis qui, consulentes sacra, repererant omnes Christianos futuros si id optato evenisset, et templa reliqua deserenda." Now those who rested this conclusion on an oracle, or divine premonition, could have no knowledge of the *nature* of Christianity.

P. 368. PP. The reader will not be displeased to hear a curious story, from the life of St. Anscharius, which tends much to illustrate what we say, concerning the genius of Paganism, and the reason of its aversion to Christianity. This Saint travelling amongst the people of the North, fell into the following adventure:—"Pervenit ad Byrcam, ubi invenit regem et multitudinem populi nimio errore confusam. Instigante enim Diabolo, contigit, eo ipso tempore, ut quidam illo adveniens diceret, se in conventu deorum, *qui ipsam terram possidere credebantur*, adfuisse, et ab iis missum, ut hæc regi et populis nuntiaret: Vos, inquiunt, nos vobis propitios diu habuistis, et terram incolatus vestri cum multa abundantia nostro adjutorio in pace et prosperitate longo tempore tenuistis. Vos quoque nobis sacrificia et vota debita persolvistis. At nunc et sacrificia solita subtrahitis, et *vota spontanea segnius offertis*, et, quod magis nobis displicet, *alienum Deum* super vos introducitis. Si itaque nos vobis propitios habere vultis, sacrificia omissa augete, et vota majora persolvite. Alterius quoque Dei culturam,

quæ contraria nobis docetur, ne apud vos recipiatis, et ejus servitio ne intendatis. Porro si etiam *plures Deos habere desideratis, et vobis non sufficimus, Ericum quondam regem vestrum nos unanimes in collegium nostrum adsciscimus, ut sit unus de numero Deorum.*" Mabillon, Act. SS. Ord. S. Bened. Sæc. iv. p. 2. And how little these Pagans doubted of Christianity's being a real Revelation from a God, we may see in another place of the same *Life*, where one of their piratical kings proposes, according to their custom, to enquire by divination what place they should next invade :—"Interim rex præfatus cum Danis agere cœpit, ut sorte perquirerent, utrum voluntate deorum locus ipse ab eis devastandus esset. Multi, inquit, ibi sunt Dii potentes et magni, ibi etiam olim ecclesia constructa est, et cultura Christi à multis Christianis ibi excolitur, qui *fortissimus est Deorum*, et potest sperantibus in se quomodo vult auxiliari—Quæsitum est igitur sortibus," etc. Cap. xvi.

P. 368. QQ. The very learned and acute M. Moyle says, *it was the greatest misfortune that could have befallen the Christians to be persecuted by so great and good a man* [M. Antonine.] *Post. Works*, v. ii. p. 274. And Lord Shaftesbury observes, *that nothing could have been a greater honour or advantage to Christianity than to be persecuted by a* Nero. Letter con. Enthus. Sect. III. We shall know what to think of these observations, when we have considered how the case stood with regard to *persecuting* Emperors. In this class we find, on one side, Nero, Domitian, and the Maximiani ; on the other, Trajan, the Antonines, and Valerian. Had the *Persecutors* been all like the first set, Unbelievers would have said, "No wonder that force and violence failed to root out the Christian sect, when employed by such Monsters as were hated by Gods and Men." Had the *Persecutors*, on the contrary, been all of the other kind, Unbelievers would then have said, "There must needs have been something very wrong in the Christian practice, or very impudent in the imposture of their pretences, to provoke the sanguinary resentments of Emperors so wise and clement." But now, to see Christianity *persecuted* indifferently by the Good and Bad, is sufficient to reduce the enemies of Revelation to silence upon this topic : and is enough to satisfy unprejudiced men, assisted in their judgment by what has been said above, that Providence appeared anxious (as it were) to shew, by this disposition of things, that matters very foreign to the *merits of the case* set this violent machine a-going ; whose issue, it was decreed, should convince the World that all it's power was weakness, when opposed to the progress of the Gospel.

P. 369. RR. St. Paul tells us in what this *hostile odium* consisted, where speaking of their obstinate adherence to the *Law* against all the convictions of the *Gospel*, he says, *And they please not God, and are* contrary to all men, 1 Thess. ii. 15. They were not *contrary to all men* in their having different Rites ; for each nation had rites different from one another : but in their condemning and reprobating all Rites but their own : which being (till the coming of Christianity) peculiar to themselves, was ascribed to their *hatred of mankind.*

P. 369. SS. Τὸ δὲ ἕτοιμον τοῦτο, ἵνα ἀπὸ ἰδικῆς κρίσεως ἔρχηται, μὴ κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν, ὡς οἱ Χριστιανοί. Lib. xi. § 3. But by this *mere obstinacy*, no more possibly might be meant than *a rigid adherence to truth*, which was not one of the distinguishing virtues of this royal Philosopher, as appears even from these *Meditations*. He represents *L. Verus*, his Colleague in the Empire, as a pattern of vigilance, sobriety, and decency ; and his Wife *Faustina*, as exemplary for her conjugal tenderness and fidelity. Might not then the same stoical pride which thought fit to cover Luxury

and Lust under the names of Temperance and Chastity, be ready to call the divine Heroism of the Christian Martyrs a *brutal obstinacy*?

P. 371. TT. St. Chrysostom supposed the Apostle was convened before the Areopagus as a CRIMINAL: and his authority hath made it the general opinion: From whence, the learned Author of a Tract intituled, *Observations on the conversion of St. Paul*, hath received it. I would rather think, that the *Philosophers*, who *encountered* him, invited him thither as a PUBLIC BENEFACTOR, who had a new Worship to propose to the people. My reasons are these:

1. St. Paul was taken up to this Court by the PHILOSOPHERS. Acts xvii. 19.—But the Philosophers, *of that time*, abhorred the character of delators or persecutors for Religion: this was a temper which sprung up amongst them with the progress of Christianity. The worst opinion they had of Paul was his being a *babbler*, as the Epicureans called him; though the Stoics thought more reverently of his character, as *a setter forth of strange gods*, *ξένων δαιμονίων καταγγελεὺς*, a discoverer of some *foreign* Gods; for their hospitality extended to all *strangers*, (as Julian tells us) whether *Gods* or *Men*; and this could not but be a welcome office to a people disposed to raise altars even to *Gods unknown*, v. 23.

2. Their address to him, when they had brought him thither, [*may we know what this doctrine, whereof thou speakest, is*, v. 19.] implies rather a request to a Teacher than an interrogatory to a Criminal.

3. At least, the reason they give for their request goes no further than to imply a desire of satisfaction concerning a doubtful matter—*For thou bringest certain strange things to our ears*, v. 20. *ξενίζοντά τινα, certain foreign ceremonies or customs.* And Strabo, as we see, tells us, the Athenians were most addicted to *foreign worship.*

4. But the very words of the historian fully explain the whole matter; for having told us that these Philosophers *took Paul, and brought him to Areopagus*, he subjoins the motive of their proceeding in these words,—*For all the Athenians, and strangers which were there* [*i. e.* such as resided there for education, or out of love for the Athenian manners] *spent their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing.* Now had the writer understood the *citation* to be of the criminal *form*, he would have given a more pertinent reason for their conduct; such as jealousy of danger to the State, or the established Religion.

5. St. Paul's speech to the Court hath not the least air of an apology suiting a person *accused*; but is one continued information of an important matter, such as befitted a Teacher or Benefactor to give.

6. Had he appeared as a Criminal, the charge against him would have been simply, *The setting forth of strange Gods.* Now this charge of less importance he declines to answer; and yet confesses a much greater crime, of which he was not accused, namely a condemnation of their established Worship—*And the times of this ignorance God winked at*, etc. v. 30.

7. The behaviour of the Court towards him shews he was not heard as a Criminal. He is neither acquitted nor condemned: but dismissed as a man, *coram non judice.—And when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked: and others said, We will hear thee again of this matter*, v. 32.

8. He left the Court, as one *thus* dismissed.—*So Paul departed from amongst them*, v. 33. A strange way of intimating a juridical acquittal; but very naturally expressing a resentment for a slighted mission. For as some *mocked*, and others referred him to an indefinite time of audience, nothing was left him but to depart, and, according to his master's direction, *to shake the dust from off his feet.*

9. The historian's reflection on the whole supports all the foregoing reasons—*Howbeit, certain men clave unto him, and believed*, etc. v. 34. A very natural conclusion of the story, if only a transaction within the sphere of his Mission; for then, having related its ill success in general, *some mocking, and others putting off the hearing*, he adds, that however it was not altogether without effect, for a few converts he did make, *etc.* But if we suppose it a narrative of a juridical process, we shall not find in it one circumstance of a proper relation. We are not so much as told whether he was acquitted or censured, or gave caution for a new appearance: But, as if so illustrious a prosecution (where the most learned of the Apostles was the *Criminal*, the Greek Philosophers his *Accusers*, and the Court of Areopagus his *Judges)* was below the historian's notice, we are told a thing quite foreign to the matter,—That he made but few converts.

In a word, take this history in the sense here explained, and the whole narrative is simple, exact, and luminous: Take it in the other, and it scarce affords us one single quality of a pertinent relation, but is obscured from one end to the other, both by redundancies and omissions.

But had the interpreters not overlooked a plain fact, they would have given a different sense to this adventure. When Christianity first appeared, its two enemies, the Jews and Gentiles, had long administered their superstitions on very different principles. The Jews employed *persecution;* but the Gentiles gave a free *toleration*. And, though, soon after, the latter went into the *intolerant* measures of the other, yet, at this time, they still adhered to the ancient genius of Paganism. So that, of the many various persecutions of the Christian Teachers, recorded in *The Acts of the Apostles*, there is not one but what was begun and carried on by Jewish Magistrates, or at least excited by their emissaries; if we except that at Philippi, which too was on pretence of an injury to private property.—But the good Father, like more modern Interpreters, was full of the ideas of his own times, when the Persecution of the Christian Faith was far advanced, rather than those of St. Paul, when it was not yet begun. And so I leave it (as it is a mistake) to be obstinately persisted in.

P. 372. UU. Lib. ii. c. 8. Thus, I think, the words ought to be read and pointed. The common reading is, *separatim nemo habessit deos neve novos: sed ne advenas, nisi publice adscitos, privatim colunto:* which is absurd and unintelligible. The manuscript quoted by Manutius reads, *neve novos sive advenas*. In a word, this Law seems not to have been understood by the critics, from their not apprehending the nature of Paganism, and the distinction between their *tolerated* and *established* religions. By the first branch, *separatim nemo habessit deos*, is meant that the Gods in general should not be worshipped in private CONVENTICLES, or be had, as it were, in propriety; (*Suos deos*, says the comment) but lie in common to all the Citizens. And by the second branch, *neve novos, neve advenas, nisi publice adscitos, privatim colunto*, is meant that PARTICULARS should not worship any *new* or *foreign* god without licence and authority from the State. For we must remember what hath been said, in the first section of this book, concerning the two parts of Pagan religion; the one public, and the other private; the one, which had the *State* for its subject; the other, *particulars*. Now the *State*, as such, worshipped only the country gods; and this was properly the *established religion*. *Particulars*, as such, frequently grew fond of new and foreign gods, and modes of worship: and these, when allowed by the state, were their *tolerated religions*. *Privatim* therefore signifies [*by particulars*] not [*privately*], which latter sense would make a contradiction in the sentence: *Nisi publice adscitos, privatim*

colunto: "Let them not worship them PRIVATELY, unless they be PUBLICLY allowed." For how could those be said to be *privately* worshipped, that were *publicly* owned? By *deos* NOVOS, both here and in the comment, I suppose, is meant *gods newly become such:* which in another place he calls —*quasi* NOVOS *et adscriptitios cives in cœlum receptos.—De nat. deor.* l. iii. c. 15. For the *dii minorum gentium* were a kind of every-day manufacture: such as Tully in the words immediately following thus describes: *Ollos quos endo cœlo merita vocaverint;* or, *those who had newly discovered themselves to men.* And by ADVENAS, the *known local gods of other countries.*

P. 372. XX. Lib. ii. c. 10. Thus I venture to correct the passage. The common editions have it—*Non a sacerdotibus, non a patribus acceptos deos, ita* PLACET *coli, si huic legi* PARUERUNT *ipsi.* Gruter says: "Ita me Deus amet, vix intelligo: hæreo, adhuc hæreo."—And none of the critics have pretended to make sense of it, but Petit, in his comment on the Attic laws: "De advenis Diis" *(says he)* "sibi facit objici Tullius, an non liceat acceptos a sacerdotibus aut a patribus alienigenas Deos colere? Respondet Cicero, licere, si, prout hac cavebatur lege, publice sint adsciti, non privata patrum aut sacerdotum auctoritate. Hic igitur verborum Tullii sensus est, qui latet et lectores fugit, qui excidit interrogationis nota, loco suo restituenda et reponenda ad hunc modum. *Suosque deos, aut novos aut alienigenas coli, confusionem habet religionum, et ignotas ceremonias. Non a sacerdotibus, non a patribus acceptos deos? Ita placet coli, si huic legi* PARUERINT *ipsi.*" But as plausible as this appears, it cannot, I think, be the true interpretation. Cicero is made to object impertinently: for who, from the words *neve novos, neve advenas, nisi publice adscitos, privatim colunto,* could form any suspicion that, by this law, *the gods received by the priests or their forefathers* (which certainly had long enjoyed the public allowance) were forbid to be worshipped? And those not publicly allowed, were forbid, from whatever quarter they were brought in. On the other hand, the propriety of the sense, given above, is seen from hence: 1. That the observation is of the nature of an example to a precept. He delivers a *law* concerning the licensing new religions by the Magistrate; and then takes notice that, had it been well observed in Rome, it had prevented a great deal of superstition. 2. The frequent breach of this *law* in Rome was a notorious fact; as appears by the speech of Posthumius in Livy, quoted above; and therefore very likely to be taken notice of by Tully, when he was upon this subject. And what St. Austin says, in his second book of the *City of God,* concerning the actions told of the gods in their public worship at Rome, and the lubricity of that worship, shews the seasonableness of this animadversion. Further, as the general sense of the *law* justifies the emendation in the *Comment;* so the words, *aut novos, aut alienigenas,* in the *Comment,* confirm the correction in the *law.*—By, *confusionem religionum,* I suppose Tully meant, such a confusion of ceremonies, as would leave no distinction between the *established* and the *tolerated* worship; and thereby reduce Religion to so impotent a state, as to render it useless to civil Society: And by, *ignotas ceremonias,* rites, which the Magistrate, by reason of their celebration in private conventicles, could not take cognizance of: which might hurt the morals of society, by their lewdness, as happened in the Bacchanals at Rome; or endanger its peace by cabals and factions, supported and encouraged by the secrecy of their celebration. In the remaining words, Cicero gives a plain intimation, that, had this law been observed, many superstitions both in the *established* and *tolerated* religions had been avoided; which he hints had been introduced, without warrant from the State, by an interested Priesthood and an ignorant Ancestry. To conclude,

the neglect of this law in Rome was very notorious: and, probably, owing to their having no standing judicature, as at Athens, for that purpose.

P. 376. YY. An intelligent missionary seemed to see where the thing stuck, when he says, "Pour ce qui est des conversions, qu'on peut faire de ces gens-là touchant l'Evangile, *on ne sauroit faire aucun fond sur eux.* Ces sauvages, de même que tous ceux de l'Amerique, sont fort peu disposez aux lumieres de la foi, parce qu'ils sont *brutaux et stupides*, et que leurs *mœurs sont extremement corrompues*, et opposées au Christianisme." *Nouvelle Decouv. dans l'Ameriq. Sept. par le R. P. Louis Hennepin Missionaire Recollect et Notaire Apostolique*, à Utr. 1697. p. 221. The corrupt manners of the savages here complained of, as indisposing them to the Gospel, we find, from this writer and others, are of such a kind as arise only from the want of civil government; and which civil government every where rectifies; such as *rapine*, *cruelty*, and *promiscuous mixtures*. Hans Egede, a Danish missionary, who had been five and twenty years in Greenland, in his description of that country, speaks to the same effect: "It is a matter which cannot be questioned" (says this sensible writer) "that, if you will make a man a Christian out of a mere savage and wild man, you must first make him a reasonable man.—It would contribute a great deal to forward their conversion, if they could, by degrees, be brought into a settled way of life," &c. p. 211, 212.

P. 377. ZZ. This justice is due to the JESUITS, That they have been wiser in their attempts on PARAGUAY, and on the coast of California; where they have brought the savage inhabitants to a love of agriculture and the mechanic arts. The mission in California was founded at the expence of a certain marquis de Valero; for which the reverend person, whose name was permitted to be put to the Account of *Lord Anson's Voyage Round the World*, has suffered the Marquis to be called *a most magnificent Bigot*.

P. 377. AAA. This is the system of *Charlevoix* in the following passage; which is well worth the reader's notice: After having spoken of the shocking miseries attending the uncivilized condition of the Canadian savages, he goes on thus: "Il faut néanmoins convenir que les choses ont un peu changé sur tous ces points, depuis notre arrivée en ce pays; J'en ai même vû chercher à se procurer des commodités, dont ils auront peut-être bientôt de la peine à se passer. Quelques-uns commencerent aussi à prendre un peu plus leurs précautions pour ne pas se trouver au depourvû, quand la chasse leur manquera; et parmi ceux, qui sont domiciliés dans la colonie, il y a bien peu à ajouter pour les faire arriver au point d'avoir un nécessaire raisonnable. Mais qu'il est à craindre que, quand ils en seront là, ils n'aillent *bientôt plus loin, et ne donnent dans un superflu*, qui les rende plus malheureux encore, qu'ils ne sont presentement dans le sein de la plus grande indigence. *Ce ne sera pas au moins les missionnaires, qui les exposerent à ce danger;* persuadés qu'il est moralement impossible de bien prendre ce juste milieu, et de s'y borner, ils ont beaucoup mieux aimé partager avec ces peuples ce qu'il y a de penible dans leur maniere de vivre, *que de leur ouvrir les yeux sur les moyens d'y trouver des adoucissemens.* Aussi ceux-mêmes, qui sont tous les jours temoins de leurs souffrances, ont-ils encore bien de la peine à comprendre comment ils y peuvent resister, d'autant plus qu'elles sont sans relâche, et que toutes les saisons ont leurs incommodités particulieres." *Journal Histor. d'un Voyage dans l'Ameriq. Septent.* vol. VI. p. 57, 58.

THE

DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES

DEMONSTRATED.

BOOK III.

SECTION I.

In the beginning of the last book, I entered upon the proof of my second proposition; namely, That all antiquity was unanimous in thinking that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was necessary to the well-being of society: And the method I laid down for it, was, 1. To shew *the conduct of Legislators, and the founders of civil policy.* 2. *The opinions of the wisest and most learned of the ancient Sages.*

The conduct of the legislators hath been fully examined in the last book.

II. The opinion of the ancient sages, is the subject of the present.

They too, as well as the Lawgivers, were unanimous in this point, how discordant soever and at variance amongst themselves, in other matters. Whatever System of Policy the Historian favoured; whatever Theory of Nature the Philosopher espoused; this always remained an unquestionable principle. The favourer of arbitrary power deemed it the strongest bond of blind obedience; and the friend of civil liberty, the largest source of virtue and a public spirit. The Atheist, from the vastness of its social use, concluded Religion to be but an invention of State; and the Theist, from that confessed utility, laboured to prove it of divine original.

To give the reader a detail of the discourses, where this truth is owned and supported, would be to transcribe Antiquity: for, with *this* begins and ends every thing they teach and explain of Morals, Government, human Nature, and civil Policy. I shall therefore content myself with two or three passages, as a specimen only, of the general voice of ancient Wisdom.

Timæus the Locrian, a very early Pythagorean, well practised in

Affairs, and, in Plato's opinion, of consummate knowledge in philosophy, discoursing on the remedies to moral evil, after having spoken of the use of philosophy to lead well-tempered minds to happiness, by teaching the measures of just and unjust; adds, that, for intractable spirits civil Society was invented; which keeps men in fear by the coercions of Law and Religion: "But if we come" (says he) "to a perverse ungovernable disposition, there, punishments should be applied; both those which civil laws inflict, and those which the terrors of religion denounce against the wicked from above and from below: as, that ENDLESS PUNISHMENTS attend the remains of unhappy men; and all those torments, which I highly applaud the Ionic poet for recording from ancient tradition, in order to cleanse and purify the mind from vice."*

That sage historian, Polybius (whose knowledge of mankind and civil Government was so celebrated, that Rome preferred him to the august employment of composing laws for Greece, now become a province to the republic) speaking of the excellence of the Roman Constitution, expresseth himself in this manner: "But the superior excellence of this Policy, above others, manifests itself, in my opinion, chiefly in the religious notions the Romans hold concerning the Gods: that thing, which in other places is turned to abuse, being the very support of the Roman affairs; I mean THE FEAR OF THE GODS, or what the Greeks call *superstition;* which is come to such a height, both in its influence on particulars, and on the public, as cannot be exceeded. This, which many may think unaccountable, seems plainly to have been contrived for the sake of the Community. If, indeed, one were to frame a civil Policy only for wise men, it is possible this kind of Institution might not be necessary. But since the multitude is ever fickle and capricious, full of lawless passions, and irrational and violent resentments, there is no way left to keep them in order, but by the terrors of FUTURE PUNISHMENT, and all the pompous circumstance that attends such kind of fictions. On which account the Ancients acted, in my opinion, with great judgement and penetration, when they contrived to bring in these notions of the Gods, and of a FUTURE STATE, into the popular belief; and the present age as inconsiderately, and absurdly, in removing them, and encouraging the multitude to despise their terrors. For see now the consequence: in Greece, the man who is entrusted with the public money (to pass by other matters) though it be but of a single talent, and though he give a ten-fold security in the most authentic form, and before twice the

* —Εἰ δὲ κά τις σκληρὸς καὶ ἀπειθὴς, τούτῳ δ' ἐπέσθω κόλασις, ἅ τ' ἐκ τῶν νόμων καὶ ἃ ἐκ τῶν λόγων σύντονα ἐπάγουσα δείματά τε ἐπωράνια καὶ τὰ καθ' ᾅδεω, ὅτι κολάσεις ἀπαραίτητοι ἀπόκεινται δυσδαίμοσι νερτέροις· καὶ τἄλλα ὅσα ἐπαινέω τὸν Ἰωνικὸν ποιητὰν, ἐκ παλαιᾶς ποιεῦντα τὼς ἐναγέας.—Περὶ ψυχᾶς κόσμω. TIMÆUS, p. 23. in *Opuscula Myth. Eth. et Physicis*, Cantabr. 1671, 8vo.

number of witnesses which the Law requires, cannot be brought to discharge his engagements; while, amongst the Romans, the mere RELIGION OF AN OATH keeps those, who have vast sums of money passing through their hands, either in the public administration or in foreign legations, from the least violation of their trust, or honour. And whereas, in other places, it is rare to find a man, who can keep his hands clean, or forbear plundering his Country; in Rome it is as rare to take any one offending in this kind. That every thing which exists is subject to mutation and decay, we need not be told; the unalterable nature of things sufficiently informs us of this truth. But there being two ways, whereby every kind of Policy is ruined and dissolved; the one from WITHOUT, and the other from WITHIN; that destruction, which cometh from without, cannot be constantly avoided by any human provision: but then, there are known and efficacious remedies for those evils which arise from within."*

Polybius says literally, There are two ways by which a State is brought to dissolution, from without and from within: *that* from without is uncertain and little known; that from within is known and certain. By which words he must mean what I make him to say, as appears by what he immediately subjoins, where he shews how the power of the Great, when degenerated into tyranny, may be checked by the People: whose opposition to power produces, as it happens to be well or ill managed, either the best or worst form of government, a Democracy or Ochlocracy.

This long passage deserves our attention, and for many reasons. Polybius was a Greek, and, as all good men are, a tender lover of his Country, whose ancient glory and virtue were then fast on the decline,

* Μεγίστην δέ μοι δοκεῖ διαφορὰν ἔχειν τὸ Ῥωμαίων πολίτευμα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, ἐν τῇ περὶ θεῶν διαλήψει. Καί μοι δοκεῖ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ὀνειδιζόμενον, τοῦτο συνέχειν τὰ Ῥωμαίων πράγματα· λέγω δὲ τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἐκτετραγῴδηται καὶ παρεισῆκται τοῦτο τὸ μέρος παρ' αὐτοῖς εἴς τε τοὺς κατ' ἰδίαν βίους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ καταλιπεῖν ὑπερβολήν· ὃ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι θαυμάσιον· ἐμοί γε μὴν δοκοῦσι τοῦ πλήθους χάριν τοῦτο πεποιηκέναι. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν πολίτευμα συναγαγεῖν, ἴσως οὐδὲν ἦν ἀναγκαῖος ὁ τοιοῦτος τρόπος· ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶν πλῆθός ἐστι ἐλαφρὸν καὶ πλῆρες ἐπιθυμιῶν παρανόμων, ὀργῆς ἀλόγου, θυμοῦ βιαίου, λείπεται τοῖς ἀδήλοις φόβοις, καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τραγωδίᾳ τὰ πλήθη συνέχειν. Διόπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ δοκοῦσί μοι τὰς περὶ θεῶν ἐννοίας καὶ τὰς περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾅδου διαλήψεις οὐκ εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν εἰς τὰ πλήθη παρεισαγαγεῖν· πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ νῦν εἰκῇ καὶ ἀλόγως ἐκβάλλειν αὐτά. Τοιγαροῦν χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ τὰ κοινὰ χειρίζοντες, παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἐὰν τάλαντον μόνον πιστευθῶσιν, ἀντιγραφεῖς ἔχοντες δέκα, καὶ σφραγῖδας τοσαύτας, καὶ μάρτυρας διπλασίους, οὐ δύνανται τηρεῖν τὴν πίστιν· παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις οἱ κατά τε τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς πρεσβείας πολύ τι πλῆθος χρημάτων χειρίζοντες δι' αὐτῆς τῆς κατὰ τὸν ὅρκον πίστεως, τηροῦσι τὸ καθῆκον. Καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις σπάνιόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν ἀπεχόμενον ἄνδρα τῶν δημοσίων, καὶ καθαρεύοντα περὶ ταῦτα· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις σπάνιόν ἐστι τὸ λαθεῖν τινα πεφωραμένον ἐπὶ τοιούτῳ πράξει. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπόκειται φθορὰ καὶ μεταβολή, σχεδὸν οὐ προσδεῖ λόγου· ἱκανὴ γὰρ ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἀνάγκη παραστῆσαι τὴν τοιαύτην πίστιν· δυοῖν δὲ τρόπων ὄντων καθ' οὓς φθείρεσθαι πέφυκε πᾶν γένος πολιτείας, τοῦ μὲν ἔξωθεν, τοῦ δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς φυομένου· τὸ μὲν ἐκτὸς ἄστατον ἔχειν συμβαίνει τὴν θεωρίαν· τὰ δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν τεταγμένην.—E POLYBII *Historiarum* libro vi. cap. 54, 55.

and the Roman mounting to its meridian. The melancholy reflexions, arising from this view of things, were always uppermost in his thoughts: so that speaking here of the great influence which Religion had on the minds of the Romans, he could not forbear giving his countrymen a lesson, and instructing them in what he esteemed the principal cause of their approaching ruin; namely, a certain libertinism, which had spread amongst the PEOPLE OF CONDITION, who, ashamed of the simplicity of their Ancestors, and despising the ignorance of the People, affected a superior penetration, which brought them to regard, and preposterously to teach others to regard, the restraints of religion as illusory and unmanly. This he confirms by shewing the strong influence religion hath on the morals of men. But to understand what follows, *of the two ways by which a state comes to ruin, from without and from within*, which seems to be brought in a little abruptly, we must suppose, that those, to whom the historian addresses himself, had objected, *That it was not a want of piety amongst themselves, but the force of the Roman arms without, which had broken the power of Greece; and that this disaster they were patiently to submit to, because all empires have their stated periods.* Let us suppose this, and the political reflexion on the fall of States will have a high propriety, and close connection with what preceded. It is to this effect: "I agree with you," says Polybius, "that evils, coming suddenly on a State from without, cannot be easily warded; but then, those arising from within, as they are commonly foreseen, have their remedies at hand. Now I take our misfortunes to have proceeded from *these:* for had not a neglect of religion depraved the manners of the Greeks, Rome had wanted both pretence and inclination to invade us, and Greece would have continued able to support its own sovereignty: therefore your trite aphorism *of the mutability of human things* is here altogether misapplied."

But had this great man lived only one age later, he would have found large occasion of addressing this very admonition to the Romans themselves; when the same libertine spirit foreran and contributed to the destruction of *their* Republic; and religion had so lost its hold of those, whom, in the time of Polybius, it so entirely possessed, that Cæsar could dare, in full senate, with a degree of licence unexampled in Antiquity, to declare, that the doctrine of a *future state of rewards and punishments* was all a groundless notion. This was a dreadful prognostic of their approaching ruin.

If this great politician then may deserve credit, it would be worth while for our *People of condition* to look about them, and compute their gains by such a conduct: those of them I mean, if any such there be, who profess to love their Country, and yet as publicly

despise the Religion of it. One of them, who did both in an eminent degree, and who would substitute a TASTE, instead of a *future state*, for the government of the world, thus expresseth himself: "Even *conscience*, I fear, such as is owing to *religious discipline*, will make but a slight figure, where this TASTE is set amiss. Amongst the vulgar perhaps it may do wonders: a *devil* and a *hell* may prevail, where a *jail* and a *gallows* are thought insufficient. But such is the nature of the liberal, polished, and refined part of mankind; so far are they from the *mere simplicity of babes and sucklings*, that, instead of applying the notion of a future reward or punishment to their immediate behaviour in society, they are apt much rather, through the whole course of their lives, to shew evidently that they look on the pious narrations to be indeed no better than children's tales and the amusement of the mere vulgar."*

I will not now ask, Where was the *religion*, but where was the *civil prudence* of this great patriot? For if it be indeed true, as he confesses, that *amongst the vulgar a devil and a hell may prevail, where a jail and a gallows are thought insufficient;* why would this *lover of his country* take off so necessary a restraint on the manners of the multitude? If he says he would not, I ask, why then hath he publicly ridiculed it? Or was it indeed his intention to make all his fellow-citizens MEN OF TASTE? He might as well have thought of making them all LORDS.†

So absurd and pernicious is the conduct of the Free-thinkers, even admitting them to be in the right. But if, instead of removing the rubbish of superstition, they be indeed subverting the grounds of true religion, what name must be given to this degree of madness and impiety?

On the whole, I fear we are in no right way. Whether in the Public too we resemble the picture this sage historian hath drawn of degenerated Greece, I leave to such as are better skilled in those matters to determine.

The great *Geographer*, whose knowledge of men and manners was as extensive as the habitable globe, speaks to the same purpose: "The multitude in society are allured to virtue by those enticing fables, which the poets tell of the illustrious atchievements of ancient heroes, such as the labours of Hercules and Theseus; and the rewards conferred by the Gods, for well-doing. So again, they are restrained from vice by the punishments, the Gods are said to inflict upon offenders, and by those‡ terrors and threatnings which certain dreadful words and monstrous forms imprint upon their minds; or by believing that divine judgements have overtaken evil men. For it is

* "Characteristics," vol. iii. p. 177, edit. 3. † See note A, at the end of this book. ‡ See note B, at the end of this book.

impossible to govern women and the gross body of the people, and to keep them pious, holy, and virtuous, by the precepts of philosophy: this can be only done by the FEAR OF THE GODS; which is raised and supported by ancient fictions and modern prodigies. The thunder therefore of Jupiter, the Ægis of Minerva, the Trident of Neptune, the Thyrsus of Bacchus, and the Snakes and Torches of the Furies, with all the other apparatus of ancient theology, were the engines which the Legislator employed, as bugbears, to strike a terror into the childish imaginations of the Multitude."*

Lastly, Pliny the elder "owns it to be expedient for society, that men should believe, that the Gods concerned themselves in human affairs; and that the punishments they inflict on offenders, though sometimes late indeed, as from Governors busied in the administration of so vast an Universe, yet are never to be evaded."† Thus He, though an Epicurean; but an Epicurean in his senses: from whom we hear nothing of the mad strains of Lucretius, "That all religion should be abolished, as inconsistent with the peace of mankind."

SECTION II.

BUT to give this matter its full evidence, it will be proper to set together the PUBLIC PROFESSIONS, and the PRIVATE SENTIMENTS of the ancient THEISTICAL PHILOSOPHERS: who, notwithstanding they were for ever discoursing on the doctrine of *a future state* of rewards and punishments, to the People, yet were all the while speculating in private on other and different principles. A conduct which could proceed from nothing, but a full persuasion that this *doctrine* was the very vital part of Religion; and the only support of that influence, which divine worship hath on the minds of the Multitude.

Now, though after reading their *history*, reflecting on their *characters*, and examining their *writings* with all the care I was able, it appeared to me, that these men believed nothing of that *future state* which they so industriously propagated in the world; and therefore on this, as well as other accounts, deserved all that asperity of language with which they are treated by the *Sacred writers;* yet the

* Οἵ τε πολλοὶ τῶν τὰς πόλεις οἰκούντων εἰς μὲν προτροπὴν ἄγονται τοῖς ἡδέσι τῶν μύθων, ὅταν ἀκούωσι τῶν ποιητῶν ἀνδραγαθήματα μυθώδη διηγουμένων· οἷον Ἡρακλέους ἄθλους, ἢ Θησέως, ἢ τιμὰς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν νεμομένας,—εἰς ἀποτροπὴν δὲ, ὅταν κολάσεις παρὰ θεῶν, καὶ φόβους, καὶ ἀπειλὰς, ἢ διὰ λόγων, ἢ διὰ τύπων ἀώρων τινῶν προσδέχωνται, ἢ καὶ πιστεύωσι περιπεσεῖν τινας. Οὐ γὰρ ὄχλον τε γυναικῶν, καὶ παντὸς χυδαίου πλήθους ἐπαγαγεῖν λόγῳ δυνατὸν φιλοσόφῳ, καὶ προσκαλέσασθαι πρὸς εὐσέβειαν, καὶ ὁσιότητα, καὶ πίστιν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ διὰ δεισιδαιμονίας· τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἄνευ μυθοποιΐας, καὶ τερατείας. Κεραυνὸς γὰρ, αἰγὶς, καὶ τρίαινα, καὶ λαμπάδες, καὶ δράκοντες, καὶ δυσόλογχα τῶν θεῶν ὅπλα, μῦθοι· καὶ πᾶσα θεολογία ἀρχαϊκὴ· ταῦτα δ' ἀπεδέξαντο οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καταστησάμενοι μορμολύκας τινὰς πρὸς τοὺς νηπιόφρονας.—STRABO, *Geogr.* lib. i.

† "Verum in his Deos agere curam rerum humanarum credi, ex usu vitæ est; pœnasque maleficiis aliquando seras, occupato Deo in tanta mole, nunquam autem irritas esse."—*Hist. Nat.* lib. ii. cap. 7.

contrary having been long and generally taken for granted, and their real opinions often urged by our ablest divines, as conformable and favourable to the Christian doctrine of a future state; I suspect that what I have here said, will be exclaimed against as an unreasonable and licentious *paradox*.

But, for all this, I do not despair of proving it a certain, though an unheeded, *truth*: and then I shall hope my reader's pardon for the length of this enquiry, as it is of no small moment to shew the sense Antiquity had of the *use* of a future state to Society: and as, in shewing that use, I shall be able to clear up a very important point of antiquity, doubly obscured, by length of time and perversity of contradiction.

But, before I enter on the matter, I shall, in order to abate the general prejudice, explain what is meant by that FUTURE STATE, which, I suppose, the THEISTICAL PHILOSOPHERS did not believe. And this the rather, because the contrary opinion has continued the longer unquestioned, through the lax and ambiguous use of the term. Thus, because it was evident, that all, or most of the theistical philosophers *believed*, as well as taught, the *immortality*, or rather the *eternity* of the *soul*, men, tied down to the associations of modern ideas, concluded that they believed, as well as taught, the doctrine of a *future state of rewards and punishments*.

To make the reader, therefore, master of the question, it will not be unfit, just to distinguish the several senses, in which the Ancients conceived the PERMANENCY of the human soul; and to reserve the explanation of them, and assignment of them to their proper authors, for another place.

This *permanency* was either,

I. *A* SIMPLE EXISTENCE *after this life*: or,

II. EXISTENCE IN A STATE OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT, *according to men's behaviour here*.

Each of these was two-fold.

Simple existence was either,

I. AN IMMEDIATE REFUSION OF THE SOUL, ON DEATH, INTO THE UNIVERSAL NATURE or TO' 'EN, FROM WHENCE IT PROCEEDED:

Or, II. A CONTINUANCE OF ITS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT EXISTENCE, ON DEATH, FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD, BEFORE ITS REFUSION INTO THE TO' 'EN, IN A SUCCESSIVE TRANSITION THROUGH VARIOUS ANIMALS, BY A NATURAL AND FATAL, NOT MORAL DESIGNATION.

Existence in a state of rewards and punishments was either,

I. A STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, *IMPROPERLY* SO CALLED; WHERE HAPPINESS AND MISERY WERE THE NATURAL

AND NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES OF VIRTUE AND VICE; NOT POSITIVELY SO, OR BY THE FREE DESIGNATION OF WILL:

Or, II. A STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, *PROPERLY* SO CALLED; WHERE THE HAPPINESS AND MISERY CONSEQUENT ON VIRTUE AND VICE, WERE THE POSITIVE AND FREE DESIGNATION OF WILL, AND NOT THE NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES OF THINGS.

The LAST is that notion of a future state, so useful to Society, which all the Lawgivers, Priests, and Philosophers publicly taught and propagated; and which the People throughout the whole earth universally believed. Of this, the METEMPSYCHOSIS was, generally, a part; and, what is more, continues to be so to this very day, amongst the civilized Gentiles of the East.

It is A FUTURE STATE, then, OF REWARDS and PUNISHMENTS IN GENERAL, and particularly the *second* and proper notion of it (for as to the *first*, it was peculiar to the Platonists) which I pretend to prove the ancient Philosophers did not believe.

But before I proceed to explain the principles of each sect, it will not be improper to premise those GENERAL REASONS, which induced me to think *that the Philosophers did not always believe what they taught: And that they taught this doctrine without believing it.* And as the reader's chief prejudice, on this point, ariseth from the Philosophers' having talked and written so much in behalf of a future state of rewards and punishments; the three first of the following general reasons will shew, 1. That they all thought it lawful to say one thing, and think another. 2. That they perpetually practised what they thus professed to be lawful. And 3. That they practised it on the very point in question.

I. My *first* general reason was, *that the ancient Sages held it lawful, for the public good, to say one thing when they thought another.*

We have described the times of Antiquity very ill, if it doth not appear, from what is here said, that each People had the most religious regard to the laws and constitutions of their country. What raised this veneration (natural to all men, accustomed to a form of Policy) to such a height, was the popular prejudice in favour of their original. For, we have seen, the Founders pretended to receive their respective institutions from some PATRON GOD. At the time, they received the *civil policy*, they established the *national religion*; whose principal rites were objective to the *patron God*; which gave occasion to the PUBLIC PART OF RELIGION, explained above: whereby, the State, as such, became the subject of religious worship.

This making the *national Religion* one of the most necessary and essential parts of *civil Government*, it would become a general maxim, not only of *mere* politicians, but of all the best and wisest of those

times, THAT EVERY ONE SHOULD CONFORM TO THE RELIGION OF HIS COUNTRY. We see, by the behaviour of SOCRATES himself, how much men were possessed with the fitness and importance of this rule. That excellent man, who made it the business of his life to search out, and expose the errors of human conduct, was most likely to detect the folly of this general prejudice. Yet when he comes to his defence before his judges; a defence, in which he was so scrupulous that he rejected what his friends would have added of confessed utility to his service, because not strictly conformable to that truth, by which he squared the rectitude of his life; when he comes, I say, to answer that part of the charge which accuses him of attempting to overturn the *popular Divinities*, he declares it, in the most solemn manner, as his opinion, that *every one should adhere to the Religion of his country.** If it should still be suspected, that this was only said, as it made best for his defence, let us follow him in his last moments, retired amidst his philosophic friends and followers; and there we shall find him still true to this *great principle*, in a circumstance which hath much distressed, and still distresses, modern critics to account for; I mean the requesting his friends to sacrifice a cock to Æsculapius; a piece of devotion, on some account or other, no matter what, due from him, according to the customs of his country, which he had neglected to perform.†

But for all this, no one the least conversant in antiquity, will, I suppose, take it into his head that these Sages, because they held *every one should adhere to the religion of his country*, did not therefore see the gross errors of the national religions. Why then (it may be asked) was this strange violation of truth amongst men who employed all their studies to evince the importance of it, in general, to happiness?

The explanation of the riddle is easy: the GENIUS of their national religions, consisting rather in the performance of *Rites* of Worship than in the profession of *Opinions*, taught them to conclude, THAT UTILITY AND NOT TRUTH WAS THE END OF RELIGION. And if we attentively consider those religions (formed in subserviency to the State) as is occasionally explained in the several parts of this work, we shall not much wonder at their conclusion. And then not rightly distinguishing between *particular* and *general* UTILITY; between that which ariseth from the *illegitimate*, and *legitimate*, administration of civil policy, they universally embraced this other false conclusion, THAT UTILITY AND TRUTH DO NOT COINCIDE.‡ From this latter principle, a third necessarily arose, THAT IT WAS LAWFUL AND EXPEDIENT TO DECEIVE FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD. This all the

* See note C, at the end of this book. † See note D, at the end of this book.
‡ See the contrary proposition proved towards the beginning of the sixth section of the third book.

ancient Philosophers embraced: and Tully, on the authority of Plato, thinks it so clear, that he calls the doing otherwise NEFAS, *a horrid wickedness*. The famous Scævola, the Roman Pontiff, frankly declares his opinion (as St. Austin tells us) "that Societies should be deceived in religion." * The last mentioned author goes on: "Varro, speaking of religions, says plainly, that there are many TRUTHS which it is not EXPEDIENT the vulgar should know; and many FALSHOODS which yet it is useful for the people to receive as truths." † Upon which the Father remarks, "Here you have the whole arcana of state." ‡ Nothing shews more strongly, that, not truth, but utility, ruled all, in Paganism, than the case Livy mentions, of what happened in the 573d year of Rome. Some concealed books of Numa were discovered; which, on examination by the proper officers, being found to be injurious to the *established Worship*, were ordered, by Authority, to be burnt. Not one word is objected to them as containing any *falsehood;* on the contrary, they were treated at their execution with the utmost reverence and respect; and the fire was lighted by the sacred Ministers who served at the Altar.—As we go along, we shall find *this* maxim universally received by the *theistical* Philosophers.

I would only observe, that it appears from hence, that the principles, which induced the ancient Sages to deem it lawful to LYE or deceive for the public good, had no place in the *nature*, or in the *consonant propagation* of the JEWISH and CHRISTIAN religions.

II. My *second* general reason was, *that the ancient Sages did actually say one thing when they thought another.* This appears from that general practice in the *Greek Philosophy*, of a TWOFOLD DOCTRINE; the EXTERNAL and the INTERNAL; a *vulgar and a secret.* The first openly taught to all; and the second confined to a select number. If this needed any other proof than what is given above, it might be supported by the very language used in speaking of the Philosophers—εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος ἦγεν μυσταγωγίαν.§—ἐπῆν Ἀριστοτέλους τοῖς μυστηρίοις.‖ Now what *initiation* or what *mystery* could there be in a sect that had nothing to *hide* from the Many, nothing to *communicate* to the Few? And how, but by saying one thing and thinking another, could such a System be supported? Nor were they different doctrines or subjects, but one and the same, handled differently; popularly and scientifically; viz. according to OPINION, or according to TRUTH. ¶

* "Expedire existimat falli in religione civitates."—*De Civitate Dei*, lib. iv. cap. 10.
† "Varro de religionibus loquens, evidenter dicit, multa esse VERA, quæ vulgo scire non sit UTILE; multaque, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat."
‡ "Hic certe totum consilium prodidit SAPIENTIUM, per quos civitates et populi regerentur." § MARINUS in *Vita Procli*. ‖ THEMIST. in *Patr. Ob.* ¶ See note E, at the end of this book.

PARMENIDES, we are told, had two doctrines concerning the nature of the universe; one, in which he taught that the world had been *made*, and would be *destroyed;* another, in which he said, it was *ungenerated*, and would never be *dissolved;* and that the first was his PUBLIC, and the second was his PRIVATE teaching.*

That PLATO followed the same practice, we learn from his own words, who, in a letter to his friends, says, according to Dr. Bentley's translation,† "As for the symbol or private note you desire, to know my serious letters, and which *contain my real sentiments*, from those that *do not*, know and remember that GOD begins a serious letter, and GODS one that is otherwise." ‡ Now had not Plato used the *exoteric* doctrine, or delivered things not corresponding to the real sentiments of his mind, what occasion had his friends to desire this private mark or symbol to know when he was in earnest?

GALEN says, "Plato declares that animals have constantly a soul, which serves to animate and inform their bodies: as for stones, wood, and what we commonly call the inanimate parts of the creation; all these, he says, are quite destitute of soul. And yet in his Timæus, where he explains his principles to his disciples and select friends, he there gives up the common notion, declares that there is a soul diffused through the universe, which is to actuate and pervade every part of it. *Now we are not to imagine that in this case he is* INCONSISTENT *with himself, or maintains contrary doctrines, any more than Aristotle and Theophrastus are to be charged with contradiction, when they delivered to their Disciples their acroatic doctrines, and to the Vulgar, principles of another nature.*"§ And, in the communication of their *acroatics* or arcane opinions, the philosophers were as cautious as the teachers of the *Mysteries* were in theirs: and set about it with the same solemnity.‖

SYNESIUS, a thorough Platonist, and scarce more than half a Christian, who perfectly well understood all the intrigues of Pagan philosophy, delivers it as the plain consequence of the practice of the

* See note F, at the end of this book. † See the Doctor's "Remarks on the Discourse of Free-thinking," &c. ‡ Περὶ δὲ δὴ τοῦ ξυμβόλου τοῦ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστολὰς, ὅσας τε ἂν ἐπιστέλλω ΣΠΟΥΔΗι, ΚΑΙ ΟΣΑΣ ΑΝ ΜΗ, οἶμαι μέν σε μέμνησθαι· ὅμως δ' ἐννοεῖ, καὶ πάνυ προσεχε τὸν νοῦν· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ κελεύοντες γράφειν, οἷς οὐ ῥᾴδιον φανερῶς διωθεῖσθαι· τῆς μὲν γὰρ σπουδαίας ἐπιστολῆς Θεὸς ἄρχει, Θεοὶ δὲ τῆς ἥττον.—*Epistola* xiii. § Πλάτων μὲν αὐτὸς ἔμψυχα μὲν ἀεὶ λέγει τὰ ζῶα, τοὺς λίθους δὲ, καὶ τὰς πόας, καὶ τὰ ξύλα, καὶ καθόλου φάναι τὰ φῦτα πάντα τῶν ἀψυχῶν σωμάτων εἶναι φησιν· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐν Τιμαίῳ τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρίαν ὀλιγίστοις ἀκροαταῖς, κατακολουθεῖν ἐπιστημονικοῖς λόγοις δυναμένοις, ἀποχωρήσας τῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκούντων, εἰς ὅλον τὸν κόσμον ἐκτέτασθαι λέγοι τὴν ψυχήν· αὐτοῦ διαφωνίαν, οὐ χρὴ τοῦτο νομίζειν εἶναι τἀνδρὸς ἑαυτῷ τἀναντία λέγοντος, ὥσπερ οὐδ' Ἀριστοτέλους ἢ Θεοφράστου, τὰ μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς γεγραφότων, τὰς δὲ ἀκροάσεις τοῖς ἑταίροις.—GALENI *De Substantia naturalium Facultatum fragmentum.* ‖ And in the same form of words:

Φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστὶ, θυρὰς δ' ἐπίθεσθε βεβήλοις.

So, Porphyry in Eusebius introduces his internal doctrines.

double doctrine, "that philosophy, when it has attained the truth, allows the use of LIES AND FICTIONS."*

After this, it will hardly need to be observed, That their *external* doctrine was, either the invention of fables, or the propagation of what they held to be false: and their *internal*, the delivery of what they held, or discovered, to be the truth: Yet because a remarkable passage of MACROBIUS will, together with the proof of this point, tend to the further illustration of the general subject we are upon, I shall give it at large.—"Yet it is to be understood" (says this author) "that the PHILOSOPHERS did not admit into every kind of disputation, the false and fabulous, whether of their own invention or of public allowance,† but only in those works which treated of the SOUL, or of ETHERIAL POWERS, or of the OTHER GODS.‡ But when their discourse ventured to raise itself to GOD, the origin and principle of all things, Him whom the Greeks call the GOOD and the FIRST CAUSE; or, to MIND, § which the Greeks call ΝΟΥΣ, the offspring of the supreme God, which contains the original species of things called ideas; when these things, I say, MIND and the SUPREME GOD, are the subject, then all fable and falshood is banished from the discourse. But still let us observe, that if, on these subjects, their discourse leads them to inculcate doctrines, which not only exceed the power of speech, but even human ideas and cogitations, they then fly to allusions, similitudes, and figures.—But then again, on the other hand, when the discourse is of the first kind, that is, concerning the GODS and the HUMAN SOUL, where fable and falshood are employed, the philosophers have had recourse to this method, not out of an idle or fantastic humour, or to please their audience by an agreeable amusement; but because they know that a naked and open exposition of NATURE ‖ is injurious to her; who, as she hides the knowledge of herself from gross and vulgar conceptions, by the various covering and disguise of *Forms*, so it is

* Νοῦς οὖν φιλόσοφος ἐπόπτης ὢν τἀληθοῦς συγχωρεῖ τῇ χρείᾳ τοῦ ΨΕΥΔΕΣΘΑΙ. —*Epist.* cv. † The text says, *fabulosa vel licita*. The two last words are found in all the old editions: the more modern, for an obvious reason, dropt them. Gronovius takes notice of the fraud, and restores them to their place; but, in order, finally, to degrade them, on a fair hearing: which he does, and puts *vel ficta* in their place. But *licita* is, I believe, Macrobius's own word, and signifies, those *theological fables allowed of by public authority*. So that *fabulosa vel licita* means, *either such fables as the philosophers invented*, or *such as they borrowed from the popular belief*. ‡ The text says, *de aëriis ætheriisve potestatibus*; by which the author means, the first natural Gods of Gentilism, the *heavenly bodies*; as, by *vel de ceteris Dis*, he means, the second class of false gods, *dead men deified*. § *Ad mentem*. By *mind*, the author here means the third hypostasis of the Platonic trinity, called νοῦς or λόγος. For he takes his example, of what he says, of the conduct of the philosophers, from Plato; and illustrates an observation of his own, in this place, by a passage in that philosopher. ‖ *Quia sciunt inimicam esse naturæ apertam nudamque expositionem sui*. He alludes here to the danger of explaining openly the physical nature of the heavenly bodies, because it would unsettle one half of vulgar polytheism. So Anaxagoras was accused, and some say convicted, of a capital crime, for holding the sun to be a mere material mass of fire.

her pleasure, that her priests, the Philosophers, should treat her secrets in fable and allegory. And thus it is even in the sacred *Mysteries*, where the secret is hid, even from the initiated, under figurative and scenical representations.* And while princes and magistrates only, with Wisdom † for their guide, are admitted to the naked truth ;‡ the rest may be well content with outside ornaments, which, at the same time that they excite the beholder's reverence and veneration,§ are contrived to secure the dignity of the secret, by hiding it under that cover from the knowledge of the Vulgar."‖ The first observation I shall make on this long passage is, that the SAME SUBJECT, namely, the *nature of superior beings*, was handled in a TWO-FOLD manner; *exotericallγ;* and then the discourse was of the *national Gods: esotericallγ;* and then it was of the *first Cause of all things*. 2. That the *exoteric* teaching admitted fable and falshood, *fabulosa vel licita:* the *esoteric* only what the teacher believed to be true, *nihil fabulosum penitus*. 3. That what was taught the Vulgar concerning the HUMAN SOUL was of the *exoteric* kind. 4. That the teaching *of* fables was one thing; and the teaching *in* fables, or by figurative expressions, quite another: the first being the cover of *error;* the second the vehicle of *truth:* that the passions and prejudices of men made the *first* necessary; that the *latter* became unavoidable through the weakness of human conception. This distinction was useful and seasonable, as the not attending to it, in those late times, in which Macrobius wrote, was the occasion of men's confounding these two ways of teaching with one another.

From all this it appears, that a right conception of the nature of

* *Figurarum cuniculis operiuntur*, i. e. *cuniculis figurarum ad repræsentationem aptis*. It alludes to the allegorical shews of the *mysteries* represented in subterraneous places. † *Sapientia interprete; Wisdom* is here put into the office of *hierophant* of the *mysteries*, who instructed the *initiated* in the *secret*. ‡ *Summatibus tantum viris veri arcani consciis*. By these Macrobius means, heroes, princes, and legislators: alluding to their old practice of seeking initiation into the *greater mysteries*. § *Contenti sint reliqui ad venerationem figuris*, &c. is equivalent to *Contenti sint reliqui aptis venerationi figuris*. ‖ "Sciendum est tamen non in omnem disputationem philosophos admittere fabulosa vel licita, sed his uti solent, vel cum de ANIMA, vel de *aëriis ætheriisve potestatibus*, vel de *ceteris Dîis*, loquuntur. Ceterum cum ad *summum et principem omnium Deum*, qui apud Græcos τἀγαθὸν, qui πρῶτον αἴτιον nuncupatur, tractatus se audet attollere; vel ad *mentem* quam Græci νοῦν appellant, originales rerum species, quæ ἰδέαι dictæ sunt, continentem, ex summo natam et profectam Deo: cum de his, inquam, loquuntur, *summo Deo et mente*, nihil fabulosum penitus attingunt. Sed si quid de his assignare conantur, quæ non sermonem tantummodo, sed cogitationem quoque humanam superant, ad similitudines et exempla confugiunt—De *Diis* autem, ut dixi, *ceteris*, et de *anima*, non frustra se, nec ut oblectent, ad fabulosa convertunt; sed quia sciunt inimicam esse naturæ apertam nudamque expositionem sui: quæ sicut vulgaribus hominum sensibus intellectum sui vario rerum tegmine operimentoque subtraxit; ita a prudentibus arcana sua voluit per fabulosa tractari. Sic ipsa *mysteria* figurarum cuniculis operiuntur, ne vel hæc adeptis nuda rerum talium se natura præbeat: sed summatibus tantum viris, Sapientia interprete, veri arcani consciis; contenti sint reliqui ad venerationem figuris defendentibus a vilitate secretum."—*In Somnium Scipionis*, lib. i. cap. 2.

the DOUBLE DOCTRINE was deemed the TRUE KEY to the ancient Greek philosophy.

On which account several writers of the lower ages composed discourses ON THE HIDDEN DOCTRINES OF THE PHILOSOPHERS.* But as these, which would have given much light to the subject, are not come down to us, we must be content to feel out our way to the original and end of the *double doctrine* as well as we are able. For it is not enough, that this method of teaching was general amongst the Greek philosophers: to bring it to our point, we must prove it was invented for the *good of Society*.

The original is little understood. It hath been generally supposed owing either to a barbarous love of mystery; or a base disposition to deceive. Toland, who made it the study of a wretched life, to shed his venom on every thing that was great and respectable, sometimes † supposes this *double doctrine* the issue of craft and roguery; at other times, a grave and wise provision against the bigotry and superstition of the vulgar. And a different sort of man, the celebrated Fontenelle, when he calls *mystery*, which is the consequence of the double doctrine, *the apanage of barbarity*, does as little justice to Antiquity.

I shall shew *first*, that those, from whom the Greeks borrowed this method of philosophising, invented it for the service of Society. And *secondly*, that those who borrowed it, employed it for that purpose; however it might at length degenerate into craft and folly.‡

First, then, it is confessed by the Greeks themselves that all their learning and wisdom came from Egypt; fetched from thence either immediately by their own Philosophers, or brought round to them by the Eastern Sages, by the way of Asia. In this the Greeks are unanimous. Now Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Plutarch, all testify that the Egyptian priests, with whom the learning of the place resided, had a TWOFOLD PHILOSOPHY, the one hidden and sacred, the other open and vulgar.§

To know their *end* in this way of teaching, we must consider their *character*. Ælian tells us,‖ that in the most early times, the *Priests*, amongst the Egyptians, were *Judges* and *Magistrates*. So that the care of the People must needs be their chief concern under both titles: and as well what they divulged as what they concealed, must be equally for the sake of Society. Accordingly we find them to have been the first who taught an intercourse with the Gods, a future state of rewards and punishments, and initiation into MYSTERIES,

* Zacynthus scripsit Τὰ Ἀπόῤῥητα τῆς Φιλοσοφίας, referente Laërtio; Porphyrius Τῶν Φιλοσόφων τὰ Ἀπόῤῥητα, teste Eunapio in ejus vita. † See his "Tetradymus," in what he calls, "Of the Exoteric and Esoteric Philosophy." ‡ See note G, at the end of this book. § Οἱ ἱερεῖς—ΔΥΟ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ ἔχοντες, ὧν τὸν μὲν ἱερὸν καὶ ἀπόῤῥητον—ὁ δὲ ἐμφανὴς καὶ προχειρος.—Περὶ Ἴσιδ. καὶ Ὄσιρ. ‖ *Var. His'*. lib. xiv. cap. 34.

instituted for the support of that belief: The ἀπόῤῥητα of which was the doctrine of the UNITY.

Plutarch assures us of this truth, where he tells us, that it was chiefly to their Kings and Magistrates, to whom the SECRET doctrines of the College were revealed. "The Kings were chosen" (says he) "either out of the priesthood, or the soldiery: as *this* order for their valour, and *that* for their wisdom, were had in honour and reverence. But when one was chosen out of the soldiery, he was forthwith had to the college of the Priests, and instructed in their secret philosophy; which involves many things in fables and allegories, where the face of truth is seen, indeed; but clouded and obscured."*

And in the same manner, and with the same view, the MAGI of Persia, the DRUIDS of Gaul, and the BRACHMANS of India, the genuine offspring of the Egyptian priests, and who, like them, shared in the administration of the State, had all their *external* and *internal doctrines*.†

What hath misled both ancient and modern writers to think the *double doctrine* to be only a barbarous and selfish craft of keeping up the reputation of the teacher, was a prevailing opinion, that moral and natural truths were concealed under the ancient fables of the Gods and Heroes. For then, these fables must have been invented by the ancient Sages; and invented for the sake of explaining them, and nothing more. So the learned Master of the Charter-house, taking it for granted that the Sages were the inventors of the ancient mythology, concludes that one of these two things was the original of the *double doctrine*: "It arose either from the genius of Antiquity, especially of the Orientalists; or else from the affectation of making important things, difficult, and not easily understood at first sight." ‡ But that way of allegorizing the ancient fables was the invention of the later Greek philosophers. The old Pagan mythology was only the corruption of historical traditions; and consequently arose from the People; whose follies and prejudices occasion the *double doctrine*, to be employed for their service. But what it was that facilitated its use, we shall see hereafter, when we come, in the fourth book, to speak of the Egyptian HIEROGLYPHICS.

Secondly, We say, the Greeks, who borrowed this method of the *double doctrine*, employed it, like the Egyptians, who invented it, TO THE USE OF SOCIETY.

* Οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς ἀπεδείκνυντο μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἱερέων ἢ τῶν μαχίμων, τοῦ μὲν δι' ἀνδρίαν, τοῦ δὲ διὰ σοφίαν, γένους ἀξίωμα, καὶ τιμὴν ἔχοντος· ὁ δὲ ἐκ μαχίμων ἀποδεδειγμένος εὐθὺς ἐγίνετο τῶν ἱερέων, καὶ μετεῖχε τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικεκρυμμένης τὰ πολλὰ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις ἀμυδρὰς ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ διαφάσεις ἔχουσιν.—Περὶ ΙΣ. καὶ ΟΣ. Steph. ed.

† ORIGEN. *Contra Celsum*, lib. i.

‡ "Sive id factum fuerit pro ingenio priscorum hominum, maxime orientalium; sive ut ea, quæ pulchra erant, difficilia redderent, neque primo intuitu discernenda."—*Archæolog. Philosoph.* lib. i. cap. 3.

1. The first who went out of Greece to learn Egyptian wisdom, were the LEGISLATORS: Or such as, projecting to reduce the scattered tribes, which then over-ran Greece, into civil Society, travelled thither to learn the ART of LAWGIVING, from a nation the most celebrated for that knowledge. Of these, were Orpheus, Rhadamanthus, Minos, Lycaon, Triptolemus, and others; who concerned themselves with nothing of the Egyptian wisdom, but their public morals or *Politics;* and received the *double doctrine* along with it; as appears from their instituting the MYSTERIES (where this doctrine was practised) in their several civil establishments.

2. The next sort of men who went from Greece to Egypt for instruction (though the intercourse of the Lawgivers with Egypt was not interrupted, but continued down to the times of Draco, Lycurgus, and Solon) were the NATURALISTS; who, throughout their whole course, bore the name of SOPHISTS. For now Greece being advanced from a savage and barbarous state, to one of civil Policy, the inhabitants, in consequence of the cultivation of the arts of life, began to refine and speculate. But physics and mathematics wholly ingrossed the early sophists, such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Leucippus. For as these studies were managed systematically and fitted to the vain and curious temper of that people, this, as the post of honour, would be first seized upon. Besides, Greece being at this time over-run with petty TYRANTS,* the descendants of their ancient HEROES, it was found unsafe to turn their speculations upon *morals;* in which *politics* were contained, and made so eminent a part. All then that this second class of Adventurers learnt of the Egyptians, was PHYSICAL AND MATHEMATICAL KNOWLEDGE: and as, in the cultivation of this, there was little occasion for, so their character of mere Naturalists made them have less regard to, the *double doctrine*. And in effect, we find little mention of it amongst the first Greek Sophists, who busied themselves only in these enquiries.

3. The last sort of people, who went to Egypt for instruction, were the PHILOSOPHERS, properly so called. A character exactly compounded of the two preceding, the *Lawgiver* and the *Naturalist*. For when now, after various struggles, and revolutions, the Grecian States had asserted, or regained their liberties, MORALS, public and private, would become the subject most in fashion. From this time, the Grecian Sages became violently given to Legislation, and were actually employed in making laws for the several emerging Commonwealths: Hence Aristotle observed, that "the best Lawgivers in

* Δυνατωτέρας δὲ γενομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος, καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτῆσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ποιουμένης, τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο, τῶν προσόδων μειζόνων γιγνομένων.—*Hist.* lib. i.

ancient Greece, were amongst the middle rank of men." The first (as well as most famous) of this class, and who gave *philosophy* its name and character, was PYTHAGORAS. He, and Plato, with others, travelled into Egypt, like their predecessors. But now having joined in one, the two different studies of Politics and Philosophy, a slight tincture of Egyptian instruction would not serve their purpose: to complete their Character, there was a necessity of being thoroughly imbued with the most hidden wisdom of Egypt. Accordingly, the Ancients tell us,* of their long abode there; their hard condition of admittance into the sacred Colleges; and their bringing away with them all the secret science of the priesthood. The result of all was, and it is worth our observation, that, from this time, the *Greek Sophists* (now called *Philosophers)* began to cultivate *the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments*, and, at the very same time, *the practice of the double doctrine:* which *two principles* were the distinguishing badges of their Character.

Thus, by an intimate acquaintance with the Egyptian priesthood, the Greeks, at length, got amongst themselves a new species of SAGES, whose character much resembled that of their masters. But with this difference, that amongst the Egyptian Priests (and so amongst the Magi, the Brachmans, and the Druids) Philosophy was an appendix to Legislation; while amongst the Greeks, Legislation was but the appendix to Philosophy. For philosophy was the *first* acquest of the Greek Sages; and legislation, of the Egyptian. There was yet another difference; which was, that, in the *Greek Sophists*, the two characters of LEGISLATOR and PHILOSOPHER were always kept distinct, and conducted on the contrary principles: whereas in the *Egyptian* Priests, they were incorporated, and went together. So that in Greece, the *hidden doctrine* of the *Mysteries*, and the ἀπόῤῥητα of the *Schools*, though sometimes founded by one and the same person, as by Pythagoras, were two very different things; but in Egypt, still one and the same.

Greece was now well settled in popular Communities; and yet this legislating humour still continued. And when the Philosophers had no more work, they still kept on the trade; and from practical, became speculative Lawgivers. This gave birth to a deluge of visionary *Republics*, as appears from the titles of their works preserved by Diogenes Laertius; where, one is always as sure to find a treatise *De legibus*, or *De republica*, as a treatise *De deo*, *De anima*, or *De mundo*.

But of all the sects, the Pythagoreans and Platonists continued longest in this humour. The Academics and Stoics, indulging to the

* PORPHYR. *De Vita Pythag.*—STRABO, *Geogr.* lib. xvii. *De Platone.*—ORIGEN. *Comm. in Ep. ad. Rom.* cap. iii.

disputatious genius of the Greek philosophy, struck out into a new road; and began to cultivate the last great branch of philosophy, LOGIC; especially the Stoics, who, from their great attachment to it, were surnamed *Dialectici.*

The reader hath here a short view of the progress of the GREEK PHILOSOPHY; which Plato aptly divided into PHYSICS, MORALS, and LOGIC.* We have shewn that this was the order of their birth: the study of *physics* and *mathematics* began while Greece groaned under its petty tyrants: *morals* public and private arose with their civil liberties: and *logic,* when they had contracted a habit of disputation and refinement.

But when now the liberties of Greece began to be again shaken by Tyrants of greater form and power, and every nobler province of Science was already possessed and occupied by the Sects above mentioned; some ambitious men, as EPICURUS, attempted to revive the splendour of ancient PHYSICS by an exclusive cultivation of them; rejecting LOGIC, and all the *public* part of MORALS, *Politics* and *Legislation:* and, with *them,* in consequence, (which deserves our notice) the use of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE,† as of no service in this reform. An evident proof of its having been employed only for the sake of *Society:* for were it, as Toland and his fellows pretend, for *their own,* it had found its use chiefly in *Physics;* because the celestial bodies being amongst the popular Gods, enquiries into their physical essence would hardly escape the public odium: Plutarch tells us how heavily it fell both on Protagoras and Anaxagoras.‡ Notwithstanding this, the *first* and the *last* of the *Sophists,* who dealt only in *Physics,* equally rejected the *double doctrine.* While on the other hand, the *legislating* philosophers employed *this* very doctrine even in natural enquiries. We are told, that Pythagoras's popular account of earthquakes was, that they were occasioned by a synod of ghosts assembled under ground.§ But Jamblichus ‖ informs us, that he sometimes predicted earthquakes by the taste of well-water.¶

It appears then, on the whole, that the *double doctrine* was used *for the sake of Society;* their high notions of which made them conclude the practice not only to be innocent, but laudable: whereas,

* Μέρη δὲ φιλοσοφίας τρία, ΦΥΣΙΚΟΝ, ΗΘΙΚΟΝ, ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΝ.—DIOG. LAERT. *Proœm.* sect. 18. † Clemens Alex. indeed *(Strom.* 5) says, that "the Epicureans bragged they had their *secrets* which it was not lawful to divulge;" but this was only arrogating to themselves a *mark* of Philosophy, which those, to whom it really belonged, had made venerable. ‡ Ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος σαφέστατόν γε πάντων καὶ βαρβαλεώτατον περὶ Σελήνης καταγασμῶν καὶ σκιᾶς λόγων εἰς γραφὴν καταθέμενος Ἀναξαγόρας, οὔτ' αὐτὸς ἦν παλαιὸς, οὔτε ὁ λόγος ἔνδοξος, ἀλλ' ἀπόῤῥητος ἔτι, καὶ δι' ὀλίγων, καὶ μετ' εὐλαβείας τινὸς ἢ πίστεως βαδίζων· οὐ γὰρ ἠνείχοντο τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τότε καλουμένους ὡς εἰς αἰτίας ἀλόγους καὶ δυνάμεις ἀπρονοήτους καὶ κατηναγκασμένα πάθη διατρίβοντας τὸ θεῖον· ἀλλὰ καὶ Πρωταγόρας ἔφυγε, καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν εἰρχθέντα μόλις περιποιήσατο Περικλῆς.—*Vita Niciæ.* § ÆLIANI *Var. Hist.* lib. iv. cap. 17. ‖ JAMBLICHUS, *Vita Pythagor.* lib. i. cap. 23. ¶ See note H, at the end of this book.

were the motive either love of *mystery*, of *fraud*, or of *themselves*, it cannot be reconciled to any of their several systems of private morals.

III. My third general reason was, that *the ancient Sages seemed to practise the* DOUBLE DOCTRINE, *in the point in question*. I have observed, that those Sects which joined *legislation* to *philosophy*, as the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics, always professed the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments: while those, who simply philosophised, as the Cyrenaic, the Cynic, and the Democritic, publicly professed the contrary. And just as those of the legislating class were more or less in the practice of that art, so were they more or less in the profession of a future state: as on the one hand, the Pythagoric and Platonic; and on the other, the Peripatetic and Stoic. Nay in one and the same sect (as the Peripatetic, or the Stoic), when a follower of it studied legislation, he professed this belief; when he confined himself to private morals, or abstract speculations, he rejected it. Thus Zeno, amongst the Stoics, was a great assertor of it; while Epictetus openly denied it. And Seneca, who was but a mongrel, seems willing to expose the whole mystery. For in those parts of his writings, where he strictly philosophises, he denies a future state; and in those, where he acts the preacher or politician, he maintains it; and having, in this character, said what he thought fit in its behalf, is not ashamed to add: "Hæc autem omnia ad MORES spectant, itaque suo loco posita sunt; at quæ a DIALECTICIS contra hanc opinionem dicuntur, segreganda fuerunt: et ideo seposita sunt." * As much as to say, the doctrine was preached up as useful to Society, but untenable by reason. One might push this observation from sects to particulars. So Xenophon and Isocrates, who concerned themselves much in the public, declared for it; and Hippocrates and Galen, who confined themselves to natural studies, are inclined to be against it.

This totally enervates what might be urged in support of the common opinion, from those many professions in the writings of the Theistical philosophers, in favour of a future state of rewards and punishment; as it shews that those professions only made part of the EXTERNAL or popular doctrines of such sects.† It may likewise help to explain and reconcile an infinite number of discordances in their works in general; and more especially on this point, which are commonly, though I think falsly, ascribed to their inconstancy. How endless have been the disputes amongst the learned, since the revival of letters, about what Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics held of

* *Ep.* 103. † Yet neither could a truth so obvious, nor the notice here given of it, prevent the numerous writers against this book from perpetually urging, one from another, those professions in the EXOTERIC writings of the Philosophers, as a confutation of what is here delivered concerning their REAL SENTIMENTS.

the Soul? But it was not the Moderns only who found themselves at a loss; sometimes the Ancients themselves were embarrassed. Plutarch complains heavily of the *Repugnances of the Stoics:* and in his tract so intituled, accuses Chrysippus, now, for laughing at the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, as a Mormo, fit only to frighten women and children; and now again, for affirming seriously, that, let men laugh as they pleased, the thing was a sober truth.

IV. My *fourth* general reason is gathered from *the opinions which Antiquity itself seems to have had of its philosophers on this point.* The gravest writers (as we see in part, by the quotations above, from Timæus, Polybius, and Strabo) are full of apologies for the national Religions; that is, for what was taught in them, concerning a Providence here, and especially concerning the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, hereafter. They pretend that these things were necessary to keep the People in awe; but frankly own, that were Society composed all of wise men, THE RELIGION OF THE PHILOSOPHERS, which enforces morality by considerations drawn from the excellence of virtue, the dignity of our nature, and the perfection of the human soul, would be a fitter and more excellent way to good. Now, the *national Religions,* as they taught a doctrine of a future state, being here opposed to the *Religion of the philosophers,* which employed other motives, I conclude, that, in the opinion of these apologists, the Philosophers did not really believe *this doctrine.*

V. My *last* general argument against the common opinion, is collected *from an extraordinary circumstance in the Roman history.* CÆSAR, in his speech to the senate, to dissuade them from punishing the followers of Catiline with death, argues, "that death was no evil, as they, who inflicted it for a punishment, imagined, and intended it should be made." And thereon takes occasion, with a licentiousness till then unknown to that august Assembly, to explain and enforce the *avowed* principles of Epicurus (of whose sect he was) concerning the *mortality of the soul.** Now when CATO and CICERO, who urged the death of the conspirators, come to reply to his argument for lenity; instead of opposing the principles of that philosophy by the avowed principles of a better, they content themselves with only saying, that "the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was delivered down to them from their *ancestors.*"† From this cold manner of evading the argument, by retiring under the opinion of their Forefathers, I conclude, that these two great patriots were conscious that the real opinion of ancient

* "De pœna, possum equidem dicere id quod res habet; in luctu atque miseriis, mortem ærumnarum requiem, non cruciatum esse; eam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere; ultra neque curæ, neque gaudio locum esse."—CÆSAR apud SALL. *De Bell. Catilin.*

† See note I, at the end of this book.

philosophy would not support them: for nothing was more illogical than their reply, it being evidently, *that Authority of their Ancestors*, which Cæsar opposed with the principles of the Greek philosophy. Here then was a fair challenge to a philosophic enquiry: and can we believe, that Cicero and Cato would have been less favourably heard, while they defended the doctrine of a future state on the principles of Plato and Zeno, so agreeable to the opinions of their Ancestors, than Cæsar was in overthrowing it on the system of Epicurus? Or was it of small importance to the State, that an opinion, which Tully, in the words below, tells us was established by their Ancestors for the service of Society, should be shewn to be conformable to the conclusions of the most creditable Philosophy? Yet, for all this, instead of attempting to prove Cæsar a bad philosopher, they content themselves with only shewing him to be a bad citizen. We must needs conclude then, that these two learned men were sufficiently apprized, that the doctrine of their Ancestors was unsupported by the *real* opinion of *any* Greek *sect* of Philosophy; whose *popular* profession of it would have been to no purpose to have urged against Cæsar, and such of the Senate as were instructed in these matters; because the practice of the *double doctrine*, and the part to which this point belonged, was a thing well known to them.

It may be true, that as to Cato, who was a rigid Stoic, this observation on his conduct will conclude only against one sect; but it will conclude very strongly: for Cato was so far from thinking that the principles of that philosophy should not be brought into the conclusions of State, where it could be done with any advantage, that he was even for having public measures regulated on the standard of their *paradoxes;* for which he is agreeably rallyed by Cicero in his oration for Muræna. He could not then, we must think, have neglected so fair an opportunity of employing his beloved philosophy upon Cæsar's challenge, would it have served his purpose in any reasonable degree.

But though Cato's case only includes the Stoics; yet Cicero's, who made use indifferently of the principles of any sect to confute the rest, includes them all. It will be said perhaps, that the reason why he declined replying on any philosophic principle, was because he thought the opinion of their Ancestors the strongest argument of all; having *so* declared it, in a more evident point; the very *being of a God* itself: "In QUOD, MAXIMUM EST MAJORUM NOSTRORUM SAPIENTIÆ, qui sacra, qui ceremonias," &c.* But it is to be observed, that this was spoken to the People, and recommended to them as an argument they might best confide in; and therefore urged with Tully's usual prudence, who always suited his arguments

* *Oratio pro Milone.*

to his auditors; while the words under question were addressed to an audience of Nobles, who had, at that time, as great an affectation to philosophise as Cicero himself. Hear what he says in his oration for Muræna: "Et quoniam non est nobis hæc oratio habenda aut cum IMPERITA MULTITUDINE, aut in aliquo *conventu agrestium*, audacius paulo de STUDIIS HUMANITATIS quæ et MIHI et VOBIS NOTA ET JUCUNDA sunt, disputabo."*

SECTION III.

HAVING premised thus much, to clear the way, and abate men's prejudices against a new opinion, I come to a more particular enquiry concerning each of those SECTS which have been supposed to BELIEVE the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.

The ancient Greek philosophy may be all ranged in the ELEATIC, the ITALIC, and the IONIC lines. The *Eleatic* line was wholly composed of Atheists of different kinds; as the Democritic, the Pyrrhonian, the Epicurean, &c. so these come not into the account. All in the *Italic* line derive themselves from PYTHAGORAS, and swear in his name. All in the *Ionic*, till SOCRATES, busied themselves only in Physics, and are therefore likewise excluded. HE was the first who brought philosophy out of the clouds, to a clearer contemplation of HUMAN NATURE; and founded the *Socratic school*, whose subdivisions were the PLATONIC or OLD ACADEMY, the PERIPATETIC, the STOIC, the MIDDLE, and the NEW ACADEMY.

As to Socrates, Cicero gives this character of him, that *He was the first who called philosophy from heaven, to place it in cities, and introduce it into private houses*,† i. e. to teach *public* and *private* morals. But we must not suppose, that Cicero *simply* meant, as the words seem to imply, *that* Socrates *was the first of the philosophers who studied morals*; this being evidently false; for the Pythagoric school had, for a long time before, made morals its principal concern. He must therefore mean (as the quotation below partly implies) that HE *was the first who called off philosophy from a contemplation of nature, to fix it* ENTIRELY *upon morals*. Which was so true, that Socrates was not only the *first*, but the *last* of the Philosophers who made this separation; having here no followers, unless we reckon Xenophon; who upbraids Plato, the immediate successor of his school, for forsaking his master's confined scheme, and imitating the

* Sect. 29. † "Primus Philosophiam devocavit e cœlo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit."—*Tuscul. Quæst.* lib. v. And again, "Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis, et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi *occupati* fuerunt, evocavisse Philosophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis, *omninoque* de bonis rebus et malis quæreret; cœlestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret, vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum conferre."—*Acad.* lib. i.

common practice of the philosophers in their pursuit of general knowledge; he being, as the same Cicero observes, *varius et multiplex et copiosus.*

However, This, which Socrates attempted in Philosophy, was a very extraordinary project: and, to support its credit, he brought in those principles of DOUBT and UNCERTAINTY, which some of his pretended followers very much abused: for while *he* restrained those principles of *doubt* to *natural* things, whose study he rejected; *they* extended them to every thing that was the subject of philosophical inquiry. This we presume was Socrates's true character: who thus confining his searches, was the only one of all the ancient Greek philosophers (and it deserves our notice) who really believed the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. How it happened that he was so singularly right, will be considered hereafter, when we bring his case to illustrate, and to confirm the general position here advanced.

From Socrates, as we said, came the *middle* and *New Academy*, as well as the *Old*, or Platonic. Arcesilaus was the founder of the *middle;* and Carneades of the *New*. Between the principles of these two there was no real difference, as Cicero tells us; and we may take his word; but both, I will venture to affirm, were as real *Sceptics*, as the *Pyrrhonians* themselves: I mean in their *principles* of philosophising, though not in the *professed conclusions* each pretended to draw from those *principles*. For the Academics as well as Pyrrhonians agreed in this, "That nothing could be known; and that, without interfering with any sentiments of their own, every thing was to be disputed." Hence the Pyrrhonians concluded, "that nothing was ever to be assented to, but the mind to be kept in an eternal suspense:" The Academics, on the contrary, held, "that the PROBABLE, when found, was to be assented to; but, till then, they were to go on with the *Pyrrhonians*, questioning, disputing, and opposing every thing." And here lay the jest: they continued to do so, throughout the whole period of their existence, without ever finding the *probable* in any thing; except, in what was necessary to supply them with arms for disputing against every thing. It is true, this was a contradiction in their scheme: but Scepticism is unavoidably destructive of itself. The mischief was, that their allowing the *probable* thus far, made many, both ancients and moderns, think them uniform in their concessions: In the mean time they gave good words, and talked perpetually of their *verisimile* and *probabile*, amidst a situation of absolute darkness, and scepticism; like Sancho Pancha, of his island on the Terra Firma. This was Lucian's opinion of the *Academics;* and no man knew them better; speaking of the happy island, in his *true history*, and telling us in what manner it was

stocked with the several sects of Greek philosophy; when he comes to the *Academics* he observes with much humour, that though they were in as good a disposition to come as any of the rest, they still keep aloof in the Confines, and would never venture to set foot upon the Island. For here truly they stuck; they were not yet satisfied whether it was an island or not.*

This I take to be the true key to the intrigues of the ACADEMY; of which famous sect many have been betrayed into a better opinion than it deserved. If any doubt of this, the account which Cicero himself gives of them, will satisfy him. He, who knew them best, and who in good earnest espoused only the more reasonable part of their conduct, tells us, that they held nothing could be known, or so much as perceived: "Nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt—Opinionibus et INSTITUTIS omnia teneri; nihil VERITATI relinqui: deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. Itaque *Arcesilaus* negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum:" † That every thing was to be disputed; and that the *probable* was not a thing to engage their assents, or sway their judgments, but to enforce their reasonings.—"Carneades vero multo uberius iisdem de rebus loquebatur: *non quo aperiret sententiam suam (hic enim mos erat patrius Academiæ* ADVERSARI SEMPER OMNIBUS *in disputando) sed*,‡ &c.—Proprium sit Academiæ *judicium suum nullum interponere*, ea *probare* quæ simillima veri videantur; conferre causas, et quid in quamque sententiam dici possit expromere, nulla adhibita sua auctoritate, judicium audientium relinquere integrum et liberum:" § That, though they pretended their end was to find the *probable*, yet, like the *Pyrrhonians*, they held their mind in an eternal suspense, and continued going on disputing against every thing, without ever finding the *probable* to determine their judgments. "O Academiam volaticam et sui similem, modo huc modo illuc," ‖ says the man whose business it was to shew only its fair side. And indeed how could it be otherwise, when, as he himself tells us, in the case of the same *Arcesilaus*, they endeavoured to prove, that the moment, or weight of evidence, on each side the question, was exactly equal—"Huic rationi, quod erat consentaneum, faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dies jam plerosque deduceret: [diceret] *ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta rationum invenirentur*, facilius ab utraque parte adsertio sustineretur." This they held to be the case, even in the most important subjects, such as the SOUL. And in the most interesting questions concerning it, as whether it was, in its nature, MORTAL or IMMORTAL.—"Quod intelligi quale sit vix

* Τοὺς δὲ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς ἔλεγον ἐθέλειν μὲν ἑλθεῖν, ἐπέχειν δ' ἔτι, καὶ διασκέπτεσθαι· μὴ δὲ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτό πως καταλαμβάνειν, εἰ καὶ νῆσός τις τοιαύτη ἐστίν.—*Vera Historia*, lib. ii. † *Acad. Quæst.* lib. i. cap. 12, 13. ‡ *De Orat.* lib. i. cap. 18. § *De Divin.* lib. ii. sub fin. ‖ *Epist. ad Atticum*, lib. 13.

potest: et quicquid est, mortale sit, an æternum? Nam utraque in parte multa dicuntur. Horum aliquid *vestro* sapienti certum videtur: *nostro* ne quid maxime quidem probabile sit, occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum PARIA MOMENTA." *

Thus it appears, that the sect was thoroughly sceptical: † And Sextus Empiricus, a master of this argument, says no less: who, though he denies the *Academics* and *Pyrrhonians* to be exactly the same, as some ancients affirmed, because, though both agreed that truth was not to be found, yet the Academics held there was a difference in those things which pretended to it (the mystery of which has been explained above) yet owns that Arcesilaus and Pyrrho had one common philosophy.‡ Origen, or the author of the fragment that goes under his name, seems to have transcribed the opinion of those whom Sextus hints at. "But another sect of philosophers" (says he) "was called the *Academic*, because they held their disputations in the Academy. Pyrrho was the head and founder of these: From whom they were called Pyrrhonians. He first of all brought in the Ακαταληψία, or incomprehensibility, as an instrument to enable them to dispute on both sides the question, without proving or deciding any thing." §

But now a difficulty arises which will require some explanation. We have represented the *Academy* as entirely *sceptical:* We have represented Socrates a Dogmatist; and yet on his sole authority, as we are assured by Tully, did this sect hold its principles of *knowing nothing* and *disputing all things*. The true solution seems to be this:

1. SOCRATES, to deter his hearers from all studies but those of *morality*, was perpetually representing the obscurity, in which all other lay involved: not only affirming that he knew nothing of them, but that nothing could be known; while, in *Morals*, he was a dogmatist, as appears largely by Xenophon, and the less fabulous parts of Plato. But Arcesilaus and Carneades took him at his word, when he said *he knew nothing;* and extended that principle of uncertainty *ad omne scibile*.

* See note K, at the end of this book. † See note L, at the end of this book.

‡ *Φασὶ μέντοι τινες ὅτι ἡ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ φιλοσοφία ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῇ σκέψει. Ὁ μέν τι Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὃν τῆς μέσης Ἀκαδημίας ἐλέγομεν εἶναι πρωστάτην καὶ ἀρχηγόν, πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς Πυῤῥωνείοις κοινωνεῖν λόγοις, ὡς μίαν εἶναι σχεδὸν τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν ἀγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν.—Hypot. Pyrrh.* lib. i. cap. 33. Agellius, too, assures us, that the difference between the two sects amounted to just nothing. "Vetus autem quæstio et a multis scriptoribus Græcis tractata est, in quid et quantum Pyrrhonios et Academicos Philosophos intersit. Utrique enim ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΙ, *ἐφεκτικοὶ, ἀπορητικοὶ*, dicuntur, quoniam utrique nihil affirmant, nihilque comprehendi putant—differre tamen inter sese —vel maxime propterea existimati sunt. Academici quidem ipsum illud nihil posse comprehendi, quasi comprehendunt, et nihil posse decerni, quasi decernunt: Pyrrhonii ne id quidem ullo pacto videri verum dicunt, quod nihil esse verum videtur."—Lib. ii. cap. 5.

§ *Ἀλλη δὲ ἄιρεσις φιλοσόφων ἐκλήθη Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ, διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἀκαδημίᾳ τὰς διατριβὰς αὐτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι, ὧν ἄρξας ὁ Πύῤῥων, ἀφ' οὗ Πυῤῥώνιοι ἐκλήθησαν φιλόσοφοι, τὴν ἀκαταληψίαν ἁπάντων πρῶτος εἰσήγαγεν, ὡς ἐπιχειρεῖν μὲν εἰς ἑκάτερα, μὴ μέντοι ἀποφαίνεσθαι μηδέν.*—ORIGEN. *Philosophica*, Περὶ Ἀκαδημ.

2. Again, the adversaries, with whom SOCRATES had to deal, in his project of discrediting natural knowledge, and of recommending the study of *morality*, were the SOPHISTS properly so called; a race of men, who, by their eloquence and fallacies, had long kept up the credit of Physics, and much vitiated the purity of *Morals*: And These being the Oracles of science at that time in Athens, it became the modesty and humility of his pretensions, to attack them covertly, and rather as an enquirer than a teacher. This produced the way of disputing by interrogation; from the inventor, called the *Socratic*: And as this could not be carried on but under a professed admiration of their wisdom, and acquiescence in their decisions, it gave birth to the famous Attic Irony.* Hence it appears, his method of confutation must begin in doubt; be carried on in turning their own arms against them, and end in *advancing nothing of his own.*

Now Arcesilaus and Carneades having, as we say, extravagantly extended the Socratic principle *of knowing nothing*; easily mistook this other, *of advancing nothing of his own*, when disputing with the *Sophists*, as a necessary consequence of the former; and so made that a general rule for their school, which, in their master, was only an occasional and confined practice.

On these two mistaken principles was the *New Academy* erected. "1. Omnia latere in occulto, nec esse quidquam, quod cerni aut intelligi possit. 2. Quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri, neque affirmare quemquam, neque assertione approbare." †

They of the OLD ACADEMY,‡ who came first after Socrates, did, with more judgment, decline their master's method of disputation; easily perceiving that it was adapted to the occasion: and that to make it a general practice, and the characteristic of their school, would be irrational and absurd. But the MIDDLE and NEW, instead of profiting by this sage conduct of their Predecessors, made it a handle to extol their own closer adherence to their Master; and an argument that they were returned to his true principles, from which the *old* had licentiously digressed. A passage in Cicero will justify these observations; and these observations will explain that passage, which, I presume, without them would not be thought very intelligible. Thus the Roman Orator expresses himself, under the character of an Academic: "Primùm, inquam, deprecor, ne me, tanquam philosophum, putetis scholam vobis aliquam explicaturum: quod ne in ipsis quidem philosophis magnopere unquam probavi: *quando enim* Socrates, *qui parens philosophiæ jure dici potest, quidquam tale fecit?* Eorum erat iste mos, qui tum Sophistæ nominabantur; quorum è numero

* "Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione, plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione, quam Græci εἰρωνείαν vocant."—*Acad.* lib. ii. cap. 5. † *Acad. Quæst.* lib. i. cap. 12. ‡ See note M, at the end of this book.

primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quæstionem, id est, jubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire. Audax negotium; dicerem impudens, *nisi hoc institutum postea translatum ad philosophos nostros esset.* Sed et illum, quem nominavi, et ceteros Sophistas, ut è *Platone* intelligi potest, lusos videmus a *Socrate.* Is enim percunctando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea, quæ ii respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret: QUI MOS CUM A POSTERIORIBUS NON ESSET RETENTUS, ARCESILAUS EUM REVOCAVIT, INSTITUITQUE, *ut ii, qui se audire vellent, non de se quærerent, sed ipsi dicerent, quid sentirent: quod cum dixissent, ille contra.*" * Here Cicero has gilded the false, but shewy pretences of his Sect: which not only represented their scepticism, as a return to the true principles of Socrates; but would have the dogmatic sects of philosophy, against all evidence of antiquity, the later product of that race of Sophists, with whom the venerable Athenian had to do. But the *Old Academy*, we may be sure, thought differently of the matter: Lucullus says of Arcesilaus, "Nonne cum jam philosophorum disciplinæ gravissimæ constitissent, tum exortus est ut in optima Rep. Tiberius Gracchus, qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilaus, qui constitutam philosophiam everteret." †

However, these bold pretensions of restoring the SOCRATIC SCHOOL to its integrity, deluded many of the Ancients; and made them, as particularly Diogenes Laertius, to rank Socrates in the number of the *Sceptics.*

But this is not strange, for it was in the fashion for all the Sects to pretend relation to Socrates. "Proseminatæ sunt familiæ dissentientes, et multum disjunctæ et dispares, cum tamen OMNES se philosophi SOCRATICOS et dici vellent et esse arbitrarentur," says Cicero. And again, "Fuerunt etiam alia genera philosophorum fere qui se OMNES SOCRATICOS esse dicebant: Eretricorum, Herilliorum, Megaricorum, PYRRHONEORUM." ‡ The same thing, I believe, *Apuleius* meant to express, when speaking of *Socrates* he says,—*cum nunc etiam egregii Philosophi sectam ejus sanctissimam præoptent, et summo beatitudinis studio jurent in ipsius nomen.* §

On the whole it appears that the Academics, *(middle* and *new)* as distinguished from the Platonists, were mere Sceptics; and so, like the *Pyrrhonians,* to be thrown out of the account.

Those therefore which remain, are the PYTHAGORIC, the PLATONIC, the PERIPATETIC, and the STOIC: And if it be found that none of these four renowned schools (the PHILOSOPHIC QUATERNION OF DOGMATIC THEISTS) did believe, though all sedulously taught, the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments,

* *De Finibus Boni et Mali*, lib. ii. cap. 1. † *Acad.* lib. ii. cap. 5. ‡ *De Orat.* lib. iii. § *Metam.* lib. x.

the reader, perhaps, will no longer dispute the conclusion, THAT IT WAS NOT THE REAL OPINION OF ANY GRECIAN SECT OF PHILOSOPHY.

I. PYTHAGORAS comes first under our inspection. HE is said to have invented the name long after the existence of his trade; and was, as we may say, the middle link that joined together the *Lawgivers* and *Philosophers;* being indeed the only Greek, who was properly and truly both: though, from his time, and in conformity to his practice, not only those of his own school, but even those of the *other three,* dealt much in legislation: In which, his fortune was like that of Socrates, who was the first and last of the philosophers that *confined* himself to *morals;* though, in imitation of his conduct, *morals,* from thence, made the chief business of all the subdivisions of his school.

In the science of legislation, ORPHEUS,* for whom he had the highest reverence, was his master; and in philosophy, PHERECYDES SYRUS.†

After he had formed his character on two so different models, he travelled into EGYPT, the fountain-head of science; where, after a long and painful initiation, he participated of all the Mysteries of the priesthood.

He had now so thoroughly imbibed the spirit of legislation, that he not only pretended his LAWS were inspired, which most other Lawgivers had done; but that his PHILOSOPHY was so, likewise; ‡ which no other Philosopher had the confidence to do.

This, we may be sure, would incline him to a more than ordinary cultivation of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE. "He divided his disciples" (says Origen) "into two classes, the one he called the ESOTERIC, the other, the EXOTERIC. For to *Those* he intrusted the more perfect and sublime doctrines; to *These* he delivered the more vulgar and popular." § And, indeed, he was so eminent in this practice, that the *secret* or *esoteric doctrine* of Pythagoras became proverbial. For what end he did it, Varro informs us, in St. Austin, where he says, that "Pythagoras instructed his auditors in the science of legislation LAST OF ALL, when they were now become learned, wise, and happy." And on what subject, appears from a common saying of the sect, that "in those things which relate to the Gods, ALL was not to be revealed to ALL." ‖

The Communities he gave laws to, the Cities he set free, are known to every one. And that nothing might be wanting to his *legislative*

* JAMBLICHUS *De Vita Pyth.* cap. 151. † Idem, ibid. cap. 184. ‡ Idem, ibid. cap. 1. § Οὗτος τοὺς μαθητὰς διεῖλε, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΥΣ, τοὺς δὲ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΥΣ ἐκάλεσεν. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ τὰ τελεώτερα μαθήματα ἐπίστευε, τοῖς δὲ τὰ μετριώτερα.—Fragm. *De Philos.* Περὶ Πυθαγ. ‖ Μὴ εἶναι πρὸς πάντας πάντα ῥητά.

character, He, likewise, in conformity to general practice, instituted MYSTERIES; in which was taught, as usual, "the unity of the divine nature." So Jamblichus: "They say too he taught lustrations and INITIATIONS, in which were delivered the MOST EXACT KNOWLEDGE of the Gods. They say farther that he made a kind of union between *divine philosophy* and *religious worship*; having learnt some things from the ORPHIC rites; some, from the EGYPTIAN PRIESTS; some, from the *Chaldeans* and *Magi*; and some from the INITIATIONS celebrated in ELEUSIS, *Imbros*, *Samothrace* and *Delos*; or wherever else, as amongst the CELTS, and *Iberians*." * Nay so much did his *legislative* Character prevail over his *philosophic*, that he brought not only the principles † of the *Mysteries* into the *schools*, but likewise many of the observances; as abstinence from *Beans* and several kinds of animals; which afterwards contributed not a little to confound the *secret doctrines* of the *Schools* and the *Mysteries*. This conformity was, without doubt, the reason why the Crotoniates, or the Metapontines (for in this authors differ) ‡ turned his house or *school*, after his death, into a TEMPLE of CERES.

Thus the fame and authority of Pythagoras became unrivalled over all Greece and Italy. Herodotus calls him, *the most authoritative of philosophers*.§ Cicero says of him: "Cum, Superbo regnante, in *Italiam* venisset, tenuit Magnam illam Græciam cum HONORE EX DISCIPLINA, *tum etiam* AUCTORITATE." ‖

And this was no transient reputation: it descended to his followers, through a long succession; to whom the cities of Italy frequently committed the administration of their affairs;¶ where they so well established their *authority*, that St. Jerom tells us, very lasting marks of it were remaining to his time: "Respice omnem oram Italiæ, quæ quondam Magna Græcia dicebatur; et *Pythagoreorum dogmatum incisa publicis literis æra* cognosces." **

But there are two circumstances, which must needs give us the highest idea of Pythagoras's fame in point of legislation.

1. The *one* is, that almost every Lawgiver of eminence, for some

* Ἀγγέλλειν δὲ αὐτῶν τοὺς καθαρμοὺς, καὶ τὰς λεγομένας ΤΕΛΕΤΑΣ, τὸν ΑΚΡΙΒΕΣΤΑΤΗΝ ΕΙΔΗΣΙΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ (τῶν θεῶν) ἔχοντα· ἔτι δέ φασι καὶ σύνθετον αὐτὸν ποιῆσαι τὴν θείαν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ θεραπείαν· ἃ μὲν μαθόντα παρὰ τῶν ΟΡΦΙΚΩΝ, ἃ δὲ παρὰ τῶν ΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΩΝ ΙΕΡΕΩΝ, ἃ δὲ παρὰ Χαλδαίων καὶ Μάγων, ἃ δὲ παρὰ τῆς ΤΕΛΕΤΗΣ, τῆς ἐν ΕΛΕΥΣΙΝΙ γινομένης, ἐν Ἰμβρῳ τε, καὶ Σαμοθράκῃ, καὶ Δήλῳ, καὶ εἴ τι παρὰ τοῖς λοιποῖς, καὶ περὶ τοὺς ΚΕΛΤΟΥΣ καὶ τὸν Ἰβηρίαν.—JAMBLICHUS *De Vita Pythag.* § 151. † See book ii. sect. iv. p. 202. ‡ DIOG. LAERT. lib. viii. § 17. PORPHYRIUS *De Vita Pythag.* No. 4. § Οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρῃ.—Lib. iv. § 95, literally, *not of the least authority:* a common mode of expression in the ancient languages. So Homer, in the 15th Iliad, calls Achilles, οὐκ ἀφαυρότατος Ἀχαιῶν, *not the worst soldier of the* Greeks; meaning, we know, the *best*. ‖ See note M, at the end of this book. ¶ Πυθαγόρας δ' ἄχρι πολλοῦ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν οὕτως ἐθαυμάζετο αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ συνόντες αὐτῷ ἑταῖροι, ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπιτρέπειν τὰς πόλεις.—PORPHYRIUS *De Vita Pythag.* No. 54. ** *Contra Rufin.* lib. ii.

time *before* * and *after*, as well as *during his time*, was numbered amongst his disciples: for the general opinion was, that nothing could be done to purpose in the legislating way, which did not come from Pythagoras.

2. The *other* is, that the doctrine of the dispensation of Providence by a METEMPSYCHOSIS, or transmigration of the soul, though taught in all the Mysteries, and an inseparable part of a future state in all the Religions of paganism, became, in common speech, the *peculiar doctrine* of Pythagoras.

And here the reader will pardon a short remark or two, not a little illustrating the point we are upon.

There is not a more extraordinary book in all Antiquity, than the METAMORPHOSIS OF OVID; whether we regard the matter or the form. The subject appears prodigiously extravagant, and the composition irregular and absurd: had it been the product of a dark age, and a barbarous writer, one might have been content to rank it in the class of our modern *Oriental Tales*, as a matter of no consequence. But when we consider it as written when Rome was in its meridian of science and politeness; and by an Author, whose acquaintance with the Greek tragic writers, had informed him of what belonged to a work or composition, we cannot but be shocked at so grotesque an assemblage of things: Unless we would rather distrust our *modern judgment*, and conclude the deformity to be only in appearance. And this, perhaps, we shall find to be the case: though it must be owned, the common opinion seems supported by Quintilian, the most judicious critic of Antiquity, who thus speaks of our Author and his Work: "Ut Ovidius LASCIVIRE in *Metamorphosi* solet, quem tamen excusare necessitas potest, RES DIVERSISSIMAS IN SPECIEM UNIUS CORPORIS COLLIGENTEM." †

But to determine on proper grounds, in this matter, we must consider the origin of the ancient fables in general.

There are *two opinions* concerning it.

I. The *first* is of such who think the fables contrived, by the ancient Sages, for repositories of their mysterious wisdom; and, consequently, that they are no less than *natural*, *moral*, and *divine* truths, fantastically disguised. Gregory Nazianzen characterises these *allegories* well, where he calls them *monstrous explanations, without principles*; in which there is nothing stable, but a way of interpretation which, if indulged, would enable you to make any thing out of any thing.‡ But what must eternally discredit the fancy, that the first Mythologists were Allegorists, is, that if they indeed invented these fables to

* See the discourse on Zaleucus's laws, book ii. sect. iii. pp. 180—190. † *Instit. Orat.* lib. iv. cap. 1, sub fin. ‡ Εἶτ' ἐπινοείσθω τούτοις ἀλληγορήματα καὶ τερατεύματα, καὶ τῶν προκειμένων ἐκπίπτων ὁ λόγος εἰς βάραθρα χωρείτω καὶ κρημνοὺς θεωρίας οὐκ ἐχούσης τὸ στάσιμον.—*Orat.* iii.

convey under them *natural*, *moral*, and *divine* truths, they must have been wise and virtuous men, lovers of Mankind, and the friends of Society. But how will this character agree to the abominable lewdness, injustice, and impiety, with which most of these popular fables abound; and which they could not but foresee would (as in fact they did) corrupt all the principles of moral practice. For both these reasons, therefore, we must conclude that a system which gives us nothing for the *moral*, but what, as Gregory Nazianzen observes, is uncertain, groundless and capricious; while the *Fable* presents nothing but what is absurd and obscene,* must be an after-thought employed to serve a purpose. However, it was well for truth, that none of these ancient Allegorists were able to do better; that none of them entered upon their task with any thing like the force of our BACON; † the creative power of whose genius so nearly realized these inventions, as sometimes to put us to a stand, whether we should not prefer the riches and beauty of his imagination, to the poor and meagre Truth that lies at bottom.

II. The *other opinion* of the origin of the fables, is that which supposes them to be the corruptions of civil history; and consequently, as having their foundation in real facts: And this is unquestionably the truth. But this system did not find so able an expositor formerly in *Palæphatus*, as the other more groundless conceit did of late in *Bacon*. It would lead me too far from my subject, to shew, in this place, which of the fables arose from the *ambiguity of words*, ill translated from some eastern languages; which, from proper names ill understood; which, from the *high figures of poetry*, were invented to affect barbarous minds; and which, from the *politic contrivances of statesmen*, to tame and soften savage Manners: and how the *universal passion* of ADMIRATION procured an easy admittance into the mind, for all these various delusions.

But we must not omit, that the followers of this better opinion are divided into two factions; *One* of which would have the ancient fables the corruption of PROFANE history only; the *Other*, only of SACRED.

This *Last* seems unsupported by every thing but an ill-directed zeal of doing honour to *the Bible*: For by what we can collect from Pagan, or even Jewish writers, the history of the Hebrews was less celebrated, even less known, than that of *any* other people whose memory Antiquity hath brought down to us. But, known or unknown, it is somewhat hard, methinks, that GREECE must not be allowed the honour of producing one single Hero; but all must be fetched from PALESTINE. One would have thought the very number

* Ὑμῖν δὲ οὔτε τὸ νοούμενον ἀξιόπιστον καὶ τὸ προσεσκευασμένον ὀλέθριον.—Ibid.
† In his book, *De Sapientia Veterum*.

of the Gentile worthies, and the scarcity of the Jewish, might have induced our critics, in mere charity, to employ some home-spun Pagans, for Heroes of a second rate, at least. But this, it seems, would look too like a sacrilegious compromise. So, an expedient is contrived to lessen that disparity in their number: and Moses alone is discovered to be Apollo, Pan, Priapus, Cecrops, Minos, Orpheus, Amphion, Tiresias, Janus, Evander, Romulus, and about some twenty more of the Pagan Gods and Heroes. So says the learned and *judicious* Mr. Huet: * who, not content to seize, as lawful prize, all he meets within the waste of fabulous times, makes cruel inroads into the cultivated ages of history, and will scarce allow Rome its own Founder.†

Nay, so jealous are they of this fairy honour paid to Scripture, that I have met with those who thought the BIBLE much disparaged, to suppose any other origin of *human sacrifices* than the command to Abraham, to offer up his son. The contending for so extraordinary an honour being not unlike that of certain Grammarians, who, out of due regard to the glory of former times, will not allow either the *great* or *small-pox* to be of modern growth, but vindicate those special blessings to this highly favoured Antiquity.

The *other party* then, who esteem *the fables* a corruption of Pagan history, appear in general to be right. But the misfortune is, the spirit of system seems to possess these likewise, while they allow nothing to Jewish history: For, that reasoning, which makes them give the Egyptian and Phenician a share with the Grecian, should consequentially have disposed them to admit the Jewish into partnership; though it might perhaps contribute least to the common stock. And he who does not see ‡ that Philemon and Baucis is taken from the story of Lot, must be, very near, blind: Though he § who can discover the expedition of the Israelites from Egypt to Palestine, in the fable of the Argonauts, must certainly be gifted with the *second-sight*.

Lastly, as it is the fault of these to allow nothing to Jewish history, so it is the fault of both to allow nothing to the system of the *Allegorists:* for though without all question the main body of the ancient fables is the corruption of civil History, yet it is as certain,

* See note P, at the end of this book. † "Si fidem sequimur historiæ, fabulosa pleraque de eo [Romulo] narrari."—Prop. iv. cap. 9, § 8. ‡ "La fable de Philemon et de Baucis—les personages sont inconnus, et j'en ai rien d'interessant à en dire: car de penser avec Mr. Huet, qu'elle nous cache l'histoire des Anges qui allerent visiter Abraham, c'est une de ces imaginations hazardées dans lesquelles ce savant prelat," &c. —BANIER, *Les Metam. d'Ovid, explic. des fables* 7–10. lib. viii. § See Lavaur, one of the best and latest supporters of this system, in his *Histoire de la Fable conferée avec l'Histoire Sainte:* "Ainsi cette fable est toute composée des traditions que les Chananéens ou Pheniciens avoient repanduës dans leurs voyages. On y voit des traits defigurez par ces traditions, mais CERTAINEMENT pris de l'histoire des Israëlites sous Moyse et sous Josué."—Chap. *Jason et les Argonautes,* à la fin.

that some few, especially of the late ones, were invented to convey *physical* and *moral* TRUTHS.

Such was the original of the *fables* in general: But we must be a little more explicite concerning that species of them called the METAMORPHOSIS.

The *metempsychosis* was the method, the religious ancients * employed to explain the ways of Providence; which, as they were seen to be unequal *here*, were supposed to be set right *hereafter*. But this inequality was never thought so great, as to leave no footsteps of a superintendency: For the people of old argued thus: If there were *no* inequality, *nothing would want to be set right;* and if there were nothing *but* inequality, there would be *no one to set it right*. So that a *regular* Providence, and *none at all*, equally destroyed their foundation of *a future state*.

It being then believed, that a Providence was administered here as well as hereafter, though not with equal vigour in both states; it was natural for them to suppose that the mode of it might be much the same throughout. And as the way of punishing, in a different state, was by a *transmigration of the soul;* so in *this*, it was by a *transformation of the body:* The thing being the same, with only a little difference in the ceremonial of the transaction: the soul in the first case going to the body; and, in the latter, the body coming to the soul: *This* being called the *metamorphosis;* and *That*, the *metempsychosis*. Thus, each made a part of the popular doctrine of Providence. And it is remarkable, that wherever the doctrine of *transmigration* was received, either in ancient or modern times, there the belief of *transformation* hath prevailed likewise.† It is true, that in support of the first part of this superstition, *Reason* only suffered; in support of the latter, the *Senses* too were violated. But minds grossly passioned never want attested facts to support their extravagancies. What principally contributed to fix their belief of the *metamorphosis* was, in my opinion, the strong and disordered imagination of a *melancholy habit;* a habit, more than any other, producing religious fear, and most affected by what it produces. There was a common distemper, arising from this *habit*, well known to the Greek physicians by the name of the LYCANTHROPY; where the patient fancied himself turned into a wolf, or other savage animal. Why the disordered imagination should take this ply, is not hard to conceive, if we reflect that the *metempsychosis* made part of the popular doctrine of

* But this being the voice of our common nature, it is no wonder we should find the doctrine of the *metempsychosis* operating, as an old opinion, amongst the uninstructed natives of South America. See CHARLEVOIX's "History of Paraguay," vol. ii. p. 151.

† The modern eastern tales are full of *metamorphoses;* and it is to be noted that those people, before they embraced mahometanism, were pagans and believers of the *metempsychosis*.

Providence; and that a *metamorphosis* was, as we have said, the same mode of punishment, differing only in time and place. For the *religious belief*, we may be assured, would work strongly on a diseased fancy, racked by a consciousness of crimes, to which that *habit* is naturally obnoxious; and, as it did in the case of Nebuchadnezzar, make the patient conclude himself the object of divine justice. Indeed, Daniel's *prediction* of that monarch's disgrace, evidently shews it to have been the effect of divine vengeance; yet the circumstances of his punishment, as recorded in holy Writ, seem to shew, that it was inflicted by common and natural means. And that the vulgar superstition generally gives the bias to the career of a distempered mind, we have a familiar instance. No people upon earth are more subject to *atrabilaire* disorders than the English: Now while the tales of magicians, and their transformations were believed, nothing was more symptomatic in this distemper, than such fancied changes by the power of witchcraft. But since these fables lost their terror, very different whimsies, we find, possess our melancholic people.

These sickly imaginations therefore, proceeding from the impressions of the religious notion of the *metamorphosis*, would in their turn add great credit to it; and then any trifle would keep it up; even an equivocal appellation; which, I do not doubt, hath given birth to many a fable; though to many more, it hath served only for an after-embellishment. But it is remarkable, that fabulous Antiquity itself assists us to detect its own impostures. For, although it generally represents the punishments for impiety, *as actual transformations;* yet, in the famous story of the daughters of Prœtus, it has honestly told us the case; that it was no more than a *deep melancholy*, inflicted by Juno, which made them *fancy* themselves turned into heifers; so the poet,

"Prœtides implerunt FALSIS mugitibus agros."

and of this, Melampus cured them by a course of physic.*

Thus the METAMORPHOSIS arose from the doctrine of the *metempsychosis;* and was, indeed, a mode of it; and, of course, a very considerable part of the Pagan theology: † So that we are not to wonder

* "Prœtides, Prœti, et Stenobœæ, sive Antiopæ secundum Homerum, filiæ fuerunt, Lysippe, Ipponoe, Cyrianassa. Hæ se cum prætulissent Junoni in pulchritudine; vel, ut quidam volunt, cum essent antistites, ausæ sunt vesti ejus aurum detractum in usum suum convertere: illa irata hunc furorem earum immisit mentibus; ut putantes se vaccas in saltus abirent, et plerumque mugirent, et timerent aratra; quas Melampus, Amythaonis filius, pactâ mercede ut Cyrianassam uxorem cum parte regni acciperet, placatâ Junone, infecto fonte, ubi solitæ erant bibere, purgavit et in pristinum sensum reduxit." —SERVIUS *in Bucol. Virgilii* vi. 48. † It plainly appears to have been in general credit by its making the foundation of the following epigram, one of the finest in antiquity:

Ἐκ ζωῆς με θεοὶ τεῦξαν λίθον· ἐκ δὲ λίθοιο
Ζωὴν Πραξιτέλης ἔμπαλιν εἰργάσατο.

if several grave Writers made collections of them; such as Nicander, Bœus, Callisthenes, Dorotheus, Theodorus, Parthenius, and Adrian the sophist. Of what kind these collections were, we may see by that of Antonius Liberalis, who transcribed from them: Thence, too, Ovid gathered his materials; and formed them into a poem on the most sublime and regular plan, A POPULAR HISTORY OF PROVIDENCE; carried down in as methodical a manner as the graces of poetry would allow, from the creation to his own times, through the EGYPTIAN, PHENICIAN, GREEK, and ROMAN histories: And this the elegant Paterculus seems to intimate, in the character he gives of the poet and his work.*

Now the proper introduction, as well as foundation and support, of this kind of history is a THEISTICAL COSMOGENY. Accordingly, we find our Poet introduceth it with such a one. And this likewise in imitation of his Grecian Originals. Theopompus, by the account Servius gives of him, seems to have composed such a History, and so prefaced; but on a more ingenious plan. He feigns that some of Midas's shepherds took the God, Silenus, asleep, after a debauch; and brought him bound to their master. When he came into the Presence, his chains fell from him of their own accord; and he answered to what was required of him, concerning NATURE and ANTIQUITY.† From hence (as Servius remarks) Virgil took the hint of his SILENUS: the subject of whose song is so exact an epitome of the contents of the METAMORPHOSIS of Ovid, that amongst the ancient titles of that Eclogue, the name of *Metamorphosis* was one; which therefore makes it worth considering;

> "Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta
> Semina, &c.
> — et ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis.—
> Hinc lapides Pyrrhæ jactos, Saturnia regna,
> Caucasiasque refert volucres, furtumque Promethei—
> Tum Phaëtontiadas musco circumdat amaræ
> Corticis—
> Quid loquar aut Scyllam Nisi, quam fama secuta est,
> Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina monstris,
> Dulichias vexasse rates—
> Aut ut mutatos Terei narraverit artus:" &c.

Here we have the *formation of the world*, the *golden age*, and the *original and renovation of man*; together with those *ancient fables* which taught the government of the Gods, and their punishment of impiety, by the *change* of human, into brutal and vegetable forms. It is evident from hence, that both the Latin poets drew from one source; and particularly from Theopompus: whom Virgil hath epito-

* "Naso perfectissimi in forma operis sui."—*Hist. Rom.* lib. ii. cap. 36. † "Sane hoc de Sileno non dicitur fictum a Virgilio, sed a Theopompo translatum. Is enim apprehensum Silenum a Midæ regis pastoribus, dicit crapula madentem, et ex ea soporatum; illos dolo adgressos dormientem vinxisse; postea viuculis sponte labentibus liberatum et rebus NATURALIBUS et ANTIQUIS Midæ interroganti respondisse,"—SERVIUS *ad Eclog.* vi. 13.

mised; and Ovid paraphrased. And if Ovid neglected to borrow a great beauty from his original, to adorn his own poem; Virgil (which is much more surprising) by deviating, in one material circumstance, from their common source, hath committed a very gross blunder. OVID, in neglecting to lay the scene of his History in the adventure of Midas's shepherds; and so disabling himself from making SILENUS the Narrator throughout, hath let slip the advantage of giving his sacred History the sanction of a divine Speaker, and, by that means, of tying the whole composition together in the most natural and artful manner. But then VIRGIL, either in fondness to the philosophy of Epicurus, or in compliment to Varus, who was of that School, instead of making his Cosmogeny *theistical* (as without doubt Theopompus did, and we see, Ovid hath done) from whence the popular history of Providence naturally followed, hath made it the product of BLIND ATOMS;

— "per inane coacta
Semina,"

from whence, nothing naturally follows, but *Fate* or *Chance*. And yet Virgil talks *like a Theist* (indeed, because he talks *after Theists)* of the renovation of Man, the golden Age, and the punishment of Prometheus. Servius seems to have had some obscure glimpse of this absurdity, as appears from his embarras to account for the CONNECTION between the *Epicurean origin* of the world, and the *religious fables* which follow. In his note on the words *hinc lapides Pyrrhæ jactos*, he says,—"quæstio est hoc loco: nam, relictis prudentibus rebus de mundi origine, subito ad fabulas transitum fecit. Sed dicimus, aut exprimere eum voluisse sectam Epicuream, quæ *rebus seriis* semper inserit *voluptates:* aut fabulis plenis admirationis puerorum corda mulcere."

The old Scholiast, we see, was much a stranger to that conceit of *Catrou's*, that as Epicurus's *Physics* are followed in the origin of the World, so his *Morals* are explained in the Fables. Without doubt Servius thought it absurd to suppose, that the Poet would explain the most obnoxious part of Epicurus's Philosophy (his Physics) so *clearly*, and the useful part (his Morals) so *obscurely*.—However, in other respects, the Eclogue is full of beauties.

On the other hand, Ovid not only found advantages in making his Cosmogeny *theistical*, but improved what he found with wonderful art. Describing the formation of man to be from *earth*, he shuts up his account in these beautiful lines,

"Sic modo quæ fuerat rudis et sine imagine *Tellus*
Induit ignotas hominum *conversa figuras*;"

Insinuating that this was the first of those CHANGES which he had promised to speak of; and thereby finely preparing his Reader for

the following *conversions* of Men into brutes, stocks, stones, and the several elements, by shewing that they were only returned into that, out of which they had been taken, by a no less surprising *Metamorphosis*.

But to go back to his Poem. Now although, to adorn and enliven his Subject, he hath followed the bent of his disposition, in filling it with the love-stories of the Gods; which, too, their Traditions had made sacred; yet he always keeps his end in view, by taking frequent occasion to remind his reader, that those punishments were inflicted by the Gods, for impiety. This appears to have been the usual strain of the writers of METAMORPHOSES.—*As long as they preserved their piety to the Gods, they were happy*,* being the constant prologue to a tragic story. So that, what Palæphatus says of the mythologic poets in general may with a peculiar justness be applied to Ovid: *The poets* (says he) *contrived fables of this kind to impress on their hearers a reverence for the Gods*.†

But this was not all. Ovid, jealous, as it were, of the secret dignity of his Work, hath taken care, towards the conclusion, to give the intelligent reader the master-key to his meaning. We have observed, that though the *metempsychosis* was universally taught and believed long before the time of PYTHAGORAS; yet the greatness of his reputation, and another cause, we shall come to presently, made it afterwards to be reckoned amongst his peculiar doctrines. Now Ovid, by a contrivance, which for its justness and beauty may be compared with any thing in Antiquity, seizes this circumstance, to instruct his reader in these two important points: 1. *That his poem is a popular history of Providence:* And 2. *That the Metempsychosis was the original of the Metamorphosis*. For in the conclusion of his book, he introduceth Pythagoras, teaching and explaining the TRANSMIGRATION of things to the people of Crotona. This was ending his Work in that just philosophic manner, which the elegance of pure and ancient wit required.

The Abbé Banier, not entering into this beautiful contrivance, is at a loss‡ to account for Ovid's bringing in Pythagoras so much out of course. The best reason he can assign, is that the poet having finished the *historical* metamorphosis, goes on to the *natural;* which Pythagoras is made to deliver to the Crotoniates. But this is not fact, but hypothesis: The poet had not finished the *historical* metamorphosis: for having gone through the episode of the *natural change of things*, he re-assumes the proper subject of his work, the *historical*, or *moral, metamorphosis*, through the remaining part of the

* Ἄχρι μὲν οὖν θεοὺς ἐτίμων, εὐδαίμονες ἦσαν.—ANT. LIBERALIS *Met.* cap. xi.
† Τοὺς δὲ μύθους τούτους συνέθεσαν οἱ ποιηταὶ, ἵνα οἱ ἀκροώμενοι μὴ ὑβρίζωσιν εἰς τὸ θεῖον.—*De Incredibilibus Historiæ*, cap. 3.
‡ *Metamorph. d'Ovid et des Expl. Hist.* tom. iii.

last book; which ends with the change of Cæsar into a comet. Had not Ovid, therefore, introduced Pythagoras for the purpose here assigned, we should hardly have found him in this place; but in the Greek *division*, to which he properly belonged. Where the famous circumstance of his GOLDEN THIGH, and the exhibition of it at the Olympic Games, would have afforded a very artful and entertaining Episode, in a narrative of a CHANGE begun and left unfinished; a proof of the truth of the doctrine of the *Metamorphosis*, at least as strong as that which the Alchymists bring for the reality of the *transmutation* of Metals, from the Nails, half gold and half iron, now to be seen in the Cabinets of the German Virtuosi.

What hath been said, I suppose, will tend to give us a different and higher notion of this extraordinary WORK: and lessen our surprize at the Author's presumption, in so confidently predicting immortality to his performance:

> "Jamque OPUS exegi, quod nec Jovis ira, nec ignis,
> Nec poterit ferrum, nec edax abolere vetustas."

To proceed with our subject. From what hath been said of Pythagoras's character, it appears, that he taught several doctrines which he did not believe; and cultivated opinions merely on account of their utility. And we have the express testimony of Timæus Locrus, that, in the number of *these latter*, was the popular doctrine of the *metempsychosis*. This very ancient Pythagorean, after having said,* that the propagating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, was necessary to society, goes on in this manner: "For as we sometimes cure the body with unwholesome remedies, when such as are most wholesome have no effect; so we restrain those minds by *false* relations, which will not be persuaded by the *truth*: There is a necessity therefore of instilling the dread of those FOREIGN TORMENTS. As that the soul shifts and changes its habitation; that the coward is ignominiously thrust into the body of a woman; the murderer imprisoned within the furr of a *savage*; the lascivious condemned to invigorate a boar or sow; the vain and inconstant changed into birds; and the slothful and ignorant into fishes. The dispensation of all these things is committed in the second period, to Nemesis the Avenger; together with the infernal Furies, her Assessors, the Inspectors of human actions; to whom God, the sovereign Lord of all things, hath committed the government of the world, replenished with Gods and Men, and other animals; all which were formed after the perfect model of the eternal and intellectual ideas." †

* See the first section of this book.

† Ὡς γὰρ τὰ σώματα νοσώδεσι ποκα ὑγιάζομες, εἶκα μὴ εἰκῆ τοῖς ὑγιεινοτάτοις· οὕτω τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπείργομες ψευδέσι λόγοις, εἶκα μὴ ἄγηται ἀλαθέσι· λέγοιντο δ' ἀναγκαίως καὶ TIMΩPIAI ΞENAI, ὡς

Timæus's testimony is precise; and, as this notion of the *metempsychosis* was an inseparable part of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, if the Pythagoreans disbelieved the *one*, they must necessarily reject the *other*.

But, here it may be proper to explain, and inforce a *distinction*, which, by being totally overlooked, hath much embarrassed the whole matter.

The doctrine of the *metempsychosis*, as it signified a *moral designation of providence*, came originally from *Egypt*, and was, as we have said, believed by all mankind. But Pythagoras, who had it, with the rest of the world, from thence, gave it a new modification, and taught, "that the successive transition of the soul into other bodies, was physical, necessary, and exclusive of all moral considerations whatever." This is what *Diogenes Laertius* means, when he tells us, "That Pythagoras was reported to be the FIRST who taught the migration of the soul, from one body to another, by a PHYSICAL NECESSITY." * This doctrine was, indeed, *peculiarly his*, and in the number of the *esoterics*, delivered in his School, to be believed.

How destructive this *proper pythagoric* notion of the *metempsychosis* was to the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, Ovid, who well understood the secret of the *distinction*, evidently perceived, where he makes Pythagoras, in delivering the *esoteric* doctrine of his school to the Crotoniates, reject a future state of rewards and punishments, on the very principle of *his own metempsychosis*, though the *general metempsychosis* was an inseparable and essential part of that state:

> "O genus attonitum gelidæ formidine mortis,
> Quid Styga, quid tenebras, et nomina vana timetis,
> Materiem vatum, falsique piacula mundi?
> Corpora, sive rogus flammâ, seu tabe vetustas
> Abstulerit, mala posse pati non ulla putetis.
> Morte carent animæ: SEMPERque priore relictâ
> Sede, novis domibus † habitant vivuntque receptæ."

The not attending to this *distinction* hath much perplexed even the best modern writers on the subject of Pythagoras. Mr. Dacier, in his life of that philosopher, when he comes to speak of the doctrine of the *metempsychosis*, advances crudely, that all Antiquity have been deceived in thinking Pythagoras really believed it. And, for his

μετενδυομέναν τὰν ψυχὰν, τῶν μὲν θειλῶν, ἐς γυναικέα σκάνεα, ποθ' ὕβριν ἐκδιδόμενα· τῶν δὲ μιαιφόνων, ἐς θηρίων σώματα, ποτὶ κόλασιν· λαγνῶν δ' ἐς συῶν ἢ κάπρων μορφάς· κούφων δὲ καὶ μετεώρων, ἐς πτηνῶν ἀεροπόρων· ἀργῶν δὲ καὶ ἀπράκτων, ἀμαθῶν τε καὶ ἀνοήτων, ἐς τὰν τῶν ἐνύδρων ἰδέαν· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν δευτέρῳ περιόδῳ ἃ Νέμεσις συνδιέκρινε, σὺν δαίμοσι παλαμναίοις χθονίοις τε, τοῖς ἐπόπταις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων· οἷς ὁ πάντων ἀγεμὼν θεὸς ἐπέτρεψε διοίκησιν κόσμω, συμπεπληρωμένω ἐκ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν τε ἄλλων ζώων· ὅσα δεδαμιούργηται ποτ' εἰκόνα τὰν ἄριστον εἴδεος αἰωνίω καὶ νοητῷ.—*De Anima Mundi, sub fin.*

* Πρῶτον δὲ φασὶ τοῦτον ἀποφῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ΚΥΚΛΟΝ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ ΑΜΕΙΒΟΥΣΑΝ, ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις ἐνδεῖσθαι ζώοις.—Lib. viii. § 14. † Lib. xv.

warrant, quotes the passage from *Timæus*, given above. Mr. *Le Clerc*,* scandalized at this assertion, affirms as crudely, that he did believe it; and endeavours to prove his point by divers arguments, and passages of ancient writers. In which dispute, neither of them being aware of the two different kinds of *Metempsychosis*, each of them have with much confusion, taken of the true and false in this question, and divided it between them. *Dacier* was surely in the right, in supposing *Pythagoras* did not believe the *Metempsychosis*, as delivered by his disciple *Timæus;* but as certainly in the wrong to conclude from thence, that he believed none at all. And *Le Clerc* was not mistaken in thinking the philosopher did believe some sort of *Metempsychosis;* but apparently in an error in supposing that it was the *popular* and *moral* notion of it. In a word, the proofs which Dacier brings, conclude only against Pythagoras's believing a *moral* transmigration; and those Le Clerc opposes, conclude only for his believing a *natural* one. While neither, as we say, apprehending there were two kinds, the one common to all, the other peculiar to that Philosopher, they have both fallen into great mistakes.

Let me give an instance from Le Clerc; as it will contribute in general to illustrate the subject, and, at the same time, throw light on the latter part of the passage, we have but now quoted from Timæus. Dacier had urged that passage to prove Pythagoras did not believe the *Metempsychosis;* and Le Clerc had urged it, to prove he did; because the author in conclusion expressly affirms, *that the dispensation of the Metempsychosis is committed in the second period to Nemesis the avenger.* Ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν δευτέρᾳ περιόδῳ ἃ Νέμεσις ΣΥΝΔΙΕΚΡΙΝΕ. Le Clerc says, *I have translated these words verbatim, that the reader may see he talks seriously.*† But whoever reads the whole passage, which expressly speaks of the doctrine as *useful* and not as *true*, will be forced to own, that by the phrase, Nemesis *decrees*, is meant, *it must be taught that* Nemesis *decrees*. But this circumstance of Nemesis is remarkable; and enough to put the matter out of question. There were two kinds, as we have said, of the *Metempsychosis*, which the Pythagoreans taught; the *moral* and the *natural*. The latter they believed, the first they only preached. So that Timæus speaking here of the *Metempsychosis* as a fable, useful for the people to credit; lest the reader should mistake him as meaning the *natural*, he adds the circumstance of Nemesis, the poetical Avenger of the crimes of men, to confine all he had said, to the *moral Metempsychosis*.

To support what is here observed, it may not be improper to insert

* *Bibl. Choisie*, tom. x. art. ii. sect. 5. † "J'ai traduit ces dernieres paroles de Timée mot pour mot, àfin que l'on pût voir, qu'il parle serieusement."—*Bibl. Choisie*, tom. x. p. 193.

the sentiments of some of the most considerable of Pythagoras's DISCIPLES on this point: which I shall transcribe from my very learned Friend, the author of the *critical inquiry into the opinions and practices of the ancient philosophers:* where the reader may see them admirably well explained and defended from a deal of idle chicane. "Plutarch tells us 'that EMPEDOCLES held death to be a separation of the fiery substance from the other parts, and therefore supposed that death was common to the soul and body.'*

"Sextus Empiricus says, 'it is evident that Epicurus stole his principles from the poets. As to that famous tenet of his, that *death is nothing to us*, he borrowed it from EPICHARMUS, who says, I neither look upon the act of dying, *or the state that succeeds it, as of any consequence and importance to me.*'†

"Plutarch likewise, in his *consolation to Apollonius*, cites the following words of EPICHARMUS: 'The parts of which you are composed will be separated at death; and each will return to the place from which it originally came. The earth will be restored to earth, and the spirit will ascend upwards; what is there terrible or grievous in this?'‡

"As for this ascent of the spirit upwards, Lucretius will explain it:

> 'Cedit enim retro, de terra quod fuit ante,
> In terras: et quod missum est *ex ætheris oris*,
> Id rursum *coeli* rellatum *templa receptant*.'—Lib. i.

"TELES, another follower of Pythagoras, thus addresses himself to one grieved and afflicted for the loss of a deceased friend; 'You complain' (says he) 'that your friend will never exist more. But remember, that he had no existence ten thousand years ago, that he did not live in the time of the Trojan war, nor even in much later periods. This, it seems, does not move you: all your concern is, because he will not exist for the future.'§ Epicurus uses the very same language on the same occasion:

> 'Respice item quam nil ad nos ante acta vetustas
> Temporis æterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante.

* Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸν θάνατον γεγενῆσθαι διαχωρισμὸν τοῦ πυρώδους, ἐξ ὧν ἡ σύγκρισις τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συνεστάθη· ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτο κοινὸν εἶναι τὸν θάνατον σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς.—*De Plac.* cap. 25. Cicero says, "Empedocles animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem."—*Tuscul. Disput.* lib. i. cap. 9, alluding to Empedocles's own words in that famous verse:

Αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.

† Ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος φωρᾶται τὰ κράτιστα τῶν δογμάτων παρὰ ποιητῶν ἀνηρπακώς—τὸν δὲ θάνατον ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ἐπίχαρμος αὐτῷ προσμεμήνυκεν, εἰπών, Ἀποθανεῖν ἢ τεθνάναι οὐ μοὶ διαφέρει.—*Ad Gram.* sect. 273. ‡ Καλῶς οὖν ὁ Ἐπίχαρμος συνεκρίθη, φησὶ, διεκρίθη καὶ ἀπῆλθεν ὅθεν ἦλθε πάλιν, γᾶ μὲν εἰς γᾶν, πνεῦμα δ' ἄνω· τί τῶνδε χαλεπόν; Οὐδὲ ἕν. § Ἀλλ' οὐκέτι ἔσται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν μυριοστὸν ἔτος, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῷ Τρωικῷ, οὐδὲ κατὰ τοὺς προπάππους σου. Σὺ δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἄχθη· ὅτι δὲ εἰς ὕστερον οὐκ ἔσται, δυσχεραίνεις.—STOBÆUS, *Mor. Ec.* c. 106.

Hoc igitur nobis speculum natura futuri
Temporis exponit, post mortem denique nostram.'
Lucr. l. iii."

So far, my learned friend.

II. PLATO is next in order: He likewise greatly affected the character of *Lawgiver;* and actually composed laws for several people, as the Syracusians and Cretans; but with what kind of spirit we may judge, by his refusing that employment for the Thebans and Arcadians, as soon as he understood they were averse to equality of possessions.* The truth is, his *philosophic* character, which was always predominant (as in Pythagoras the *legislative)* gave his politics a cast of refinement which made his schemes of Government very impracticable, and even unnatural. So that, though his knowledge of mankind was indeed great and profound, and therefore highly commended by Cicero,† yet his fine-drawn speculations brought him at length into such contempt as a writer of politics, that Josephus tells us, notwithstanding *he was so high in glory and admiration amongst the Greeks, above the rest of the Philosophers, for his superior virtue, and power of eloquence,* yet *he was openly laughed at, and bitterly ridiculed by those who pretended to any profound or high knowledge of politics.*‡

The only Greek masters he followed, were Pythagoras and Socrates: These he much admired. From the first, he took his fondness for geometry, his fanaticism of numbers, his ambition for lawgiving, and the doctrine of the *Metempsychosis:* From the latter, the study of morals, and the *mode* of disputing.

This was a monstrous mis-alliance: § I mean, the incorporating into one Philosophy, the doctrines of two such discordant Schools: the first of which dogmatized in the most sublime questions of nature; the other gave up the most vulgar, as inscrutable. The Philosopher of Samos aimed at glory; the Legislator of Samos followed utility; but the simple Moralist of Athens laboured after truth.

We need not therefore any longer wonder at the obscurity which Plato's frequent contradictions throw over his writings. It was caused not only by the *double doctrine,* a practice common to all the Philosophers; but likewise by the joint profession of two such contrary Philosophies. This effect could not escape the observation of Eusebius. *Hear then* (says he) *the Greeks themselves, by their best and most powerful speaker, now rejecting, and now again adopting the* FABLES.‖

* See ÆLIANI *Var. Hist.* lib. ii. cap. 42. † "Deus ille noster Plato in Πολιτείᾳ."—See book ii. sect. 3, p. 190. ‡ Πλάτων δὲ θαυμαζόμενος παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ὡς καὶ σεμνότητι βίου διενεγκὼν καὶ δυνάμει λόγων, καὶ πειθοῖ πάντας ὑπεράρας τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ γεγονότας, ὑπὸ τῶν φασκόντων δεινῶν εἶναι τὰ πολιτικὰ, μικροῦ δεῖν χλευαζόμενος, καὶ κωμῳδούμενος διατελεῖ.—*Contra Apion.* lib. ii. sect. 31. § See note P, at the end of this book. ‖ Ἄκουε δ' οὖν αὐτῶν Ἑλλήνων δι' ἑνὸς τοῦ πάντων ἀρίστου, ποτὲ μὲν ἐξωθοῦντος, ποτὲ δ' οὖν πάλιν εἰσποιουμένου τοὺς μύθους.—*Præp. Evang.* p. 47. Steph. ed. See above, p. 36; and what will be further said on this matter, in note M, at the end of this book.

However it was the abstruse philosophy of Pythagoras with which he was most taken. For the sake of this, he assumed also the legislative part; and in imitation of his master, travelled into Egypt; where he was initiated into the Mysteries of the priesthood. It was this which made Xenophon, the faithful follower of Socrates, say, that Plato had adulterated the pure and simple philosophy of their Master; and *was* IN LOVE *with* Egypt, *and the portentous wisdom of* Pythagoras.* And even occasioned Socrates himself, on reading his romantic Dialogues, to exclaim, *Ye Gods, what a heap of lyes has this young man placed to my account?* †

But of all the Egyptian inventions, and Pythagoric practices, nothing pleased him more than that of the *double doctrine*, and the division of his auditors into the exoteric and esoteric classes: He more professedly than any other, avowing those principles, on which that distinction was founded; such as,—*That it is for the benefit of mankind, that they should be often deceived—That there are some truths not fit for the people to know—That the world is not to be entrusted with the true notion of God;* and more openly philosophizing upon that distinction, in his writings. Thus, in his books of Laws, (which we shall see presently were of the exoteric kind) he defends the popular opinion, which held the sun, moon, stars, and earth, to be Gods, against the theory of Anaxagoras, which taught the sun was a mass of fire, the moon an habitable earth, &c. Here, his objection to the NEW PHILOSOPHY, (as he calls it) is, that it was an inlet to atheism; for the common people, when they once found these to be no Gods which they had received for such, would be apt to conclude, there were none at all: But in his Cratylus, which was of the esoteric kind, he laughs at their Forefathers for worshipping the sun and stars, as Gods.

In a word, the Ancients thought this distinction of the *double doctrine*, so necessary a key to Plato's writings, that they composed discourses on it. Numenius, a Pythagorean and Platonist both in one, wrote a treatise (now lost) *of the secret doctrines* (that is, the real opinions) of Plato;‡ which would probably have given much light to this question, had the question wanted it. But Albinus, an old platonist, hath, in some measure, supplied this loss, by his *introduction to the dialogues of* Plato.§ From which it appears, that those very books, where Plato most dwells on the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, are all of the *exoteric* kind. To this it hath been said, that some of these were of the *political* and

* Αἰγύπτου ἠράσθη, καὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρου τερατώδους σοφίας. † Φασὶ δὲ καὶ Σωκράτην ἀκούσαντα τὸν Λύσιν ἀναγινώσκοντος Πλάτωνος, Ἡράκλεις, εἰπεῖν, ὡς πολλά μου κατεψεύδεθ' ὁ νεανίσκος.—DIOG. LAERT. lib. iii. sect. 35. ‡ Περὶ τῶν Πλάτωνος ἀπορρήτων.—Teste EUSEBIO, *Præp. Evang.* lib. xiii. cap. 4, 5. § Apud FABRICII *Biblioth. Græc.* lib. iii. cap. 2.

civil kind: and so say I; but nevertheless of the *exoteric*, called *political*, from their subject, and *exoterical* from their manner of handling it. But if the nature of the subject will not teach these objectors that it must needs be handled exoterically, Jamblichus's authority must decide between us; who, in his life of Pythagoras,* hath used *political* in the sense of *exoterical*: And in that class, Albinus ranks† the Criton, Phædo, Minos, Symposium, Laws, Epistles, Epinomis, Menexenus, Clitophon, and Philebus.

There is an odd passage in Cicero,‡ which seems to regard the Phædo in the light of a mere *exoteric* composition, so far as it concerns the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. The *auditor* is advised to read the Phædo, to confirm his belief in this point; to which he replies, *Feci mehercule, et quidem sæpius; sed* NESCIO QUOMODO, *dum lego assentior: cum posui librum, et mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum cœpi cogitare, assensio omnis illa elabitur.* The only reasonable account I can give of this reflection, (for to suppose it an imitation of something like it in the Phædo itself, applied to a very different purpose, gives us none at all) I say the only reasonable account is, that the Phædo being an *exoteric* dialogue, and written for the people, was held amongst the learned, in the rank of a philosophical romance: but while one of these better sort of readers, is very intent on such a work, a master-piece, like this, for composition and eloquence, he becomes so captivated with the charms and allurements of these graces, that he forgets, for a moment, the hidden meaning, and falls into the vulgar deceit. But having thrown aside the book, grown cool, and reflected on those principles concerning *God* and the *soul*, held in common by the Philosophers (of which more hereafter) all the bright colouring disappears, and the gaudy vision shrinks from his embrace. A passage in Seneca's *epistles* will explain, and seems to support, this interpretation. *Quomodo molestus est* JUCUNDUM SOMNIUM VIDENTI, *qui excitat; aufert enim voluptatem, etiamsi falsam, effectum tamen veræ habentem; sic epistola tua mihi fecit injuriam; revocavit enim me cogitationi aptæ traditum, et iturum, si licuisset, ulterius. Juvabat de* æternitate animarum *quærere, imo mehercule credere.* Credebam enim facile opinionibus magnorum virorum, rem gratissimam promittentium magis quam probantium! *Dabam me spei tantæ. Jam eram fastidio mihi, jam reliquias ætatis infractæ contemnebam, in immensum illud tempus et in possessionem omnis ævi transiturus: cum subito experrectus sum, epistola tua accepta, et tam* BELLUM SOMNIUM *perdidi.*§

The Platonic philosophy being then entirely Pythagorean in the

* Sect. 150. † Sect. 5. ‡ CICERONIS *Tusculan. Disputat.* lib. i. cap. 5.
§ Epist. 102.

point in question, and this latter rejecting the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, we might fairly conclude them both under the same predicament.

But as PLATO is esteemed the peculiar patron of this doctrine; chiefly, I suppose, on his being the *first* who *brought* REASONS *for the* ETERNITY *of the soul*: * on this account, it will be proper to be a little more particular.

1. First then, it is very true, that Plato hath argued much for the *eternity*, or, if you will, for the *immortality* of the soul. But to know what sort of immortality he meant, we need only consider what sort of arguments he employs. Now these, which he was so famous for inventing and inforcing, were *natural* and *metaphysical*, taken from the essence and qualities of the soul; which therefore concluded only for its *permanency*: and this he certainly believed.† But for any *moral arguments*, from which only a future state of rewards and punishments can be deduced, he resolves them all into tradition, and the religion of his country.

2. As the inventing reasons for the immortality of the soul, was *one* cause of his being held the great patron of this doctrine; so *another*, was his famous refinement (for it was indeed *his*) of the *natural Metempsychosis*, the peculiar notion of the Pythagoreans. This *natural Metempsychosis* was, as we have said, that *the successive transition of the soul into other bodies was physical and necessary, and exclusive of all moral designation whatsoever*. Plato, on receiving this opinion from his master, gave it this additional improvement; *that those changes and transitions were the purgations of impure minds, unfit, by reason of the pollutions they had contracted, to reascend the place from whence they came, and rejoin that* SUBSTANCE *from whence they were discerped; and consequently, that pure immaculate souls were exempt from this transmigration*. Thus Plato's *Metempsychosis* (which was as peculiarly his, as the other was Pythagoras's) seemed indeed to have some shadow of a *moral* designation in it, which his master's had not: neither did it, like that, necessarily subject all to it, without distinction; or for the same length of time. In this then they differed: But how much they agreed in excluding the notion of all future state of reward and punishment, will be seen, when in the next section we come to shew what a kind of existence it was which Pythagoras and Plato afforded to the soul, when it had rejoined that universal SUBSTANCE, from which it had been discerped.

We have now explained the three sorts of *Metempsychosis*;—The

* *Primum de animorum* ÆTERNITATE *non solum sensisse idem quod* PYTHAGORAS, *sed* RATIONEM *etiam attulisse.*—CICERONIS *Tusculan. Disputat.* lib. i. cap. 17.
† "Tot rationes attulit [Plato] ut velle ceteris, sibi certè persuasisse videatur."—Idem, ibid. cap. 21. Καθάπερ ὁ νόμος ὁ πάτριος λέγει, as he expresses it in his twelfth book of Laws.

popular;—That which was peculiar to Pythagoras; and lastly, That peculiar to Plato. The not distinguishing the Platonic from the Pythagoric; and both, from the Popular, has occasioned even the Ancients to write with much obscurity on this matter. What can be more inexplicable and contradictory than the account Servius hath given of it? "Sciendum, non omnes animas ad corpora reverti. Aliquæ enim propter vitæ merita non redeunt: aliquæ redeunt propter malam vitam; aliquæ propter fati necessitatem." *In. Æn.* vi. ver. 713. Here, he has jumbled into *one*, as the current doctrine of the *Metempsychosis*, these *three* different and distinct sorts: *aliquæ propter vitæ* MERITA *non redeunt*, belonging to the popular notion; *aliquæ redeunt propter fati necessitatem*, belonging to Pythagoras's; and *aliquæ propter* MALAM *vitam*, to Plato's.

3. However it is very true, that Plato in his writings inculcates the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments: but this, always in the gross sense of the populace: that *the souls of ill men descended into asses and swine;*—that *the uninitiated lay in mire and filth;*—that *there were three judges of hell:* and talks much of Styx, Cocytus, Acheron, &c. and all so seriously,* as shews he had a mind to be believed. But did he indeed believe these fables? We may be assured he did not: for being the most spiritualized of the Philosophers, had he really credited a *future state* of rewards and punishments, he would have refined and purified it, as he did the doctrine of the *eternity* of the soul, which he certainly believed. But he has as good as told us what he really thought of the matter, in his *Epinomis;* where, writing of the condition of a good and wise man after death, he says, *of whom, both in* JEST *and in* EARNEST, *I constantly affirm, that when such a one shall have finished his destined course by death, he shall at his dissolution be stript of those many senses which he here enjoyed; and then only participate of one simple lot or condition. And, of* MANY, *as he was here, being become* ONE, *he shall be happy, wise, and blessed.*† In this passage, I understand Plato *secretly* to intimate, that, when he was in *jest*, he held the future happiness of good men in a peculiar and distinct existence, which is the *popular* and *moral notion* of a future state: but, when *in earnest*, he held, that this existence was not personal or peculiar, but a *common life*, without distinct sensations; a *resolution* into the τὸ ἕν. And it is remarkable that the whole sentence has an elegant ambiguity, capable of either meaning. For πολλῶν αἰσθήσεων may either signify our many *passions and appetites*, or our *many cogitations*.

* In his *Gorgias*, *Phædo*, and *Republic*.

† Ὃν καὶ διϊσχυρίζομαι πάλιζων καὶ σπουδάζω ἅμα, ὅτε θανάτῳ τις τῶν τοιούτων τὴν αὑτοῦ μοῖραν ἀναπλήσει, σχεδὸν ἐάνπερ ἀποθανὼν ᾖ, μήτε μεθέξειν ἔτι πολλῶν τότε καθάπερ νῦν αἰσθήσεων, μιᾶς τε μοίρας μετειληφότα μόνου, καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα, εὐδαίμονά τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ σοφώτατον ἅμα καὶ μακάριον.—Sub fin.

To deny we have the *first* of these in a future state, makes nothing against a distinct existence; but to deny the *second*, does. His disciple Aristotle seems to have understood him as meaning it in this *latter* sense, when in earnest; and has so paraphrased it as to exclude all peculiar existence.* There is the same ambiguity in ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα, which may either signify, that, of his many sensations, he hath only one left, the feeling happiness; or that, from being a part, and in the *number of many individuals* of the same species, he is become *one*, and entire, by being joined to, and united with the universal nature. Plato affirms all this still more plainly, in his commentary on Timæus, where he agrees to his author's doctrine of the fabulous invention of the FOREIGN TORMENTS.†

4. In confirmation of the whole, *(i. e.* of Plato's disbelief of the religious doctrine of a future state, as founded on the will and providence of the Gods) we observe, in the last place, that the most intelligent of the Ancients regarded what Plato said of a future state of rewards and punishments, to be said only in the *exoteric* way to the people.

The famous Stoic, *Chrysippus*,‡ when he blames Plato, as not rightly deterring men from injustice, by frightful stories of future punishments, takes it for granted that Plato himself gave no credit to them: for he turns his reprehension, not against that philosopher's wrong belief, but his wrong judgment, in imagining such childish terrors§ could be useful to the cause of Virtue.

Strabo plainly declares himself of the same opinion, when, speaking of the Indian Brachmans, he says, that *they had invented fables in the manner of* Plato, *concerning the immortality of the soul, and a future judgment in the shades below; and other things of the same nature.*‖

Celsus owns that every thing which Plato tells us of a future state, and the happy abodes of the virtuous, is an allegory. "But what" (says he) "we are to understand by these things, is not easy for every one to find out. To be master of this, we must be able to comprehend his meaning, when he says, *They cannot, by reason of their imbecillity and sluggishness, penetrate into the highest region. But were their nature vigorous enough to raise itself to so sublime a contemplation, they would then come to understand, that this was the true heaven, and the true irradiation.*"¶ To understand this *true*

* See hereafter, in sect. iv. of this book. † See p. 53. ‡ PLUTARCH. *De Stoic. Repug.* § Ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφιτοῦς, δι' ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνειργοῦσι. ‖ Παραπλέκουσι δὲ καὶ μύθους, ὥσπερ καὶ ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, περί τε ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς, καὶ τῶν καθ' ᾅδου κρίσεων, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.—*Geogr.* lib. xv. p. 1040, Gron. ed. ¶ Τί δὲ διὰ τούτων ἐμφανίζει, οὐ παντὶ γνῶναι ῥᾴδιον· εἰ μὴ ὅστις ἐπαΐειν δύναιτο, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο ὃ φησιν· ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδύτητος οὐχ οἵους τ' εἶναι διεξελθεῖν ἐπ' ἔσχατον τὸν ἀέρα· καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνασχέσθαι θεωροῦσα, γνῶναι ἂν ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθινὸν φῶς.—ORIGEN. *Contra Celsum*, lib. vii. p. 352, Spenceri ed.

irradiation, the ἀληθινὸν φῶς, we must consider that *light* was one of the most important circumstances of the Pagan Elysium, as we may see in the chapter of the Mysteries; where a certain ravishing and divine light is represented, as making those abodes so recommendable;

> "Largior hic campos æther et lumine vestit
> Purpureo"——

But this remarkable passage of Celsus, besides the general conclusion to be drawn from it, confirms what we have said of the peculiar Platonic *Metempsychosis*. For here Celsus resolves all Plato's meaning, in his representations of a future state of rewards and punishments, into that Metempsychosis: and we shall see hereafter, that *that* was resolvable into the re-union of the soul with the Divine Nature, when it became *vigorous enough to penetrate into the highest region*.*

The emperor Julian addressing himself to Heraclius the Cynic, on the subject of that sect, when he comes to speak of the *double doctrine*, and the admission of *fable* into the teachings of the philosophers, observes, that it hath its use chiefly in *Ethics* (in which he includes Politics†) and in that *part of theology relating to initiation, and the mysteries*.‡ To support which, he presently quotes the example of Plato, who, when *he writes of Theology, or as a Theologer, is full of fables in his accounts of the infernal regions*.§ From hence it appears that, in the opinion of this learned emperor, Plato did not only not speak his real sentiments of these matters, but that when he did treat of them, it was not as a Philosopher, but as a Theologer; in which character the ancient Sages never thought themselves obliged to keep within the limits of truth. What these *fabulous relations* were, he intimates, when he previously speaks of the fables taught in the *Mysteries*; by which he could only mean their representations of a future state: The great *Secret* of the Mysteries, the doctrine of the Unity, being, in his opinion, of a nature directly contrary to the other.

We now come to the PERIPATETICS and STOICS, who will give us much less trouble. For these having in some degree, though not entirely, thrown off the legislative character, spoke more openly against a future state of rewards and punishments. Indeed the difference in this point, between them and the Platonists, was only from less to more reserve, as appears from their all having the same common principles of philosophising.‖

III. ARISTOTLE was the disciple of Plato, and his Rival. This

* See note Q, at the end of this book. † Ἠθικόν· οἰκονομικὸν δὲ, τὸ περὶ λίαν οἰκίαν· πολιτικὸν δὲ, τὸ περὶ πόλιν.—*Orat.* 7. ‡ Καὶ τοῦ θεολογικοῦ, τῷ τελεστικῷ, καὶ μυστικῷ.—Ibid. § Ἐπεὶ καὶ Πλάτωνι πολλὰ μεμυθολόγηται περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾅδου πραγμάτων θεολογοῦντι.—Ibid. ‖ *Acad. Quæst.* lib. i.

emulation, though it disposed him to take a different road to fame, in a province yet unoccupied, and to throw off the legislative character; yet it set him upon writing books of *laws* and *politics*, in opposition to his Master; whom he takes every occasion to contradict.

He stuck indeed to the ancient method of the *double doctrine*, but with less caution and reserve. For, whereas the Pythagoreans and Platonists kept it amongst the *secrets* of their schools, he seems willing that all the world should take notice of it, by giving public directions to distinguish between the two kinds.* Accordingly, in his Nicomachian Ethics, he expresses himself without any ceremony, and in the most dogmatic way, against a future state of rewards and punishments. *Death* (says he) *is of all things the most terrible. For it is the final period of existence. And beyond that, it appears, there is neither good nor evil for the dead man to dread or hope.*†

And in another place he tells us, that the soul, after its separation from the body, will neither *joy* nor *grieve*, *love* nor *hate*, nor be subject to any passions of the like nature. And lest we should suspect that this was said of the ANIMAL *life* only, he goes further, and observes, that it will then neither *remember*, *think*, *nor understand*.‡ It must, therefore, according to this Philosopher, be absolutely lost, as to any separate existence.

IV. ZENO, the Founder of the Porch, followed the mode, in writing of *Laws* and a *Republic*. Agreeably to this part of his character, we find, by Lactantius, that he taught a future state of rewards and punishments in the very terms of Plato: *Esse inferos* Zeno Stoicus *docuit; et sedes piorum ab impiis esse discretas; et illos quidem quietas ac delectabiles incolere regiones, hos vero luere pœnas in tenebrosis locis atque in cœni voraginibus horrendis.*§ Yet, we know that he and the whole Porch held, that God governed the world only by his general Providence; which did not extend either to Individuals, Cities, or People:‖ And, not to insist that his follower Chrysippus laughed at these things, as the most childish of all terrors, we know too, that the philosophic principle of his School was, *that the soul died with the body*.¶ Indeed, to compliment their WISE MAN, the Stoics taught that *his* soul held it out till the general Conflagration:

* See CICERONIS *Ep. ad Att.* lib. iv. ep. 16: "In singulis libris [de republica] utor proœmiis, ut Aristoteles in iis, quos ἐξωτερικοὺς vocat." † *Φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γὰρ καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν, οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι.* —*Eth. ad Nicom.* lib. iii. cap. 6, p. 130, ed. Han. 1610, 8vo. ‡ *Τὸ δὲ* ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ, *καὶ* ΦΙΛΕΙΝ *ἢ* ΜΙΣΕΙΝ, *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου πάθη, ἀλλὰ τοῦδε τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο ᾗ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει· διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρομένου, οὔτε* MNHMONEYEI, *οὔτε φιλεῖ.*— *De Anima*, lib. i. cap. v. § *Institut.* lib. vii. sect. 7. ‖ *Natura Deorum*, lib. iii. cap. 39. ¶ *Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἐξιοῦσαν τῶν σωμάτων ὑποφέρεσθαι τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν ἅμα. τοῖς συγκρίμασι γενέσθαι· (ταύτην δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων·) τὴν δὲ ἰσχυροτέραν οἵα ἐστὶ περὶ τοὺς* ΣΟΦΟΥΣ, *καὶ μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως.*—PLUTARCHUS *De Plac. Phil.* lib. iv. cap. 7.—See "the Critical Inquiry into the Opinions and Practice of the Ancient Philosophers," p. 27—37, 2d ed.

by which, when we come to speak of their opinion concerning the nature and duplicity of the soul, we shall find they meant just nothing.

However, it was not long before the *Stoics* entirely laid aside the legislative character; for which their Master appears to have had no talents, as we may judge by what he lays down in his *Republic*, that *States should not busy themselves in erecting temples; for we ought not to think there is any thing holy, or sacred, or that deserves any real esteem, in the work of masons and labourers.** The good man had forgot that he was writing Laws for a *People;* and so turned impertinently enough, to philosophise with the *stoical Sage*. The truth is, this sect had never any great name for Legislation: The reason is evident. This part of Ethics, more than any other, requires the cultivation of, and adherence to, what is called COMMON NOTICES. Whereas, of all the ancient systems of Philosophy, the Stoical *Morals* most deviated from Nature.† They soon felt the effects which the doctrines of their School had on common life, and therefore in good time laid the study of Politics quite aside. After which, they wrote, without the least reserve, against a future state of rewards and punishments.

Thus EPICTETUS, a thorough Stoic, if ever there was any, speaking of death, says, "But whither do you go? no where to your hurt: you return from whence you came: to a friendly consociation with your kindred elements: what there was of the nature of fire in your composition, returns to the element of fire; what there was of earth, to earth; what of air, to air; and of water, to water. There is no *Hell*, nor *Acheron*, nor *Cocytus*, nor *Pyriphlegethon*." ‡

In another place, he says, "The hour of death approaches. Do not endeavour to aggravate, and make things worse than they really are: Represent them to yourself in their true light. The time is now come when the *materials of which you are compounded will be resolved into the elements from which they were originally taken*. What hurt or cause of terror is there in this? or what is there in the world that ABSOLUTELY PERISHETH?" §

ANTONINUS says, "He who feareth death, either fears that he shall be deprived of all sense, or that he shall experience different sensations. If all sensations cease, you will be no longer subject to

* Προσθήσομεν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὅ, τι καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιττιεὺς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ φησίν· Ἱερά τε οἰκοδομεῖν οὐδὲν δεήσει, ἱερὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν χρὴ νομίζειν, οὐδὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον καὶ ἅγιον οἰκοδόμων τε ἔργον καὶ βαναύσων.—Apud ORIG. *Contra Celsum*, p. 6. † See note R, at the end of this book. ‡ Ποῦ; εἰς οὐδὲν δεινόν, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ἐγένου, εἰς τὰ φίλα καὶ συγγενῆ, εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα· ὅσον ἦν ἐν σοὶ πῦρ, εἰς πῦρ ἀπεισιν, ὅσον ἦν γηδίου, εἰς γῆδιον· ὅσον πνευματίου, εἰς πνευμάτιον· ὅσον ὑδατίου, εἰς ὑδάτιον· οὐδεὶς Ἅδης, οὐδὲ Ἀχέρων, οὐδὲ Κωκυτός, οὐδὲ Πυριφλεγέθων.—Apud ARRIANUM, lib. iii. cap. 13. § Ἤδη καιρὸς ἀποθανεῖν· μὴ τραγῴδει τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ' εἶπε ὡς ἔχει· ἤδη καιρὸς τὴν ὕλην, ἐξ ὧν συνῆλθεν, εἰς ἐκεῖνα πάλιν ἀναλυθῆναι, καὶ τί δεινόν, τί μέλλει ἀπόλλυσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ;—Lib. iv. cap. 7.

pain and misery; if you be invested with senses of another kind, you will become another creature, and will continue to exist as such." *

SENECA, in his consolation to Marcia, daughter of the famous Cremutius Cordus the Stoic, is not at all behind hand, in the frank avowal of the same principles. *Cogita, nullis defunctum malis affici: illa quæ nobis inferos faciunt terribiles,* FABULAM *esse: nullas imminere mortuis tenebras, nec carcerem, nec flumina flagrantia igne, nec oblivionis amnem, nec tribunalia, et reos et in illa libertate tam laxa ullos iterum tyrannos. Luserunt ista poëtæ, et vanis nos agitavere terroribus. Mors omnium dolorum et solutio est, et finis: ultra quam mala nostra non exeunt, quæ nos in illam tranquillitatem,* IN QUA, ANTEQUAM NASCEREMUR, *jacuimus, reponit.*†

LUCIAN, who, of all the Ancients, best understood the intrigues and intricacies of ancient Philosophy, appears to have had the same thoughts of the Stoics upon the point in question. In his *Jupiter Tragicus*, or *discourse* on *Providence*, Damis, the Epicurean, arguing against Providence, silences the Stoic, Timocles, when he comes to the *inequality of events;* because the Author would not suffer his Stoic to bring in a *future state* to remove the difficulty. And, that nothing but decorum, or the keeping each Sect to its own principles, made him leave the Stoic embarrassed, appears from his *Jupiter confuted*, or *discourse on destiny;* where, when Cyniscus presses Jupiter with the same arguments against Providence, Jupiter easily extricates himself: "You appear by this, Cyniscus, to be ignorant what dreadful punishments await the wicked after this life, and what abundant happiness is reserved for the good." ‡

I will only observe in taking leave of this subject, that the famous STOICAL RENOVATION (which hath been opposed to what is here represented) seems to have been conceived on the *natural Metempsychosis* of Pythagoras. Origen gives the following account of it: "The generality of the *Stoics* not only subject every thing mortal to these RENOVATIONS, but the Immortals likewise, and the very Gods themselves. For after the conflagration of the Universe, which hath happened already, and will happen hereafter, in infinite successions, the same face and order of things hath been and ever will be preserved from the beginning to the end." § It is true, the men of this

* Ὁ τὸν θανατὸν φοβούμενος, ἤτοι ἀναισθησίαν φοβεῖται, ἢ αἴσθησιν ἑτέροιαν· ἀλλ' εἴτε οὐκέτι αἴσθησιν, οὐδὲ κακοῦ τινὸς αἰσθήσῃ, εἴτε ἀλλοιοτέραν αἴσθησιν κτήσῃ, ἄλλοιον ζῶον ἔσῃ, καὶ τοῦ ζῆν οὐ παύσῃ.—*De Rebus suis*, lib. viii. § 58. † Cap. 19.

‡ Οὐ γὰρ οἶσθα, ὦ Κυνίσκε, ἡλίκας, μετὰ τὸν βίον, οἱ πονηροὶ τὰς κολάσεις ὑπομένουσιν, ἢ ἐν ὅσῃ οἱ χρηστοὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ διατρίβουσιν. § Στοϊκῶν οἱ πλείους οὐ μόνον τὴν τῶν θνητῶν περίοδον τοιαύτην εἶναι φασὶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀθανάτων καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτοὺς θεῶν· μετὰ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἐκπύρωσιν ἀπειράκις γενομένην, καὶ ἀπειράκις ἐσομένην, ἡ αὐτὴ τάξις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους πάντων γέγονέ τε καὶ ἔσται. Πειρώμενοι μέντοι θεραπεύειν πως τὰς ἀπεμφάσεις οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στύας, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως, ἀπαραλλάκτους φασὶν ἔσεσθαι κατὰ περίοδον τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων περιόδων πάντας· ἵνα μὴ Σωκράτης πάλιν γένηται, ἀλλ' ἀπαράλλακτός τις τῷ Σωκράτει, γαμήσων απαράλλακτον τὴν

School, to ease a little the labouring absurdity, contend for no more than the most exact resemblance of things, in one *renovation*, to those of another. Thus the next Socrates was not individually the same with the last, but one exactly like him; with exactly such a wife as Xantippe, and such accusers as Anytus and Melitus.* Which, however, shews the folly of bringing this *renovation* for a proof, that the Stoics believed a future state of rewards and punishments.

Having now gone through these FOUR FAMOUS SCHOOLS, I should have closed the section, but that I imagined the curious reader would be well pleased to know what CICERO thought, on this important point; Cicero, who finished the Conquests of his countrymen in Greece, and brought home in triumph, those only remains of their ancient grandeur, their PHILOSOPHY and ELOQUENCE.† But there are great difficulties in getting to his real sentiments. I shall mention some of the chief.

1. First, that which arises from the use of the *double doctrine;* a circumstance common to the Greek philosophy; of its essence; and therefore, inseparable from its existence. The Ancients who lived after Cicero, such as Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Synesius, Sallust the philosopher, Apuleius, do in fact speak of it as an instrument still in use; nor do any other ever mention it as a thing become obsolete. So that when Cicero undertook to explain the Greek Philosophy to his countrymen, he could not but employ so fashionable a vehicle of science. But how much it contributed to hide the real sentiments of the user, we have seen above.

2. Another difficulty arises from the peculiar genius of the Sect he espoused, the *New Academy;* which was entirely *sceptical:* It professed a way of philosophising, in which there was no room for any one to *interfere* with his own opinions; or, indeed, to *have* any. It is true, were we to consider Cicero as a *strict Academic,* in the Grecian sense of adhering to a Sect, our enquiry would be presently at an end; or at least very impertinent: but he professed this Philosophy in a much laxer way; as we shall now see.

3. And this leads us to another difficulty, arising from the manner, in which the Greek Philosophy was received in Italy. The Romans in general were, by their manners and dispositions, little qualified for speculative science. When they first got footing, and had begun a commerce for arts, in Greece, they entertained great jealousies of the

Ξανθίππην, καὶ κατηγορηθησόμενος ὑπὸ ἀπαραλλάκτων Ἀνυτὼ καὶ Μελιτώ.—ORIGENES *Contra Celsum*, lib. iv. ed. Spen. pp. 208, 209. The nature of this *renovation* is examined a large, and admirably developed, in "the Critical Inquiry into the Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers."

* See note S, at the end of this book.

† Τὸν δ' Ἀπολλώνιον—εἰπεῖν, Σὲ μὲν, ὦ Κικέρων, ἐπαινῶ καὶ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος οἰκτείρω τὴν τύχην, ὁρῶν, ἃ μόνα τῶν καλῶν ἡμῖν ὑπελείπετο. καὶ ταῦτα Ῥωμαίοις διὰ σοῦ προσγενόμενα, ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΝ τε καὶ ΛΟΓΟΝ.—PLUTARCH. *Vita Ciceronis.*

Sophists, and used them roughly: and it was long before they could be persuaded to think favourably of a set of men, who professed themselves always able and ready to dispute for or against VIRTUE indifferently: * and even then, the Greek Philosophy was introduced into Rome, but as a more refined species of luxury, and a kind of table-furniture, set apart for the entertainment of the Great; who were yet very far from the Grecian humour, *jurare in verba magistri:* they regarded the doctrines of the Sect they espoused, not as a rule of life, but only as a kind of Apparatus for their rhetoric schools; to enable them to invent readily, and reason justly, in the affairs of life. Cicero, who best knew upon what footing it was received, says no less, when he ridicules Cato for an unfashionable fellow. *Hæc homo ingeniosissimus M. Cato auctoribus eruditissimis inductus, arripuit,* NEQUE DISPUTANDI CAUSA, UT MAGNA PARS, *sed ita vivendi.*† The least, then, we may conclude from hence is, that Cicero, laughing at those who espoused a Sect *vivendi causa*, did himself espouse the Academic, *causa disputandi:* which indeed he frankly enough confesses to his adversary, in this very oration: "*fatebor enim*, Cato, *me quoque in adolescentia*, diffisum ingenio meo, quæsisse adjumenta doctrinæ." Which, in other words, is, I myself espoused a Sect of philosophy, for its use in disputation. Quintilian, having spoken of Cicero as a Philosopher, when he comes to Cato's nephew, Brutus, (in his Philosophy, as much in earnest as his Uncle,) of him, by way of Contrast to Cicero, he says, "Egregius vero, multoque quam in Orationibus præstantior Brutus, suffecit ponderi rerum: *scias enim sentire quæ dicit.*" As much as to say, "in this he was like Cicero, that he was equal to his subject; in this however he was unlike, that *he always said what he thought.*" This slippery way, therefore, of professing the Greek philosophy, must needs add greatly to the embarras we complain of.

4. A fourth difficulty arises from Tully's purpose in writing his works of philosophy: which was, not to deliver his own opinion on any point of ethics or metaphysics, but to explain to his countrymen, in the most intelligible manner, whatever the Greeks had taught concerning them. In the execution of which design, no Sect could so well serve his turn as the NEW ACADEMY, whose principle it was, *not to interfere with their own opinions:* and a passage, in his Academic questions, inclines me to think, he entered late into this Sect, and not till he had formed his project. Varro, one of the dialogists, says to him: *sed de teipso quid est quod audio?* Tully answers: *quanam de re?* Varro replies: *relictam a te* VETEREM JAM, *tractari autem* NOVAM. Varro hints at it again, where speaking afterwards to Tully, he says, *tuæ sunt nunc partes, qui ab antiquorum ratione* NUNC

* See note T, at the end of this book. † See note U, at the end of this book.

*desciscis, et ea, quæ ab Arcesila novata sunt probas, docere, etc.** This further appears from a place in his *Nature of the Gods*,† where he says, that his espousing the *New Academy* of a sudden, was a thing altogether unlooked for. *Multis etiam sensi mirabile videri, eam nobis potissimum probatam esse philosophiam, quæ lucem eriperet et quasi noctem quandam rebus offunderet, desertæque disciplinæ, et jam pridem relictæ patrocinium* NEC OPINATUM *a nobis esse susceptum.* The change then was late; and after the ruin of the Republic; when Cicero retired from business, and had leisure, in his recess, to plan and execute this noble undertaking. So that a learned Critic appears to have been mistaken, when he supposes the choice of the *New Academy* was made in his youth. *This Sect* (says he) *did best agree with the vast genius and ambitious spirit of* YOUNG CICERO.‡

5. But the principal difficulty proceeds from the several and various characters he sustained in his life, and writings; which habituated him to feign and dissemble his opinions. He may be considered as an Orator, a Statesman, and a Philosopher. 1. As a STATESMAN, he discharged the office of a PATRIOT, *urbis conservator et parens*, in a Government torn in pieces by the dissensions between Senate and People. But could this be done by speaking his real sentiments to either? Both were very faulty; and, as faulty men generally are, too angry to hear reason. I have given an instance below, in the case of the *Catiline conspiracy*. And the issue of it declares the wisdom of his conduct. He saved the Republic. 2. As a PHILOSOPHER, his end and design in writing was not to deliver his own opinion, but to explain the Grecian *Philosophy*. On which account he blames those men as too curious, who were for knowing his own sentiments. In pursuance of this design, he brings in Stoics, Epicureans, Platonists, Academics new and old, in order to instruct the Romans in their various opinions, and several ways of reasoning. But whether it be himself or others that are brought upon the stage, it is the *Academic*, not Cicero; it is the Stoic, the Epicurean, not Balbus nor Velleius, who deliver their opinions. 3. As an ORATOR, he was an *Advocate for his client*, or more properly *personated* him. "Verum etiam" (says Quintilian) "in his causis quibus advocamur, eadem differentia diligenter est custodienda. Utimur enim *fictione personarum*, et velut *ore alieno* loquimur." In this case, then, he was to speak the sentiments of his client, not his own. So that in all these cases, though he acted neither a weak nor an unfair part, he becomes totally inscrutable. For these were Characters, all equally *personated*; and no one more the real man than the other: but each of them taken up,

* Manutius and Davies, who, I suppose, did not attend to what passed before, agree to throw out the word *nunc*, as perfectly useless and insignificant. † Lib. i. cap. 3. ‡ "Remarks upon a late Discourse of Free-thinking," part ii. rem. 53.

and laid down, for the occasion. This appears from the numerous inconsistencies we find in him, throughout the course of his sustaining them. In his oration *de Harusp. respon. in senatu*, when the popular superstition was inflamed by present prodigies, he gives the highest character of the wisdom of their Ancestors, as Founders of their established Religion: "Ego vero primùm habeo auctores ac magistros religionum colendarum majores nostros: quorum mihi tanta fuisse sapientia videtur, ut satis superque prudentes sint, qui illorum prudentiam, non dicam assequi, sed, quanta fuerit, perspicere possint." Yet in his treatise *of Laws*, as the reader has seen above,* he frankly declares, that *the folly of their Ancestors had suffered many depravities to be brought into Religion*. Here the Philosopher confuted the Statesman: As, in another instance, the Statesman seems to have got the better of the Philosopher. He defends the paradoxes of the Stoics in a philosophical dissertation: But in his oration for *Muræna*, he ridicules those paradoxes with the utmost freedom. Nor under one and the same Character, or at one and the same time, is he more consistent. In *the orations against Catiline*, when he opens the conspiracy to the *Senate*, he represents it as the most deep-laid design, which had infected all orders and degrees of men in the City. Yet, when he brings the same affair before the *People*, he talks of it as only the wild and senseless escape of a few desperate wretches; it being necessary for his purpose, that the *Senate* and *People*, who viewed the *Conspiracy* from several stations, should see it in different lights.

We meet with numbers of the like contradictions, delivered in his own person, and under his philosophic character. Thus, in his *books of divination*, he combats all augury, &c. and yet, in his philosophic *treatise of laws*, he delivers himself in their favour; and in so serious and positive a manner, that it is difficult not to believe him in earnest. In a word, he laughed at the opinions of State, when he was amongst the Philosophers; he laughed at the doctrines of the Philosophers, when he was cajoling an Assembly; and he laughed heartily at both, when withdrawn amongst his friends in a corner. Nor, is this the worst part of the story. He hath given us no MARK to distinguish his meaning: For, in his *Academic questions*,† he is ready to swear he always speaks what he thinks: "Jurarem per Jovem Deosque penates, me et ardere studio veri reperiendi, et ea sentire quæ dicerem:" ‡ Yet, in his *Nature of the Gods*,§ he has strangely changed his note: "Qui autem requirunt, quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est."

If it be asked then, in which of his writings we can have any

* See book ii. sect. 6. † Lib. iv. sect. 20. ‡ See note X, at the end of this book. § Lib. i. sect. 5.

reasonable assurance of his true sentiments? I reply, scarce in any but his EPISTLES. Nor is this said to evade any material evidence that may be found in his other works, in favour of a future state of rewards and punishment: on the contrary, there are many very glaring instances of his disbelief, as far as we can hazard a judgment of his mind. As in his *Offices*, which bids the fairest of any to come from his heart, he delivers himself very effectually against it; as will appear in the next section. And in his oration for Cluentius to the Judges, he speaks with yet more force on the same side of the question: "Nam nunc quidem quid tandem illi mali mors attulit? nisi forte ineptiis ac *fabulis* ducimur, ut existimemus illum apud inferos impiorum supplicia perferre, &c. Quæ si falsa sunt, *id quod omnes intelligunt*, quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit præter sensum doloris?"

Nor will most of *those* passages, which are usually brought in support of the opinion, that Tully did really believe the *immortality of the soul*, stand in any account against *these*: Because, as will be shewn in the next section, they best agree to a *kind of immortality* very consistent with a thorough disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments. As to the celebrated argument of Plato for the immortality of the soul, explained and inforced by Cicero, it is so big with impiety and nonsense, that one would wonder how any Christian Divine could have the indiscretion to recommend it as doing credit to ancient Philosophy; or to extol the inventers and espousers of it, as having delivered and entertained *very just, rational, and proper notions* concerning the immortality of the human soul. If we examine this Philosophy as it is delivered us by Plato in his Phædrus, or as it is translated by Cicero in his first Tusculan, we shall find it gives the human soul the attributes of the Divine Being, and supposes it to have been from eternity, uncreated and self-existent. Speaking of the *principle of motion*, or the *soul*, it says, "principii autem nulla est origo: nam e principio oriuntur omnia: ipsum autem *nullâ ex re aliâ nasci potest*: nec enim esset id principium quod gigneretur aliunde.—Id autem nec *nasci* potest, nec mori.—Hæc est propria natura animi atque vis; quæ si est una ex omnibus, quæ se ipsa semper moveat, *neque nata* certe est, et *æterna* est." 1 *Tusc.* cap. 2, 3. It is plain too, that this argument assigns the human soul a NECESSARY immortality, or an immortality which arises from it's nature and essence, or from it's original and inherent powers; and not from the Will or appointment of God. We are told that the soul is immortal, because it is a self-moving substance; for that a self-moving substance can never cease to be, since it will always have a power of existing within itself, independent of any foreign or external cause. And what can be said more of God himself? "sentit igitur animus se moveri, quod cum

sentit, illud una sentit se vi sua, non aliena, moveri; *nec accidere posse, ut ipse unquam a se deseratur,*" 1 Tusc. c. 23. Here it's immortality is not supposed to arise from the influence of any foreign or external cause, but is resolved into the natural and inherent powers of the soul itself. Plato says, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀδιάφθορον αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι—τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατὸν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγέννητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη. The *necessity* here spoken of was supposed to arise from an internal faculty and power of the soul, or from the principle of self-motion. The force of all this, has been shuffled over by the writers against the Divine Legation with only repeating, that, Cicero *inferred the immortality of the soul from it's wonderful powers and faculties, on it's principle of self-motion, it's memory, invention, wit and comprehension.* As to *self-motion*, the word is equivocal, and may either signify the power *given* to a being to begin motion; or a power *inherent* and essential to a Being, who has all things within itself, and receives nothing from without. Now we have shewn, that Plato and his followers used *self-motion*, when applied to the soul, in this latter sense; and from thence inferred a NECESSARY *immortality* in that Being which had it, an immortality which implied increation and self-existence. As to the other *powers and faculties of memory, invention, wit and comprehension*, whatsoever immortality may be *logically* deduced from them, it is not that which Cicero deduces: For, as we see, *his* is a strict and proper immortality, an existence *from* all eternity, *to* all eternity: In a word, the immortality of the Supreme Being himself. "Si cernerem" (says Tully) "quemadmodum *nasci* possent [facultates animi] etiam quemadmodum interirent viderem." 1 Tusc. cap. 24. And again, when he proves the immortality of the soul against Panætius, he goes upon the principle that the soul cannot be shewn to be immortal, but on the supposition of its being actually ungenerated. "Volt enim [Panætius] quod nemo negat, quicquid *natum* sit interire;—nasci autem animos, quod declaret eorum similitudo—nihil necessitatis adfert cur nascatur, animi similitudo."—1 Tusc. cap. 32, 33. I would therefore have the friends of REASON, not to say of REVELATION, consider whether these extravagant notions of the human soul, do any honour to ancient Philosophy? and whether Tully had not acted a more decent and modest part to have held consistently, even with Epicurus, the *mortality* of the soul, than with Plato that it was *uncreated, self-existent, and necessarily eternal?*

It is only then (as we say) in his EPISTLES to his friends, where we see the *man* divested of the *Politician*, the *Sophist*, and the *Advocate:* And there he professes his disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments in the frankest and freest manner. To L. Mescinius he says: "Sed ut illa secunda moderatè tulimus, sic

hanc non solùm adversam, sed funditus eversam fortunam fortiter ferre debemus; ut hoc saltem in maximis malis boni consequamur, ut mortem, quam etiam beati contemnere debeamus, propterea quod NULLUM SENSUM esset habitura, nunc sic affecti, non modo contemnere debeamus, sed etiam optare." * In his epistle to Torquatus, he says: "Ita enim vivere ut non sit vivendum, miserrimum est. Mori autem nemo sapiens miserum dixit, ne beato quidem—sed hæc consolatio levis est; illa gravior, qua te uti spero: Ego certe utor. Nec enim DUM ERO, angar ulla re, cum omni vacem culpa: Et si NON ERO, *sensu omnino carebo*." † Some have taken the *ero* and *non ero*, in this passage, to relate *generically*, to existence or non-existence *absolutely*; and not, as Tully certainly meant it, *specifically*, to the state of existence or non-existence *here*, i. e. *life* or *death*. But if that were his meaning, that *if he had no being he should have no sense*, Torquatus, for so wonderful a discovery, might well have returned him his proverb, quoted in this Epistle, γλαῦκ' εἰς Ἀθήνας. On the contrary, his meaning in all these passages is *that he should have no sense, because he should have no being*. So in his Tuscul. lib. i. cap. 11. "Quomodo igitur, aut cur, mortem malum tibi videri dicis; quæ aut beatos nos efficiet, animis manentibus; aut non miseros, *sensu carentes*," i. e. *animis non manentibus*. But the foregoing passage from the epistle to Mescinius, in which we find the same thought, and in the same expression, puts the meaning out of doubt. Add to this, that it was the very language of the Epicureans, and used by Lucretius as an antidote against the fear of death,

> "Scilicet haud nobis quidquam, qui NON ERIMUS tum,
> Accidere omnino poterit SENSUMQUE movere."

But let it be observed, that when Cicero talks of death as of the end of man, he does not make this conclusion on the Epicurean principle, that the soul was a mere *quality*, but on the Platonic, that it was resolved into the substance from whence it was extracted, and had no longer a *particular* existence. Again, to the same person ‡ he says; "Deinde quod mihi ad consolationem commune tecum est, si jam vocer ad exitum vitæ, non ab ea republica avellar, qua carendum esse doleam, præsertim cum id SINE ULLO SENSU futurum sit." And again to his friend Toranius: § "Cum consilio profici nihil possit, una ratio videtur, quicquid evenerit, ferre moderate, præsertim cum *omnium rerum mors sit extremum*." That Cicero here speaks his real sentiments, is beyond all doubt. These are letters of consolation, to his friends, when he himself, by reason of the ill state of Public Affairs, much wanted consolation; a season when men have least disguise, and are most disposed to lay open their whole hearts:

* *Familiares Epist.* lib. v. ep. 21. † Lib. vi. ep. 3. ‡ Lib. vi. ep. 4. § Lib. vi. ep. 21.

"Nam veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo
Ejiciuntur, et eripitur PERSONA, manet RES."*

LUCRET.

Here his *real* sentiments are delivered positively; which in his *Tusculan disputations* he advances only hypothetically; but with a clearness that well comments the conciseness of the foregoing passages. "M. Video te altè spectare et velle in cœlum migrare. A. Spero fore, ut contingat id nobis. Sed fac, ut isti volunt, animos NON remanere post mortem.—M. Mali vero quid affert ista sententia? Fac enim sic animum interire, ut corpus. Num igitur aliquis dolor, aut omnino post mortem SENSUS in corpore est?—Ne in animo quidem igitur SENSUS remanet, ipse enim nusquam est.—Hoc premendum etiam atque etiam est argumentum, confirmato illo, de quo, si mortales animi sunt, dubitare non possumus, quin tantus interitus in morte sit, ut ne minima quidem suspicio SENSUS relinquatur."† Now, this is the very language of the Epicureans, as appears from the following words of Pliny: "Post sepulturam aliæ atque aliæ manium ambages. Omnibus a suprema die eadem, quæ ante primum: nec magis a morte SENSUS ullus aut corpori aut animæ quam ante natalem. Eadem enim vanitas in futurum etiam se propagat,—alias immortalitatem animæ, alias transfigurationem, alias sensum inferis dando, et manes colendo, deumque faciendo, qui jam etiam homo esse desierit.—Quæ (malum) ista dementia est, iterari vitam morte? Quæve genitis quies unquam, si in sublimi SENSUS ANIMÆ manet?" ‡

PLUTARCH was amongst the Greeks, what Cicero was amongst the Latins, as far as concerned the business of delivering and digesting the various opinions of the Philosophers. In his famous tract of SUPERSTITION, he uses their COMMON arms to combat that evil; and expresses himself with uncommon force where he speaks of a *future state* as an error essential to *superstition*, and what the general voice of Reason, interpreted by sound Philosophy, disclaims. "Death is the final period of our being. But SUPERSTITION says NO.—She stretches out life beyond life itself. Her fears extend further than our existence. She has joined to the idea of death, that other inconsistent idea of eternal life in misery. For when all things come to an end, then, in the opinion of Superstition, they begin to be endless."§—

I will beg leave to conclude this section with two observations relative to the general argument. 1. We have just given a passage from the oration for Cluentius, in which, Cicero having ridiculed the

* See note Y, at the end of this book.

† *Tusc. Disp.* lib. i. cap. 34—36.

‡ *Nat. Hist.* lib. vii. cap. 55.

§ Πέρας ἐστὶ βίου πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ θάνατος· τῆς δὲ δεισιδαιμονίας οὐδ' οὗτος, ἀλλ' ὑπερβάλλει τοὺς ὅρους ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ζῆν, μακρότερον τοῦ βίου ποιοῦσα τὸν φόβον, καὶ συναπτούσα τῷ θανάτῳ κακῶν ἐπίνοιαν ἀθανάτων· καὶ ὅτε παύεται πραγμάτων, ἄρχεσθαι δοκοῦσα μὴ παυομένων.

popular fables concerning a future state, he subjoins, *if these be false, as all men see they are, what hath death deprived him of, besides a* SENSE *of pain?** From this inference of the Orator, it appears that we have not concluded amiss, when, from several quotations, interspersed throughout this work, in which a disbelief of the *common notion* of a future state of rewards and punishments is implied, we have inferred the writer's disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments in *general*. 2. We have seen the Philosophers of every Sect, one while speaking directly for, and at another, as directly against a future state of rewards and punishments, without intimating the least change in their principles, or making the least hesitation in their professions: So that either we must hold them guilty of the most gross and impudent contradictions, which their characters will not suffer us to conceive of them; or else admit the explanation given above of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE, and the different methods of their *exoteric* and *esoteric* discipline.

Yet to all this it hath been said, "If the Philosophers disbelieved the popular Divinities, and yet really believed the being of a God; why might they not reject the popular opinions of a future state, and yet, at the same time, hold a future state of real rewards and punishments? Now as they who did not believe Hercules and Æsculapius to be Gods, did not for that reason disbelieve the existence of a governing Mind; so they that did not believe Æacus or Minos to be judges of Hell, did not for that reason disbelieve all future rewards and punishments."† I answer, the two cases are nothing alike; the common fate of this Writer's Parallels.

1. At the very time the Philosophers discard the popular Divinities, they declare for the being of a God. Thus when Varro had said that Hercules and Æsculapius, Castor and Pollux, were not Gods; he adds, *they only have a right notion of God, who conceive him to be a Soul, actuating and governing all things by his power and wisdom.*‡ But now, when these Philosophers exploded Styx, Acheron, and Cocytus, did they ever substitute any other future state of rewards and punishments in their place?

* "Quæ si falsa sunt, id quod omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit præter SENSUM doloris?"—Seneca reasons in the same manner. "Mors contemni debet magis quam solet: multa enim de illa credimus. Multorum ingeniis certatum est ad augendam ejus infamiam. Descriptus est carcer infernus, et perpetua nocte oppressa regio, in qua

—'ingens janitor orci,' &c.

Sed etiam cum persuaseris istas fabulas esse, *nec quicquam defunctis superesse quod timeant*, subit alius metus, æque enim timor ne apud inferos sint, quam ne nusquam."—Ep. 83. † DR. SYKES. ‡ "Quæ sunt autem illa, quæ prolata in multitudinem nocent? Hæc, inquit, non esse Deos Herculem, Æsculapium, Castorem, Pollucem. Proditur enim a doctis, quod homines fuerint, et humana conditione defecerint."—But the same Varro says,—"Quod hi soli ei videantur animadvertisse quid esset Deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam, motu et ratione mundum gubernantem."—Apud AUGUST. *De Civ. Dei*, lib. iv. cap. 27—31.

2. The Philosophers give the popular stories of the infernal regions, as the *only foundation and support* of future rewards and punishments; so that, if they explode the popular stories, they must explode the things themselves. And what is more, THEY TELL US THAT THEY DID SO. But was this the case concerning their popular Divinities? Do they ever represent *these* as the *only foundation and support* of the belief of a Deity?

3. Lastly, The Philosophers held a PRINCIPLE (and we are now about to enter upon that matter) which was inconsistent with a future state of rewards and punishments: in consequence of which, they formally, and in express words, disclaim and reject all *such state* and condition. But I know of no *principle* they held, inconsistent with the belief of a God; nor of any declarations they ever made against such belief. We conclude, therefore, that the two cases are altogether dissimilar and unrelated.

SECTION IV.

NOTWITHSTANDING this full evidence against the PHILOSOPHERS; I much doubt, the general prejudice in their favour, supported by the reasonableness of the doctrine itself, will be yet apt to keep the reader's opinion on this point suspended.

I shall therefore, in the last place, explain the CAUSES which withheld the Philosophers *from believing:* and these will appear to have been certain fundamental PRINCIPLES of the ancient Greek Philosophy, altogether inconsistent with the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.

But to give this its due force, it will be proper to premise, that the constitution of that Philosophy, being above measure refined and speculative, it was always wont to judge and determine rather on METAPHYSICAL than on MORAL maxims; and to stick to all consequences, how absurd soever, which were seen to arise from the former.

Of this, we have a famous instance in the ancient Democritic Philosophy: which holding, that not only *sensations*, but even the *cogitations* of the mind, were the mere passion of the Thinker; and so, all *knowledge* and understanding, the same thing with *sense;* the consequence was, that there could not be any error of false judgment; because all passion was true passion, and all appearance true appearance. From hence it followed, that the sun and moon were no bigger than they seemed to us: and these men of reason chose rather to avow this conclusion, than to renounce the *metaphysic* principle which led them into it.

So just is that censure which a celebrated French writer passes upon them: *when the Philosophers once besot themselves with a preju-*

*dice, they are even more incurable than the People themselves; because they besot themselves not only with the prejudice, but with the false reasonings employed to support it.**

The regard to *metaphysic* principles being so great, the Greek Philosophers (as we shall see) must needs reject the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, how innumerable and invincible soever the *moral* arguments are which may be brought to support it. For now we come to shew, that there were two METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES concerning GOD and the SOUL, universally embraced by all, which necessarily exclude all notion of a future state of reward and punishment.

The FIRST PRINCIPLE, which led the Philosophers to conclude against such a state was, THAT GOD COULD NEITHER BE ANGRY NOR HURT ANY ONE. This, Cicero assures us, was held universally; as well by those who believed a Providence, as by those who believed not: "At hoc quidem COMMUNE EST OMNIUM PHILOSOPHORUM, non eorum modo, qui Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt, et nihil exhibere alteri: sed eorum etiam qui Deum semper agere aliquid et moliri volunt, NUMQUAM NEC IRASCI DEUM NEC NOCERE."† What conclusion the Epicureans drew from hence (those who, he here says, held, "Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii,") he tells us in another place, by the mouth of Velleius their spokesman. "Intelligitur enim" (an expression denoting that, in this point, the philosophers were agreed) "à beata, immortalique natura, et iram et gratiam segregari: quibus remotis, nullos a superis impendere METUS."‡ And that the other Sects drew the same conclusion (which infers the denial of *a future state of rewards and punishments*) we shall now see by Cicero himself, who speaks for them all.

He is here commending Regulus for preferring the public good to his own, and the *honest* to the *profitable*; in dissuading the release of the Carthaginian prisoners, and returning back to certain misery, when he might have spent his age at home in peace and pleasure. All this, he observes, was done out of regard to his oath. But it may, perhaps, says he, be objected, what is there in an oath? The violater need not fear the wrath of Heaven; for all Philosophers hold, that *God cannot be angry nor hurt any one.* He replies, that, indeed, it was a consequence of the principle of *God's not being angry*, that the perjured man had nothing to fear from divine vengeance: but then it was not this *fear*, which was really NOTHING, but justice and good faith, which made the sanction of an oath. The learned will chuse to hear him in his own words. "M. Atilius Regulus Cartha-

* "Quand les philosophes s'entêtent une fois d'un prejugé, ils sont plus incurables que le peuple même; parce qu'ils s'entêtent également et du prejugé et des fausses raisons dont ils le soutiennent."—FONTENELLE, *Hist. des Oracles.* † *Offic.* lib. iii. cap. 28. ‡ *De Nat. Deor.* lib. i. cap. 17.

ginem rediit : neque eum caritas patriæ retinuit, nec suorum. Neque vero tum ignorabat se ad crudelissimum hostem, et ad exquisita supplicia proficisci : Sed jusjurandum conservandum putabat. Quid est igitur, dixerit quis, in jurejurando ? Num iratum timemus jovem ? At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum.—NUMQUAM NEC IRASCI DEUM, NEC NOCERE.—Hæc quidem ratio non magis contra Regulum, quam contra omne jusjurandum valet : Sed in jurejurando, non qui metus, sed quæ vis sit, debet intelligi. Est enim jusjurandum affirmatio religiosa : Quod autem affirmatè, quasi Deo teste, promiseris, id tenendum est : Jam enim non ad iram Deorum, quæ NULLA EST ; sed ad justitiam et ad fidem pertinet."* It is true, the same Tully says,† "deos *placatos* pietas efficiet et sanctitas," which looks as if he thought the Gods might be angry ; and that, therefore, by *quæ nulla est*, in the words above, he did not mean, what the words imply,—*quæ vana et commentitia est ;* but, what they do not imply—*quæ nihil ad rem pertinet.* But *placatos* is not here used in the strict specific sense of *appeased*, which infers preceding *anger ;* but in the more loose generic sense of *propitious*, which infers no such thing. And my reason for understanding the word in this sense, is, that, two or three lines afterwards, he declares it to be the opinion of the Philosophers (to which he agrees) *Deos non nocere :* But this opinion was founded on that other, in question, *Deos non irasci.*

Here, then, we see, Tully owns the consequence of this universal principle ; that it overthrew the notion of divine punishments : And it will appear presently, that he was not singular in this concession ; but spoke the sense of his Grecian masters.

A modern reader, full of the philosophic ideas of these late ages, will be surprised, perhaps, to be told, that this consequence greatly embarrased Antiquity ; when he himself can so easily evade it, by distinguishing between the human passions of anger and fondness, and the divine attributes of justice and goodness ; on which the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is invincibly established. But the ancients had no such precise ideas of the divine Nature.

Dacier, who understood the genius of Antiquity very well, was of the same opinion, as appears from his comment on these words of Antoninus—*If there be Gods, then leaving the world is no such dreadful thing ; for you may be sure they will do you no harm*—εἰ μὲν θεοί εἰσιν, οὐδὲν δεινόν· κακῶ γάρ σε οὐκ ἂν περιβάλοιεν.—"Comme les Stoïciens n'avoient aucune idée ni de peines, ni de recompenses eternelles après la mort, et que le plus grand caractere qu'ils reconnoissoient en Dieu, estoit une BONTE INFINIE, ils estoient persuadez

* Cap. 26, 27, 28, 29. † *Offic.* ii. 3.

qu'apres cette vie on n'avoit rien à craindre, et que c'estoit une chose entierement opposée à la nature de Dieu, de faire du mal. La veritable religion a tiré les hommes d'une securité si pernicieuse," &c. —The learned Critic, indeed, expresses himself very ill, confounding the premisses and conclusion, the cause and effect, all the way, one with another; but his meaning is plain enough, that (in his opinion) the Ancients were very inexpert in their attempts to sever (if ever they attempted it) *anger* from God's justice, and *fondness* from his goodness. We shall shew, by an illustrious instance, that he was not mistaken; lest the reader should suspect that, of an obscure speculative Principle, we have feigned *one* of general credit and influence.

LACTANTIUS, from a forensic Lawyer, now become an Advocate for *Christianity*, found nothing so much hindered its reception with the Learned as the doctrine of a FUTURE JUDGMENT; which, their universal principle, *that God could not be angry*, directly opposed. To strike at the root of this evil, he composed a discourse, which Jerom calls, *pulcherrimum opus*, intituled, DE IRA DEI: For he had observed, he tells us, that this Principle was now much spread amongst the common People; * he lays the blame of it upon the Philosophers; † and tells us, as Tully had done before, that all the Philosophers agreed to exclude the passion of anger from the Godhead.‡

So that the general syllogism, Lactantius proposed to answer, was this:

If God hath no affections of fondness or hatred, love or anger; he cannot reward or punish.

But he hath no affections;—

Therefore, &c.

Let us see then, how he manages: For although his knowledge in the true genius of Christianity was, perhaps, very imperfect, he was exquisitely well skilled in the strong and weak side of Pagan Philosophy. A modern answerer would certainly have denied the *major;* but *that* was a Principle received by all parties, as Lactantius himself gives us to understand, when he says, that the Principle of God's not being angry destroyed all religion, by taking away a future state.§ He had nothing left then but to deny the *minor:* And this, he tells us, is his purpose to undertake.‖

His business is to prove, that God hath human passions: And though, by several expressions, dropped up and down, he seems to be fully sensible of the grossness of this Principle; yet, on the other

* "Animadverti PLURIMOS existimare non irasci Deum." † "Iidem tamen a Philosophis irretiti, et falsis argumentationibus capti." ‡ "Ita omnes Philosophi de ira consentiunt." § "Qui sine ira Deum esse credentes, dissolvunt omnem religionem—Sive igitur gratiam Deo, sive iram, sive utrumque detraxeris, religionem tolli necesse est." ‖ "Hæc [*nempe uti rascatur Deus*] tuenda nobis et asserenda sententia est: in ea enim summa omnis et cardo religionis pietatisque versatur."

hand, all Philosophy agreeing to make it the necessary support of a future state, he sets upon his task in good earnest, avoids all refinements, and maintains that there are in God, as there are in man, the passions of *love* and *hatred*. These indeed are of two kinds in man, *reasonable* and *unreasonable;* in God, the *reasonable* only are to be found. But, to make all sure, and provide a proper subject for these passions, he contends strongly for God's *having a human form:* No discreditable notion, at that time, in the Church; and which, if I might be indulged a conjecture, I would suppose, was first introduced for that very purpose, to which Lactantius here enforces it.

But it is very observable, that our Author introduceth this monstrous notion of *God's having a human form*, with an artful attempt, supported by all his eloquence, to discredit *human reason;* in order to dispose the Reader to believe him, that nothing could be known of God but by *Revelation*. This is an old trick of the Disputers of all times, to make reprisals upon Reason; which when found too upright to deflect, must be represented as too weak to judge. And when once we find an Author, who would be valued for his logic, begin with depreciating Reason; we may be assured he has some very unreasonable paradox to advance. So when the learned Huetius would pass upon his readers a number of slight chimerical conjectures for *Demonstrations*, he introduces his work by cavilling at the certainty of the principles of Geometry.

I. Here we see how the *Orthodox* evaded this conclusion of Pagan Philosophy, against a state of future punishment. Would you know how the *Heretics* managed? They went another way to work, which it may be just worth while to mention. The Creator of the *invisible* world (or the first Cause) the Marcionites called the GOOD; and the Creator of the *visible* world, the JUST. "Si de Marcionis argueris hæresi, quæ alterum *bonum*, alterum *justum* Deum ferens, illum invisibilium, hunc visibilium creatorem."—*Hieron. Ep. ad Pammach.* Now they agreed in this, with the Pagans, that the GOOD could not punish, but that the JUST would; whose office it was to execute vengeance on the wicked. And, at the same time, holding an EVIL PRINCIPLE, they called this *Just*, the MIDDLE, whose office is thus described in the *dialogue against* Marcion.—*To those who conform themselves to the* GOOD, *the* MIDDLE PRINCIPLE *gives peace; but to those who obey the* EVIL, *the* MIDDLE *inflicts tribulation and anguish.* Ἡ οὖν μέση ἀρχὴ ὑπηκόοσι τῷ ἀγάθῳ ἄνεσιν δίδωσι, ὑπηκόοσι δὲ τῷ πονηρῷ θλίψιν δίδωσι. Thus did these *Heretics* divest the first Cause, or the GOOD, of his attribute of *justice;* and gave it to the *Middle Principle*, because they were not able to sever it from *anger*. Upon the whole, as Lactantius, himself a Philosopher, was admirably well versed in all the pagan Systems, he could not but understand a *Prin-*

ciple, which all the Philosophers held; nor could he mistake a *Consequence*, which they all drew from it. And as St. Jerom has dignified this tract *de ira Dei*, with the title of PULCHERRIMUM OPUS, we must needs conclude that the method Lactantius took to support a future judgment was strictly conformable to THE OLD POSTURE OF DEFENCE, and approved by the Orthodox of that time.

I. But it may be objected, perhaps, that this principle, of *God's not being angry*, only concluded against a future state of *punishments*, and not of *rewards: Many* of the philosophers holding the affection of *grace and favour;* though they *all* denied that of *anger;* as Lactantius expressly assures us: *Ita omnes philosophi de* ira *consentiunt, de* gratia *discrepant.* To this I reply,

1. That, when the sanction of *punishment* is taken off, the strongest influence of a future state is destroyed. For while the Ancients made the rewards of Elysium only *temporary*,

> "Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos," &c.

they made the punishments of Tartarus *eternal;*

> "Sedet, æternumque sedebit
> Infelix Theseus."

This, Plato teaches in several places of his works.* And Celsus is so far from rejecting it, that he ranks it in the number of those doctrines which should never be abandoned, but maintained to the very last.†

It is true, that several passages of Antiquity may be objected to what is here said against the *eternity of rewards;* particularly this of Cicero: "Omnibus qui patriam conservarint, adjuverint, auxerint, certum esse in cœlo ac definitum locum, ubi beati ÆVO SEMPITERNO fruantur." ‡ But we are to know, that the Ancients distinguished the souls of men into three species: the HUMAN, the HEROIC, and the DEMONIC. The *two last*, when they left the body, were indeed believed to enjoy eternal happiness, for their public services on earth; not in *Elysium*, but in *Heaven;* where they became a kind of demigods. But all, of the *first*, which included the great body of Mankind, were understood to have their designation in *Purgatory, Tartarus*, or *Elysium:* The *first* and *last* of which abodes were *temporary;*

* Οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν, διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας, ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι, ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τυγχάνει ὄντα τοιαῦτα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν.—*Phædo*, p. 113. Ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίανται οἱ τούτους ὀρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον.—*Gorgias*, p. 525. † Τοῦτο μέν γε ὀρθῶς νομίζουσιν, ὡς οἱ μὲν εὖ βιώσαντες εὐδαιμονήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι πάμπαν αἰωνίοις κακοῖς συνέξονται· καὶ τούτου δὲ τοῦ δόγματος μήθ' οὗτοι, μήτ' ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων μηδεὶς ποτε ἀποστῇ, ἀποτείνοντες.—Apud ORIG. *Contra Celsum*, lib. viii. ‡ *Somnium Scipionis*, cap. 3.

and the *second* only *eternal*. Now those who had greatly served their Country, in the manner Tully there mentions, were supposed to have souls of the *heroic* or *demonic* kind.*

2. But secondly, in every sense of a future state as a *moral designation*, rewards and punishments necessarily imply each other: So that where one is wanting, the other cannot possibly subsist. This was too visible not to be seen by the ancient Philosophers: Lactantius thus argues with them, on common principles. "*If God be not provoked at impious and wicked men, neither is he pleased with the good and just.* For contrary objects must either excite contrary affections, or no affections at all. So that he who loves good men, must at the same time hate the ill; and he who hates not ill men, cannot love the good: Because both to love good men proceedeth from an abhorrence of ill; and to hate ill men from a tenderness to the good." † And so concludes, that the denying God's attribute of *anger*, which removes the *punishments* of a future state, overturns the *state* itself. "Sive igitur gratiam Deo, sive iram, sive utrumque detraxeris, religionem tolli necesse est."

In all this (as we say) he does not in the least misrepresent the common conclusions of philosophy. Plutarch delivering the sentiments of learned Antiquity on this head, expressly makes the denial of *future misery*, to infer the denial of a *future state*. "Death is the final period of our being. But Superstition says, *no*. She stretches out life beyond life itself. Her fears extend further than our existence. She has joined to the idea of death, that other inconsistent idea of eternal life in misery. For when all things come to an end, then, in the opinion of Superstition, they begin to be endless. Then, I can't tell what, dark and dismal gates of Tartarus fly open: then, rivers of fire, with all the fountains of Styx, are broken up, &c.—Thus doth cursed Superstition oppose the voice of God, which hath declared death to be the end of suffering." ‡ *Death*, says he, *is the end of suffering*, therefore *the end of being*. Only with the ὕστερον πρότερον of the rhetoricians he has here, in the most rhetorical of all his discourses, put the conclusion before the premisses.

3. But lastly, I shall shew (under the next head, to which we are going) that the Philosophers did not consider the attribute of *grace*

* Eusebius, speaking of the political Gods of Egypt, supports what is here delivered of those *heroic* or *demonic* souls: Ἄλλους δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἐπιγείους γενέσθαι, φασὶν, ὑπάρξαντας μὲν θνητοὺς, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίαν τετευχότας τῆς ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ.—*Præp. Evang.* lib. iii. cap. 3. † "Si Deus non irascitur impiis et injustis, nec pios utique justosque diligit: In rebus enim diversis, aut in utramque partem moveri necesse est, aut in neutram. Itaque qui bonos diligit, et malos odit; et qui malos non odit, nec bonos diligit: Quia et diligere bonos, ex odio malorum venit; et malos odisse, ex bonorum caritate descendit." ‡ Ἅδου τινὲς ἀνοίγονται πύλαι βαθεῖαι, καὶ ποταμοὶ πυρὸς ὁμοοῦ καὶ στυγὸς ἀπορρῶγες ἀναπετάνυνται—οὕτως ἡ κακοδαίμων δεισιδαιμονία καὶ θεῷ τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ἐκπέφευγεν.—*De Superst.*

and favour (which they allowed) to be a *passion or affection;* though they considered *anger* (which they allowed not) under that idea.

II. As the foregoing objection would insinuate that the universal Principle of *God's not being angry,* doth not prove *enough;* so, the next pretends, that it proves *too much:* For, secondly, it may be objected, that this principle destroys God's Providence here, as well as a future state of rewards and punishments hereafter; which Providence several of the theistical Philosophers, we know, did believe.

This will require consideration.

Lactantius says: "All the philosophers agree about the *anger;* but concerning the *grace* or *favour* they are of different opinions." * And taking it for granted, that they considered the *grace* or *favour,* which they held, as well as the *anger,* which they denied, to be *a passion or affection,* he argues against them as above: and adds, "Therefore the error of those who take away both *grace* and *anger* is the most consistent." † But methinks, the absurdity of the error here imputed, should have taught Lactantius, that the Philosophers, who had rejected *anger* because it was an human passion, could never give their God *favour* or *fondness,* which is another human passion: For though they sometimes dogmatized like lunatics, they never syllogized like ideots; though their principles were often unnatural, their conclusions were rarely illogical. He should therefore have seen, that those, who held the *gratia* or benevolence of the divine Nature, considered it not as a *passion or affection,* but as an *efflux from its essence;* ‡ on which they built their notion of a general Providence. So that when he says, *concerning the grace or favour, they are of different opinions,* we are to understand no more, than that some of them held a Providence, and others denied it.

Let us see then what kind of Providence the theistical Philosophers believed. The PERIPATETICS and STOICS went pretty much together in this matter. It is commonly imputed to Aristotle, that he held no Providence to be extended lower than the moon: But this is a calumny which Chalcidias raised of him. What Aristotle meant by the words, which gave a handle to it, was *that a particular providence did not extend itself to individuals:* For being a fatalist in natural things, and at the same time maintaining free-will in man, he thought, if Providence were extended to individuals, it would either impose a necessity on human actions, or, as employed on mere contingencies, be itself frequently defeated; which would look like impotency: and not seeing any way to reconcile free-will and prescience, he cut the knot, and denied that Providence extended its care over

* "Omnes philosophi de *ira* consentiunt, de *gratia* discrepant." † "Ergo constantior est error illorum, qui et iram simul, et gratiam tollunt." ‡ See the following quotation from Sallust the philosopher.

individuals. Zeno's notion of Providence, seems to have been as loose,* yet his fatalism was more uniform: and, indeed, better supported, for he denied free-will in man: Which was the only difference in this matter between him and Aristotle.

Here we have a Providence very consistent with a disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments; nay, almost destructive of it.

But the PYTHAGOREANS and PLATONISTS will not be put off so: They held a particular Providence, extending itself to Individuals: A Providence, which, according to ancient notions, could not be administered without the *affections of love and anger*. Here then lies the difficulty: These Sects removed all passions from the Godhead, especially *anger;* and, on that account, rejected a future state of rewards and punishments; while yet they believed a Providence, which was administered by the exercise of those very passions. For the true solution of this difficulty, we must have recourse to a prevailing principle of Paganism, often before hinted at, for the clearing up many obscurities in Antiquity: I mean, that of *local tutelar Deities*. Pythagoras and Plato were deep in the Theology which taught, that the several regions of the earth were delivered over, by the Creator of the Universe, to the vicegerency and government of inferior Gods. This opinion was originally Egyptian; on whose authority these two Philosophers received it; though it had been long the popular belief all over the pagan world. Hence, we see the writings of the Pythagoreans and Platonists so full of the DOCTRINE OF DEMONS: A doctrine, which even characterized the Theology of those Sects. Now, these *Demons* were ever supposed to have *passions and affections*. On these principles and opinions the Greeks formed the *name* of that mixed moral mode, SUPERSTITION: they called it δεισιδαιμονία, which signifies the fear of Demons or inferior Gods. And these being supposed, by the *Philosophers*, to have *passions;* and a Species, or at least one of them (called, by the people, THE ENVIOUS DEMON) to be more than ordinary capricious and cruel in the exercise of the passions, these notions gave birth to all the extravagant Rites of attonement: † the practice of which, as we say, they called δεισιδαιμονία; intimating, in the very term, the *passion* which gave birth to them; and by which alone, the Ancients understood a particular Providence could be administered. And here it is worthy our observation, that Chalcidias gives *this* as the very reason why the Peripatetics rejected a particular Providence, (he says indeed, though falsely, all Providence below the moon) namely, because they held nothing of the administration of infe-

* Cotta, in Cicero, explaining the doctrine of the Stoics, says, "Non curat [Deus] singulos homines. Non mirum: ne civitates quidem. Non eas? Ne nationes quidem et gentes."—*Natura Deorum*, lib. iii. cap. 39. † See note Z, at the end of this book.

rior Deities. His words are these: "Aristotle holds that the providence of God descends even to the region of the moon: but that, below that orb, things were neither governed by the decrees of God, nor upheld by the wisdom and aid of *Angels*. Nor does he suppose any providential intervention of *Demons*." * So closely united, in the opinion of this writer, whom Fabricius calls *gnarissimus veteris philosophiæ*,† was the doctrine of a particular Providence, and the doctrine of Demons and subaltern Deities.

But when now the Soul is disengaged from the body, it is no longer, in their opinion, under the government of Demons; nor consequently subject to the effects of the Demonic passions. And what becomes of it then, we shall see hereafter. A remarkable passage in Apuleius, will explain and justify the solution here given: "God" *(saith this author)* "cannot undergo any *temporary* exercise of his power or goodness: And therefore cannot be affected with indignation or anger; cannot be depressed with grief, or elated with joy. But, being free from all the passions of the mind, he neither sorrows nor exults; nor makes any *instantaneous* resolution to act, or to forbear acting. Every thing of this kind suits only the middle nature of the Demons: For they are placed between Gods and Men; as well in the frame and composition of their minds, as in the situation of their abodes, having immortality in common with the former, and *affections* in common with the latter. For they are subject, like us, to be every way irritated and appeased: so as to be inflamed by anger, melted by compassion, allured by gifts, softened by prayers, exasperated by neglect, and soothed again by observance. In a word, to be affected by every thing that can make impression on the human mind." ‡ Plutarch says the same thing, but with this remarkable addition, that it was the very doctrine of PLATO and PYTHAGORAS.§

* "Aristoteles Dei providentiam usque ad lunæ regionem progredi censet; infra vero neque providentiæ scitis regi, nec angelorum ope consultisque sustentari: nec vero Dæmonum prospicientiam putat intervenire."—*Com. in Platonis Timæum.* † *Biblioth. Lat.* lib. iii. cap. 7.

‡ "Debet Deus nullam perpeti vel operis vel amoris temporalem perfunctionem; et idcirco nec indignatione nec ira contingi, nullo angore contrahi, nullâ alacritate gestire: sed ab omnibus passionibus animi liber, nec dolere unquam, nec aliquando lætari, nec aliquid repentinum velle vel nolle. Sed et hæc cuncta, ut id genus cætera, Dæmonum mediocritati congruunt. Sunt enim inter homines et deos, ut loco regionis, ita ingenio mentis intersiti, habentes communem cum superis immortalitatem, cum inferis passionem. Nam perinde ut nos, pati possunt omnia animorum placamenta vel incitamenta; ut et ira incitentur, et misericordia flectantur, et donis invitentur, et precibus leniantur, et contumeliis exasperentur, et honoribus mulceantur, aliisque omnibus ad similem nobis modum varientur."—*De Deo Socratis.*

§ Βέλτιον οὖν οἱ τὰ περὶ τὸν Τυφῶνα καὶ Ὄσιριν καὶ Ἶσιν ἱστορούμενα, μήτε θεῶν παθήματα, μήτε ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΩΝ ΜΕΓΑΛΩΝ εἶναι νομίζοντες, ὡς καὶ ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, καὶ ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΑΣ, καὶ Ξενοκράτης, καὶ Χρυσίππος, ἑπόμενοι τοὺς ΠΑΛΑΙ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΟΥΣ, ἐρρωμενεστέρους μὲν ἀνθρώπων γεγονέναι λέγουσι, καὶ πολλῇ τῇ δυνάμει τῶν φύσιν ὑπερφέροντας ἡμῶν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον οὐκ ἀμιγὲς, οὐδὲ ἄκρατον ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς φύσει καὶ σώματος αἰσθήσει ἐνσυνειληχὸς, ἡδονὴν δεχομένην καὶ πόνον ὅσα ταύταις ἐγγενόμενα ταῖς μεταβολαῖς πάθη, τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον, τοὺς δὲ ἧττον ἐπιταράττει· γίνονται γὰρ ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δαίμοσιν, ἀρετῆς διαφοραὶ καὶ κακίας.—*De Iside et Osiride*, p. 642.

On the whole then it appears, that the Principle of *God's not being angry*, which subverted the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, did not at all affect a particular Providence here; and that the *grace or favour* which some of them left unto the Deity was no passion or affection, like the *anger*, which they took away; but only a *simple benevolence*, which, in the construction of the Universe, was directed to the best; but did not interfere to prevent disorders in particular Systems. A benevolence too, that went not from the *will*, but the *essence* of the supreme Being.*

SALLUST, the Philosopher, writing of the *Gods and the World*, proposes in his fourteenth chapter, to speak to this question, *how the immutable Gods may be said to be angry and appeased?* † In the first place, he says, that God hath no human passions; he *neither rejoices, is angry, nor appeased with gifts:* ‡ So far is certainly agreeable to truth. But how then? Why, the Gods are *eternally beneficent* (that is, as Seneca says below, "causa Diis benefaciendi NATURA") and beneficent only, and never hurtful.§ Thus having avoided one extreme, he falls into another; and supposeth it to be *blind Nature*, and not *Will*, which determines God's beneficence. The inference from which is, that the rewards and punishments of Heaven are the *natural and necessary effects of action; not positive, arbitrary consequences, or the designation of Will:* And so our Philosopher maintains. For now the difficulty being, that if *nature be the cause of the beneficence of the Godhead*, how can Providence bestow good on the virtuous man, and evil on the wicked? Our Sophist resolves it thus: "While we are good, we are joined by similitude of nature to the Gods; and when evil, separated by dissimilitude. While we practise virtue, we are in union with them; but defection to vice makes them our enemies; not because they are *angry* at us, but because our crimes interpose between us and their divine irradiations, and leave us a prey to the avenging Demons.—So that to say, God is turned away from the wicked, is the same as to say, THE SUN IS HID FROM A BLIND MAN." ‖ An apt comparison: and very expressive of the principle of this philosophy; which supposes the influence of the *Deity*, to be like that of the *Sun*, physical and necessary; and, con-

* So Seneca informs us: "Quæ causa est Diis bene faciendi? NATURA. Errat, siquis putat illos nocere velle: Non possunt. Nec accipere injuriam queunt, nec facere; lædere etenim lædique conjunctum est. Summa illa ac pulcherrima omnium natura, quos periculo exemit, nec periculosos quidem fecit."—*Epist.* 95.

† Πῶς οἱ Θεοὶ μὴ μεταβαλλόμενοι, ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ θεραπεύεσθαι λέγονται.

‡ Οὐ χαίρει Θεὸς—οὐδὲ ὀργίζεται—οὐδὲ δώροις θεραπεύεται.

§ Ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἀγαθοί τέ εἰσιν AEI, καὶ ὠφελοῦσι μόνον· βλάπτουσι δὲ οὐδέ ποτε.

‖ Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ὄντες δι' ὁμοιότητα θεοῖς συναπτόμεθα, κακοὶ δὲ γενόμενοι δι' ἀνομοιότητα χωριζόμεθα· καὶ κατ' ἀρετὰς ζῶντες, ἐχόμεθα τῶν θεῶν, κακοὶ δὲ γενόμενοι ἐχθροὺς ἡμῖν ποιοῦμεν ἐκείνους· οὐκ ἐκείνων ὀργιζομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων Θεοὺς μὲν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐόντων ἑλλάμπειν. Δαίμοσι δὲ κολαστικοῖς συναπτόντων.—Ὥστε ὅμοιον τὸν Θεὸν λέγειν τοὺς κακοὺς ἀποστρέφεσθαι, καὶ τὸν ΗΛΙΟΝ τοῖς ἐστερημένοις τῶν ὄψεων κρύπτεσθαι.

sequently, all reward and punishment not the *moral*, but the *natural*, issue of things: A Platonic notion, entirely subversive of the proper doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, as conceived every where by the People, and taught by the Christian Religion: which holds, that they arise out of God's Goodness and Justice, not by way of emanation, as light from the Sun, but as the designation of *Will*: which disparts *freely*, though not fancifully or capriciously; as, with equal malignity and folly, my reasoning in this place hath been represented.

On the whole, then, we find, that the Pagans in taking away *human passions* from God, left him nothing but that kind of natural excellence, which went not from his *will*, but his *essence* only; and consequently, was destitute of *morality*. This was one extreme. The primitive Fathers (as Lactantius) understanding clearly that the Platonic notion of God overturned a *future judgement*, and not finding the medium, which their Masters in Science, the Philosophers, had missed, supposed (as we have seen) that God had *human passions*. This was the other extreme. And whence, I would ask, did both these extremes arise, but from neither party's being able to distinguish between *human passions* and the divine attributes of GOODNESS AND JUSTICE? the true medium between *human passions* on the one hand, and a *blind excellence of nature*, on the other.

II. I proceed now to the OTHER CAUSE, which kept the Philosophers from believing a future state of rewards and punishments. As the first was an erroneous notion concerning the *nature* of GOD, so this was a much more absurd one concerning the *nature* of the SOUL. For, as our epic Poet sings,

"Much of the SOUL they talk, but all awry."*

There are but two possible ways of conceiving of the *Soul*: we must hold it to be, either a QUALITY, or a SUBSTANCE.

1. Those Ancients who believed it to be only a *Quality*, as Epicurus, Dicæarchus, Aristoxenus, Asclepiades, and Galen, come not into the account; it being impossible that these should not believe its total annihilation upon death. The ingenious conceit of it's SLEEP was reserved to do honour to modern *Invention*.

2. But the generality of the Philosophers held it to be a *Substance*; and ALL who so held, were unanimous that it was a DISCERPED PART OF A WHOLE; and that this *Whole* was GOD; into whom it was again to be *resolved*.

But concerning this *Whole* they differed.

SOME held that there was only *one* Substance in Nature: Others held *two*.

* "Paradise Regained," book iv. 313.

THEY who maintained the *one* Universal Substance, or TO' 'EN, in the strictest sense, were ATHEISTS; and altogether in the sentiments of the modern Spinozists; whose Master apparently catched this epidemical contagion of human reason from Antiquity.

The OTHERS, who believed there were *two* general Substances in nature, GOD and MATTER, were taught to conclude, by their way of interpreting the famous maxim of *ex nihilo nihil fit*, that they were both *eternal*. These were their THEISTS; though approaching sometimes, on the one hand, to what is called *Spinozism;* sometimes, on the other, to *Manicheism*.

For they, who held *two* Substances, were again subdivided.

Some of them, as the Cyrenaics, the Cynics, and the Stoics, held *both* these Substances to be *material;* which gave an opening to Spinozism: Others, as the Pythagoreans, the Platonists, and Peripatetics, held only *one* to be *material;* which gave the like opening to *Manicheism*.

Lastly, the maintainers of the *immateriality* of the divine Substance, were likewise divided into two parties; the first of which held but *one* person in the Godhead; the other, *two* or *three*. So that as the *former* believed the Soul to be part of the supreme God; the *latter* believed it to be part only of the second or third *Hypostasis*. Origen, speaking of the Greek Philosophers, says, "They plainly suppose the whole World to be God. The Stoics make it the *first* God. As to the followers of Plato, some make it the *second*, and some the *third* God."*

As they multiplied the Persons of the Godhead, so they multiplied the subsistence of the Soul; some giving *two*, and some, more liberally, *three* to every man. But it is to be observed, that they esteemed only one of these to be part of God; the others were only elementary matter, or mere qualities.

These things are but hinted at, as just sufficient to our purpose: A full explanation of them, though both curious and useful, would take up too much room, and lead us too far from our subject.

Now, however They, who held the Soul to be a real substance, differed thus in circumstantials, yet in this consequence of its substantiality, *that it was part of God, discerped from him, and would be resolved again into him*, they all, we say, agreed. For those who held but *one* substance, could not but esteem the soul a part of it; and those who held *two*, considered those *two* as conjoined, and composing an *Universe;* just as the soul and body composed a *man*. Of which Universe, God was the soul; and matter, the body. Hence

* Σαφῶς δὲ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι θεόν. Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον. Οἱ δ' ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος τὸν δεύτερον· τινὲς δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν τρίτον.—*Contra Celsum*, lib. v.

they concluded, that as the human body was resolved into its Parent Matter, so the soul was resolved into its Parent Spirit.

Agreeably to this explanation, Cicero delivers the common sentiments of his Greek masters on this head: "A natura Deorum, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, HAUSTOS animos et LIBATOS habemus."* And again: "Humanus autem animus DECERPTUS EX MENTE DIVINA, cum alio nullo nisi cum ipso Deo (si hoc fas est dictu) comparari potest."†

And, in another place, he says,—"animos hominum quadam ex parte extrinsecus esse tractos et haustos, ex qua intelligimus esse *extra* divinum animum humanus unde ducatur."‡ He afterwards gives the whole system, from Pacuvianus, more at large:

> "Quicquid est hoc, omnia animat, format, alit, auget, creat,
> Sepelit, recipitque in sese omnia, omniumque idem est Pater;
> Indidemque, eademque oriuntur de integro, atque eodem occidunt."§

And St. Austin did not think them injured in this representation. In his excellent work of the *City of God*, he thus exposes the absurdity of that general principle: "Quid infelicius credi potest, quam Dei partem vapulare, cum puer vapulat? Jam vero partes Dei fieri lascivas, iniquas, impias, atque omnino damnabiles quis ferre potest, nisi qui prorsus insanit?"‖

Now, lest the reader should suspect that these kind of phrases, such as, *the soul's being part of God;—discerped from him;—of his Nature;* which perpetually occur in the writings of the Ancients, are only *highly figurative expressions*, and not measurable by the severe standard of metaphysical propriety; he is desired to take notice of one consequence drawn from this principle, and universally held by Antiquity, which was this, *That the soul was eternal, à parte* ANTE, as well as *à parte* POST; which the Latins well expressed by the word SEMPITERNUS.¶

For this we shall produce an authority above exception: "It is a thing very well known" (says the accurate Cudworth) "that, according to the sense of Philosophers, these two things were always included together, in that one opinion of the Soul's immortality, namely, its *pre-existence*, as well as its *post-existence*. Neither was there ever any of the Ancients, before *Christianity*, that held the Soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its pre-existence; they *clearly perceiving* that if it was once granted, that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might be also corrupted: And *therefore* the assertors of the Soul's immortality commonly began here; first to prove its pre-existence," &c.** What this learned man is quoted for, is the fact: And, for

* *De Divin.* lib. i. cap. 49. † See note AA, at the end of this book. ‡ *De Divin.* lib. i. cap. 32. § Ibid. cap. 57. ‖ Ibid. lib. iv. cap. 13. ¶ See note BB, at the end of this book. ** "Intellectual System," p. 38.

that, we may safely take his word: As to the reason given, *that*, we see, is visionary; invented, perhaps, to hide the enormity of the Principle it came from. The true reason was its being a natural consequence of the opinion, that *the Soul was part of God.* This, Tully plainly intimates, where, after having quoted the verses from Pacuvianus given above, he subjoins, "Quid est igitur, cur domus sit omnium una, eaque communis, cumque animi hominum *semper fuerint futurique sint*, cur hi, quid ex quoque eveniat, et quid quamque rem significet, perspicere non possint?" And again as plainly, "Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest:—His enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat? quod et præterita teneat, et futura provideat, et complecti possit præsentia; quæ sola divina sunt. Nec invenietur unquam, unde ad hominem venire possint, nisi a Deo.—Ita quicquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vult, quod viget, cœleste et divinum est; ob EAMQUE REM ÆTERNUM SIT NECESSE EST."*

It hath been observed, in the last section, that the famous argument of Plato, explained, and strongly recommended by Cicero, supposes the soul to have been from eternity, because it is a self-existent substance; which is plainly supposing it to have been eternal *à parte antè*, because it is *a part of God.*

Here then is a *consequence*, universally acknowledged, which will not allow the principle, from whence it proceeded, to be understood in any other sense than one strictly metaphysical. Let us consider it a little. We are told they held the soul to be *eternal:* If eternal, it must be either independent on God, or part of his substance. Independent it could not be, for there can be but one independent of the same kind of substance: The Ancients, indeed, thought it no absurdity to say, that God and Matter were both self-existent, but they allowed no third; therefore they must needs conclude that *it was part of God.*

And in that sense, indeed, they called it (as we see in the last section) *independent*, when, on account of its original, they gave it this attribute of the Deity; and, with that, joined the others of *ungenerated*, and self-*existent.*

But when the Ancients are said to hold the *pre-* and *post-existence* of the Soul, and therefore to attribute a proper eternity to it, we must not suppose that they understood it to be eternal in its *distinct and peculiar existence;* but that it was *discerped* from the substance of God, in *time;* and would, in *time*, be rejoined, and *resolved* into it again. This they explained by a closed Vessel filled with sea-water, which swimming a while upon the ocean, does, on the Vessel's breaking, flow in again, and mingle with the common mass. They only

* Fragm. *De Consolatione.*

differed about the time of this re-union and resolution: The greater part holding it to be at death;* but the Pythagoreans, not till after many transmigrations. The Platonists went between these two opinions; and rejoined pure and unpolluted souls immediately, to the universal spirit: but those which had contracted much defilement, were sent into a succession of other bodies, to purge and purify them, before they returned to their Parent Substance.† And these were the two sorts of the NATURAL METEMPSYCHOSIS, which we have observed above, to have been really held by those two Schools of philosophy.‡

That we have given a fair representation of the ancient belief in this matter, we appeal to the learned Gassendi: "Interim tamen vix ulli fuere (quæ humanæ mentis caligo, atque imbecillitas est) qui non inciderint in errorem illum de REFUSIONE IN ANIMAM MUNDI. Nimirum, sicut existimârunt singulorum animas particulas esse animæ mundanæ, quarum quælibet suo corpore, ut aqua vase, includeretur; ita et reputârunt unamquamque animam, corpore dissoluto, quasi diffracto vase, effluere, ac Animæ mundi, e qua deducta fuerit, iterum uniri; nisi quod plerumque ob contractas in impuro corpore sordeis, vitiorumque maculas, non prius uniantur, quàm sensim omneis sordeis exuerint, et aliæ seriùs, aliæ ocyùs repurgatæ, atque immunes ab omni labe evaserint." § A great Authority! and the greater, for that it proceeded from the plain view of the fact only: Gassendi appearing not to have been sensible of the consequence here deduced from it, namely, *that none of the ancient philosophers* COULD *believe a future state of rewards and punishments.* Otherwise, we may be sure, he had not failed to urge that consequence, in his famous Apology for Epicurus; whose monstrous errors he all along strives to palliate, by confronting them with others as bad, amongst the Theistic sects of Philosophy.

Thus we see, that this very opinion of the *Soul's eternity*, which hath made modern writers conclude that the ancient Sages believed a future state of reward and punishment, was, in truth, the very reason why they believed it not.

The *primitive christian* writers were more quick-sighted: They plainly saw, this Principle was destructive of such future state, and therefore employed all their Eloquence, and more successfully than they did their Logic, to oppose it. Thus Arnobius (not indeed attending to the *double doctrine* of the ancient Philosophy) accuses

* See the "Critical Inquiry into the Opinions and Practice of Ancient Philosophers," p. 125, et seq. 2d edit. † "Nec enim omnibus iidem illi sapientes arbitrati sunt eundem cursum in cœlum patere. Nam vitiis et sceleribus contaminatos deprimi in tenebras, atque in cœno jacere docuerunt: castos autem, puros, integros, incorruptos, bonis etiam studiis atque artibus expolitos, levi quodam ac facili lapsu ad Deos, id est, ad naturam sui similem pervolare."—Fragm. *De Consolatione.* ‡ See note CC, at the end of this book. § *Animadv. in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii*, p. 550.

Plato of *contradiction*, for holding this Principle, and yet, at the same time, preaching up a future state of reward and punishment.*

But it must be confessed, some of the *Fathers*, as was their custom, ran into the opposite extreme; and held the Soul to be naturally *mortal*; and, to support this, maintained its *materiality*: Just as in the case before, to support *human passions* in the Godhead, they gave him a *human form*. Tatian, Tertullian, and Arnobius, fell into this foolish error. Others indeed, as Justin Martyr, and Irenæus, went more soberly to work; affirming only, against the notion of its *eternity*, that it was *created* by God, and depended continually upon him for its duration. In the heat of dispute, indeed, some unwary words may now and then drop from the soberest of them, which seem to favour the doctrine of the Soul's *materiality*: But it is but candid to correct them by the general tenor of their sentiments.

This was the true original of every thing looking so untowardly, in the writings of the *Fathers*: which had Mr. Dodwell considered, he had never written so weak a book as his *epistolary discourse* against the Soul's immortality, from the *judgment of the Fathers*; whose opinions he hath one while egregiously mistaken; at another, as grosly misrepresented.

Having now seen that the Philosophers in general, held *the Soul to be part of God, and resolvable into him*; lest any doubt should remain, I shall shew in the next place, that this was, more especially, believed by the famous PHILOSOPHIC QUATERNION: And if held by them, we cannot have the least doubt of the rest.

Cicero, in the person of Velleius, the Epicurean, accuses PYTHAGORAS, for holding that the human soul was discerped from the substance of God, or the universal nature. "Nam Pythagoras, qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum et commeantem, ex quo nostri animi carperentur, non vidit distractione humanorum animorum discerpi et lacerari Deum." † Here, Velleius does not (as hath been pretended) exaggerate or strain matters, to serve his purpose. Pythagoras held the old maxim *ex nihilo nihil fit*, and, therefore, must needs hold the soul to be taken from some foreign and external substance. And he allowed only two substances,

* "Quid? Plato idem vester in eo volumine, quod de animæ immortalitate composuit, non Acherontem, non Stygem, non Cocytum fluvios, et Pyriphlegethontem nominat, in quibus animas asseverat volvi, mergi, exuri? Et homo prudentiæ non pravæ, et examinis judiciique perpensi, rem inenodabilem suscipit, ut cum animas dicat immortales, perpetuas, et corporali soliditate privatas; puniri eas dicat tamen, et doloris afficiat sensu. Quis autem hominum non vidit, quod sit immortale, quod simplex, nullum posse dolorem admittere; quod autem sentiat dolorem, immortalitatem habere non posse? Et qui poterit territari formidinis alicujus horrore, cui fuerit persuasum, tam se esse immortalem quam ipsum Deum primum; nec ab eo judicari quidquam de se posse, cum sit una immortalitas in utroque, nec in alterius altera conditionis possit æqualitate vexari?"—*Adversus Gentes*, lib. ii. pp. 52—64, ed. Lugd. Bat. 1651, quarto. † *Natura Deorum*, lib. i. cap. 11.

God and *matter:* therefore, as he taught the Soul was immaterial, he could not possibly conceive it to be any other than a Part of God. So that Velleius's consequence naturally follows, that as Pythagoras held the soul to be a Substance not a Quality, he must suppose it to be torn and discerped from the Substance of God. To the same purpose, Sextus Empiricus:—Pythagoras *and* Empedocles, *and the whole company of the* Italic *school, hold that our Souls are not only of the same nature with one another, and with the Gods, but likewise with the irrational souls of brutes: For that there is one spirit that pervades the Universe, and serves it for a soul; which unites us and them together.** That Pythagoras and Plato held the *human* soul to be of the same nature with God, has been seen at large; that they supposed the *brutal* soul to be of the same nature with the human, which is the other particular here asserted by Sextus Empiricus, appears from the testimony of Plutarch—Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, λογικὰς μὲν εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων καλουμένων τὰς ψυχάς, οὐ μὴν λογικῶς ἐνεργούσας παρὰ τὴν δυσκρασίαν τῶν σωμάτων.†—For the Ancients taught that the discerped Parts of this universal Spirit, the "Anima mundi," or whatsoever name they gave it, acted with different degrees of activity and force, according to the different nature and disposition of the Matter with which these parts were invested. Lastly, Laertius tells us, that Pythagoras supposed *the soul to be different from the life; and immortal; for that the Substance, from which it was discerped, was immortal.*‡

If we may give credit to the ancient Christian writers, we shall find they too charge the Pythagoreans with these very principles. Jerom says,—"Juxta Pythagoricorum dogmata, qui hominem exæquant Deo, et de ejus dicunt esse *substantia*." § Austin speaks to the same purpose—"Cedant et illi quos quidem puduit dicere Deum corpus esse, verumtamen *ejusdem naturæ*, cujus ille est, animos nostros esse putaverunt; ita non eos movet tanta *mutabilitas animæ, quam Dei naturæ tribuere nefas est.*" ‖

Plato, without any softening, frequently calls the Soul, God; and part of God, ΝΟΥΝ ΑΕΙ ΘΕΟΝ. Plutarch says, "*Pythagoras and Plato held the soul to be immortal: For that launching out into the Soul of the universe, it returns to its parent and original.*"¶ Tertullian charges this opinion home upon him. "Primo quidem

* Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν καὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα, καὶ τῶν Ἰταλῶν πλῆθος, φασὶ μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναί τίνα κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων· ἓν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα, τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου διῆκον ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἕνουν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα.—*Adv. Physic.* lib. ix. § 127. † *Plac. Phil.* lib. v. cap. 20. ‡ Διαφέρειν τε ψυχὴν, ζωῆς· ἀθάνατόν τε εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπειδήπερ καὶ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἀπέσπασται, ἀθάνατόν ἐστι.—*Vit. Phil.* lib. viii. § 28. § Ctesiphon *Adver. Pelag.* ‖ *De Civitate Dei*, lib. viii. cap. 5. ¶ Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· ἐξιοῦσαν γὰρ εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν, ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές.—*De Plac. Phil.* lib. iv. cap. 7.

oblivionis capacem animam non cedam, quia tantam illi concessit divinitatem, ut *Deo adæquetur*." * Arnobius does no less, where he apostrophises the Platonists in this manner: "Ipse denique animus, qui immortalis à vobis et Deus esse narratur, cur in ægris æger sit, in infantibus stolidus, in senectute defessus? Delira, et fatua, et insana!" † The latter part of the sentence is commonly read thus; —*Cur in ægris æger sit, in infantibus stolidus, in senectute defessus, delira, et fatua, et insana?* The Critics think something is here wanting before the three last words. But it appears to me only to have been wrong pointed; there should be a note of interrogation instead of a comma at *defessus?—Delira, et fatua, et insana*, making a sentence of itself, by means of *narratis* understood. Hermias in his *Irris. Gent. Phil.* expresses himself, on the same occasion, pretty much in the same manner: ταῦτα οὖν τί χρὴ καλεῖν; ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τερατείαν, ἢ ἄνοιαν, ἢ μανίαν, ἢ στάσιν. Eusebius expressly says, that Plato held the soul to be *ungenerated*, and to be derived by way of *emanation from the first cause;* as being unwilling to allow that it could be *made out of nothing*. Which necessarily implies, that, according to Plato's doctrine, God was the material or substantial cause of the Soul, or that the Soul was part of his substance.‡

There is indeed a passage in Stobæus, which hath been understood by some, to contradict what is here delivered as the sentiments of Plato. It is where Speusippus, the nephew and follower of Plato, says, *that the* MIND *was neither the same with* THE ONE, *nor* THE GOOD; *but had a peculiar nature of its own*.§ Our Stanley supposes ‖ him to speak here of the *human mind:* And then, indeed, the contradiction is evident. But that learned man seems to have been mistaken, and misled by his author, Stobæus; who has misplaced this *placit*, and put it into a chapter with several others, which relate to the *human mind*. I conceive it to be certain that Speusippus was here speaking of a different thing; namely, of the nature of the third hypostasis in the Platonic Trinity; the ΝΟΥΣ, or λόγος, so intitled by his uncle; which he would, by the words in question, personally distinguish from the ΤΟ᾽ ῞ΕΝ, the ONE, the *first* person; and from the Τ᾽ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ, the GOOD, the *second* in that Trinity.

ARISTOTLE thought of the Soul like the rest, as we learn from a passage quoted by Cudworth ¶ out of his Nichomachean *ethics;* where having spoken of the sensitive soul, and declared it to be

* *De Anima*, cap. 24. † *Adversus Gentes*, lib. ii. p. 47. ‡ Ὁ δέ γε Πλάτων, ἀσωμάτους μὲν καὶ νοητὰς οὐσίας, τὰς λογικὰς φύσεις ὁμοίως Ἑβραίοις ὑφίστησι, διαπίπτει δὲ τῆς ἀκολουθίας· πρῶτον μὲν, ἀγεννήτους εἶναι φάσκων αὐτὰς ὥσπερ καὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν, ἔπειτα ἐξ ἀπορροίας τῆς τοῦ μὴ ὄντος αὐτὰς γεγονέναι διδόναι βούλεται.—*Præp. Evang.* lib. xiii. cap. 15. § Σπευσίππος τὸν νοῦν οὔτε τῷ ἑνὶ, οὔτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν αὐτὸν, ἰδιοφυῆ δέ.—*Eccl. Phys.* lib. i. cap. 1. ‖ "History of Philosophy," part v. Art. SPEUSIPPUS, chap. 2. ¶ "Intellectual System," p. 55.

mortal, he goes on in this manner: *It remains that the mind or intellect, and that alone (pre-existing) enter from without, and be only* DIVINE.*

But then he distinguishes again concerning this *Mind* or *intellect*, and makes it two-fold; *agent* and *patient*: The former of which, he concludes to be *immortal*, and the latter *corruptible.—The agent Intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible.*† Cudworth thinks this a very doubtful and obscure passage; and imagines Aristotle was led to write thus unintelligibly, by his doctrine of *forms* and *qualities*; which confounds corporeal with incorporeal substances: But had that excellent person reflected on the general doctrine of the TO' 'EN, he would have seen, the passage was plain and easy: and that Aristotle, from the common principle of the Human Soul's being part of the Divine Substance, draws a conclusion against a future state of separate existence; which, though (as it now appears) all the Philosophers embraced, yet all were not so forward to avow. The obvious meaning of the words then is this: *The agent Intelligent* (says he) *is only immortal and eternal, but the passive, corruptible, i. e.* The particular sensations of the soul *(the passive Intelligent)* will cease after death; and the substance of it *(the agent Intelligent)* will be resolved into the Soul of the Universe. For it was Aristotle's opinion, who compared the Soul to a *rasa tabula*, that human sensations and reflections were passions: These therefore are what he finely calls, the *passive Intelligent*; which, he says, shall cease, or is corruptible. What he meant by the *agent Intelligent*, we learn from his commentators; who interpret it to signify, as Cudworth here acknowledges, the DIVINE INTELLECT; which gloss Aristotle himself fully justifies, in calling it ΘΕΙΟΝ, *divine*. But what need of many words? The Learned well know, that the *intellectus agens* of Aristotle was the very same with the *anima mundi* of Plato and Pythagoras.

Thus, this seeming extravagance in dividing the human mind into *agent* and *patient*, appears very plain and accurate: But the not having this common key to the ancient Metaphysics, hath kept the followers of Aristotle long at variance amongst themselves, whether their master did, or did not believe the Soul to be immortal. The anonymous writer of the life of Pythagoras, as we find it in the Extract, by Photius, says, *that* Plato *and* Aristotle *with one consent agree that the Soul is immortal: Though some, not fathoming the profound mind of* Aristotle, *suppose that he held the Soul to be mortal;*‡ that is, mistaking the *passive Intelligent* (by which Aristotle

* Λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι. καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον. † Τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός. ‡ Ὅτι Πλάτων, φησὶ, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, ἀθάνατον ὁμοίως λέγουσι τὴν ψυχήν· κἂν τινες εἰς τὸν Ἀριστοτέλους νοῦν οὐκ ἐμβαθύνοντες, θνητὴν νομίζουσιν αὐτὸν λέγειν.—PHOT. *Biol.* cod. 259.

meant the present partial sensations) for the Soul itself, or the *agent Intelligent*. Nay, this way of talking of the *passive Intelligent* made some, as Nemesius, even imagine that he held the Soul to be only a quality.*

As to the STOICS, Cleanthes held (as Stobæus tells us) that *every thing was made out of one, and would be again resolved into one.*† But let Seneca speak for them all.—*And why should you not believe something divine to be in him, who is indeed* PART OF THE GODHEAD? *That* WHOLE, *in which we are contained, is* ONE, *and that* ONE *is* GOD; *we being his Companions and Members.*‡

Epictetus says, the souls of men *have the nearest relation to God, as being parts, or fragments of him, discerped and torn from his Substance.* Συναφεὶς τῷ θεῷ, ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα. This passage amongst others, equally strong, is quoted by the learned Dr. *Moor*, in his book of the *Immortality of the Soul.*§ And one cannot but smile at the good Doctor's explanation of a general Principle which he could by no means approve. *These expressions* (says he) *make the Soul of man a ray or beam of the Soul of the World, or of God. But we are to take notice,* THEY ARE BUT METAPHORICAL PHRASES. So, the Socinian, to texts of scripture full as strong for the *doctrine of the Redemption.* And so, indeed, men of all Parties, when they would remove what stands in their way. They first change Things into Figures; and then change Figures into nothing. —But here the learned Doctor was, more than ordinary, unlucky in the application of his solution: for Arrian, the Interpreter of Epictetus, tells us, by an apt comparison, what is meant by being part of the τὸ ἓν, *I am*, says he, *a man, a part of the* τὸ πᾶν, *as an hour is part of the day;* εἰμὶ ἄνθρωπος, μέρος τῶν πάντων, ὡς ὥρα ἡμέρας.

Lastly, Marcus Antoninus, as a consolation against the fear of death, says, *To die is not only according to the course of nature, but of great use to it.* We shall consider *how closely man is united to the* GODHEAD, *and in what part of him that union resides; and what will be the condition of that part or portion when it is resolved into the* ANIMA MUNDI.‖ Here the doctrine of the τὸ ἓν is hinted at; but writing only to Adepts, he is a little obscure. The Editors have made a very confused comment and translation: the common reading of the latter part of the passage is, Καὶ ὅταν πῶς ἔχῃ διακέηται τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦτο μόριον· which is certainly corrupt. Gataker very accurately transposed the words thus: Καὶ πῶς ἔχῃ ὅταν, and for διακέηται,

* Οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι λέγουσιν οὐσίαν, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Δείναρχος ἀνούσιον.—*De Nat. Hom.* † *Eclog. Phys.* cap. 20. ‡ "Quid est autem, cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid existere qui Dei pars est? Totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est, et Deus: et socii ejus sumus, et membra."—Ep. 92. § Book iii. chap. 16. ‖ Τοῦτο μέντοι οὐ μόνον φύσεως ἔργόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον αὐτῇ· πῶς ἅπτεται θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ κατὰ τί αὐτοῦ μέρος, καὶ πῶς ἔχῃ ὅταν διαχέηται τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦτο μόριον.—Εἰς ἑαυτὸν, lib. ii. cap. 12.

read διΐχηται. Meric Casaubon, more happily, διαχέηται. They have the true reading between them: But not being aware that the doctrine of the *refusion* was here alluded to, they could not settle the text with any certainty. The last word MOPION can signify nothing else but a discerped particle from *the Soul of the world*. Epictetus uses it in that sense in the passage above; and it seems to be the technical term for it.

But though here the imperial Stoic must be owned to be a little obscure; yet we have his own elucidating comment upon it, in another place. "You have hitherto existed as a PART [or have had a particular existence]; you will hereafter be absorbed and lost in the Substance which produced you: or rather, you will be assumed into the Divine Nature, or the Spermatic Reasons."* And again, "Every Body will be soon lost and buried in the universal Substance. Every Soul will be soon absorbed and sunk in the Universal Nature."†

After all this, one cannot sufficiently admire how Cudworth‡ came to say,—"All those *Pagan* Philosophers who asserted the incorporeity of Souls, must of *necessity*, in like manner, suppose them not to have been made out of pre-existing matter, but by God, *out of nothing*. *Plutarch* being *only here to be excepted*, by reason of a certain odd hypothesis which he had, that was peculiarly his own, of a third principle besides God and Matter, an evil Demon, self-existent: who therefore seems to have supposed all particular human souls to have been made neither out of nothing, nor yet out of matter or body pre-existing, but out of a certain strange commixture of the substance of the evil Soul, and God, blended together; upon which account he does affirm souls to be not so much ἔργον, as μέρος θεοῦ, not so much *the work of God, as part of him*." Plutarch's words are these: "The soul is not so much the work and production of God, as a part of him,—nor is it made by him, but from him, and out of him." Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ—οὐκ ἔργόν ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος—οὐδ' ΥΠ' αὐτοῦ, αλλ' ΑΠ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ΕΞ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν.§ On all which I will only make this observation: If Plutarch called the Soul *a part of God*, only in a figurative or popular sense, what hindered him from considering it as the *mere work and production of God?* Nay how could it have been considered otherwise? for figurative expression relates not to the *Nature* of *ideas*, but only to the *Mode of conveying them*.

1. But Cudworth thinks those Philosophers, who held the *incorporeity* of the Soul, must of *necessity* believe is to be made by God *out of nothing*. Why so? Because they could not possibly suppose

* ΕΝΥΠΕΣΤΗΣ ΩΣ ΜΕΡΟΣ· ΕΝΑΦΑΝΙΣΘΗΣΗ, ΤΩι ΓΕΝΝΗΣΑΝΤΙ· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν κατὰ μεταβολήν.—Lib. iv. cap. 14. † Πᾶν τὸ ἔνυλον ἐναφανίζεται τάχιστα τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσίᾳ, καὶ πᾶν αἴτιον εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων λόγον τάχιστα ἀναλαμβάνεται.—Lib. vii. cap. 10.
‡ "Intellectual System," p. 741. § *Plat. Quæst.*

it to be made out of *pre-existing Matter*. But is there no other pre-existing Substance in being, besides Matter? Yes, the *divine*. Out of this, then, it might have been made. And from this, in fact, the Philosophers did suppose it to be made. The learned author, therefore, has concluded too hastily.

2. He thinks Plutarch was *single*, in conceiving the soul to be a *part*, rather than a *work* of God; and that Plutarch was led into that error by the Manichean principle: But how this principle should lead any one into such an error, is utterly inconceivable. It is true, indeed, that he who already believes the Soul to be μέρος, or μόριον θεοῦ, a part or particle of the Divinity, if at the same time he hold TWO PRINCIPLES, will naturally suppose the Soul to take a part from each. And so indeed did Plutarch: And in *this only*, differed from the rest of the Philosophers: who, as to the general tenet of μέρος, and not ἔργον θεοῦ, that the soul was *rather a part, than a work of God*, were all of the same opinion with him.

SUCH was the general doctrine on this point, before the coming of CHRIST: But then, those Philosophers, who held out against the FAITH, contrived, after some time, to new model both their Philosophy and Religion; making their Philosophy more religious, and their Religion more philosophical: Of which I have given many occasional instances, in the course of this work. So, amongst the philosophic improvements of Paganism, the softening this doctrine was one; the modern Platonists confining the notion of *the Soul's being part of the divine Substance* to *those of brutes*.* *Every irrational power* (says PORPHYRY) *is resolved into the life of the whole*.† And, it is remarkable, that then, and not till then, the Philosophers began *really* to believe a future state of rewards and punishments. But the wiser of them had no sooner laid down the Doctrine of the TO' 'EN than the Heretics, as the Gnostics, Manicheans, and Priscillians, took it up. These delivered it to the Arabians, from whom the Atheists of these ages have received it.

Such then being the general notion concerning the nature of the Soul, there could be no room for the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments: and how much the Ancients understood the disbelief of the one to be the consequence of holding the other, we have a remarkable instance in STRABO. This excellent writer speaking of the Mosaic Religion, thus expresseth himself: *For he* [Moses] *affirmed and taught that the* Egyptians *and* Libyans *conceived amiss, in representing the Divinity under the form of beasts and cattle: and that the* Greeks *were not less mistaken, who pictured him in a human shape; for God was that only* ONE, *which contains all*

* See note DD, at the end of this book.

† See note EE, at the end of this book.

mankind, the earth, and sea, WHICH *we call* HEAVEN, THE WORLD, AND THE NATURE OF ALL THINGS.* This, indeed, is the rankest *Spinozism:* But very unjustly charged on the Jewish Lawgiver, who hath delivered, in his divine writings, such an idea of the Deity, that had he drawn it on set purpose to oppose to that absurd opinion, he could not have done it more effectually. What then, you will say, could induce so ingenuous a writer to give this false representation of an Author, to whose Laws he was no stranger? The solution of the difficulty (which Toland has written a senseless dissertation† to aggravate and envenom) seems to be this: Strabo well knew, that all who held the TO' 'EN, necessarily denied a future state of reward and punishment; and finding in the Law of Moses so extraordinary a circumstance as the omission of a future state in the national religion, he concluded backwards, that the reason could be no other than the Author's belief of the TO' 'EN: For these two ideas were inseparably connected in the philosophic imagination of the Greeks. He was supported in this reasoning by the common opinion of the Greek Philosophers of that time, that the τὸ ἓν was an Egyptian doctrine: and he was not ignorant from whence Moses had all his learning.

But now, though the notion is shown to be so malignant, as, more or less, to have infected all the ancient Greek philosophy; yet no one, I hope, will suspect, that any thing so absurd and unphilosophical will need a formal confutation. Mr. Bayle thinks it even more irrational than the plastic atoms of Epicurus: *The atomic system is not, by a great deal, so absurd as* Spinozism:‡ And judges it cannot stand against the demonstrations of Newton: *In my opinion* (says he) *the* Spinozists *would find themselves embarrassed to some purpose, if one obliged them to admit the demonstrations of Mr.* Newton.§ In this he judged right; and we have lately seen a treatise, intitled, *An Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul,* &c. so well reasoned on the principles of that philosophy, as totally to dispel the impious phantasm of *Spinozism.* He who would have just and precise notions of GOD and the SOUL, may read that book; one of the best pursued pieces of reasoning, that, in my humble opinion, the present times, greatly advanced in true philosophy, have produced.

But it will be asked, From whence then did the Greeks learn this strange opinion? for we know they were not ΑΥΤΟΔΙΔΑΚΤΟΙ.

* Ἔφη γὰρ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐδίδασκεν, ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς φρονοῦσιν οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι θηρίοις εἰκάζοντες καὶ βοσκήμασι τὸ θεῖον· οὐδ' οἱ Λίβυες· οὐκ εὖ δὲ οὐδ' οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἀνθρωπομόρφους τυποῦντες· εἴη γὰρ ἓν τοῦτο μόνον θεὸς τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς ἅπαντας, καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν, ὃ καλοῦμεν οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν. —*Geog.* lib. xvi. † See his *Origines Judaicæ.* ‡ "Le Systeme des atomes n'est pas à beaucoup près aussi absurde que le spinozism."—*Crit. Dict.* Article DEMOCRITE. § "Je croi que les spinozistes se trouveroient bien embarassés, si on les forçoit d'admettre les demonstrations de Mr. Newton."—Ibid. Art. LEUCIPPE. Rem. (G) à la fin.

It will be said, perhaps, from Egypt; where they had all their other learning: And the books which go under the name of TRISMEGISTUS, and pretend to contain a body of the ancient Egyptian wisdom, being very full and explicit in favour of the doctrine of the ΤΟ ἝΝ, have very much confirmed this opinion: Now though that imposture hath been sufficiently exposed,* yet on pretence, that the writers of those books took the substance of them from the ancient Egyptian physiology, they preserve, I do not know how, a certain authority amongst the learned, by no means due unto them.

However, I shall venture to maintain, that the *notion* was purely GRECIAN.

1. For first, it is a refined, remote, and far-fetched, yet imaginary conclusion from true and simple principles. But the ancient Barbaric philosophy, as we are informed by the Greeks, consisted only of detached placits or tenets, delivered down from tradition; without any thing like a pursued hypothesis, or speculation founded on a system.† Now refinement and subtilty are the consequence only of these inventions.

But of all the Barbarians, this humour would be least seen in the Egyptians; whose Sages were not sedentary scholastic *Sophists*, like the Grecian; but men employed and busied in the public affairs of Religion and Government. Men of such characters, we may be sure, would push even the more solid sciences no farther than to the uses of life. In fact, they did not, as appears by a singular instance, in the case of Pythagoras. Jamblichus tells us, that *he spent two and twenty years in Egypt, studying astronomy and geometry*:‡ And yet after his return to Samos, he himself discovered the famous 47th *proposition* of the *first book of* Euclid. This, though a very *useful*, is yet a very *simple* theorem; and not being reached by the Egyptian Geometry, shows they had not advanced far in such speculations. So again, in Astronomy: Thales is said to be the first who predicted an eclipse of the sun; nor did the Egyptians, nor any other Barbarians, pretend to dispute that honour with him. To this it may be said, that the Egyptians certainly taught Pythagoras the true constitution of the Solar system in general: and, what is more extraordinary, the doctrine of Comets in particular, and of their revolutions, like the other planets, round the sun: § which is esteemed a modern discovery; at least it needed the greatest effort of Newton's genius to

* Is. CASAUBON *Contra Bar. Exerc.* 1, No. 18. † Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἱ παλαίτατοι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμφισβητεῖν καὶ ἀπορεῖν ἐφέροντο—οἱ μὲν γὰρ νεώτεροι τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι φιλοσόφων ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας κενῆς τε καὶ ἀτελοῦς, ἐλεγκτικῶς, ἅμα καὶ ἐριστικῶς, εἰς τὴν ἄχρηστον ἐξάγονται φλυαρίαν· ἔμπαλιν δὲ ἡ βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία, τὴν πᾶσαν ἔριν ἐκβάλλουσα.—CLEM. ALEX. *Strom.* lib. viii. in prin. ‡ Δύο δὴ καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτη κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἐν τοῖς ἀδύτοις διετέλεσεν ἀστρονομῶν καὶ γεωμετρῶν.—*Vit. Pyth.* cap. 4. § It is recorded by Aristotle and Plutarch; and thus expressed by Amm. Marcellinus: "Stellas quasdam, *ceteris similes*, quarum *ortus obitusque*, quibus sint temporibus *præstituti* humanis mentibus ignorari."—Lib. xxv. cap. 10.

render it probable; and still the periods of their revolutions are only guessed at. We grant they taught him this: but it is as true, that they taught it not scientifically, but dogmatically, and as they received it from Tradition; of which, one certain proof is, that the Greeks soon lost or entirely neglected it, when they began to hypothesise.*

It will be asked, then, in what consisted this boasted Wisdom of Egypt; which we have so much extolled throughout this work; and for which liberty we have so large warrant from *holy Scripture?* I reply, In the science of LEGISLATION and CIVIL POLICY: But this, only by the way.

That the Egyptians did not philosophise by hypothesis and system, appears farther from the character of their first Greek disciples. Those early *Wise men*, who fetched their Philosophy from Egypt, brought it home in detached and independent *placits;* which was certainly as they found it. For, as the ingenious writer of the *Enquiry into the Life of* Homer says, *there was yet no* SEPARATION *of* WISDOM; *the philosopher and the divine, the legislator and the poet were all united in the same person.* Nor had they yet any Sects, or succession of Schools. These were late; and therefore the Greeks could not be mistaken in their accounts of this matter.

One of the first, as well as noblest systems of Physics, is the Atomic theory, as it was revived by Des Cartes. This, without doubt, was a Greek invention; nothing being better settled, than that Democritus and Leucippus were the authors of it.† But Posidonius, either out of envy or whim, would rob them of this honour, and give it to one Moschus a Phenician. Our excellent Cudworth has gone into this fancy; and made of that unknown Moschus, the celebrated Lawgiver of the Jews. But the learned Dr. Burnet hath clearly overthrown this notion, and vindicated the right of the discovery to the two Greeks.‡

* "*Fixas* in supremis mundi partibus immotas persistere, et planetas his inferiores circa solem revolvi, terram pariter moveri cursu annuo, diurno vero circa axem proprium, et solem ceu focum universi in omnium centro quiescere, antiquissima fuit philosophantium sententia. Ab Ægyptiis autem astrorum antiquissimis observationibus propagatam esse hanc sententiam verisimile est. Et etiam ab illis et a gentibus conterminis ad Græcos gentem magis philologicam quam philosophicam, philosophia omnis antiquior juxta et sanior manasse videtur. Subinde docuerunt Anaxagoras, Democritus, et alii nonnulli, terram in centro mundi immotam stare, et astra omnia in occasum, aliqua celerius, alia tardius moveri, idque in spatiis liberrimis. Namque orbis solidi postea ab Eudoxo, Calippo, Aristotele, introducti sunt; declinante in dies philosophiâ primitus introductâ, et novis Græcorum commentis paulatim prævalentibus. Quibus vinculis *antiqui* planetas in spatiis liberis retineri, deque cursu rectilineo perpetuo retractos in orbem regulariter agi docuere, non constat. In hujus rei explicationem orbes solidos excogitatos fuisse opinor."—NEWTON. *De Mundi Systemate.* † See note FF, at the end of this book. ‡ "Præterea non videtur mihi sapere indolem antiquissimorum temporum iste modus philosophandi per hypotheses et principiorum systemata; quem modum, ab introductis atomis, statim sequebantur philosophi. Hæc Græcanica sunt, ut par est credere, et sequioris ævi. Durasse mihi videtur ultra Trojana tempora philosophia traditiva, quæ ratiociniis et causarum explicatione non nitebatur, sed alterius generis et originis doctrinâ, primigeniâ et πατροπαραδότῳ."—*Archæol. Phil.* lib. i. cap. 6.

This being the case, we may easily know what Plato meant in saying, that the *Greeks improved whatever science they received from the Barbarians.** Which words, Celsus seems to paraphrase, where he says, the Barbarians were good at INVENTING OPINIONS, but the Greeks were only able to PERFECT and SUPPORT them.† And Epicurus, whose spirit was entirely systematic as well as atheistic, finding none of these delicacies amongst the Barbarians, used to maintain that *the Greeks knew only how to philosophise.*‡ So much was the author of *the voyage of Cyrus* mistaken in thinking that *the Orientalists had a genius more subtile and metaphysical than the Greeks.*§ But he apparently formed his judgement in this matter, from the modern genius of the people, acquired since the time they learnt to speculate of the Greek Philosophers; whose writings, since the Arabian conquests, have been translated into the languages of the *East.*

It appears therefore, from the nature of the Barbaric philosophy, that such a notion as the TO' 'EN could not be Egyptian.

2. But we shall shew next, that it was in fact a Greek invention; by the best argument, the discovery of the Inventors.

TULLY, speaking of PHERECYDES SYRUS, the Master of Pythagoras, says, that he was the first who affirmed the souls of men were ETERNAL, "Quod literis extet, Pherecydes Syrus primum dixit animos hominum esse SEMPITERNOS: antiquus sane; fuit enim meo regnante gentili. Hanc opinionem discipulus ejus Pythagoras maximè confirmavit."‖ This is a very extraordinary passage. If it be taken in the common sense of the interpreters, that Pherecydes *was the first, or the first of the* Greeks, *who taught the* IMMORTALITY *of the soul,* nothing can be more false or groundless. Tully himself well knew the contrary, as appears from several places of his works, where he represents the *immortality of the soul,* as a thing taught from the most early times of memory, and by all mankind; the author and original of it, as Plutarch assures us, being entirely unknown; which indeed might be easily gathered, by any attentive considerer, from the very early practice of deifying the dead. Cicero therefore, who knew that Homer taught it long before; who knew that Herodotus recorded it to have been taught by the Egyptians from the most early times, must needs mean a different thing; which the exact propriety of the

* Διὸ καὶ ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν, ὅ, τι ἂν καὶ παρὰ βαρβάρων μάθημα λάβωσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες, τοῦτο ἄμεινον ἐκφέρουσι.—Anonymus *De Vita Pythagor.* apud PHOTIUM, cod. 249. † Καὶ εὐγνωμόνως γε οὐκ ὀνειδίζει ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων ἀρχῇ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐπαινῶν ὡς ἱκανοὺς εὑρεῖν δόγματα τοὺς βαρβάρους, προστίθεσι δὲ τούτοις, ὅτι κρῖναι καὶ βεβαιώσασθαι τὰ ὑπὸ βαρβάρων εὑρεθέντα ἀμείνονες εἰσὶν Ἕλληνες.—ORIGEN. *Contra Celsum,* p. 5. ‡ Ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἔμπαλιν ὑμπολαμβάνει μόνους φιλοσοφῆσαι Ἕλληνας δύνασθαι.—CLEMENS ALEXAND. *Strom.* lib. i. p. 302, ed. Morel. 1629. § Voiez *Disc. sur la Mythologie.* ‖ *Tusc. Disp.* lib. i. cap. 16.

word *sempiternus* will lead us to understand. Donatus the grammarian says, that SEMPITERNUS *properly relates to the Gods, and* PERPETUUS *to men; Sempiternum ad Deos, perpetuum proprie ad homines pertinet:** Thus a proper ETERNITY is given to the Soul; a consequence which could only spring, and does necessarily spring from the principle, of the Soul's being *part of God*. So that Cicero hath here informed us of a curious circumstance; which not only fixes the doctrine of the TO' 'EN to Greece, but records the Inventor of it: And this is farther confirmed by what he adds, that Pythagoras, the scholar of Pherecydes, took it from his master; and by the authority of his own name added great credit to it. So great indeed, that, as we have seen, it soon overspread all the Greek philosophy. And I make no question but it was Pherecydes's broaching this impiety, and not hiding it so carefully as his great Disciple did afterwards, by the *double doctrine*, which made him pass with the people for an Atheist. And if the story of his mocking at all religious worship, which Ælian† mentions, be true, it would much support the popular opinion.

Tatian is the only ancient writer I know of, who seems to be apprized of this intrigue; or to have any notion of *Pherecydes's* true character. Tatian writing to the *Greeks*, against their Philosophers, says, Aristotle *is the heir of* Pherecydes's *Doctrine; and traduces the notion of the soul's immortality;* ‡ i. e. rendered the notion odious, διαβάλλει: as *such an immortality* certainly was to the Christian Church. How true it is that Aristotle was *heir* to this Doctrine, may be seen above in the interpretation of a passage in the *Nichomachean ethics*.§ But it hath much embarassed Tatian's commentators to find on what his censure was grounded.

That *Pherecydes* was the inventor of this notion, and not barely the first bringer of it to the *Greeks*, may not only be collected from what hath been said above of the different genius of the *Greek* and *Barbaric* philosophy, but from what *Suidas* tells us of his being self-taught, and having no master or director of his studies.‖

But as the *Greeks* had two Inventors of their best *physical* principle, *Democritus* and *Leucippus*; so had they two likewise of this their very worst in *metaphysics*. For we have as positive attestation that THALES was one of them, as that *Pherecydes* was the other. *There are* (says *Laertius) who affirm, that* Thales *was the first who held the souls of men to be* IMMORTAL;¶ 'AΘA'NATOΣ, an epithet, in the philosophic ages of Greece, which as properly signified the immortality

* In TERENTII *Andriam*, act. v. sc. v. † *Var. Hist.* lib. iv. cap. 28. ‡ Ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης τοῦ Φερεκύδους δόγματος κληρονόμος ἐστὶ, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς διαβάλλει τὴν ἀθανασίαν.—*Orat. ad Græcos*, cap. 25. § See p. 486. ‖ Αὐτὸν δὲ οὐκ ἐσχηκέναι καθηγητὴν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἀσκῆσαι.—Voce Φερεκύδ. ¶ Ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν ὡρῶτον εἰπεῖν φασὶν ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχάς.—Lib. i. sect. 24.

of the *Gods;* as ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ signified the immortality of *men.** The same objection holds here against understanding it in the common sense, as in the case of Pherecydes.

The sum then of the argument is this: THALES and PHERECYDES, who, we are to observe, were contemporaries, are said to be the *first* who taught the *immortality of the soul.*† In the common sense of this assertion, they were not the first; and known not to be the first, by those who affirmed they were so. The same Antiquity informs us, that they held the doctrine of the ΤΟ ΕΝ; which likewise, commonly went by the name of the *immortality.* Nor is there any person earlier than these on record, for holding this doctrine. We conclude therefore, that those who tell us they were the first who taught the *immortality of the soul,* necessarily meant that they were the first who held it to be *part of the divine substance.* This, I say, we may conclude, although Plutarch had not expressly affirmed it of *one* of them, where he says, that Thales *was the* FIRST *who taught the soul to be an eternal-moving, or a self-moving Nature.*‡ But none, but God alone, was supposed to be such a *Nature:* Therefore the Soul, according to Thales, was part of the divine Substance; and he, according to Plutarch, was the *first* who held this opinion.

3. But though the Greeks were the inventors of this impious notion; yet we may be assured, as they had their first learning from Egypt, it was the recognition of some Egyptian Principles which led them into it. Let us see then what those principles were.

The Egyptians, as we are assured by the concurrent testimony of Antiquity, were amongst the first who taught that the soul survived the body and was *immortal.* Not, like the Greek Sophists, for speculation; but for a support to their practical doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment: and, every thing being done in Egypt for the sake of Society, a future state was inforced to secure the general doctrine of a Providence. But still there would remain great difficulties concerning the ORIGIN OF EVIL, which seemed to affect the moral attributes of God. And it was not enough for the purposes of Society, that there was a divine Providence, unless that Providence was understood to be perfectly *good* and *just.* Some solution therefore was to be given; and a better could not be well found, than the notion of the METEMPSYCHOSIS, or transmigration of Souls; without which, in the opinion of Hierocles,§ the ways of Providence are not to be justified. The necessary consequence of this doctrine was, that

* So EUSEBIUS, speaking of the political Gods of Egypt, says: Ἄλλους δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἐπιγείους γενέσθαι φασὶν, ὑπάρξαντας μὲν ΘΝΗΤΟΥΣ, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων ἐνεργεσίαν τετευχότας τῆς ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ.—*Præp. Evang.* lib. iii. cap. 3.

† SUIDAS, speaking of Pherecydes, says: Ἐξηλοτύπει δὲ τὴν Θάλητος δόξαν.—Voce Φερεκύδ. ‡ Θαλῆς ἀπεφήνατο ΠΡΩΤΟΣ τὴν ψυχὴν, φύσιν ΑΕΙΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ ἢ ΑΥΤΟΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ.—*Plac. Phil.* lib. iv. cap. 2.

§ Lib. *De Prov.* apud PHOT. *Bib.* cod. 214.

the *Soul* is elder than the *Body*: So having taught before, that the *Soul* was eternal, *à parte post*; and now, that it had an existence before it came into the *Body*, the Greeks, to give a rounding to their system, taught, on the foundation of its pre-existence, that it was eternal too, *à parte ante*. This is no precarious conjecture; for Suidas, after having told us that Pherecydes (whom we have shown above to be one of the inventors of the notion of the Soul's *proper eternity)* had no master, but struck every thing out of his own thoughts; adds, that *he had procured certain secret Phenician books.** Now we know from Eusebius's account of Sanchoniatho, and the famous fragment there preserved, that these secret Phenician Books contained the Egyptian wisdom and learning.

The Greeks having thus given the Soul *one* of the attributes of the Divinity; another Egyptian doctrine soon taught them to make a perfect *God almighty* of it.

We have observed, that the *Mysteries* were an Egyptian invention; and that the great *secret* in them was the *unity of the Godhead*. This was the first of the ἀπόῤῥητα; in which, we are told, their Kings, and Magistrates, and a select number of the best and wisest, were instructed. It is clear then that the doctrine was delivered in such a manner as was most useful to Society: But the principle of the ΤΟ῾ ῞ΕΝ is as destructive to Society, as Atheism can well make it. However, having suitable conceptions of the Deity thus *found*, they represented him, *as a* SPIRIT *diffusing itself through the world, and intimately pervading all things.* Παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῦ ϖαντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκόν ἐστι ϖνεῦμα, says *Horapollo.* And Virgil, where he gives us the ἀπόῤῥητα of the *Mysteries,* describes the Godhead in the same manner:

> "SPIRITUS intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
> MENS agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet."

And thus the Egyptians, in a figurative and moral sense, teaching that GOD WAS ALL THINGS; † the Greeks drew the conclusion, but in a literal and metaphysical; that ALL THINGS WERE GOD, ῞Εν τι τὰ ϖάντα, say the poems going under the name of Orpheus; and so ran headlong into what we now call *Spinozism.* But these propositions the Greeks afterwards father'd upon the Egyptians. The Asclepian *dialogue* translated into Latin by Apuleius, says, OMNIA UNIUS ESSE, ET UNUM ESSE OMNIA. And again: *Nonne hoc dixi,* OMNIA UNUM ESSE, ET UNUM OMNIA? Μόρια τοῦ θεοῦ ϖάντά ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ ϖάντα μόρια, ϖάντα ἄρα ὁ θεός· ϖάντα οὖν ϖοιῶν, ἑαυτὸν ϖοιεῖ.—ἐάν τις ἐπιχειρήσῃ τὸ ϖᾶν καὶ ἓν χωρίσαι, τὸ ϖᾶν τοῦ ἑνὸς λύσας ἀπολέσει τὸ ϖᾶν, ϖάντα γὰρ ἓν εἶναι δεῖ.‡ This pas-

* Αὐτὸν δὲ οὐκ ἐσχηκέναι καθηγητὴν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἀσκῆσαι, κτησάμενον τὰ ΦΟΙΝΙΚΩΝ ἀπόκρυφα βιβλία. † Δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς δίχα θεοῦ μηδὲν ὅλως συνεστάναι.—Idem. ‡ Lib. xvi. of the works of TRISMEGIST, published by Ficinus.

sage cannot be well understood without recollecting what has been just observed above, of the Egyptian *premisses* and the Greek *conclusion*. Now the Platonist, who forged these books, conscious of the Greek *conclusion*, artfully endeavours, in these words, to shew, it was a necessary consequence of the Egyptian *premisses*; which, he would make us believe, conveyed an imperfect representation of the Universe without it. *If any man* (says he) *go about to separate the All from the One, he will destroy the All; for All ought to be One.*

4. But this mistake concerning the birth-place of Spinozism, for a mistake it is, being chiefly, as we see, supported by the books, which go under the name of Hermes Trismegistus, it will be proper to say something to that matter.

The most virulent enemies, the CHRISTIAN FAITH had to encounter, on its first appearance in the world, were the PLATONISTS and PYTHAGOREANS. And *national Paganism*, of which, these Sects set up for the defenders, being, by its gross absurdities, obnoxious to the most violent retortion, their first care was to cover and secure it, by *allegorizing* its GODS, and *spiritualizing* its WORSHIP. But lest the novelty of this invention should discredit it, they endeavoured to persuade the world, that this refinement was agreeable to the ancient mysterious wisdom of Egypt: in which point, several circumstances concurred to favour them. 1. As first, that known, uncontroverted fact, that the Greek RELIGION and PHILOSOPHY came originally from Egypt. 2. The state of the Egyptian *philosophy* in their times. The power of Egypt had been much shaken by the Persians; but totally overturned by the Greeks. Under the Ptolemies, this famous Nation suffered an entire revolution in their Learning and Religion; and their Priests, as was natural, began to philosophise in the Grecian mode; At the time we speak of, they had, for several ages, accustomed themselves so to do; having neglected and forgotten all the old Egyptian learning: which, if we consider their many subversive revolutions, will not appear at all strange to those who know, that this Learning was conveyed from hand to hand, partly by unfaithful *Tradition*, and partly by equivocal *Hieroglyphics*. However, an opinion of Egypt's being the repository of the true old Egyptian Wisdom, derived too much honour to the colleges of their Priests, not for them to contrive a way to support it. 3. This they did (and it leads me to the third favourable circumstance) by forging books under the name of HERMES TRISMEGISTUS, the great Hero and Lawgiver of the old Egyptians. They could not have thought of a better expedient: For, in the times of the Ptolemies, the practice of forging books became general; and the Art arrived at its perfection. But had not the Greeks of this time been so universally infatuated with the delusion of mistaking their own Philosophy for the old

Egyptian, there were marks enough to have detected the forgery. Jamblichus says, *the books that go under the name of* Hermes *do indeed contain the* Hermaic *doctrines,* THOUGH THEY OFTEN USE THE LANGUAGE OF THE PHILOSOPHERS: *For they were translated out of the* Egyptian *tongue by* MEN NOT UNACQUAINTED WITH PHILOSOPHY.* These, it must be owned, were Translators of trust! who, instead of giving the *Egyptian Philosophy* in Greek, have given us the *Greek Philosophy* in the Egyptian tongue; if at least what Jamblichus says be true, that these forgeries were first fabricated in their own country language. But whether this Writer saw the cheat, or was himself in the delusion, is hard to say: He has owned enough; and made the matter much worse by a bad vindication. But the credit of these forgeries, we may well imagine, had its foundation in some genuine writings of Hermes. There were in fact, such writings: and, what is more, some fragments of them are yet remaining; sufficient indeed, if we wanted other proof, to convict the *books that go under the name of* Hermes, of imposture. For what Eusebius hath given us, from SANCHONIATHO, concerning the *Cosmogony,* was taken from the genuine works of Thoth or Hermes: and in them we see not the least resemblance of that spirit of refinement and speculation, which marks the character of those forged writings: every thing is plain and simple; free of all hypothesis or metaphysical reasoning; those inventions of the later Greeks.

Thus the Pythagoreans and Platonists, being supplied both with open *prejudices* and concealed *forgeries,* turned them, the best they could, against Christianity. Under these auspices, Jamblichus composed the book just before mentioned, OF THE MYSTERIES; meaning the profound and recondite doctrines of Egyptian wisdom: Which, at bottom, is nothing else but the *genuine Greek Philosophy,* imbrowned with the dark fanaticism of eastern cant.

But their chief strength lay in the *forgery:* And they even interpolated the very *forgery,* the better to serve their purpose against *Christianity.*

It is pleasant enough to observe how some primitive *Apologists* defended themselves against the authority of these books. One would imagine they should have detected the cheat; which, we see, was easy enough to do. Nothing like it: Instead of that, they opposed fraud to fraud: for some Heretics (the learned Beausobre, in his *History of Manicheism,* very reasonably supposes a Gnostic to have been concerned) had added whole books to this noble collection of *Trismegist:* In which they have made Hermes speak plainer of the

* Τὰ μὲν φερόμενα, ὡς Ἑρμοῦ Ἑρμαϊκὰς περιέχει δόξας, εἰ καὶ τῇ τῶν φιλοσόφων γλώττῃ, πολλάκις χρῆται, μεταγέγραπται γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Αἰγυπτίας γλώττης ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν φιλοσοφίας οὐκ ἀπείρως ἐχόντων.—*De Mysteriis.*

mysteries of the christian Faith, than even the Jewish Prophets themselves. All this was done with a spirit not unlike that of the two law-solicitors, of whom the story goes, that when one of them had forged a bond, the other, instead of losing time to detect the cheat, produced evidence to prove that it was paid at the day. But this was the humour of the times: for the Grammarians, at the height of their reputation under the Ptolemies, had shamefully neglected *critical learning*, which was their province, to apply themselves to the *forging of books*, under the names of old authors. There is a remarkable passage in Diogenes Laertius, which is obscure enough to deserve an explanation; and will shew us how common it was to oppose forgery to forgery. He is arguing against those who gave the origin of Philosophy (which he would have to be from Greece) to the Barbarians; that is, the Egyptians—*But these* (says he) *ignorantly apply to the* Barbarians *the illustrious inventions of the* Greeks; *from whence not only Philosophy, but the very Race of mankind had its beginning. Thus we know* Musæus *was of* Athens, *and* Linus *of* Thebes: *The former of these, the son of* Eumolpus, *is said to be the first, who wrote, in verse, of the sphere, and of the generation of the Gods; and taught, that* ALL THINGS PROCEED FROM ONE, AND WILL BE RESOLVED BACK AGAIN INTO IT.* To see the force of this reasoning, we are to suppose, that they whom Laertius is here confuting, relied principally on this argument, to prove that Philosophy came originally from the Barbarians, namely, that the great principle of the Greek Philosophy, the TO' 'EN *and the* REFUSION, was an Egyptian notion. To this he replies, not so: Musæus taught it originally in Athens. The dispute, we see, is pleasantly conducted: His adversaries, who supported the common, and indeed, the true opinion of Philosophy's coming first from the Barbarians, by the false argument of the τὸ ἓν's being originally Egyptian, took this on the authority of the forged books of *Trismegist;* and Laertius opposes it by as great a forgery, the fragments which went under the name of Musæus.†

These are my sentiments of the Imposture. Casaubon supposes the whole a forgery of some Platonic Christians: But Cudworth has fully shewn the weakness of that opinion; yet is sometimes inclined to give them to the pagan Platonists *of those times;* which seems full as weak.

1. Because they are always mentioned, both by *Christian* and

* Λανθάνουσι δ' αὐτοὺς τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων κατορθώματα, ἀφ' ὧν μὴ ὅτι γε φιλοσοφία, ἀλλὰ καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων ἦρξε, Βαρβάροις προσάπτοντες. Ἰδοὺ γοῦν, παρὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίοις γέγονε Μουσαῖος, παρὰ δὲ Θηβαίοις Λίνος· καὶ τὸν μὲν, Εὐμόλπου παῖδα φασὶ, ποιῆσαι δὲ θεογονίαν καὶ σφαῖραν πρῶτον· φάναι τε ἐξ ἑνὸς τὰ πάντα γενέσθαι, καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀναλύεσθαι.—Lib. i. § 3. † See note GG, at the end of this book.

Pagan writers, as works long known, and of some considerable standing. 2. Because, had *those Platonists* been the authors, they would not have delivered the doctrine of the soul's consubstantiality with the Deity, and its refusion into him, in the gross manner in which we find it in the books of *Trismegist.* For, as we have shewn above by a passage from Porphyry,* they had now confined that irreligious notion to the Souls of brutes. At other times, this great Critic seems disposed to think that they might indeed be genuine, and translated, as we see Jamblichus would have them, from old Egyptian originals: But this, we presume, is sufficiently overthrown by what has been said above.

In a word, these forgeries (containing the rankest *Spinozism*)† passed unsuspected on all hands; and the Principle of the τὸ ἓν and *the refusion* went currently, at that time, for Egyptian: And though, since the revival of learning, the cheat hath been detected, yet the false notion of their original hath kept its ground. The celebrated M. La Croze has declared himself in favour of it. This is nothing strange; for learned, like unlearned men, are often carried away by Party. But that so discerning a man should think the notion well supported by a passage in a Greek Tragic, (where the Writer, to keep decorum, puts the sentiment into the mouth of an *Egyptian* Woman,) is very strange. Theonoe, the Daughter of Proteus, is made to say, *The mind or soul of the deceased doth not live,* [i. e. hath no separate existence] *but hath an immortal sensation, sliding back again into the immortal Æther.*‡

Why I have been thus solicitous to vindicate the pure EGYPTIAN WISDOM from this opprobrium, will be seen in its place.

And now, to sum up the general argument of this last section. These two errors in the *metaphysical* speculations of the Philosophers, concerning *the nature of* GOD, *and of the* SOUL, were the things which necessarily kept them from giving credit to a doctrine, which even their own moral reasonings, addressed to the People, had rendered highly probable in itself. But, as we observed before, it was their ill fate to be determined rather by *metaphysical* than *moral* arguments. This is best seen by comparing the belief and conduct of SOCRATES with the rest. He was singular, as we said before, in *confining* himself to the study of morality; and as singular in *believing*

* See p. 489; and note DD, at the end of this book. † As in the following passage, Οὐκ ἤκουσας ἐν τοῖς Γενικοῖς, ὅτι ἀπὸ μιᾶς ψυχῆς τῆς τῶν ὅλων πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαί εἰσιν; As where it is affirmed of the world, Πάντα ποιεῖν, καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιεῖν.—Of the incorruptibility of the soul, Πῶς μέρος τι δύναται φθαρῆναι τοῦ ἀφθάρτου, ἢ ἀπολέσαι τι τοῦ θεοῦ—ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποτετμημένος τῆς οὐσιότητος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἠπλωμένος καθάπερ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς.

‡ ——— Ὁ Νοῦς
Τῶν κατθανόντων ζῇ μὲν οὐ, γνώμην δ' ἔχει,
Ἀθάνατον, εἰς ἀθάνατον Αἰθέρ' ἐμπεσών.—EURIPIDIS *Helen.*

the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. What could be the cause of his belief but this restraint; of which his belief was a natural consequence? For having confined himself to MORALS, he had nothing to mislead him: Whereas the rest of the philosophers applying themselves, with a kind of fanaticism, to *physics* and *metaphysics*, had drawn a number of absurd, though subtil conclusions, which directly opposed the consequences of those moral arguments. And as it is common for parents to be fondest of their weakest and most deformed issue, so these men, as we said, were easier swayed by their *metaphysical* than *moral* conclusions. But SOCRATES, by imposing this modest restraint upon himself, had not only the advantage of believing steadily, but of informing his hearers, of what he really believed; for not having occasion for, he did not make use of, the *double doctrine*. Both these circumstances, Cicero (under the person of Lelius) alludes to in the Character he gives of this divine Sage.—"Qui Apollinis Oraculo sapientissimus est judicatus, *non tum hoc, tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed* IDEM *dicebat semper*, ANIMOS HOMINUM ESSE DIVINOS: *iisque cum e corpore excessissent reditum in Cælum patere optimoque et justissimo cuique expeditissimum.*"*— By which words, Cicero, as we observe, seems to refer to *the double doctrine* of the rest of the Philosophers, who sometimes pretended to believe a future state, and sometimes professed to hold the extinction or refusion of the human soul.

Thus, as the apostle PAUL observes, the Philosophers PROFESSING THEMSELVES TO BE WISE, BECAME FOOLS.† Well therefore might he warn his followers lest they too should BE SPOILED THROUGH VAIN PHILOSOPHY:‡ and one of them, and he no small fool neither, is upon record for having been thus *spoiled*; SYNESIUS bishop of Ptolemaïs. He went into the church a Platonist; and a Platonist he remained; as extravagant and as absurd as any he had left behind him.§ This man, forsooth, could not be brought to believe the *Apostles' Creed*, of the resurrection: And why? Because he believed with *Plato* that the soul was before the Body; that is, eternal, *à parte ante*: and the consequence they drew from this was (as we have shewn) the very thing which disposed the Platonists to reject all future state of rewards and punishments. However, in this station, he was not for shaking hands with *Christianity*, but would suppose some grand and profound mystery to lie hid under the Scripture account of the RESURRECTION. This again was in the very spirit of Plato; who, as we are told by Celsus, concealed many sublime things of this kind, under his popular doctrine of a future state.‖ It was

* *De Amicitia*, cap. iv. † Rom. i. 22. ‡ Coloss. ii. 8. § See a full account of this man, his principles, his scruples, and his conversion, in "The Critical Inquiry into the Opinions of the Philosophers," &c. chap. xiv. ‖ See note (¶) p. 543.

just the same with the Jewish Platonists at the time when the doctrine of a future state became national amongst that people. And Philo himself seems disposed to turn the notion of Hell into an allegory, signifying an impure and sinful life.*

But it was not peculiar to the *Platonists* to allegorize the doctrine of the *resurrection*. It was the humour of all the *Sects* on their admission into *Christianity*. "Et ut carnis restitutio negetur" (says Tertullian) "de una OMNIUM PHILOSOPHORUM SCHOLA sumitur." † Yet in another place he tells us, that *every Heresy received its* SEASONING *in the school of Plato*. "Doleo bona fide Platonem factum HÆRETICORUM OMNIUM Condimentarium." ‡ For the Philosophers being, in their moral lectures in their schools (in imitation of the language of the *Mysteries*, whose phraseology it was the fashion to use both in *Schools* and *Courts*) accustomed to call vicious habits, *death*; and reformation to a good life 'ΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ or a *resurrection*, they were disposed to understand the RESURRECTION OF THE JUST in the same sense. Against these pests of the Gospel it was § that the learned apostle Paul warned his Disciple Timothy, SHUN (says he) PROFANE AND VAIN BABBLINGS, *for they will increase unto more ungodliness. And their word will eat as doth a canker: of whom is* Hymenæus *and* Philetus, *who concerning the Truth have erred, saying that* THE RESURRECTION IS PAST ALREADY; *and overthrow the faith of some.* ‖

And here I will beg leave to observe, that whenever the holy Apostles speak of, or hint at the Philosophers or Philosophy of Greece, which is not seldom, they always do it in terms of contempt or abhorrence. On this account I have not been ashamed nor afraid to shew, at large, that the reasons they had for so doing were just and weighty. Nor have I thought myself at all concerned to manage the reputation of a set of men, who, on the first appearance of *Christianity*, most virulently opposed it, by all the arts of sophistry and injustice: and when, by the force of its superior evidence, they were at length driven into it, were no sooner in, than they began to deprave and corrupt it.¶ For from their *profane and vain babblings*, Tertullian assures us, every heresy took its birth. *Ipsi illi* SAPIENTIÆ PROFESSORES, *de quorum ingeniis omnis hæresis animatur.*** And, in another place, he gives us their genealogy. "Ipsæ denique hæreses à

* See his tract, *De Congressu quærendæ Eruditionis Causâ.* † *De Præscrip. adversus Hæret.* ‡ *De Anim.* cap. 23. § "Hinc illæ fabulæ et genealogiæ indeterminabiles, et quæstiones infructuosæ, et *Sermones serpentes velut cancer:* à quibus nos Apostolus refrænans, nominatim philosophiam," &c.—TERTUL. *De Præscrip. adversus Hæret.* ‖ 2 Tim. ii. 16. ¶ See the Introduction to "Julian, or a Discourse concerning his Attempt to rebuild the Temple." ** *Adv. Marc.* lib. i. The author of a fragment concerning the Philosophers going under the name of Origen, says the same thing: Ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτοῖς [Αἱρετικοῖς] τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀρχὴν μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλήνων σοφίας λαβόντα, ἐκ δογμάτων φιλοσοφουμένων, καὶ ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΩΝ ἐπικεχειρημένων καὶ ἀστρολόγων ῥεμβομένων.

PHILOSOPHIA subornantur. Inde Æones et formæ, nescio quæ, et trinitas hominis apud *Valentinum*: PLATONICUS fuerat. Inde *Marcionis* deus melior de tranquillitate, a STOICIS venerat; et uti anima interire dicatur, ab EPICUREIS observatur: ET UT CARNIS RESTITUTIO NEGETUR, DE UNA OMNIUM PHILOSOPHORUM SCHOLA SUMITUR; et ubi materia cum deo æquatur, ZENONIS disciplina est: et ubi aliquid de igneo deo allegatur, HERACLITUS intervenit. Eædem materiæ apud hæreticos et philosophos volutantur; iidem retractatus implicantur. Unde malum, et quare? et unde homo, et quomodo? *et quod proximè Valentinus proposuit, unde deus?* Scilicet et de Enthymesi, ectromate inserunt ARISTOTELEM, qui illis dialecticam instituit, artificem struendi et destruendi, versipellem in sententiis coactam, in conjecturis duram, in argumentis operariam, contentione molestam, etiam sibi ipsi omnia retractantem, nequid omnino tractaverit. Hinc illæ fabulæ et genealogiæ indeterminabiles, et quæstiones infructuosæ et SERMONES SERPENTES VELUT CANCER, a quibus nos apostolus refrænans," * &c. One would almost imagine, from these last words, that Tertullian had foreseen that ARISTOTLE was to be the founder of the SCHOOL DIVINITY.

He observes, that the Heresy, which *denies the Resurrection of the Body*, arose out of the whole School of Gentile philosophy. But he omits another, which we have shewn stood upon as wide a bottom; namely, that which *holds the* HUMAN SOUL TO BE OF THE SAME NATURE AND SUBSTANCE WITH GOD; espoused before his time by the Gnostics, and afterwards, as we learn by St. Austin, by the Manichæans and Priscillianists.†

Why the heathen Philosophers of our times should be displeased to see their ancient brethren shewn for knaves in practice, and fools in theory, is not at all strange to conceive: but why any else should think themselves concerned in the force and fidelity of the drawing, is to me a greater mystery than any I have attempted to unveil. For a stronger proof of the necessity of the Gospel of Jesus Christ cannot, I think, be given than this, That the SAGES OF GREECE, with whom all the WISDOM of the world was supposed to be deposited,‡ had PHILOSOPHISED themselves out of the most evident and useful TRUTH with which mankind hath any concern.

Besides, what greater regard could any one shew to the authority of the Sacred Writers than to justify their CENSURE *of the Greek philosophy;* a censure which Deists and Fanatics, though for different

* *De Præscrip. adversus Hæret.* pp. 70, 71, ed. Par. 1580. † "Priscillianistæ quos in Hispania Priscillianus instituit, maxime Gnosticorum et Manichæorum dogmata permixta sectantur; quamvis et ex aliis hæresibus in eas sordes, tanquam in sentinam quandam horribili confusione confluxerint. Propter occultandas autem contaminationes et turpitudines suas habent in suis dogmatibus et hæc verba, Jura, perjura, secretum prodere noli. *Hi,* ANIMAS DICUNT EJUSDEM NATURÆ ATQUE SUBSTANTIÆ CUJUS EST DEUS."—AUGUST. *De Hæresibus.* ‡ 1 Cor. i. 20.

ends, have equally concurred to represent as a condemnation of human learning in general?

In conclusion, it is but fit we should give the reader some account why we have been so long and so particular on this matter.

One reason was (to mention no other at present) to obviate an objection, which might possibly be urged against our proof, of *the divine legation of* MOSES, *from the omission of a future state.* For if now the Deists should say (and we know they are ready to say any thing) that *Moses did not propagate that doctrine, because he did not believe it;* we have an answer ready: having shewn from fact, *that the not believing a doctrine so useful to society, was esteemed no reason for the Legislator not to propagate it.* I say, having shewn it from the practice of the Philosophers: For as to the Lawgivers, that is, those who were not Philosophers professed, it appears, by what can be learnt from their history and character, that they *all believed,* as well as taught, a future state of rewards and punishments. And indeed how should it be otherwise? for they were free from those *metaphysical whimsies,* concerning GOD and the SOUL, which had so besotted the Greek Philosophers. And I know of nothing else that could hinder any man's believing it.

Against all this force of *evidence,* weak, indeed, as it is against the force of *prejudice,* the learned Chancellor of Gottingen has opposed his Authority, which is great, and his talents of reasoning and eloquence, which are still greater. "Magnam non ita pridem" (says he) "ut Antiquiores mittam, ingenii vim et doctrinæ copiam impendit, ut in hanc nos sententiam induceret GUILIELMUS WARBURTONUS, vir alioquin egregius et inprimis acutus, in celeberrimo et eruditissimo libro, quem, *The Divine Legation of Moses demonstrated,* inscripsit, Lib. iii. Sect. 4. Jubet ille nos existimare OMNES PHILOSOPHOS, qui animorum immortalitatem docuerunt, eamdem clam negasse, Naturam rerum revera Dei loco habuisse, atque mentes hominum Particulas censuisse ex mundi anima decerptas, et ad eam post corporum obitum reversuras. Verum, ut taceam, *Græcorum tantum Philosophos* cum testari, quum aliis tamen Populis sui etiam Philosophi fuerint, a Græcorum sententiis multis modis semoti, ut hoc, inquam, seponam, *non apertis et planis testimoniis* causam suam agit Vir præclarus, quod in tanti momenti accusatione necessarium videtur, sed *conjecturis tantum,* exemplis nonnullis, denique consectariis ex institutis quibusdam et dogmatibus Philosophorum quorumdam ductis."—*De rebus Christ. ante Constantinum Magnum,* p. 18. Here the learned Critic supposing the question to be,—What the *Philosophers of the ancient World in general* thought concerning a future state? charges the *Author of the Divine Legation* with falling short in his proof, *which reaches,* says he, *only the Greek Philosophers, though there were many*

other in the world besides, who dogmatised on very different principles. Now I had again and again declared, that I confined my Inquiry to the *Greek Philosophers.* We shall see presently, for what reason. What then could have betrayed this great Man into so wrong a representation? It was not, I am persuaded, a want of candour, but of attention to the Author he criticized.—For, seeing *so much* written by me against the principles of those Ancients who propagated the doctrine of a future state, he unwarily concluded that it was in my purpose to *discredit* the doctrine, as discoverable by the light of nature; and, on that ground, rightly inferred that my business was with the whole tribe of Ancient Philosophers: and that to stop at the Greeks was mistaking the extent of my course. But a little attention to my general argument would have shewn him, that this inquiry into the real sentiments of a race of Sages, then most eminent in all political and moral Wisdom, concerning this point, was made solely to shew the vast *importance* of the doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment to society, when it was seen that these men, who publicly and sedulously taught it, did not indeed believe it. For this end the Greek Philosophers served my purpose to the full. Had my end been not the *importance*, but the *discredit* of the Doctrine (as this learned man unluckily conceived it) I had then, indeed, occasion for much more than their suffrage to carry my point.

In what follows of this learned Criticism I am much further to seek for that candour which so eminently adorns the writings of this worthy person. He pretends I have not proved my charge against the *Greek Philosophers.* Be it so. But when he says, I have not ATTEMPTED it *by any clear and evident testimonies; but only by conjectures; by instances in some Particulars; by consequences deduced from the doctrines and Institutes of certain of the Philosophers;* This, I cannot reconcile to his ingenuous spirit of criticism. For what are all those passages given above, from Timæus the Locrian, from Diogenes Laertius, from Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Plato, Chrysippus, Strabo, Aristotle, Epictetus, M. Antoninus, Seneca, and others, but *testimonies, clear and evident*, either of the parties concerned, or of some of their school, or of those who give us historical accounts of the Doctrines of those Schools, that none of the Theistical Sects of *Greek Philosophy* did *believe* any thing of a future state of rewards and punishments.

So much for that kind of evidence which the learned person says I have not given.

Let us consider the nature of that kind, which he owns I have given, but owns it in terms of discredit.—"In tanti momenti accusatione—*conjecturis* tantum, *exemplis* nonnullis, denique *consectariis* ex institutis," &c.—

1. As to the CONJECTURES he speaks of—Were these offered for the purpose he represents them; that is to say, directly to inforce the main question, I should readily agree with him, that in an *accusation of such moment* they were very impertinently urged. But they are employed only occasionally to give credit to some of those particular *testimonies*, which I esteem *clear and evident*, but which he denies to exist at all, in my inquiry.

2. By what he says of the *instances or* EXAMPLES *in some particulars*, he would insinuate that what a single Philosopher says, holds only against himself, not against the Sect to which he belongs: though he insinuates it in defiance of the very genius of the Greek Philosophy, and of the extent of that temper (by none better understood than by this learned man himself) which disposed the Members of a School

—jurare in verba Magistri.

3. With regard to the INFERENCES *deduced from the Doctrines and Institutes of certain of the Philosophers;* by which he principally means those *deduced* from their ideas of *God* and the *Soul;* We must distinguish.

If the *inference*, which is charged on an opinion be disavowed by the Opinionist, the charge is *unjust*.

If it be neither avowed nor disavowed, the charge is *inconclusive*.

But if the *Consequence* be acknowledged, and even contended for, the charge is *just:* and the evidence resulting from it has all the force of the most direct proof.

Now the *Consequence* I draw from the Doctrines of the Philosophers concerning *God* and the *Soul*, in support of my charge against them, is fully and largely acknowledged by them. The learned person proceeds, and assures his reader that, by the same way of reasoning, he would undertake to prove that none of the Christian Divines believed any thing of that future state which they preached up to the people. "Ego quidem mediocris ingenii homo et tanto viro quantus est *Warburtonus* longe inferior, Omnes Christianorum Theologos nihil eorum, quæ publice tradunt, credere, et callide hominum mentibus impietatis venenum afflare velle, convincam, si mihi eadem eos via invadendi potestas concedatur, qua Philosophos Vir doctissimus aggressus est."

This is civil. But what he gives me on the side of *ingenuity*, he repays himself on the side of *judgment*. For if it be, as he says, that by the same kind of reasoning which I employ to convict the Philosophers of Impiety, the Fathers themselves might be found guilty of it, the small talent of ingenuity, which nature gave me, was very ill bestowed.

Now if the Learned Person can shew that *Christian Divines*, like the

Greek Philosophers, made use of a *double doctrine—that they held it lawful to deceive, and say one thing when they thought another—that they sometimes owned and sometimes denied a future state of reward and punishment—that they held God could not be angry, nor hurt any one—that the soul was part of the substance of God—and avowed that the consequence of these ideas of God and the Soul was, no future state of rewards and punishments*—When, I say, he has shewn all this, I shall be ready to give up the *Divines*, as I have given up the *Philosophers*.

But if, instead of this, he will first of all misrepresent the force of my reasoning against the Philosophers, and then apply it, thus misrepresented, against the Divines; bringing vague *conjectures* in support of the main question; making the *case* of particulars (Synesius for instance) to include the whole body; or urging *consequences* not seen, or abhorred when seen (such as Polytheism from the Trinity): If, I say, with such kind of proof (which his ingenuity and erudition may find in abundance) he will maintain that he has proved the charge in question as strongly against Christian Divines as I have done against the Greek Philosophers: why then—I will agree with the first Sceptic I meet, that all enquiries concerning the Opinions either of the one set of men or of the other, is an idler employment than picking straws: For when Logic and Criticism will serve no longer to discover Truth, but may be made to serve the wild vagaries, the blind prejudices and the oblique interests of the *Disputers of this World*, it is time to throw aside these old Instruments of Vanity and Mischief.

SECTION V.

But it may now perhaps be said, "Though I have designed well, and have obviated an objection arising from the present question; yet —Was it not imprudent to employ a circumstance for this purpose, which seems to turn to the discredit of the Christian doctrine of a future state? For what can bear harder on the REASONABLENESS of this doctrine, than that the best and wisest of Antiquity did not believe a future state of rewards and punishments?"

To this I reply,

1. That if the authority of the *Greek Philosophers* have found weight with us in matters of religion, it is more than ever the *sacred Writers* intended they should; as appears from the character they have given us of them, and of their works.

2. Had I, indeed, contented myself with barely shewing, that the Philosophers rejected the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, without explaining the grounds on which they went;

some slender suspicion, unfavourable to the Christian doctrine, might perhaps have staggered those weak and impotent minds which cannot support themselves without the Crutch of AUTHORITY. But when I have at large explained those grounds, which, of all philosophic tenets, are known to be the most absurd; and the reader hath seen these adhered to, while the best *moral arguments* for it were overlooked and neglected, the weight of their conclusions loses all its force.

3. But had I done nothing of this; had I left the Philosophers in possession of their whole AUTHORITY; that authority would have been found impertinent to the point in hand. The supposed force of it ariseth on a very foolish error. Those, who mistake CHRISTIANITY for *only a republication of the Religion of nature*, must, of course, suppose the doctrine it teacheth of a future state, to be one of those which *natural religion* discovers. It would therefore seem a discredit to that *Republication*, were not the doctrine discoverable by human reason; and some men would be apt to think it was not, when the Philosophers had missed of it. But our holy Religion (as I hope to prove in the last book) is quite another thing: and one consequence of its true nature will be seen to be this, that the CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE of a future state is not in the number of those which *natural Religion* teacheth. The authority of the Philosophers, therefore, is entirely out of the question.

4. But again, it will be found hereafter, that this *fact* is so far from weakening the doctrines of Christianity, that it is a strong argument for the *truth* of that Dispensation.

5. Yet as we have often seen writers deceived in their representations of *Pagan Antiquity;* and, while zealously busy in giving such a one as they imagined favourable to *Christianity*, they have been all along disserving it; Lest I myself should be suspected of having fallen into this common delusion, I shall beg leave, in the last place, to shew, that it is just such a representation of ANTIQUITY as this I have given, which can possibly be of service to our holy Faith. And that, consequently, if what is here given be the *true*, it does revealed Religion much service.

This will best appear by considering the USUAL VIEWS men have had, and the consequent methods they have pursued, in bringing PAGAN ANTIQUITY into the scene.

THEIR design has been, either to illustrate the REASONABLENESS, or to shew the NECESSITY of *Christianity*.

If the subject were REASONABLENESS, their way was to represent this Antiquity, as comprehending all the fundamental truths, concerning God and the Soul, which our holy Religion hath revealed. But as

greatly as such a representation was supposed to serve their purpose, the Infidels, we see, have not feared to join issue with them on the allowed *fact*; and with much plausibility of reasoning, have endeavoured to shew, that THEREFORE CHRISTIANITY WAS NOT NECESSARY. And this very advantage, TINDAL (under cover of a principle, which some modern Divines afforded him, of *Christianity's being only a republication of the Religion of nature)* obtained over some writers of considerable name.

If THE design were to show the NECESSITY of Christianity, they have then taken the other course, and (perhaps misled by a sense of the former mischief) run into the opposite extreme; in representing Pagan *Antiquity* as ignorant even of the first principles of Religion, and moral duty. Nay, not only, that it knew nothing, but that nothing could be known; for that human Reason was too weak to make any discoveries in these matters. Consequently, that *there never was any such thing as natural religion*; and that what glimmerings of knowledge men have had of this kind, were only the dying sparks of primitive Tradition. Here the Infidel again turned their own artillery upon them, in order to dismount that boasted REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, on which they had so much insisted: And indeed, what room was there left to judge of it, after human Reason had been represented as too weak and too blind to decide?

Thus while they were contending for the *reasonableness*, they destroyed the *necessity*; and while they urged the *necessity*, they risked the *reasonableness* of *Christianity*. And these infidel retortions had an irresistible force on the principles on which our Advocates seemed to go; namely, *that Christianity was only a republication of primitive natural Religion.**

It appears then, that the only view of *Antiquity* which gives solid advantage to the CHRISTIAN CAUSE, is such a one as shews natural Reason to be CLEAR enough to PERCEIVE Truth, and the necessity of its deductions when proposed; but not generally STRONG enough to DISCOVER it, and draw right deductions from it. Just such a view as this, I have here given of *Antiquity*, as far as relates to the point in question; which I presume to be the TRUE; not only in that point, but likewise with regard to the state of NATURAL RELIGION IN GENERAL: where we find human Reason could penetrate very far into the essential difference of things; but, wanting the true principles of Religion, the Ancients neither knew the origin of obligation, nor the consequence of obedience. REVELATION hath discovered these principles; and we now wonder, that such prodigies of parts and knowledge could commit the gross absurdities which are to be

* See note HH, at the end of this book.

found in their best discourses on morality. But yet this does not hinder us from falling into a greater and a worse delusion. For having of late seen several excellent systems of Morals, delivered as the *Principles of natural Religion*, which disclaim, or at least do not own, the aid of *Revelation*, we are apt to think them, in good earnest, the discoveries of natural Reason; and so to regard the extent of its powers as an objection to the *necessity* of any further light. The objection is plausible; but sure, there must be some mistake at bottom; and the great difference in point of excellence, between these *supposed* productions of mere Reason, and those *real* ones of the most learned Ancients, will increase our suspicion. The truth is, these modern system-makers had aids, which as they do not acknowledge, so, I will believe, they did not perceive. These aids were the true principles of Religion, delivered by *Revelation*: principles so early imbibed, and so clearly and evidently deduced, that they are now mistaken to be amongst our first and most natural ideas: But those who have studied Antiquity know the matter to be far otherwise.

I cannot better illustrate the state and condition of the human mind, before *Revelation*, than by the following instance. A summary of the ATOMIC PHILOSOPHY is delivered in the *Theætetus* of *Plato*: yet being given without its principles, when Plato's writings, at the revival of learning, came to be studied and commented upon, this summary remained absolutely unintelligible: for there had been an interruption in the succession of that School for many ages; and neither Marcilius Ficinus, nor Serranus, could give any reasonable account of the matter. But as soon as DES CARTES had revived that Philosophy, by excogitating its principles anew, the mist removed, and every one saw clearly (though Cudworth, I think, was the first who took notice of it) that Plato had given us a curious and exact account of that excellent Physiology. And Des Cartes was now thought by some, to have borrowed his original ideas from thence; though, but for the revival of the *Atomic* principles, that passage had still remained in obscurity. Just so it was with respect to the powers of the HUMAN MIND. Had not *Revelation* discovered the true principles of *Religion*, they had without doubt continued altogether unknown. Yet on their discovery, they appeared so consonant to human Reason, that men were apt to mistake them for the production of it.

CICERO (and I quote him as of superior authority) understood much better the true limits and extent of human knowledge. He owns the state of natural Reason to be just what is here delivered; clear enough to perceive Truth when proposed, but not, generally,

strong enough to discover it. His remarkable words are these—"Nam neque tam est acris acies in naturis hominum, et ingeniis, ut res tantas quisquam, NISI MONSTRATAS, possit videre: neque tanta tamen in rebus obscuritas, ut eas non penitus acri vir ingenio cernat, si modo adspexerit."*

* *De Orat.* lib. iii. cap. 31.

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